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Abstract 
Obesity poses an urgent threat to children’s health. The causes of obesity are many and 
varied, but evidence suggests that the food industry makes a significant contribution. 
Multinational companies use a range of communication channels and marketing techniques to 
promote unhealthy foods and beverages to children. This promotion has a small but 
significant effect on children’s food preferences and choices, their consumption patterns and 
diet-related health. While public health advocates call for statutory regulation of unhealthy 
food advertising, the food industry has mobilised government support for voluntary action.  
In Australia, there is significant debate over the success of two self-regulatory codes that 
address food advertising to children. In this thesis I evaluate the food industry’s initiatives 
using a new approach. Although I consider evidence of the codes’ outcomes, I focus on 
whether they establish the building blocks of an effective self-regulatory regime. I use 
regulatory studies and public health law to create a framework for evaluation, drawing 
particularly on the idea of responsive regulation. I also compare food, tobacco and alcohol 
advertising regulation to predict whether statutory regulation of food advertising is practical 
and politically feasible.  
I find that food and alcohol advertising codes contain a series of ‘escape clauses’ that permit 
companies to continue with most of their marketing practices. As a result, the codes do not 
significantly reduce children’s exposure to food and alcohol advertising, or moderate the 
persuasive techniques used by marketers. Food industry self-regulation lacks the features of a 
well-designed voluntary scheme, including clear objectives, independent administration and 
monitoring, effective enforcement and systematic review. Further, regulatory processes are 
almost entirely industry based, meaning that the scheme is not accountable to external 
stakeholders. The difficulty of conducting research in this area underscores this conclusion. 
Food and alcohol companies report high levels of compliance with the codes, and an ethical 
commitment to responsible marketing practices. However, the initiatives do not place 
demanding requirements on participants; they only codify existing best practice in advertising 
to children. Further, industry initiatives exclude some of the main food and alcohol 
advertisers. In comparison to tobacco, food and alcohol products are highly varied, making 
regulation a more complex exercise. More fundamentally, these industries have an economic 
interest in advertising unhealthy products to a wide range of age groups. Accordingly, they 
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are unlikely to accept any tighter restrictions on advertising to children, which might impact 
on their communication with adult audiences. 
One way of strengthening self-regulation is to include external stakeholders in regulatory 
processes. Public health actors engage with the food and alcohol industry (unlike the tobacco 
industry), creating the potential for more collaborative arrangements.  However, experience 
with the ‘quasi-regulation’ of alcohol advertising illustrates that public health participation 
may not create a more transparent and accountable scheme. Also, external participation in 
industry schemes is highly contentious, and public health actors risk their credibility and 
reputation in doing so. Accordingly, government action is required to broaden the reach of 
self-regulation and improve its functioning.  
Given the strong case for government action, the question becomes what form it should take. 
There are significant political barriers to legislation, including the power of the food industry, 
and neo-liberal ideologies that favour minimal regulation. Accordingly, I consider options 
outside of ‘command-and-control’ regulation.  Through co-regulation, the government could 
set clear objectives for the codes to achieve, establish an independent body for monitoring 
and enforcement, and formalise its oversight of the scheme. It must also threaten the industry 
with more intrusive regulation, should the improved scheme fail to reduce children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising. This strategy implicitly endorses a responsive 
regulatory approach that begins with voluntary action by the food industry itself. However, it 
also recognises the central role of the state in regulation, and describes new ways for 
governments to protect public health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Obesity, food advertising, and regulatory approaches  
Obesity is increasing globally at an alarming rate.1 Since the 1970s, obesity rates have 
escalated rapidly in developed and developing countries, and among both adults and 
children.2 In Australia, a quarter of children are obese or overweight, representing a 50 per 
cent increase from 25 years ago.3 Increases in childhood obesity may have slowed or 
stabilised, but the prevalence in Australia remains high.4 Obesity increases children’s risk of 
elevated blood pressure, insulin resistance, and orthopaedic difficulties, as well as the 
likelihood of psychosocial problems such as low self-esteem, discrimination and bullying.5 
Its broader significance lies in the fact that it is linked to obesity and overweight in adults, 
and associated chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and ischaemic heart disease.6 
Thus, obesity affects children’s immediate quality of life, as well as their future wellbeing 
and participation in relationships, the workforce, cultural life and physical activity.7 Further, 
childhood obesity has the potential to create a substantial burden on the Australian health care 
system, both now and in the future.8 
                                                 
1 Obesity and overweight are defined as ‘abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that may impair health’. Body 
Mass Index (BMI) is a simple weight-to-height ratio that is often used to classify obesity and overweight. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO) defines overweight as a BMI greater than or equal to 25, and obesity as a 
BMI greater than or equal to 30. World Health Organisation, Obesity and Overweight (March 2013) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/>. However, cut-off points for obesity and overweight in 
children vary according to sex and age, as well as height and weight. There is also debate over whether the 
classifications above are suitable for all ethnicities and age groups. See Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 'Australia's Health 2012'. Australia's Health Series No 13. Cat No AUS 156 (AIHW, 2012) 208 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=10737422172>. 
2 Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner and Elaine Borghi, 'Global Prevalence and Trends of Overweight and 
Obesity among Preschool Children' (2010) 92(5) The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 1257. 
3 LL Hardy et al, NSW Schools Physical Activity and Nutrition Survey (SPANS) 2010: Short Report (2010) 4-6 
NSW Ministry of Health <http://www0.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2011/spans_short.html>; Timothy P Gill et al, 
'Childhood Obesity in Australia Remains a Widespread Health Concern that Warrants Population-Wide 
Prevention Programs' (2009) 190(3) Medical Journal of Australia 146. 
4 Gill et al, above n 3.  
5 William H Dietz, 'Health Consequences of Obesity in Youth: Childhood Predictors of Adult Disease' (1998) 
101(3) Paediatrics 518. 
6 Shumei S Guo et al, 'The Predictive Value of Childhood Body Mass Index Values for Overweight at age 35y' 
(1994) 59(4) The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 810; I Caterson, 'What Should We Do About 
Overweight and Obesity?' (1999) 171(11-12) Medical Journal of Australia 599; World Health Organisation, 
'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic. Report of a WHO Consultation'. WHO Technical 
Report Series 894 (World Health Organisation, 2000) pt 2 
<http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/obesity/WHO_TRS_894/en/>; A Magarey et al, 'Predicting Obesity 
in Early Adulthood from Childhood and Parental Obesity' (2002) 27(4) International Journal of Obesity 505. 
7 C Power, JK Lake, and TJ Cole, 'Measurement and Long-Term Health Risks of Child and Adolescent Fatness' 
(1997) 21(7) International Journal of Obesity 507. 
8 World Health Organisation, 'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic', above n 6, 83-86; 
Magarey et al, above n 6. 
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Obesity is caused by a complex interplay of factors. These include individual genetic traits 
and biological mechanisms, eating and physical activity patterns, peer and family influences, 
and the broader social, economic and cultural forces that shape access to income, housing and 
education.9 However, evidence suggests that changes in the food supply make a significant 
contribution.10 Transnational food and drink companies drive unhealthy dietary habits that are 
linked to obesity and related diseases.11 Collectively called ‘Big Food’, these companies are 
responsible for the creation and distribution of highly palatable processed foods and sugary 
beverages that are cheap, readily available, and sold in increasingly large portion sizes.12 Big 
Food also aggressively markets these products to young people.13 Food companies develop 
sophisticated marketing strategies that are highly appealing to children, and draw upon a 
broad range of communication channels and marketing techniques.14 A growing body of 
research demonstrates that food marketing influences children’s food preferences and 
purchase requests, their actual consumption choices and hence their diet-related health.15 
                                                 
9 Gary Egger and Boyd Swinburn, 'An "Ecological Approach" to the Obesity Pandemic' (1997) 315(7106) 
British Medical Journal 477; Sara Gable and Susan Lutz 'Household, Parent and Child Contributions to 
Childhood Obesity' (2000) 49(3) Family Relations 293; Jennifer A O’Dea, 'Gender, Ethnicity, Culture and 
Social Class Influences on Childhood Obesity Among Australian Schoolchildren: Implications for Treatment, 
Prevention and Community Education' (2008) 16(3) Health and Social Care in the Community 282. 
10 Boyd A Swinburn et al, 'The Global Obesity Pandemic: Shaped by Global Drivers and Local Environments' 
(2011) 378(9793) The Lancet 804. David Stuckler et al, 'Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global 
Producers in Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol and 
Tobacco' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001235>; Rob Moodie et al, 
'Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of Tobacco, Alcohol and Ultra-Processed Food and 
Drink Industries' (2013)(9867) 381 The Lancet 670. 
11 Stuckler et al, above n 10; Moodie et al, above n 10; Vasanti S Malik, Mattias B Schulze and Frank B Hu, 
'Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review' (2006) 84(2) American Journal 
of Clinical Nutrition 274; Carlos Augusto Monteiro et al, 'Increasing Consumption of Ultra-Processed Foods 
and Likely Impact on Human Health: Evidence from Brazil' (2011) 14(1) Public Health Nutrition 5; Sanjay 
Basu et al, 'Nutritional Determinants of Worldwide Diabetes: An Econometric Study of Food Markets and 
Diabetes Prevalence in 173 Countries' (2013) 16(1) Public Health Nutrition 179. 
12 Swinburn et al, above n 10; 807; Stuckler et al, above n 10; Lisa R Young, and Marion Nestle, 'The 
Contribution of Expanding Portion Sizes to the US Obesity Epidemic' (2002) 92(2) American Journal of Public 
Health 246; David Stuckler and Marion Nestle, 'Big Food, Food Systems and Global Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS 
Medicine 1 <http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>. 
13 Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health (University of 
California Press, 2002); Michael J McGinnis, Jennifer Gootman and Vivica I Kraak (eds), Food Marketing to 
Children and Youth: Threat or Opportunity? (National Academies Press, 2006). 
14 See, e.g., Susan Linn and Courtney L Novosat, 'Calories for Sale: Food Marketing to Children in the Twenty-
First Century' (2008) 615 The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 133; Lana 
Hebden, Lesley King and Bridget Kelly, Bridget, 'Art of Persuasion: An Analysis of Techniques Used to Market 
Foods to Children' (2011) 47(11) Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 776. 
15 McGinnis, Gootman and Kraak, above n 13; Gerard Hastings et al, 'Review of the Research on the Effects of 
Food Promotion to Children' (Centre for Social Marketing, the University of Strathclyde, 22 September 2003) 
<http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/foodpromotiontochildren1.pdf>; Gerard Hastings et al, 'The Extent, 
Nature and Effects of Food Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence' (World Health Organisation, 
2006) <http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/43627>; Georgina Cairns, Kathryn Angus and Gerard Hastings, 
'The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence to December 2008' 
(World Health Organisation, 2009)14 
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These effects are significant, operate independently of other factors, and affect both brand 
and product choices.16 
This evidence has generated significant debate on the issue of food advertising and how it 
should be regulated. The food industry actively pursues voluntary initiatives, including 
national and international ‘pledges’ on food advertising to children.17 In contrast to tobacco 
advertising, most governments encourage voluntary industry action on food advertising, with 
only a handful introducing statutory restrictions.18 However, public health actors argue that 
legislative approaches are cost-effective and have wide community support, whereas self-
regulation produces only small or incremental changes.19 More fundamentally, the industry’s 
profit imperative conflicts with public health goals, limiting the benefit of collaborative 
approaches between government, public health actors and the food industry.20 However, 
government attempts to legislate have met with significant resistance from the food and 
beverage industries.21 Accordingly, the key question for this thesis is how to effectively 
regulate food advertising to children in light of governments’ reliance upon industry self-
regulation, and the political constraints on statutory regulation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/marketing_evidence_2009/en/index.html>. See also 
Simone Pettigrew et al, 'The Effects of Television and Internet Food Advertising on Parents and Children' 
(2013) (FirstView Article) Public Health Nutrition 1 
<http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPHN%2FS1368980013001067a.pdf&code=59bd56f47e
02cf49b1a15cd526574854>. 
16 Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 15, 32. 
17 Lisa Sharma, Stephen Teret and Kelly Brownell, 'The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to 
Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures' (2010) 100(2) American Journal of Public Health 240; 
Corinna Hawkes and Jennifer Harris, 'An Analysis of the Content of Food Industry Pledges on Marketing to 
Children' (2011) 14(8) Public Health Nutrition 1403. 
18 Corinna Hawkes 'Marketing Food to Children: Changes in the Global Regulatory Environment 2004-2006' 
(World Health Organisation, 2007); C Hawkes and T Lobstein, 'Regulating the Commercial Promotion of Food 
to Children: A Survey of Actions Worldwide' (2011) 6(2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity 83. 
19 See, e.g., Moodie et al, above n 10; A Magnus et al, 'The Cost-Effectiveness of Removing Television 
Advertising of High-Fat and/or High-Sugar Food and Beverages to Australian Children' (2009) 33(10) 
International Journal of Obesity 1094; S MacKay et al, 'A Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Children 
from Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2011) 3 
<http://www.opc.org.au/whatwedo/policydocuments.aspx>. 
20 Moodie et al, above n 10; David S Ludwig and Marion Nestle, 'Can the Food Industry Play a Constructive 
Role in the Obesity Epidemic?' (2008) 300(15) Journal of the American Medical Association 1808; Kelly 
Brownell, 'Thinking Forward: The Quicksand of Appeasing the Food Industry' (2012) 9(7) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001254>. 
21 See, e.g., Kelly D Brownell and Kenneth E Warner, 'The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played 
Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food? '(2009) 87(1) The Milbank Quarterly 259; Michelle M 
Mello, 'Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food Advertising to Children: Possibilities for a Reinvigorated 
Role' (2010) 35(2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 227; Michele Simon 'PepsiCo and Public Health: 
Is the Nation's Largest Food Company a Model of Corporate Responsibility or Master of Public Relations?' 
(2011) 15 CUNY Law Review 101. 
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2. Food industry self-regulation in Australia  
I use Australia as a case study of voluntary industry standards for food advertising created by 
transnational companies with significant reach and influence. Similar to governments in other 
countries, the Australian Federal government has encouraged the food industry to take 
voluntary action on food advertising to children.22 In 2009, the industry created two voluntary 
industry codes of conduct: The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative of the Australian 
Food and Beverage Industry (‘Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative’ or RCMI)23 and 
the Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry’s Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
Marketing to Children (QSRI).24 These codes are the main subject of this thesis.  
The RCMI and QSRI closely resemble food industry pledges in other jurisdictions: 
companies that join the schemes agree to advertise only healthier products to children, and to 
restrict their use of persuasive advertising techniques.25 Participants translate the core code 
document into a ‘company action plan’ that describes the steps they will take to comply with 
the code’s requirements.26 The Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) (an industry 
representative body) administers both schemes. The codes also operate within a broader self- 
and co-regulatory framework for advertising in Australia. As a result, government and 
advertising industry bodies also play a role in the scheme’s regulatory processes. However, 
this thesis explores whether there is sufficient government intervention in food industry self-
regulation to ensure that it serves public health objectives. 
An important influence on the development of the codes was the report of the National 
Preventative Health Taskforce.27 The government created the Taskforce in 2008 to develop a 
strategy for reducing Australia’s burden of chronic disease. The Taskforce’s 2009 report 
                                                 
22 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: 
Report of the Review' (Australian Government, 2008) 10 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>; House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Health and Ageing, Parliament of Australia Weighing It Up: Obesity in Australia (2009) 9 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=haa/./o
besity/report.htm>. 
23 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative of the Australian 
Food and Beverage Industry (March 2011) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids.html >. 
24 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children (June 2009) <http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. 
25 See Hawkes and Harris, above n 17. 
26 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, above n 23, 1; 
Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 24, 2. 
27 See National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020 - National 
Preventative Health Strategy - Overview' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
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focused on tobacco use, excessive alcohol consumption, and overweight and obesity.28 The 
Taskforce devised a ‘responsive’ approach to reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food 
advertising.29 As a first step, the government would monitor and evaluate the impact of the 
food industry’s initiatives on children’s exposure to this advertising. It would then identify 
shortfalls in the current approach, and introduce a co-regulatory agreement to address these 
weaknesses. After further monitoring, the government would introduce legislation if co-
regulation failed to reduce unhealthy food advertising shown on television before 9pm, as 
well as the industry’s use of persuasive techniques that targeted children.30 In 2010 the 
Federal government responded to the Preventative Health Taskforce’s report.31 The response 
was equivocal about the Taskforce’s recommendations for reducing children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food marketing. While the government agreed to monitor the two food industry 
initiatives, it did not explicitly commit to statutory regulation if self-regulation proved to be 
ineffective.32 
3. Is there evidence of self-regulation’s success? 
Since the Taskforce’s 2009 report, a number of studies have evaluated the Australian food 
industry initiatives. These studies can be divided into three categories: those conducted by the 
food industry; independent public health research; and reviews of the evidence by 
government agencies. Industry monitoring of the initiatives reports a dramatic reduction in 
advertising during designated children’s programming.33 However public health research 
shows that the initiatives have not significantly reduced children’s exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising.34 These latter studies also point out critical limitations in the content of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid 7. 
29 Ibid 12. 
30 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health Strategy - The Roadmap for Action' 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009) 125 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
31 Australian Government, 'Taking Preventative Action: A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 
2020, The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/>. 
32 Ibid 46-47. 
33 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report 
(December 2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian 
Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian Food 
and Grocery Council, Food Adverts for Children Fall to Almost Zero (8 May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/media-releases/1196-food-adverts-for-children-fall-to-almost-zero.html>. 
34 Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' 
(2011) 6(2 pt 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>; Lana Hebden et al, 'Advertising of 
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codes and their regulatory design. For example, the initiatives do not apply to all 
communication channels or promotional techniques, and cover only a narrow range of food 
and beverage products.35 Government reviews find that while food advertising during 
children’s programming is low, children continue to be exposed to unhealthy food advertising 
during programs not specifically targeted at children.36 Further, there is insufficient evidence 
to establish that the codes have reduced the amount of food advertising viewed by children.37  
Evidently, self-regulation does not sufficiently moderate the volume and persuasive power of 
food advertising, and this lack of success could justify introduction of legislation on the basis 
of market failure.38 However, this thesis develops the argument that statutory regulation is 
unlikely to eventuate in the immediate future. Evidence for this argument comes from the 
slow and incremental development of tobacco and alcohol advertising regulation, despite 
significant concern about the harms of both products.39 Also, the food industry has a strong 
position in the economy40 and plays an influential role in food and nutrition policy.41 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) Medical 
Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising 
on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public Health Nutrition 1 
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
35 See, e.g., King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian 
Television', above n 34; Lana Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of Foods and Beverages Marketed to 
Australian Children: How Useful are Food Industry Commitments?' (2010) 67(4) Nutrition & Dietetics 258; 
Lana Hebden et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: Reading the Fine Print' (2010) 
21(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 229; J Lumley, J Martin and N Antonopoulos, 'Exposing the 
Charade: The Failure to Protect Children from Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2012) 
<http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-charade&Type=policydocuments>; L Wallard et al, 'The 
Takeaway on Fast-Food Meals: A Summary of Three Fast-Food Studies in Australia' (Cancer Council NSW, 
2012) <http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/68145/news-media/latest-news-news-media/cc-news/fast-food-
exposing-the-truth/?pp=68145>; Belinda Reeve, 'Private Governance, Public Purpose? Assessing Transparency 
and Accountability in Self-Regulation of Food Advertising to Children' (2013) 10(2) Journal of Bioethical 
Inquiry 149. 
36 Lisa G Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, 'Television Marketing of Unhealthy Food and Beverages 
to Children in Australia: A Review of Published Evidence from 2009' (Australian National Preventive Health 
Agency, 2012) 3 <http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/publications>. 
37 Ibid 2. See also Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s 
Food and Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report' (Australian Government, 2011) 6 
<http://engage.acma.gov.au/kids-food-ads/>. 
38 See, e.g., Moodie et al, above n 10; Stuckler and Nestle, above n 12; Ludwig and Nestle, above n 20; Vivica I 
Kraak, et al, 'Industry Progress to Market a Healthful Diet to American Children and Adolescents' (2011) 41(3) 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine 322. 
39 See, e.g., Donley T Studlar, 'The Political Dynamics of Tobacco Control in Australia and New Zealand: 
Explaining Policy Problems, Instruments and Patterns of Adoption' (2005) 40(2) Australian Journal of Political 
Science 255. 
40 Australian Food and Grocery Council, State of the Industry 2012. Essential Information: Facts and Figures 
(2012) <http://www.afgc.org.au/media-releases/1295-state-of-the-industry-2012-report-underlines-challenging-
conditions.html>. 
41 For example, the food industry participates in the government-led Food and Health Dialogue, which focuses 
on a program of voluntary product reformulation. Department of Health and Ageing, Industry Engagement (13 
October 2011) Australian Government 
<http://www.foodhealthdialogue.gov.au/internet/foodandhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/industry-engagement>. 
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the Federal government can often be reluctant to introduce legislation that is unpopular with 
the industry and which risks disrupting the cooperative relationship between the two actors.42 
In these circumstances, policy-makers need practical suggestions for improving and building 
on the current regime, at least as an interim measure. Accordingly, the main task of the thesis 
is to evaluate food industry self-regulation, and to propose politically feasible ways of 
strengthening food advertising regulation in order to achieve public health objectives. 
4. A responsive approach to food advertising regulation 
To assess food industry self-regulation, I adopt the responsive strategy proposed by the 
National Preventative Health Taskforce. I build upon this approach by creating a more 
detailed picture of what responsive regulation of food advertising might look like in practice. 
To do so, I draw upon the theory of responsive regulation developed by Australian academics 
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite.43 Responsive regulation is a popular theory in regulatory 
research and practice, particularly in the fields of workplace health and safety, tax systems, 
competition policy and environmental protection.44 More recently it has appeared in food and 
obesity prevention policy initiatives: hence my interest in applying it to food advertising.45  
Responsive regulation draws upon a range of regulatory tools and enforcement measures, 
combined in a staged approach. It emphasises self-regulation as a first response to regulatory 
problems, but operating within a framework of government direction and oversight.46 This 
includes the possibility of escalation to more intrusive forms of regulation, should self-
regulation fail to achieve public policy objectives. Under responsive regulation, statutory 
                                                 
42 See also Alexandra Chung et al, 'An Analysis of Potential Barriers and Enablers to Regulating the Television 
Marketing of Unhealthy Foods to Children at the State Government Level in Australia' (2012) 12(1) BMC 
Public Health 1123. 
43 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, 1992). See also John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety 
(State University of New York Press, 1985); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation 
(Oxford University Press, 2002); John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas For Making It 
Work Better (Edward Elgar, 2008) ch 4; John Braithwaite, 'The Essence of Responsive Regulation' (2011) 44(3) 
UBC Law Review 475. 
44 Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Hart Publishing, 2004) 161. See, e.g., Neil 
Gunningham and Richard Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions (Oxford University 
Press, 1999); Lars P Feld and Bruno S Frey, 'Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: 
The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation' (2007) 29(1) Law & Policy 102. 
45 As I discuss above in relation to the National Preventative Health Taskforce’s proposal for regulating food 
advertising. See also the responsive approach of the Independent Panel that undertook Australia’s review of 
food labelling law and policy: Neal Blewett et al, 'Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 
<http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/home>. 
46 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 43, ch 2; Ian Bartle and Peter Vass, 'Self-Regulation within the Regulatory 
State: Towards a New Regulatory Paradigm?' (2007) 84(5) Public Administration 885, 889. 
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regulation operates as a ‘measure of last resort’. However, the threat of legislation provides a 
critical incentive for industry to develop and comply with demanding voluntary standards.47  
The first step in a responsive regulatory strategy is an analysis of self-regulation. My 
approach to this task involves a new way of evaluating the RCMI and QSRI (together, ‘the 
codes’). Although I draw on studies that measure the codes’ outcomes, my main focus is 
whether they establish the building blocks of a successful self-regulatory regime. The factors 
I focus on are: 
• The terms and conditions of the initiatives, including their substantive controls on 
advertising; 
• Regulatory design, including processes of administration, monitoring, enforcement 
and review; 
• The steps taken by companies to implement the codes; 
• The institutional determinants of self-regulation; and  
• External pressures on industry to take voluntary action to address food advertising to 
children. 
5. Research design  
This thesis uses tobacco and alcohol as comparators to food advertising regulation, 
specifically restrictions that seek to protect young people from exposure to advertising for 
these products. It can be thought of as a multi-case study of advertising regulation that has 
public health objectives.48 Food, alcohol and tobacco all have special restrictions on their 
advertising; however, the nature and scope of advertising restrictions differ between the three 
products. State and federal legislation combine to place a comprehensive ban on tobacco 
advertising and promotion in Australia.49 In contrast, the government does not ban alcohol 
advertising, although it restricts the placement of advertisements in broadcast media.50 
Voluntary codes apply to the content of alcohol advertising, the most important of which is 
the Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (ABAC).51  
                                                 
47 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 43, 38-39. 
48 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2012) 74. 
49 Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth). See, e.g., Public Health (Tobacco) Act 2008 (NSW) and 
Public Health (Tobacco) Regulation 2009 (NSW). 
50 See Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July 2013) cls 6.7-6.13. 
51 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (1 
March 2012) <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/thecode/>. 
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There are few legislative restrictions on the placement or volume of food advertising.52 Like 
alcohol, the main form of regulation is via industry initiatives (the RCMI and QSRI), which 
apply to the placement and content of food advertisements directed to children.53 Thus, food, 
alcohol and tobacco advertising regulation each represent a different degree of government 
intervention in the advertising regulatory system. However there is more similarity between 
food and alcohol advertising restrictions than either product with tobacco.54 
By analysing the determinants of state intervention in tobacco and alcohol advertising, I hope 
to make some predictions about whether the government is likely to legislate to protect 
children from exposure to unhealthy food advertising. Accordingly, this thesis explores the 
rationale for differences in the scope of advertising restrictions for each of the three product 
categories. The development of food advertising regulation will follow a different path to 
regulation of tobacco (and alcohol) advertising, due to changes in the social, political and 
economic climate since the development of tobacco advertising bans.55 Nevertheless, I 
identify some key similarities and differences between tobacco, food and alcohol, which may 
explain variation in advertising restrictions for each product. The factors I discuss are:  
• The nature and health effects of each product; 
• Evidence of a relationship between advertising and consumption of the product; 
• The social and cultural context of product use; 
• The activities of the relevant industries; and 
• The relationships between government, public health and industry actors.  
The similarities and differences between tobacco, food and alcohol are more complex than 
they might appear at first glance. Public health advocates point to parallels between the health 
harms of the three products, as well as a corporate ‘playbook’ of tactics common to Big Food, 
Big Tobacco and Big Alcohol – particularly the targeting of young consumers in marketing 
and product development.56 Accordingly, they argue that key elements of the tobacco control 
                                                 
52 Sondra Davoren and Nicole Antonopoulos, 'Alcohol and Food Regulation in Australia - Legal Issues in 
Cancer Prevention' (2012) 36(1) CancerForum 1, 2. 
53 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, above n 23, 1; 
Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 24, 2. 
54 Davoren and Antonopoulos, above n 52, 2. 
55 See, e.g., Studlar, above n 39. 
56 See  Brownell and Warner, above n 21; William H Wiist, 'The Corporate Play Book, Health and Democracy: 
The Snack Food and Beverage Industry's Tactics in Context' in David Stuckler and Karen Siegal (eds), Sick 
Societies: Responding to the Global Challenges of Chronic Disease (Oxford University Press, 2011) 204; Mike 
Daube, 'Alcohol and Tobacco' (2012) 36(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 108; Lois 
Dorfman et al, 'Soda and Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility Campaigns: How Do They 
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model can and should be applied to alcohol and food regulation.57 This thesis questions the 
political feasibility and practicality of applying statutory restrictions to food advertising 
similar to those that apply to tobacco marketing and promotion, at least in the medium term. 
6. Research methods  
Most research on the RCMI and QSRI uses television advertising data to document changes 
in the nature and volume of food advertising.58 This thesis uses a contrasting methodology 
that draws upon social and legal methods. I undertake close analysis of regulatory 
instruments and advertising complaint determinations, as well as corporate social 
responsibility documents and other material from the administration of food and alcohol 
industry codes of conduct. I combine documentary analysis with qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders involved in food and alcohol industry self-regulation. I 
interviewed representatives from large food and alcohol companies, trade industry 
associations, government agencies, and the independent bodies that administer and enforce 
advertising self-regulation. I also interviewed a group of public health representatives in 
order to provide a balanced perspective on the operation of self-regulation. This process of 
data triangulation seeks to broaden the current understanding of how food and alcohol 
industry self-regulation works in practice, to describe key strengths and limitations in its 
operation, and to explore industry, government and public health positions on regulation of 
food advertising to children. 
7. Key assumptions and definitions  
I base this thesis on some key assumptions and definitions. The first is a distinction between 
advertising and other forms of marketing and promotion. One definition of advertising is ‘a 
paid, mediated form of communication from an identifiable source, designed to persuade the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Compare?' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine e1001241 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001241>. 
57 Brownell and Warner, above n 21; Frank J Chaloupka and Patricia A Davidson, Applying Tobacco Control 
Lessons to Obesity: Taxes and Other Pricing Strategies to Reduce Consumption (2010) Tobacco Control Legal 
Consortium <http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-syn-obesity-2010.pdf>; Robert H 
Lustig, Laura A Schmidt and Claire D Brindis, 'Public Health: The Toxic Truth about Sugar' (2012) 482(7383) 
Nature 27. 
58 See, e.g., King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' 
above n 34; Hebden et al, 'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of 
Industry Self-Regulation', above n 34; King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food 
Advertising on Australian Television', above n 34. 
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receiver to take some action, now or in the future’.59 From this definition it is possible to view 
almost all commercial communications as a form of advertising.60 However, advertising 
industry practitioners and academics tend to distinguish between advertising and forms of 
marketing such as sales promotion, direct marketing and public relations.61 Many advertising 
self-regulatory instruments exclude other forms of promotion, most importantly product 
packaging, labelling and sponsorship.62 I challenge the exception made for these 
communication techniques, particularly in light of the growth in integrated marketing 
strategies that combine a range of promotional elements.63 However, I focus my research on 
television advertising, as this is the most heavily regulated medium, as well as the most 
studied in research on food advertising.64 Further, product packaging and labelling are 
covered by requirements found in the Australia and New Zealand Food Standards Code, and 
state-level food laws.65 Although I touch on this body of law,66 it is largely separate from the 
advertising regulatory framework and is not the main focus of my thesis. 
 Food industry self-regulation applies to advertising that has children as its target audience.67 
The RCMI and QSRI use two criteria to determine whether an advertisement is ‘directed to 
children’. The first is whether it is placed in media designed specifically for children, as well 
as media with large child audiences (for example, television shows where children make up 
50 per cent of the audience).68 The second criterion is whether the creative content of the 
                                                 
59 Jef I Richards and Catharine M Curran, 'Oracles on "Advertising'': Searching for a Definition' (2002) 31(2) 
Journal of Advertising 63, 75. 
60 Ibid 63. 
61 Ibid. 
62 For example, the ABAC excludes sponsorship arrangements with alcohol manufacturers. The RCMI and 
QSRI also exclude sponsorship, as well as product packaging and labelling and other forms of marketing such 
as in-store promotions. I discuss this loophole in the codes’ coverage in Chapter 6. 
63 See, e.g., Philip J Kitchen et al, 'The Emergence of IMC: A Theoretical Perspective' (2004) 44(1) Journal of 
Advertising Research 19; National Heart Forum, An Analysis of the Regulatory and Voluntary Landscape 
Concerning the Marketing and Promotion of Food and Drink to Children (2011) 
<http://www.heartforum.co.uk/our-work/policy/nutrition/marketing-food-and-drink-to-children/>. 
64 David Rolph, Matt Vitins and Judith Bannister, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 70; Kathy Chapman, Bridget P Kelley and Lesley A King, 'Using a Research 
Framework to Identify Knowledge Gaps in Research on Food Marketing to Children in Australia' (2009) 33(3) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 253. 
65 See Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 11 July 2013). 
See, e.g., Food Act 2003 (NSW) div 4 and Food Regulation 2010 (NSW) pt 2B, which outline requirements for 
the display of nutritional information at point-of-sale in larger fast-food and snack food chain outlets. These 
provisions are described in Chapter 2. 
66 There are some overlaps between the two systems, as I describe in Chapter 2. 
67 This is the case both with the Australian codes, and food industry pledges in other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States. See Hawkes and Harris, above n 17; Jennifer L Harris et al, 'Redefining "Child-Directed 
Advertising" to Reduce Unhealthy Television Food Advertising' (2013) 44(4) American Journal of Preventative 
Medicine 358. 
68 See the RCMI’s definition of 'media': Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children’s 
Marketing Initiative, above n 23, 1. The original version of the QSRI contained a different definition of 
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advertisement is appealing to children, i.e. its story line, and the visuals, language and sound 
used.69 The distinction between child-directed and adult-directed advertising is a key ‘axis’ 
for regulation of food advertising.70 However, there is significant debate on how to define 
‘advertising to children’, and particularly whether it should include advertising that is 
targeted at other groups but to which children are widely exposed.71 Thus, this thesis analyses 
whether it is workable to separate out a segment of advertising that appeals specifically to 
children, and to make it subject to its own set of restrictions.72  
I take the position that the goal of regulation of food advertising to children should be to 
reduce young people’s exposure to unhealthy food promotion. This position is based on 
research showing that food advertising influences children’s food preferences, purchasing 
choices and consumption habits via children’s overall exposure to this advertising.73 The 
World Health Organisation, public health researchers and health advocacy groups have also 
recognised that food advertising restrictions must seek to reduce children’s exposure to, and 
the persuasive power of, marketing for foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fat – a much 
broader objective than the food industry’s goal of reducing unhealthy food marketing that 
targets children specifically.74 Thus, there is broad consensus in the public health community 
that food advertising regulation must reduce significantly the amount of unhealthy food 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘medium’, meaning that the code applied to all media regardless of its target audience. However, a revised 
version of the code uses the same definition of media as the RCMI. As a result, the placement of the 
advertisement in media directed to children is now relevant to deciding whether the code applies to a particular 
advertisement. See Australian Food and Grocery Council, AFGC QSRI Initiative for Responsible Advertising 
and Marketing to Children (2013) cl 6 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/qsr-
initiative.html>. 
69 See Elizabeth Handsley et al, 'Regulatory Axes on Food Advertising to Children on Television' (2009) 6(1) 
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 1, 6. 
70 This term is coined by Handsley and colleagues, above n 69. 
71 See, e.g., Harris et al, above n 67; World Health Organisation, 'Population-Based Prevention Strategies for 
Childhood Obesity. Report of the WHO Forum and Technical Meeting' (World Health Organisation, 2010) 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/childhood/report/en/>. 
72 See also Hebden et al, 'Art of Persuasion: An Analysis of Techniques Used to Market Foods to Children', 
above n 14, 776-772. 
73 See McGinnis, Gootman and Kraak, above n 13; Hastings et al, 'Review of the Research on the Effects of 
Food Promotion to Children', above n 15; Hastings et al, 'The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food Promotion to 
Children: A Review of the Evidence', above n 15; Cairns, Angus and Hastings, above n 15; Pettigrew et al, 
above n15. 
74 See, e.g., International Association for the Study of Obesity, Consumers International and International 
Obesity Taskforce, 'Recommendations for an International Code on Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages to Children' (Consumers International, March 2008) <http://www.consumersinternational.org/our-
work/food/key-projects/junk-food-generation/our-activity>; Consumers International, 'Manual for Monitoring 
Food Marketing to Children' (Consumers International, September 2011) 
<http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/795222/food-manual-english-web.pdf>; 
World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of 
Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children' (World Health Organisation, 2012) 10 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/framework_marketing_food_to_children/en/>.  
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advertising that children see – regardless of whether such advertising targets children or 
adults – if such regulation is to contribute to improvements in the obesogenic environment.75 
The title of this thesis refers to the food pyramid, one of many attempts to visually represent 
the types of food that individuals should eat and in what quantities.76 While a number of 
governments (and NGOs) have used the food pyramid as part of their efforts to provide 
consumers with guidance on nutrition,77 the most prominent and controversial version was 
released by the US Department of Agriculture in 1992, followed by a revised version in 2005 
(it recently replaced the pyramid diagram with an image of a plate divided into four basic 
food groups).78 Nutritionist and health activist Marion Nestle argues that food industry lobby 
groups exerted undue influence over the design of the US food pyramid, with the result that it 
did not accurately represent a healthy diet.79 Researchers also criticise the pyramid as being 
confusing and difficult for consumers to understand.80 The food pyramid illustrates the 
significant role of the food industry in shaping official nutrition advice, and consequently the 
industry’s influence on consumer consumption choices, an important underlying theme in this 
thesis.81 
This thesis refers to the food pyramid only in a rhetorical sense, but I engage with the wider 
debate on nutrition and food categorisation because of the role of nutrition modelling in 
restrictions on food advertising. Food advertising regulation occurs within a context of 
significant debate about how to categorise various foods and beverages, the amount of food 
that consumers should eat from each category, and whether categorisation is a worthwhile 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., Eggers and Swinburn, above n 9; Swinburn et al., above n 10; King et al, 'Industry Self-regulation of 
Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' above n 34; King et al, 'Building the Case for 
Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television', above n 34; C Hawkes, 'Self-Regulation 
of Food Advertising: What it Can, Could and Cannot Do To Discourage Unhealthy Eating Habits Among 
Children' (2005) 30(4) Nutrition Bulletin 374. 
76 The food pyramid organises foods according to product category and nutrient content, accompanied by 
recommendations for the number and size of servings from each category. Tpyically it comprises a base layer 
made up of vegetables, fruits, nuts, legumes, wholemeal breads and cereals (the ‘eat most’ category), a middle 
layer that includes fish, lean meat, eggs, chicken and dairy products (‘eat moderately’) and an apex that contains 
sugars and fats (‘eat in small amounts’). See Nutrition Australia, The Healthy Living Pyramid (undated) 
<http://www.nutritionaustralia.org/national/resource/healthy-living-pyramid>.  
77 See, e.g., EUFIC Review, Food-Based Dietary Guidelines in Europe (September 2009) European Food 
Information Council <http://www.eufic.org/article/en/expid/food-based-dietary-guidelines-in-europe/>; GP 
Faulkner et al., ‘Serving Size for Consumers: Is It Effective?’ (2012) 71(4) Proceedings of the Nutrition Society 
610. 
78 William Neuman, ‘Nutrition Plate Unveiled, Replacing Food Pyramid’, The New York Times (online) 2 June 
2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/03plate.html?_r=0>. 
79 See Nestle, Food Politics, above n 13; Marion Nestle, 'Food Lobbies, the Food Pyramid and US Nutrition 
Advice' (1993) 23(3) International Journal of Health Services 483.  
80 Neuman, above n 77. 
81 See also Jane Dixon and Cathy Banwell, 'Re-embedding Trust: Unravelling the Construction of Modern Diets 
(2004) 14(2) Critical Public Health 117. 
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exercise at all.82 A complicating factor is that the food industry rejects the distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ foods, arguing that all of its products can contribute to a balanced diet.83 
Restrictions on food advertising do not necessarily apply to all food and beverage products. 
Often regulation distinguishes between healthy unprocessed foods and beverages (such as 
fresh fruit and vegetables), and energy-dense, processed products that are high in salt, fat 
and/or sugar (as well as sugary beverages such as soft drink).84 The latter, which are restricted 
in advertising to children, are referred to as ‘junk food’, HFSS products (foods high in fat, 
salt and sugar), EDNP foods (energy-dense, nutrient-poor), non-core or ‘extra’ foods.85 Thus, 
the distinction between healthy and unhealthy foods is another important axis for food 
regulation and policy.86  
Many voluntary initiatives (including the RCMI and QSRI) use nutrient profiling models to 
identify ‘healthier options’ that can be advertised to children.87 However, these models differ 
significantly according to the types of nutrients considered, the reference amount (for 
example, per 100g or per portion/serving), the mathematical model followed and how the 
final result is presented.88 Accordingly, I explore how nutrient profiling techniques affect the 
reach and effectiveness of food industry self-regulation in Australia. I use the term‘unhealthy 
foods’ (including sugary beverages) to refer to highly processed products that are energy-
dense and contain high levels of salt, fat and sugar. This term is simple and is not linked 
closely with one regulatory scheme. 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Carlos Monteiro, 'The Big Issue is Ultra-Processing' (2010) 1(6) World Nutrition 1. 
83 Jeffrey P Koplan and Kelly D Brownell, 'Response of the Food and Beverage Industry to the Obesity Threat' 
(2010) 304(13) Journal of the American Medical Association 1487. 
84 Hawkes and Harris, above n 17, 6-7; Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 18, 92; World Health Organisation, 
'Population-Based Prevention Strategies for Childhood Obesity', above n 71, 12-15. 
85For use of different terminology, see King et al, 'Industry Self-regulation of Television Food Advertising: 
Responsible or Responsive?' above n 34; OfCom, Television Advertising of Food and Drink Products to 
Children: Final Statement (22 February 2007) 1 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/foodads_new/statement/>; AM Rangan et al, 'Changes in Core 
Food Intake among Australian Children Between 1995 and 2007' (2011) 65(11) European Journal of Clinical 
Nutrition 1201; Anna M Rangan et al, 'Changes in ''Extra'' Food Intake Among Australian Children Between 
1995 and 2007' (2011) Obesity Research and Clinical Practice e55 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1871403X10002917>. 
86 Handsley et al, 'Regulatory Axes on Food Advertising to Children on Television', above n 69. 
87 The RCMI permits companies to choose between nutrient profiling models developed by government or non-
government organisations, and those that signatories have created themselves. The QSRI requires that 
participants use one set of criteria contained in an appendix to the code. See Australian Food and Grocery 
Council, Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, above n 23, 3; Australian Quick Service Restaurant 
Industry, above n 24, app 1. 
88 See World Health Organisation, 'Population-Based Prevention Strategies for Childhood Obesity', above n 71, 
11-13.  
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8. The limits of this thesis  
This thesis primarily takes a process-based approach to evaluating food industry self-
regulation. However, Chapter 4 describes how this form of evaluation risks distracting 
attention from more substantive issues around promoting unhealthy products to children, as 
well validating industry arguments about the desirability of self-regulation. Despite these 
concerns, for practical and political reasons I consider it worthwhile to examine food industry 
self-regulation against principles for good regulatory design. The initiatives do not contain 
specific goals, meaning that they are not designed for an evaluation of their outcomes. 
Accordingly, there is significant debate about what the codes aim to do, what they should aim 
to do, and how their effects might be measured.  
 
Critiquing the terms and conditions of the codes could lead to improved objectives that 
clarify the type of monitoring needed to assess them. A process-based analysis can also help 
to explain why self-regulation is failing. This kind of understanding is necessary before 
governments can be persuaded that self-regulation is an inadequate vehicle for achieving 
public objectives. Further, I assume that there are connections between regulatory processes 
and regulatory outcomes, which are overlooked in current research on food industry self-
regulation. Where industry actors control self-regulatory processes, the terms and objectives 
of voluntary codes are more likely to reflect industry interests and less likely to serve public 
health goals.89 Thus, I apply insights from regulatory theory to challenge the industry’s 
accountability to external stakeholders, and to make it more responsive to the demands of 
public health advocates, parents and the community.  
The growth in food marketing is only the most visible manifestation of deep-seated changes 
in the food supply system. Over the past three to four decades, the agriculture and food 
sectors have been transformed by new transport, food and information technologies, trade 
liberalisation and an increasingly globalised food market, and accompanying developments in 
agricultural policy.90 As described above, these changes gave rise to the powerful 
transnational food manufacturers and retailers known as Big Food, and the growing 
                                                 
89 Kernaghan Webb, 'Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary 
Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science 
and Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 2, 18. 
90 See, e.g., Swinburn et al, above n 10; Stuckler et al, above n 10; Anne Sibbel, 'Public Nutrition and the Role 
of the Food Industry' (2012) 114(6) British Food Journal 784; Corinna Hawkes et al, 'Linking Agricultural 
Policies with Obesity and Noncommunicable Diseases: A New Perspective for a Globalising World' (2012) 
37(3) Food Policy 343. 
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manufacture, supply and marketing of unhealthy food and beverages.91 The transformation of 
the food supply chain means that restrictions on advertising should form part of broader 
strategies to address the food industry’s role in the causes and control of obesity. Obesity 
prevention programs require food and agriculture policies that aim to create an equitable, 
healthy and sustainable food supply.92 Such policies include product reformulation, food 
labelling, and the provision of nutrition information to consumers.93 Other measures might be 
fiscal policies and incentives that make healthy food more accessible and affordable.94 At a 
more fundamental level, governments should reconsider economic approaches that are based 
on consumption-driven growth as a way of building and measuring prosperity.95 These policy 
changes are well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that advertising forms the tip of an iceberg of unhealthy corporate practices, each of which 
must be addressed if we are to reverse the obesity epidemic. 
9. The thesis structure   
The first section of the thesis sets out a framework for evaluating food industry self-
regulation. The second and third sections apply this framework to the RCMI and QSRI, and 
consider ways to improve the food industry’s scheme that do not necessarily draw upon 
government regulation. Chapter 1 describes obesity’s threat to children’s health, the 
contribution of food marketing to obesity, and government, public health and industry 
responses to the problem. It also sets out practical and ethical arguments for strengthening 
food advertising regulation. Chapter 2 describes restrictions on tobacco, food and alcohol 
advertising in Australia, ordered according to their degree of government intervention in 
advertising. Chapter 3 draws together literature from public health law and regulatory studies 
to provide a theoretical framework for evaluating public health governance in practice. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the current state of evidence on food advertising self-regulation and 
translates the theoretical framework from Chapter 3 into a set of criteria for evaluating the 
determinants of successful voluntary schemes. Section 1 concludes with a description of my 
research methods.  
                                                 
91 Brownell and Warner, above n 21. 
92 Hawkes et al, above n 90; Martin Caraher and John Coveney, 'Public Health Nutrition and Food Policy' 
(2004) 7(5) Public Health Nutrition 591. 
93 See, e.g., BA Swinburn et al, 'Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Excess Weight Gain and Obesity' (2004) 
7(1A) Public Health Nutrition 123. 
94 See, e.g., Hawkes et al, above n 90, 350; Mark Lawrence, 'Reflections on Public Health Policy in the Food 
Regulatory System: Challenges and Opportunities for Nutrition and Food Law Experts to Collaborate' (2009) 
14(2) Deakin Law Review 398. 
95 Swinburn et al, above n 10, 811. 
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Chapter 6 begins the main task of the thesis, which is applying criteria for a successful 
responsive regulatory scheme to the RCMI and QSRI. It evaluates the terms and conditions 
of food and alcohol industry advertising codes, with a specific focus on advertising to 
children. Chapter 7 compares the RCMI and QSRI against criteria for transparent and 
accountable self-regulatory processes, using the alcohol industry’s code (the ABAC) as a 
point of comparison. Chapter 8 examines whether the institutional determinants for 
successful self-regulation are present in the case of the food and alcohol industries. This 
involves consideration of factors such as the level of industry cohesion, the type of product 
advertised, the institutional structures for administering self-regulation, and industry-level 
incentives for developing a voluntary scheme. It concludes that voluntary initiatives in the 
food industry are unlikely to be successful without government intervention, because of a 
fundamental conflict between the food industry’s profit motive and controls on food 
advertising to children. The last chapter of Section 2 explores individual food and alcohol 
companies’ rationales for joining voluntary advertising codes, the steps they take to 
implement code requirements and their opinion on self-regulation’s successes and failures. 
Section 3 considers ways of improving food industry self-regulation. Chapter 10 describes 
the influence of public health actors on food and alcohol industry self-regulation, and whether 
there is scope for greater external stakeholder participation in the RCMI and QSRI. This 
means exploring whether public health actors would be willing to ‘co-regulate’ with food and 
alcohol industry actors as part of a largely voluntary scheme. Chapter 11 explores the Federal 
government’s involvement in food and alcohol industry self-regulation, and mechanisms for 
strengthening government monitoring and oversight. It also draws together the findings of 
each chapter to present a detailed model of improvements to the RCMI and QSRI, 
encompassing code content, administration, enforcement and external participation and 
oversight.  As such, it represents a blueprint for incrementally strengthening regulation of 
food advertising to children, in an environment where, despite the fact that direct statutory 
regulation remains unlikely, governments nevertheless need to take a leadership role in 
regulatory development. In making the case for reform, the thesis draws also attention to 
new, but under-utilised, forms of public health governance and how they can play a role in 
obesity prevention strategies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Setting the scene: advertising unhealthy food and childhood 
obesity 
This chapter considers government, public health and industry responses to the link between 
food advertising and childhood obesity. In the first sections, I describe the threat that obesity 
poses to child health. Then I discuss the immediate health problems associated with 
childhood obesity, as well as those that accrue in adulthood. Next, I describe the multiple 
causes of childhood obesity, with a specific focus on the contribution of unhealthy food 
marketing. The second section of the chapter explores the actions of public health actors, 
government and the food industry to reduce unhealthy food advertising to children. It 
concludes by examining the practical, ethical and political arguments for government 
intervention in food advertising to children, as well as describing the aim of this thesis. 
1. The problem of childhood obesity  
Childhood obesity is increasing at an alarming rate, in both developing and developed 
countries.1 In 2010, an estimated 43 million children worldwide under the age of five were 
overweight.2 If rates of childhood obesity and overweight continue to increase, this figure 
could reach 60 million by 2020.3 North America and some European countries have the 
highest prevalence of obesity and overweight, as well as Australia and New Zealand.4 
However, many developing countries have experienced a growth in obesity simultaneously 
with under-nutrition, due to changes in diet, food availability and lifestyle known as the 
‘nutrition transition’.5 The World Health Organisation (WHO) notes that obesity now ranks 
fifth as a leading global risk for mortality, due to its contribution to the prevalence of non-
                                                 
1 World Health Organisation, 'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic.  Report of a WHO 
Consultation'. WHO Technical Report Series 894 (World Health Organisation, 2000) 16 
<http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/obesity/WHO_TRS_894/en/>. 
2 Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner and Elaine Borghi, 'Global Prevalence and Trends of Overweight and 
Obesity among Preschool Children' (2010) 92(5) The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 1257. 
3 Youfa Wang and Hyunjung Lim, 'The Global Childhood Obesity Epidemic and the Association Between 
Socio-Economic Status and Childhood Obesity' (2012) 24(3) International Review of Psychiatry 176, 181. 
4 T Lobstein, L Bauer and R Uauy, 'Obesity in Children and Young People: A Crisis in Public Health' (2004) 
5(Suppl 1) Obesity Reviews 4, 17; Youfa Wang and Tim Lobstein, 'Worldwide Trends in Childhood Overweight 
and Obesity' (2006) 1(1) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity 11. 
5 Barry M Popkin, 'The Nutrition Transition and Obesity in the Developing World' (2001) 131(3) Journal of 
Nutrition 871S; Benjamin Caballero, 'A Nutrition Paradox - Underweight and Obesity in Developing Countries' 
(2005) 352(15) The New England Journal of Medicine 1514. 
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communicable disease.6 Accordingly, WHO identifies population-based strategies as vital to 
preventing childhood obesity and addressing the global epidemic of chronic disease.7 
Approximately 21 to 25 per cent of Australian children are overweight or obese.8 In 2011 to 
2012, 17.7 per cent of children aged 5 to 17 years were overweight, and 7.6 per cent were 
obese.9 More girls are overweight or obese (27.1 per cent) than boys (23.6 per cent).10 
Childhood obesity has risen rapidly over the past 20 to 25 years,11 although its prevalence 
may now have stabilised.12 However, the high prevalence in Australian children remains a 
serious concern,13 as does obesity’s socio-economic gradient. In developed countries such as 
Australia, obesity and overweight are more prevalent among children from lower socio-
economic backgrounds, putting these children at greater risk than those in higher socio-
economic groups.14 
Obesity poses immediate and long-term health risks to children and adolescents. Obese 
children are more likely to develop the risk factors for chronic disease and diabetes, such as 
increased blood pressure and insulin resistance, and to have orthopaedic difficulties, fatty 
liver disease, type 2 diabetes, sleep apnoea, and psychosocial problems.15 The latter include 
                                                 
6 World Health Organisation, 'Population-Based Prevention Strategies for Childhood Obesity. Report of the 
WHO Forum and Technical Meeting' (World Health Organisation, 2010) 8 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/childhood/report/en/>. 
7 Ibid 11. 
8 AM Magarey, LA Daniels and TJ Boulton, 'Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity in Australian Children and 
Adolescents: Reassessment of 1985 and 1995 Data Against New Standard International Definitions' (2001) 
174(11) Medical Journal of Australia 561; TS Olds et al, 'Trends in the Prevalence of Childhood Overweight 
and Obesity in Australia between 1985 and 2008' (2009) 34(1) International Journal of Obesity 57. 
9 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Health Survey: First Results, 2011-12 (cat. no. 4365.0.55.001) 
(2012) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4364.0.55.001>. 
10 Ibid, although studies usually suggest that rates of obesity are higher amongst boys than girls. See, e.g., 
Belinda C Morley et al, 'What Factors Are Associated with Excess Body Weight in Australian Secondary 
School Students?' (2012) 193(3) Medical Journal of Australia 189. 
11 Timothy P Gill et al, 'Childhood Obesity in Australia Remains a Widespread Health Concern that Warrants 
Population-Wide Prevention Programs' (2009) 190(3) Medical Journal of Australia 146; LL Hardy et al, NSW 
Schools Physical Activity and Nutrition Survey (SPANS) 2010: Short Report (2010) NSW Ministry of Health 
<http://www0.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2011/spans_short.html>. 
12 See Olds et al, above n 8; Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 9; Hardy et al above n 11, 5; B Rokholm, 
JL Baker and A Sørensen, 'The Levelling Off of the Obesity Epidemic Since the Year 1999 - A Review of 
Evidence and Perspectives' (2010) 11(12) Obesity Reviews 835, 839. 
13 Gill et al, above n 11. 
14 Wang and Lim, above n 3; Morley et al, 'What Factors Are Associated with Excess Body Weight in 
Australian Secondary School Students?', above n 10; Hardy et al, above n 11; Jennifer O’Dea, 'Differences in 
Overweight and Obesity Among Australian Schoolchildren of Low and Middle/High Socioeconomic Status' 
(2003) 179(1) Medical Journal of Australia 63. 
15 World Health Organisation, 'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic', above n 1, 58-60; 
Lobstein, Bauer and Uauy, above n 4, 23-32; William H Dietz, 'Health Consequences of Obesity in Youth: 
Childhood Predictors of Adult Disease' (1998) 101(3) Paediatrics 518; A Magarey et al, 'Predicting Obesity in 
Early Adulthood from Childhood and Parental Obesity' (2002) 27(4) International Journal of Obesity 505; 
Elizabeth Denney-Wilson et al, 'Body Mass Index, Waist Circumference, and Chronic Disease Risk Factors in 
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an increased risk of low self-esteem, perceived self-worth and body dissatisfaction, as well as 
bullying and feelings of sadness and loneliness.16 The major significance of childhood obesity 
lies in its relationship to excess bodyweight in adulthood, and related health problems.17 
Cardiovascular risk factors developed in childhood may persist into adulthood,18 and obese 
children are more likely to be obese adults.19 Adult obesity is associated with a range of 
health risks, including respiratory difficulties, chronic musculoskeletal problems, skin 
problems and infertility.20 In the longer-term, obesity predisposes individuals to a number of 
cardiovascular risk factors, including hypertension, raised cholesterol and impaired glucose 
intolerance.21 Thus, obesity greatly increases the risk of cardiovascular problems such as 
stroke and heart diseases, as well as certain types of cancer, diabetes and gallbladder 
disease.22 Studies suggest that it is also important as an independent risk factor for 
cardiovascular-related morbidity and mortality.23 
Obesity generates significant economic costs, both to the healthcare system and to the 
economy more broadly.24 One 2008 study estimated that the financial cost of obesity in 
Australia was $8.283 billion per annum.25 This included lost productivity costs of $3.6 
billion, health system costs of $2.0 billion, and carer costs of $1.19 billion.26 The Federal 
government bore the largest proportion of these costs (34.3 per cent), followed by individuals 
                                                                                                                                                        
Australian Adolescents' (2008) 162(6) Archives of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 566; Frank R Sinatra, 
'Nonalcoholic Fatty Liver Disease in Paediatric Patients' (2012) 36(Suppl 1) Journal of Parenteral and Enteral 
Nutrition S43. 
16 Simone A French, Mary Story and Cheryl L Perry, 'Self-Esteem and Obesity in Children and Adolescents: A 
Literature Review' (1995) 3(5) Obesity Research 479; Richard S Strauss, 'Childhood Obesity and Self-Esteem' 
(2000) 105(1) Paediatrics e1 <http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/105/1/e15.short>; Ian Janssen et al, 
'Associations Between Overweight and Obesity With Bullying Behaviours in School-Aged Children' (2004) 
113(5) Paediatrics 1187; Janet Franklin et al, 'Obesity and Risk of Low Self-Esteem: A Statewide Survey of 
Australian Children' (2006) 118(6) Paediatrics 2481. 
17 World Health Organisation, 'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic', above n 1, 58;  
Magarey et al, above n 15; Frank M Biro and Michelle Wien, 'Childhood Obesity and Adult Morbidities' (2010) 
91(5) American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 1499S. 
18 Lobstein, Bauer and Uauy, above n 4, 26-27. 
19 Kenneth F Ferrero, Roland J Thorpe Jr and Jody A Wilkinson, 'The Life Course of Severe Obesity: Does 
Childhood Overweight Matter?' (2003) 58B(2) The Journals of Gerontology S110. 
20 World Health Organisation, 'Obesity: Preventing and Managing the Global Epidemic', above n 1, 42. 
21 Ibid 39-54. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid 47. 
24 Access Economics, The Economic Costs of Obesity (1996) 
<http://www.pbworks.com.au/pdf/Economic_Costs_of_Obesity_Exec_Summ.pdf>; Access Economics, The 
Growing Cost of Obesity in 2008: Three Years On (August 2008) Access Economics and Diabetes Australia 
<http://www.diabetesaustralia.com.au/en/Resources/Reports/National/The-growing-cost-of-obesity-in-2008-
three-years-on/>; Stephen Colagiuri, et al, 'The Cost of Overweight and Obesity in Australia' (2010) 192(5) 
Medical Journal of Australia 260. 
25 Access Economics, The Growing Cost of Obesity in 2008, above n 24, 20. 
26 Ibid. 
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(29.4 per cent), family and friends (19.2 per cent) and state governments (5.1 per cent).27 
Research on the healthcare costs of childhood obesity in the United States estimated that 
elevated body mass index (BMI) in childhood cost the country $14.1 billion annually in 
additional prescription drugs and emergency room and outpatient visits.28 There are likely to 
be indirect economic and social costs associated with childhood obesity, such as lost 
educational opportunities through time off school, and lost days of employment for parents 
caring for children.29 There are also more intangible costs related to the psychosocial effects 
of obesity and their lasting impact on children’s quality of life.30 Further, the high burden of 
childhood obesity translates into significant future costs to the healthcare system as the 
current generation of children progress into adulthood.31  
2. The causes of childhood obesity  
Excess body weight is caused by an imbalance between the amount of energy children 
consume and how much they expend, over a prolonged period.32 This imbalance is caused by 
a number of interacting factors, including individual genetic traits and biological 
mechanisms, physical activity, leisure and transport patterns, and dietary habits.33  However, 
high-fat, energy-dense diets and sedentary lifestyles are the two characteristics most strongly 
associated with the creation of the modern obesity epidemic.34 Thus, as well as a decline in 
physical activity, childhood obesity is strongly linked to changes in dietary patterns that result 
in excess energy intake.35  
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Many Australian children eat too much unhealthy food and drink too much soft drink, while 
not meeting their recommended daily intake of fruits and vegetables.36 Studies suggest that 
Australian children’s diets improved between 1995 and 2007, with children eating a greater 
proportion of healthy foods and fewer ‘extra’ products such as cakes and muffins, fried 
potatoes and soft drinks.37 Yet, children’s intake of sodium, sugar and fat remain too high.38 
The 2007 Australian National Children’s Nutrition and Physical Activity Survey found that 
79 per cent of children aged between two and three years of age consumed more than the 
recommended amount of sugar, while 84 per cent of children in this age group consumed 
more than the recommended amount of saturated fat. The equivalent figures for children aged 
between 14 and 16 years of age was 61 per cent and 78 per cent respectively.39 Changes in 
children’s nutritional intake are accompanied by shifts in when and where they eat food. An 
increasing number of children engage in food behaviours that adversely impact upon their 
diet, including skipping breakfast, snacking on energy-dense foods, and eating food prepared 
outside the home, including unhealthy products from fast-food outlets.40 
A broad range of factors affect young people’s eating habits. These include individual genetic 
predispositions, biological and developmental characteristics, as well as the social 
environment, through interactions with peers, friends and family members.41 Parents and 
carers provide children with food both inside and outside the home, and determine meal 
structure and when meals occur. They also shape children’s food beliefs, preferences and 
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values in a way that determines their lifetime consumption habits.42 The settings in which 
children consume food may also contribute to obesity, for example the provision of unhealthy 
foods and beverages in school canteens and vending machines.43 At a fundamental level, 
children’s food choices depend on broad social, economic and cultural factors that create an 
‘obesogenic’ environment.44 These include modernisation, urbanisation and associated 
changes in eating habits and transport use,45 and a growing number of mothers in the 
workforce, accompanied by a decline in time spent in food preparation.46  
Researchers also point to important changes in the global food system, including an industrial 
approach to agriculture and food production, the creation of a global market for the trade of 
food products, and the commercialisation of food manufacturing and retail.47 Studies chart the 
emergence of ‘Big Food’ as a result of these trends. The global food market is dominated by 
a handful of large multinational agribusinesses, food manufacturers and retailers with highly 
concentrated market power.48 These include companies such as Nestlé, Kraft Foods, Unilever, 
PepsiCo, General Mills, and McDonald’s. In 2011, the top ten packaged food companies 
accounted for 15.2 per cent of global packaged food sales.49 The top ten global soft drink 
companies accounted for 53.3 per cent of total drink sales, with Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and 
Nestlé totalling 40 per cent of sales between them.50 Big Food engages in a cluster of 
practices that contribute to poor nutrition and rising rates of obesity. They develop and 
produce ‘ultra-processed’ foods high in fat, salt and sugar, increase the size of products or 
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‘upsize’ fast-food meals, sell unhealthy products at low prices, stall or block effective public 
health interventions, penetrate emerging markets and aggressively market unhealthy foods 
and beverages to children.51 Thus, public health advocates view Big Food as a key vector in 
the ‘industrial epidemic’ of non-communicable disease.52 
3. Food marketing to children 
An increasing body of research documents Big Food’s strategy of marketing to children and 
explores the impact of food advertising on children’s diets. Food companies spend a vast 
amount of money on advertising to children. In 2009, US companies spent $1.7 billion on 
advertising to people between the ages of two and 17.53 Food marketers target children 
because of their growing role as independent consumers, their influence on families’ food 
purchasing and because they represent a future adult market.54 Food is the third most heavily 
advertised consumer product and the most prevalent marketing category targeting children 
and young people.55 Food advertising to children in all media is dominated by promotions for 
the ‘Big Five’: sugar-sweetened breakfast cereals, soft-drinks, confectionery, savoury snacks, 
and increasingly, promotions for fast-food.56 Conversely, there is little to no advertising for 
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unprocessed products such as fruit and vegetables, whole grains and milk.57 Thus, the 
advertised diet contrasts sharply with that recommended by nutritionists.58  
Communication channels  
Television remains the dominant platform for food advertising to children, although research 
suggests that its importance is diminishing.59 However, while rates of televised food 
advertising may be decreasing, it remains skewed towards unhealthy products.60 One study of 
food advertising on Sydney commercial television channels in 2006 found that there was a 
higher frequency of unhealthy food advertising during designated children’s viewing times 
(49 per cent of all food advertising during these periods) compared to adult viewing times (39 
per cent).61 There was also a large amount of food advertising during television shows that 
were popular with children, 65.9 per cent of which was for unhealthy products.62 Unhealthy 
foods and beverages continue to be heavily promoted during designated children’s programs, 
on television channels designed for a youth audience63 and during children’s peak viewing 
times.64  
Large numbers of children watch television during the early evenings,65 meaning that children 
are exposed to many general audience shows and the advertising that accompanies them.66 
For example, far greater numbers of children watch programs such as The Simpsons, which 
tend to be shown in the early evening, compared to shows broadcast on Saturday morning, a 
traditional children’s viewing period. Although the latter has a much higher concentration of 
children in the audience, the former has a larger number of child viewers overall.67 Thus, 
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children view a considerable amount of unhealthy food advertising during general audience 
shows and family viewing times when parents and children watch television together.68 
Food marketers target children through other traditional media channels, such as popular 
children’s magazines.69 One study investigated food promotions in 14 child-targeted 
magazine titles published in Australia, including Disney Adventures and Bratz.70 It found 269 
branded food references in 149 editions of these magazines, the vast majority of which were 
for unhealthy products (86.2 per cent).71 However, only 83 of the 269 references were clearly 
identified as advertisements. The remainder comprised competitions, brand promotions or 
non-food advertisements and product placement, all of which obscure the differences 
between commercial and editorial content.72  
Unhealthy food advertising is also prevalent on bus shelters and billboards along main roads, 
shopping areas and train stations and concentrated around primary schools.73 Quick service 
restaurant companies create ‘kids clubs’ as a way to communicate and maintain a relationship 
with children, where members receive personalised marketing material such as membership 
cards and newsletters.74 An emerging area of concern is in-school promotion, through 
sponsored resources and activities, including school sports events.75 Food marketing also 
occurs through product packaging and labelling and point-of-sale promotions, including in 
supermarkets and at quick service restaurants.76 Thus, although television advertising 
comprises the largest proportion of measured spend on food advertising, the use of non-
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broadcast media creates an environment where children are continuously exposed to 
commercial messages promoting unhealthy food. 
Food promotion increasingly draws upon new media extensively used by children and young 
people.77 Big Food uses viral or ‘buzz’ marketing to market its products, as well as 
advertising via text messages, social networking sites, company-owned websites, marketing 
on third party internet sites and ‘advergaming’, i.e. embedding references to products or 
brands in computer games.78 One 2009 study of fast-food marketing in the United States 
identified  three child-targeted websites sponsored by McDonald’s, in addition to its main 
restaurant website.79 One site (McWorld.com) provided a highly engaging virtual world for 
children, complete with games, opportunities to chat with friends and cross-promotions to the 
‘Star Wars’ movies.80  This site received an average of 128,000 unique visitors each month 
aged between two and 17 years, i.e. approximately 1.5 million per year.81  
The interactive nature of digital media enables marketers to build relationships with young 
consumers, particularly given young people’s ‘constant connectivity’.82 Companies can also 
create more personalised and participatory advertising campaigns by using digital marking 
‘to create, test and adjust their marketing messages in real time’.83 New forms of marketing 
blur the distinction between commercial and editorial content, data collection and analysis, 
and socialising and entertainment.84 By drawing upon multiple media channels that 
complement and link to each other, marketers create integrated marketing strategies that are 
far more sophisticated, broad-reaching and influential than traditional advertising 
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campaigns.85 As noted by WHO, ‘[f]ood marketing to children is now a global phenomenon, 
and tends to be pluralistic and integrated, using multiple messages in multiple channels’.86 
Persuasive techniques  
Food advertising uses creative content that is highly appealing to young viewers, such as 
themes of fantasy, fun and novelty.87 The use of animation is strongly associated with 
advertising to children, as is the use of humour.88 The content of food companies’ websites is 
highly appealing to young people, often including free downloads, advergames and music.89 
Food marketers use persuasive techniques to which children are particularly susceptible, 
including competitions, product placement and premium offers.90 Techniques such as 
premium offers (where children receive a toy or gift free upon purchasing a food product) are 
designed to promote ‘pester-power’, where children ask their parents to purchase products on 
their behalf.91 Food manufacturers and fast-food chains engage in cross-promotions or co-
branding that draws upon licensed characters and celebrities from popular children’s 
programs, books or movies.92 Companies also create their own proprietary or ‘equity-brand’ 
characters that appeal to children and help to build children’s recognition and liking of the 
company’s brand and its products,93 for example Ronald McDonald or Coco the Monkey 
(used to promote the Coco Pops cereal).94 One study of packaged foods in Australian 
supermarkets found that products promoted by company-owned characters were much more 
likely to have a poor nutrition profile compared to those promoted by sportspersons, 
celebrities and movie tie-ins.95 Given the ubiquity of food advertising, public health 
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organisations raise concerns about both the volume of advertising directed to children and its 
content, i.e. its persuasive power.96 
4. The influence of food advertising on children’s diets  
There is considerable debate about the association between unhealthy food advertising and 
child obesity. Research is based on psychological theories that assume a sequential path 
between exposure to marketing and children’s behaviour.97 Accordingly, researchers try to 
demonstrate a series of connections between food advertising, children’s food beliefs and 
preferences, their purchase requests, actual consumption choices and diet-related health.98 It 
is difficult to isolate the effects of promotion from other aspects of the marketing process, as 
well as from other influences on children’s diet and nutrition.99 Therefore, it is a complex task 
to establish a causal relationship between advertising and obesity.100 However, a growing 
body of evidence supports the chain of steps that lead to advertising having an influence on 
children’s dietary patterns and nutrition-related health. While there is little Australian 
research on the effects of food marketing,101 there are a number of highly influential 
international studies.102 The most important of these are systematic reviews commissioned or 
undertaken by government agencies, as well as WHO. 
The history of research on food advertising’s effects on children 
In 2003, the UK Food Standards Authority commissioned researchers at the University of 
Strathclyde (led by Gerard Hastings) to conduct the first systematic study of the effects of 
food promotion on children.103 The review concluded that food promotion affects children’s 
food preferences, purchase behaviour and consumption, independent of other factors. This 
effect operated at both brand and category level, i.e. the selection of one type of food over 
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another, rather than choosing between two different brands of the same product.104 The 
review generated significant academic debate, as well as rebuttals from the UK advertising 
industry.105 In 2004, the UK’s Office of Communications (OfCom) commissioned Sonia 
Livingstone of the London School of Economics to produce a commentary on the Hastings 
report and on studies commissioned by the UK advertising industry, as well as earlier 
research from other government agencies.106 Livingstone’s report found that food advertising 
had modest effects on children’s food choices,107 but its role was limited compared to other 
factors.108 
In December 2003, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport asked OfCom to 
consider proposals for strengthening the rules on television food advertising directed to 
children.109 In response, OfCom commissioned a second report from Sonia Livingstone (co-
authored by Ellen Helsper) to review evidence on the role of television advertising in 
influencing children’s consumption of unhealthy foods.110 The authors’ 2004 report prompted 
Ofcom’s conclusion that food advertising had a modest direct effect on children’s food 
preferences, and larger but unquantifiable indirect effects on their food preferences, 
consumption and behaviour.111 Consequently, OfCom decided that there was ‘a case for 
proportionate and targeted action in terms of rules for broadcast advertising to address the 
issue of child health and obesity’.112 OfCom commissioned an update of the Livingstone and 
Helsper review as part of its consultation process on proposed regulatory options for 
restricting food advertising.113 The resulting 2006 review reported ‘a growing consensus that 
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advertising works in its influence on children’s food preferences, diet and health’.114 
Following public consultation, OfCom placed restrictions on advertisements for unhealthy 
products in and around programs that appeal to children under the age of 16.115 
In 2006, WHO commissioned Hastings and colleagues to update their 2003 review as part of 
a technical forum on food marketing to children.116 Hastings, Cairns and colleague produced 
another update to the review in a 2009 report, which summarised new research on the extent 
and nature of food promotion to children, and its effects on their food knowledge, preferences 
and behaviour.117 This last review found clear evidence supporting the influence of food 
promotion on children’s food preferences, purchase behaviour and consumption.118 In 2013 
WHO produced a briefing report that updated evidence on the changing nature of marketing 
methods and recent policy developments in food marketing to children, as well as research 
linking advertising and marketing to children’s dietary behaviour.119 The report concluded 
that food advertising promoting unhealthy products remained a concern and that there was a 
strong link between television viewing and obesity.120 The existing literature demonstrated 
that food advertising influenced children’s food preferences and energy intake.121 Further, the 
research suggested that children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising influenced 
children’s body weight, independent of other causal pathways between obesity and television 
viewing.122 
 In 2004, the US Institute of Medicine established a Committee on Food Marketing and the 
Diets of Children and Youth. In its 2006 report, the Committee reviewed research on 
American food and beverage marketing practices, the influence of these practices on young 
Americans’ diets and health and any existing food industry measures to promote healthier 
foods and beverages to children.123 The Committee examined 123 empirical studies on the 
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influence of food and beverage marketing on diets and diet-related health of children and 
young people.124 Its final report proved highly influential, and has been cited in numerous 
academic studies, as well as in the UK reviews of food advertising research. The section 
below describes the Committee’s findings, as well as those of other prominent reviews and 
reports. 
What the research shows 
Children remember and enjoy food advertising, and their most popular advertisements are for 
unhealthy products.125 There is little evidence that food promotion affects children’s 
perceptions of what constitutes a healthy diet, but it may influence specific types of nutrition 
knowledge.126 Both the Hastings/Cairns reviews and the Institute of Medicine found that there 
was modest to strong evidence that television advertising influenced the food and beverage 
preferences of children,127 and strong evidence that it influenced their purchase requests.128 
There were more mixed findings in relation to whether food and beverage advertising 
influenced consumption patterns and diets. However, the Institute of Medicine found that 
television advertising influenced the short-term consumption of children aged two to 11 
years; there was moderate evidence that it influenced the usual dietary intake of children aged 
two to five years; and weak evidence that it influenced the dietary intake of older children 
(between six to 11 years of age).129 The Cairns review found evidence of a small but 
significant correlation between television viewing and diet quality, obesity and blood 
cholesterol levels (although some studies did not disentangle this effect from other causal 
mechanisms associated with television viewing).130 It concluded that there was a statistically 
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significant association between food promotion and children’s knowledge, attitudes, 
behaviours and health status, independent of other influences.131  
Significant limitations remain in the body of research on food advertising to children. Studies 
tend to focus on televised advertising to primary-school aged children. This is because early 
research on food advertising used a model based on age-specific stages in children’s 
comprehension of advertising.132 This model assumes that children’s ability to distinguish 
between advertising and programming (and to understand the persuasive message of 
advertising) develops concurrently with their cognitive abilities and media literacy.133 This 
line of research finds that children start to distinguish between advertising and programming 
between the ages of four and seven.134 Their understanding of the persuasive nature of 
advertising only begins around the age of eight years.135 Children are able to articulate a 
critical understanding of advertising from around 11 or 12 years of age, but may still require 
prompting to distinguish between information and persuasion.136 These findings suggest that 
children become better able to defend themselves against marketing messages as they 
mature.137 Also, knowledge about nutrition, media literacy programs in schools and 
advertising to promote healthy eating and exercise will enhance children’s cognitive defences 
against unhealthy food advertising.138 Conversely, adults are assumed to be ‘competent 
consumers’ who recognise the commercial nature of advertising and its limits as a source of 
information.139 
Also, the majority of research is based on an information-processing model, ‘in which 
persuasion is posited to follow a conscious and rational sequential path from exposure to 
behaviour’.140 Thus, studies examine an (assumed) series of relationships between food 
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advertising exposure, children’s food ideas and beliefs, their consumption choices and actual 
eating habits. Taken together, these two models limit understanding of how advertising 
affects older children and adolescents, as well as its more pervasive influence.141 More recent 
psychological models of advertising’s effects draw upon social cognitive theories. These 
theories predict that repeated exposure to food advertising can trigger beliefs and behaviours 
without individuals actively and deliberately processing the information presented.142 
Exposure to marketing can have a long-lasting and powerful ‘priming’ effect, where it 
encourages children to prefer unhealthy products.143  
Further there is growing evidence that older children and adults are susceptible to marketing 
and that these effects occur without conscious deliberation of marketing stimulus.144 For 
example, one Australian study found that a single exposure to an advertisement increased 
both children and adult’s desire for, and acceptance of, the unhealthy product advertised.145 
However, there are few studies that examine the influence of advertising through automatic 
processes, and how such processes might differ according to the developmental stage of the 
individual.146 
The effects of advertising on teenagers may be enhanced by the growing use of digital media 
in food promotion. Practices such as social media marketing, advergames and viral marketing 
are designed to encourage emotion-based and unconscious decision-making processes rather 
than reasoned and deliberate ones.147  They also appeal to the developmental needs of older 
children and adolescents, who are engaged in processes of identity formation and 
distinguishing themselves from their parents.148 Social cognitive theories suggest that young 
people draw upon marketing messages in order to make meaning of the social world, in 
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processes of identity construction and in their relationships with peers and family members.149 
For example, through their exposure to food marketing, children learn that consuming 
unhealthy foods is fun, normal and ‘cool’, and has few negative consequences.150 Along with 
messages from other media, family, peers and social institutions such as schools, food 
marketing contributes to a sociocultural environment that normalises children’s routine 
consumption of ‘junk’ food.151 It is difficult to test the role of food marketing in children’s 
social development processes, and there are few studies that do so.152 However, research 
demonstrates that advertising combines with family and peer influences to shape children’s 
attitudes towards alcohol and tobacco consumption, suggesting that food advertising has 
similar normative effects.153 
A further limitation is that research focuses on the effects of marketing on beliefs and 
behaviours, rather than broader health outcomes such as diet and adiposity.154 However, more 
recent studies suggest a causal connection between exposure to food marketing, consumption 
patterns and obesity, independent of other influences associated with television viewing.155 
For example, one study found a significant association between commercial television 
viewing and increased BMI among children aged 12 years and younger, even after adjusting 
for exercise and eating while watching television.156 However, further research is needed on 
the causal link between food advertising, dietary habits and adiposity, controlling for other 
factors such as exposure to television programs or screen viewing time.157 Although more 
                                                 
149 Juliet B Schor and Margaret Ford, 'From Tastes Great to Cool: Children's Food Marketing and the Rise of the 
Symbolic' (2007) 35(1) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 10, 16. 
150 Harris et al, 'A Crisis in the Marketplace: How Food Marketing Contributes to Childhood Obesity and What 
Can be Done', above n 97, 213. See also Harris, Brownell and Bargh, above n 132, 236-237; Hoek and Gendall, 
above n 141, 414. 
151 Ibid; Harris et al, 'A Crisis in the Marketplace: How Food Marketing Contributes to Childhood Obesity and 
What Can be Done', above n 97, 211; Juliet B Schor, Born to Buy (Scribner, 2004); Mary Story et al, 'Creating 
Healthy Food and Eating Environments: Policy and Environmental Approaches' (2008) 29 Annual Review of 
Public Health 253. 
152 Harris, Brownell and Bargh, above n 132, 237. 
153 See Cornelia Pechman et al, 'Impulsive and Self-Conscious: Adolescents' Vulnerability to Advertising and 
Promotion' (2005) 24(2) Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 202, cited in Harris, Brownell and Bargh, 
above n 132, 237. 
154 Harris, Brownell and Bargh, above n 132, 240. See also McGinnis, Gootman and Kraak, above n  35, 292; 
Story and French, above n 74, 12-13. 
155 Ibid; World Health Organisation  'Marketing of Foods High in Fat, Salt and Sugar to Children: Update 2012-
2013', above n 83, 24. See also Jason CG Halford et al, 'Beyond-Brand Effect of Television Food 
Advertisements on Food Choice in Children: The Effect of Weight Status' (2007) 11(9) Public Health Nutrition 
897; Leonard H Epstein et al, 'A Randomised Trial of the Effects of Reducing Television Viewing and 
Computer Use on Body Mass Index in Young Children' (2008) 162(3) Archives of Paediatrics and Adolescent 
Medicine 239. 
156 Zimmerman and Bell, above n 122. 
157 Harris et al, 'A Crisis in the Marketplace: How Food Marketing Contributes to Childhood Obesity and What 
Can be Done', above n 97, 214. 
40 
 
difficult to design and execute, longitudinal studies are also needed to ‘quantify the effect of 
accumulated media exposure over time and measure the interactions with other relevant 
variables’.158  This is in addition to research on the effects of advertising on older children and 
adolescents, and in particular children’s response to advertising in new media such as 
websites and social networking sites.159  
5. Responses to the link between food advertising and obesity 
Public health responses 
Evidence linking advertising and obesity contributes to growing public concern about 
unhealthy food marketing to children. In response, public health organisations, researchers, 
health professionals and parent and consumer representatives pressure governments to 
introduce wide-ranging statutory restrictions on food advertising.160 In its 2004 Global 
Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WHO raised children’s increased 
consumption of unhealthy products as a particular concern.161 In May 2006, WHO held a 
stakeholder forum and expert technical meeting on advertising unhealthy food to children in 
Norway.162 The resulting report urged Member States to take ‘bold innovative action at both 
national and global levels’ in order to reduce food advertising that targeted children, as well 
as promotions to other age groups to which children were widely exposed.163  
Following a 2007 resolution of the World Health Assembly,164 WHO released a set of 
guidelines for designing state policies to protect children from unhealthy food marketing.165 
Although not calling for a specific regulatory approach, the guidelines endorsed government-
led policy that reduced children’s exposure to, and the persuasive power of, unhealthy food 
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marketing.166 WHO published a framework for implementing the recommendations in early 
2012, which elaborated on processes of policy development, implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement.167 Following its most recent review of the evidence on food marketing, it also 
called for national governments to introduce stronger controls on the advertising of unhealthy 
food to children.168 
Non-government organisations have advocated for restrictions on food advertising to children 
at both national and international levels. In 2006, an International Obesity Taskforce 
launched the ‘Sydney Principles’, which outlined criteria for food advertising regulation 
based on a human rights approach.169 The principles called for statutory regulation of all 
forms of food marketing, with the goals of substantially protecting children from food 
promotion and creating advertising-free childhood settings.170  In 2007, the Taskforce 
released a draft code on food marketing jointly with Consumers International.171 The code 
described restrictions on advertising food to children based on an international approach to 
categorising unhealthy products and a broad definition of ‘marketing to children’.172 More 
recently, Consumers International developed a set of guidelines for monitoring food 
advertising.173  
NGOs, consumer organisations and health advocates also publish reports on the extent and 
nature of food advertising to children and its impact on children’s health.174 The Australian 
public health community has taken extensive local action on childhood obesity and food 
advertising. For example, prominent public health organisations joined together in an Obesity 
Policy Coalition, which published a legislative blueprint for comprehensive, national-level 
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restrictions on unhealthy food advertising to children.175 Chapter 10 further describes how 
public health organisations have advocated for stronger restrictions on food advertising to 
children, and their influence on food industry self-regulation in Australia. 
Industry responses 
In the early 2000s the food and advertising industries developed their own initiatives on food 
marketing to children. In 2004, the global business organisation the International Chamber of 
Commerce published a Framework for Responsible Food and Beverage Communication, 
which included guidelines for marketing to children.176 Shortly before this move, the 
Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU released a similar set of principles 
on food and beverage advertising.177 These documents prohibit advertising that promotes 
excessive consumption, undermines the promotion of healthy diets or obscures the distinction 
between programs, editorial content and promotion.178 Advertising industry bodies in a 
number of jurisdictions have translated these guidelines into codes for national application.179 
Chapter 2 describes how Australian advertising industry codes on food marketing and 
advertising to children deal with similar concerns.180 However, researchers criticise these 
codes for failing to address the quantity and frequency of food advertising in a range of 
media, or the nutritional quality of products advertised to children.181 
Food and beverage manufacturers responded to community concerns by creating industry-
level pledges on food advertising to children. Pledges take the form of a code of practice 
outlining a set of principles on responsible marketing practices, accompanied by processes of 
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implementation, monitoring and review.182 Companies that join these pledges write 
‘commitments’ describing the specific steps they will take to put responsible marketing 
principles into operation at a company level.183 One of the first examples of this form of self-
regulation was the US Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (CFBAI), 
established in 2006 to shift advertising to children towards healthier foods and beverages.184 
Table 1 describes core principles found in the main code document.  
Similar initiatives have spread quickly to other jurisdictions: between 2005 and 2009 the food 
industry developed 13 pledges on food marketing to children,185 including regional and 
international pledges such as the International Council of Beverages Associations’ Guidelines 
on Marketing to Children186 and the EU Pledge,187 as well as commitments made by 
companies under the EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health.188 Many national 
and international initiatives have also been revised to place more demanding restrictions on 
food companies.189 Thus, food industry self-regulation developed rapidly and demonstrates a 
relatively flexible response to criticisms about its performance.190 However, these initiatives 
have been criticised by NGOs for their exclusion of some marketing techniques and media 
channels, inconsistencies between companies’ commitments and the fact that they set weak 
standards for compliance.191 
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Table 1. Core principles of the US Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative192  
Advertising to 
children under 12 
Media Use of 
products in 
interactive 
games 
Use of 
licensed 
characters, 
celebrities 
and movie tie-
ins 
Product 
placement  
Advertising 
in 
elementary 
schools 
All advertising 
‘primarily directed to 
children under 12’ 
must be for healthier 
choice’/better for 
you’ products in 
accordance with 
company-developed 
criteria that are 
consistent with 
established 
scientific/government 
standards. 
 
Participants should 
use healthy lifestyle 
messaging that 
encourages physical 
activity/good dietary 
habits, consistent 
with established 
scientific/government 
standards. 
Applies to 
television, print, 
radio, internet 
(third-party 
websites) where the 
audience >35% 
children. 
  
Applies to 
advertising in 
media primarily 
directed to children 
according to its 
content, e.g. direct 
marketing, 
company-owned 
websites/microsites, 
video games and 
DVDs that are rated 
as appropriate for 
children or whose 
content is primarily 
directed to children.  
Where 
interactive 
games that 
are primarily 
directed to 
children 
incorporate a 
participant’s 
food or 
beverage 
product, it 
must be a 
healthy 
dietary 
choice/better 
for you 
product. 
The use of 
licensed 
characters, 
celebrities and 
movie tie-ins 
must be 
consistent with 
companies’ 
advertising 
commitments.  
 
This principle 
explicitly 
excludes 
point-of-sale 
material and 
product 
packaging, as 
well as 
company-
owned 
characters. 
Participants 
will not pay 
for or  
actively seek 
to place their 
products in the 
program or 
editorial  
content of any 
medium 
primarily 
directed to 
children under 
12 for the 
purpose of  
promoting the 
sale of those 
products. 
Participants 
will not 
advertise 
branded 
products in 
elementary 
(primary) 
schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
192 Better Business Bureau, Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative Program and Core Principles 
Statement (September 2011) <http://www.bbb.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-initiative/info/>. 
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Governments’ response 
National governments have been slower to respond to concerns about advertising and obesity, 
despite increasing demand for policies and regulation that address the promotion of unhealthy 
food to children.193 In developed countries, most governments encourage self-regulation as a 
first response to the problem.194 However, states are demanding more from self-regulation 
than in the past, meaning that voluntary initiatives often operate within a framework of 
government intervention and oversight.195 For example, the Spanish Self-Regulatory Code on 
Food Advertising to Children is implemented by a committee that includes a representative of 
the Spanish Food Safety Agency,196 and companies must submit their advertising to a ‘pre-
copy’ advice service to ensure compliance.197 Many other EU Member States have introduced 
self-regulatory codes on food advertising to children, operating within a framework of 
general advertising regulation.198  
In some jurisdictions self-regulation follows unsuccessful attempts to restrict advertising 
through government legislation.199 In others, governments threaten the food industry with 
more intrusive forms of regulation, should voluntary measures fail to reduce children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising.200 A few countries have successfully passed statutory 
controls on food advertising, such as the UK’s co-regulatory restrictions on unhealthy food 
advertising in and around programs of particular appeal to children.201 However, even where 
self-regulation predominates, there are close relationships between government and industry 
action to reduce unhealthy food marketing to children, with governments often encouraging, 
directing or supporting voluntary industry initiatives.  
                                                 
193 Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 161, 89. 
194 Ibid 89. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Hawkes, 'Marketing Food to Children: Changes in the Global Regulatory Environment 2004-2006', above n 
177, 24; Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 161, 89. 
197 Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 161, 89. 
198 See World Health Organisation, 'Marketing of Foods High in Fat, Salt and Sugar to Children: Update 2012-
2013', above n 83, 17-19. 
199 In Italy, for example, food industry lobbying resulted in a legislative ban in food advertising being 
overturned. See Hawkes, 'Marketing Food to Children: Changes in the Global Regulatory Environment 2004-
2006',  above n 177, 89. 
200 Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 161, 90. See, e.g., Department of Health, Choosing Health: Making Healthier 
Choices Easier (HM Government, 2004) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/d
h_digitalassets/@dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalasset/dh_133489.pdf>. In this white paper the UK Department 
of Health said that the Government would tighten restrictions on broadcast food and beverage advertising to 
children and work with industry groups to strengthen voluntary controls on non-broadcast forms of promotion. 
The Government would then monitor these measures and implement legislative controls if softer measures 
failed to change the nature and volume of food advertising to children. 
201 See Committee of Advertising Practice, above n 115. 
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6. The development of food advertising regulation in Australia 
Regulatory action in Australia followed a similar pattern to international developments. 
Following a government review of standards regulating children’s television programs 
(described below), in 2009 the food industry introduced two self-regulatory initiatives 
regarding advertising directed to children. These are The Responsible Children’s Marketing 
Initiative of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry (RCMI)202 and the Australian Quick 
Service Restaurant Industry’s Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children (QSRI).203 These initiatives take a similar form to food industry ‘pledges’ in other 
jurisdictions: they comprise a core code document, accompanied by individual commitments 
from companies that join the initiatives, and mechanisms for administering, monitoring and 
reviewing the self-regulatory system. Table 2 sets out the key principles found in the codes. 
The RCMI and QSRI require that food advertising ‘directed primarily to children’ be for 
‘healthier choice’ products, determined by reference to nutritional criteria.204 The RCMI 
permits companies to select their own nutrition profiling model for determining ‘healthier 
choice’ products. Alternatively they may use criteria developed by government and non-
government organisations.205 The QSRI requires that signatories use a standard nutrient 
profile model that is attached to the code.206 The initiatives also place restrictions on the use 
of marketing techniques commonly used to promote foods and beverages to children, 
including premium offers, licensed characters, advergaming, and school-based marketing. 
 
                                                 
202 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food 
and Beverage Industry (March 2011) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids.html >. 
203 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children  (June 2009) Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. The quick service restaurant industry 
amended the QSRI following an independent review in 2011. The revised version of the code came into effect in 
March 2012; however I refer to the original edition as much of my research took place before the introduction of 
the new code. Chapter 6 discusses the revisions to the QSRI, as well as those to the RCMI that will take effect in 
January 2014. See also Australian Food and Grocery Council, AFGC QSRI Initiative for Responsible 
Advertising and Marketing to Children (2013) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/qsr-initiative.html>. 
204 Australian Food and Grocery Council, above n 202 1; Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 
203, 1. 
205 Australian Food and Grocery Council, above n 202, 2. 
206 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above  n 203, 1. 
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Table 2. The core principles of the RCMI and QSRI 207 
* The QSRI contains additional provisions related to nutrition information disclosure and product packaging not included in this table.  
 
 
                                                 
207 This table has also been published in Belinda Reeve, 'Private Governance, Public Purpose? Assessing 
Transparency and Accountability in Self-Regulation of Food Advertising to Children' (2013) 10(2) Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 149. 
Code Core principles Media Popular 
personalities, 
characters 
Product 
placement 
Interactive 
games 
Advertising 
in schools  
Use of 
premium 
offers 
RCMI No advertising to 
children (under 12) 
unless: 
1. Products 
represent healthy 
dietary choices, 
consistent with 
scientific or 
government 
standards and 
2. advertising 
references/is in the 
context of a 
healthy lifestyle 
through messaging 
encouraging good 
dietary habits and 
physical activity.  
Television, radio, 
print, cinema, 
third-party 
internet sites 
where audience is 
predominantly 
children and/or  
directed primarily 
to children, 
according to 
theme, visuals or 
language. 
Television: 
programs 
classified for 
children’s 
viewing, 
programs with 
>50% audience 
under 12, G rated 
programs that are 
designed for 
children. 
Popular 
personalities, 
program 
characters, 
licensed 
characters not to 
be used in 
advertising 
directed 
primarily to 
children unless 
it complies with 
the core 
principles. 
 
Not to be 
used in any 
medium 
directed 
primarily to 
children 
unless 
products are 
consistent 
with core 
principle no 
1. 
Where 
interactive 
game 
incorporates 
participants’ 
products, it 
must be 
consistent 
with the 
core 
principles.  
No product 
promotion in 
primary 
schools 
unless 
requested by/ 
agreed with 
the school 
admin for 
educational/ 
informational 
purposes, or 
related to 
healthy 
lifestyle 
activities, 
supervised by 
school 
admin/ 
appropriate 
adults. 
Not to be 
used unless 
the reference 
to the 
premium is 
‘merely 
incidental’. 
 
QSRI* Advertising/market
ing to children 
(under 14) must: 
(a) Represent 
healthier choices, 
determined by set 
nutrition criteria, 
and/or 
(b) Represent a 
healthy lifestyle, 
through messaging 
that encourages: 
(i) healthier 
choices, as 
determined by a 
defined set of 
nutrition criteria  
(ii) physical 
activity. 
Television, radio, 
newspapers, 
magazines, 
outdoor billboards 
and posters, 
emails, interactive 
games, cinema 
and internet sites. 
Use of popular 
personalities or 
licensed 
characters in 
advertising to 
children must be 
compliant with 
core principles. 
Can only be 
used in media 
directed to 
children 
where 
consistent 
with (a). 
 
Participants 
to ensure as 
far as 
possible 
that any 
interactive 
game 
including 
products 
sold by 
participants 
and directed 
primarily to 
children are 
consistent 
with (b). 
 
No product 
promotion in 
schools, 
unless 
specifically 
requested by/ 
agreed with, 
the school 
admin, or 
related to 
healthy 
lifestyle 
activities 
supervised by 
school 
admin/ 
appropriate 
adults. 
Not to be 
used in any 
medium 
directed 
primarily to 
children 
unless 
reference to 
premium is 
‘merely 
incidental’. 
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Food industry self-regulation evolved out of government interest in chronic disease 
prevention, beginning in the early 2000s.208 In 2009, the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Health and Ageing released a report on obesity prevention, which noted 
community concerns about inadequate regulation of food advertising to children.209 The 
Committee recommended a ‘phased’ approach to reducing unhealthy food marketing to 
children, beginning with self-regulation of unhealthy food advertising on television during 
children’s prime viewing times.210 The Committee also recommended that the Federal 
government consider ‘more stringent regulations’ should self-regulation fail to achieve this 
goal.211  
In March 2007 Australia’s government broadcasting regulator, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), began a review of the Children’s Television 
Standards (CTS) 2005.212 These standards regulate the content of children’s programs and 
non-program material (including advertising) during designated children’s programs on free-
to-air television.213 A key issue for the review was whether the ACMA should impose 
additional requirements on food and beverage advertising, in light of community concern 
about unhealthy food advertising to children.214 To inform its review, the ACMA 
commissioned a series of research reports, including an independent literature review (the 
‘Brand Review’) on television food advertising to children and its relationship to children’s 
food and beverage preferences.215 In a preliminary 2008 report, the ACMA took the position 
that it should not impose any additional restrictions on food and beverage advertising, based 
partly on the fact that the Brand review did not find a causal relationship between food 
advertising, children’s food knowledge, preferences and purchase requests (although it did 
                                                 
208 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Parliament of Australia Weighing 
It Up: Obesity in Australia (2009) 9 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=haa/./o
besity/report.htm>. 
209 Ibid 73. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid 76. 
212  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards Review (25 July 2012) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/703041/pc=PC_310262>. 
213   See Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 
2013); Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Children's Television Standards 2009: Explanatory 
Statement' (Australian Government, August 2009) 1 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>. 
214 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: 
Report of the Review' (Australian Government, 2008) 10 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>. 
215 Jeffrey E Brand, 'Television Advertising to Children: A Review of Contemporary Research on the Influence 
of Television Advertising Directed to Children' (Australian Communications and Media Authority, May 2007) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>. 
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establish a correlation between these factors).216 Therefore, the benefits of additional 
restrictions on food advertising were unclear.217 
The ACMA also undertook economic modelling of the costs and benefits of food advertising 
restrictions.218 It estimated the costs of different regulatory options including banning 
unhealthy food advertising and all forms of food advertising during certain times of the day. 
It measured these costs in terms of the value of advertising lost due to the bans, as well as 
loss of broadcaster revenue.219 It also estimated the percentage reduction in obesity-related 
costs that would be required for advertising restrictions to have a net benefit to society.220 The 
modelling exercise found that all regulatory options produced significant impacts on 
broadcaster revenue and profitability, which would not be outweighed by reductions in 
obesity-related costs that resulted from the bans.221 A ban on food and beverage advertising 
on commercial television could impact upon future investment in the television industry, as 
well as program quality.222 As a result, the ACMA declined to further restrict food advertising 
to children.223  However, it called on the food industry ‘to have regard to the strong concerns 
of interested parties in this area and consider how it can effectively address these concerns 
without additional regulation’.224  
On 1 January 2009, the Australian food industry’s trade association, the Australian Food and 
Grocery Council (AFGC), introduced the RCMI.225 It developed this code in collaboration 
with the Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) – the advertising industry’s 
representative body.226 On 25 June 2009, the AANA announced the introduction of the QSRI, 
created by the Australian quick service restaurant industry in consultation with the AANA.227  
In its final report of the CTS review, the ACMA referred to these initiatives in its decision not 
to impose any additional requirements on food and beverage advertising. However, it said 
that it would monitor the codes over a 12 month period in order to determine their 
                                                 
216 ACMA, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: Report of the Review', above n 214, 10.  
217 Ibid 12. 
218 Ibid 11-12, app A; Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television 
Standards 2005: Final Report of the Review' (Australian Government, August 2009) 5-9, app 2 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/Childrens-TV/childrens-television-standards-review> 
219 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: 
Final Report of the Review', above n 218, 6. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid 9. 
222 Ibid 6. 
223 Ibid 9. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid 7. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid 7. 
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effectiveness.228 In December 2011 the ACMA released its monitoring report on industry self-
regulation.229 The report found that the initiatives had not addressed community concerns 
about food advertising and that ‘any real-life change in the level of children’s exposure to 
food and beverage advertising on free-to-air television is unclear’.230  
The National Preventative Health Taskforce noted the creation of the RCMI in its 2009 report 
on chronic disease prevention.231 The federal Labor Government had established the 
Taskforce in 2008 to develop ways to address the main modifiable risk factors for non-
communicable diseases, namely tobacco smoking, excess alcohol consumption and obesity.232 
The following year, the Taskforce released its strategy to reduce chronic disease: Australia: 
the Healthiest Country by 2020. The strategy took a ‘responsive’ regulatory approach to 
addressing market-based influences on obesity, tobacco and excessive alcohol consumption. 
It conceptualised this approach as: 233  
… a staged and potentially escalating approach to change, allowing for ‘soft’ mechanisms to be 
trialled, such as voluntary change, self-regulation, co-design, public reporting or positive incentives. 
Where appropriate, rather than opting immediately for harder mechanisms of regulation, enforcement 
or fiscal sanctions, the results are measured and assessed, with action to follow if necessary. 
In line with this approach, the Taskforce recommended a phased strategy for reducing 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, marketing and sponsorship. The steps in 
this strategy were: 234  
• Phasing out unhealthy food advertising on free-to-air and pay television before 9pm 
within four years of the report; 
                                                 
228 Ibid 9. 
229 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report' (Australian Government, 2011) 
<http://engage.acma.gov.au/kids-food-ads/>. This report is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
230 Ibid 6. 
231 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health Strategy - The Roadmap for Action' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 123 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
232 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020 - National Preventative 
Health Strategy - Overview' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 5 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
233 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventive Health Strategy - The Roadmap for Action', 
above n 231, 67. 
234 Ibid 125. 
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• Phasing out the use of premium offers, toys, competitions and promotional characters 
(including celebrities and cartoon characters) to market unhealthy products to 
children; and  
• Developing of a set of definitions and criteria for identifying unhealthy food products. 
 
The Taskforce also noted significant limitations in the food industry’s scheme, including its 
voluntary nature, a lack of sanctions for non-compliance, and the fact that it did not provide 
set criteria for identifying unhealthy products that could not be advertised to children.235 It 
recommended that the Federal government monitor and evaluate the impact of the RCMI on 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.236 The Government could then 
identify any shortfalls in the current voluntary approach and address these through the 
introduction of a co-regulatory arrangement. After monitoring the efficacy of co-regulation, 
the Government would introduce legislation if softer measures were ineffective in achieving 
the goals outlined above.237  
In 2010 the Federal government released its response to the Taskforce’s report, Taking 
Preventive Action: A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020.238 The 
Government ‘noted’ the Taskforce’s recommendations for reducing children’s exposure to 
unhealthy advertising, but did not agree to statutory regulation of food advertising to 
children.239 Instead, it described existing measures for changing the food advertising 
environment, including the creation of the RCMI and QSRI following ‘government 
encouragement,’ funding to national broadcasters to support a children’s channel providing 
advertising free programs and the ACMA’s review and amendment of the CTS 2005.240 The 
Government committed to monitoring the effectiveness of the RCMI and QSRI in reducing 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, which it said was ‘consistent with the 
Taskforce recommendations which propose a staged and potentially escalating approach to 
change’.241 Following this report, the Government tasked the Australian National Preventive 
                                                 
235 Ibid 123. 
236 Ibid 127. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Australian Government, 'Taking Preventative Action: A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 
2020, The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/>. 
239 Ibid 46. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid 47. 
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Health Agency (ANPHA) (an independent public health agency) with monitoring and 
evaluating the efficacy of the two food industry initiatives.242  
Following the government’s failure to strengthen existing regulatory controls, Australian 
political groups sought to introduce legislation restricting food advertising to children. In 
September 2008, Senator Bob Brown (the then leader of the Australian Greens Party) 
introduced a Private Senator’s Bill to ban food and beverage advertising during children’s 
television viewing times.243 The Senate referred the Bill to an inquiry by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Community Affairs.244 The Committee’s report noted a number of 
developments in the area of food advertising regulation, including the CTS review and the 
creation of the RCMI.245 The Committee concluded that it was ‘premature to bring forward 
legislative changes to food and beverage advertising’ before the food industry’s initiative 
could be properly assessed.246 Accordingly, the Bill failed to pass. In 2010 Senator Brown 
reintroduced the Bill into the Senate, but was again opposed by Government and the 
opposition.247 In November 2011 the Senator introduced a second Bill that sought to ban 
unhealthy food advertising during children’s programming and peak viewing periods.248 As at 
July 2013, the Bill remained before Senate.249 However, it seems unlikely to gain political 
support given the government’s agreement to monitor the food industry initiatives before 
considering alternative forms of regulation.  
                                                 
242 Ibid. See also Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (2011) 17 Australian 
Government <http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/strategic-plan>.  
243 The Protecting Children from Junk Food Advertising (Broadcasting Amendment) Bill 2008 acted by 
amending the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) to prohibit food and beverage advertising between 6am 
until 9.30pm (sch 1). It also amended the Schools Assistance (Learning Together – Achievement Through 
Choice and Opportunity) Act 2004 (Cth) to require that schools not display food advertising or make 
sponsorship announcements, as a condition of financial assistance (sch 2). 
244 Rhonda Jolly, 'Marketing Obesity? Junk Food, Advertising and Kids' (Research Paper No 9, Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of Australia, 2011) 3 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2F48144
9%22>.  
245 Standing Committee on Community Affairs, The Senate, Protecting Children from Junk Food Advertising 
(Broadcasting Amendment) Bill 2008 (2008)17. 
246 Ibid 17-18. 
247 Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates Senate, 21 November 2011, 9013 (Bob Brown). See 
also Jolly, above n 244, 34. 
248 The Protecting Children From Junk Food Advertising (Broadcasting and Telecommunications Amendment) 
Bill 2011 restricts unhealthy food advertising during children’s peak television viewing periods, on subscription 
broadcast services intended for or primarily watched by children, on the internet, and by ‘commercial electronic 
message’. As with the prior Greens bill, restrictions would take effect through amendments to the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth).  
249 See Parliament of Australia, Protecting Children from Junk Food Advertising (Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Amendment Bill 2011 (undated) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s827>. 
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7. Arguments for government regulation of food advertising to children 
Children’s vulnerability to advertising 
Public health advocates support the Greens’ bid for tougher restrictions on food advertising. 
They argue that states have a responsibility to protect children’s health on the basis that 
children are a vulnerable population group.250 Because of their limited cognitive development, 
children cannot make genuinely free consumption choices.251 In particular, food advertising 
directed to children under the age of eight is widely considered unethical because of their 
inability to distinguish between marketing and editorial content (as described above).252 Thus, 
for many public health advocates, ‘[t]he intense marketing of high fat, high sugar foods to 
young children can be viewed as exploitation because they do not understand that 
commercials are designed to sell products and do not have the ability to comprehend or 
evaluate advertising’.253 Further, advertising’s influence on children’s consumption patterns 
extends into adulthood, as food preferences and behaviours develop early in life and predict 
children’s future consumption habits and diet-related health.254  
The state’s duty to protect children from harmful advertising practices finds expression in 
Australia’s international law obligations.255 For example, article 17 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) requires that States’ Parties protect 
children from information and material that is injurious to their wellbeing.256 Other United 
Nations documents grant children the right to adequate food257 and freedom from obesity.258 A 
                                                 
250 See, e.g., Wilcox et al, above n 92, 23; World Health Organisation, 'Marketing of Foods High in Fat, Salt and 
Sugar to Children: Update 2012-2013', above n 83, 9; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 'Public Health: Ethical 
Issues'  (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007) para 2.44 <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/public-health>.  
251 Committee on Communications, above n 90, 2563; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 250, 89. 
252 See, e.g., Wilcox et al, above n 92, 21. 
253 Story and French, above n 74, 16. 
254 McGinnis, Gootman and Kraak, above n 35, 73; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 250, 89. 
255 See Swinburn et al, 'The "Sydney Principles" for Reducing the Commercial Promotion of Foods and 
Beverages to Children', above n 169; Richard Ingleby, Lauren Prossner and Elizabeth Waters, 'UNCROC and 
the Prevention of Childhood Obesity: The Right Not to Have Food Advertisements on Television' (2008) 16(1) 
Journal of Law and Medicine 49; Louise Thornley, Louise Signal and George Thomson, 'Does Industry 
Regulation of Food Advertising Protect Child Rights?' (2010) 1 Critical Public Health 25. 
256 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990). See also Ingleby, Prossner and Waters, above n 255, 49-50. 
257 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate Food 
(Art 11), 20th sess, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (12 May 1999). See also Swinburn et al, 'The "Sydney Principles" 
for Reducing the Commercial Promotion of Foods and Beverages to Children,' above n 169, 882. 
258 United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition, The Human Right of Children and Adolescents to 
Adequate Food and to be Free from Obesity and Related Diseases: The Responsibilities of Food and Beverage 
Corporations and Related Media and Marketing Industries. Statement by the Working Groups on Nutrition 
throughout the Lifecycle and Nutrition, Ethics and Human Rights on the United Nations Standing Committee on 
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rights-based approach requires that states take action to support parents in protecting their 
children’s health and wellbeing.259 This includes creating a marketing environment that does 
not undermine parents’ attempts to guide their children’s eating habits.260 A rights-based 
approach also implies that protecting children’s health trumps concerns about the negative 
impact of advertising bans on broadcasters’ revenues, which was a key issue in the ACMA’s 
review of the CTS 2005.261 This approach is more favourable to the protection of children 
than a risk-based approach that weighs up the likely costs and benefits of interventions and 
attempts to minimise the risk of harm and maximise benefits.262 As such, human rights 
discourses provide a powerful justification for state intervention in food advertising to 
children. 
Harm to wider society  
Popular and political discourse more often frames obesity as a problem of individual choice 
and individual consequences.263 In the neo-liberal era public health laws can be seen as 
paternalistic and infringing individual liberties.264 This is in contrast to tobacco, where 
governments justified advertising restrictions on the basis of second-hand smoke’s harm to 
third parties, including to children.265 However, public health researchers point to emerging 
research on the addictiveness of processed foods and sugary beverages, which justifies the 
application of a tobacco control model to these products.266 Researchers also conceptualise 
obesity as causing harms to wider society through the economic, social and health costs 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nutrition (15 March 2006) <http://www.unscn.org/en/statements/>. See also Swinburn et al, 'The "Sydney 
Principles" for Reducing the Commercial Promotion of Foods and Beverages to Children,' above n 169, 882. 
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265 See, e.g., David A Kessler et al, 'The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Tobacco Products' 
(1996) 335(13) The New England Journal of Medicine 988. 
266 A Gearhard, 'Food Addiction: An Examination of the Diagnostic Criteria for Dependence' (2009) 3(1) 
Journal of Addiction Medicine 1; Robert H Lustig, Laura A Schmidt and Claire D Brindis, 'Public Health: The 
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food.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
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associated with metabolic syndrome and chronic disease.267 Thus, obesity can be thought of 
as an example of market failure.268 It is a ‘negative externality’, where the food industry 
externalises the costs of producing unhealthy food products onto wider society.269 This 
challenges the conception of obesity as an individual problem, and provides grounds for 
making food companies take responsibility for the true costs associated with production and 
consumption of unhealthy foods and beverages.270 These costs include the burden on the 
healthcare system from obesity-related illnesses, as well as decreased productivity and 
individuals’ loss of social functioning and wellbeing. 
The failure of self-regulation 
The current body of evidence does not demonstrate that voluntary initiatives by the 
Australian food industry have moderated the nature or volume of food advertising directed to 
children.271 Signatory and non-signatory companies continue to advertise unhealthy products 
during children’s programs and peak viewing times.272 There are also significant flaws in the 
design and implementation of the self-regulatory system. The codes contain narrow and 
vague terms, meaning that they exclude many advertising techniques and media channels 
used to promote food to children.273 Additionally, they only apply to a narrow range of food 
and beverage products, permitting companies to advertise a variety of unhealthy products to 
children.274 Most importantly, the initiatives only apply to advertising that is ‘directed 
primarily to children’. As a result, they do not reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food 
                                                 
267 Lustig, Schmidt and Brindis, above n 266, 28. 
268 Kathleen Seiders and Ross D Petty, 'Obesity and the Role of Food Marketing: A Policy Analysis of Issues 
and Remedies' (2004) 23(2) Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 153; Bebe Loff and Brad R Crammond, 
'Wanted: Politicians to Champion Health (Not Obesity)' (2010) 192(7) Medical Journal of Australia 397. 
269 Lustig, Schmidt and Brindis, above n 266; Frank Chaloupka, 'Public Policy versus Individual Rights and 
Responsibility: An Economist's Perspective' (2011) 8(5) Preventing Chronic Disease 1, 2. 
270 Lustig, Schmidt and Brindis, above n 266. See also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 250, xvii. 
271 Lisa G Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, 'Television Marketing of Unhealthy Food and Beverages 
to Children in Australia: A Review of Published Evidence from 2009' (Australian National Preventive Health 
Agency, October 2012) 3 <http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/publications>. 
272 Ibid 32. See also Kelly et al, 'Trends in Food Advertising to Children on Free-to-Air Television in Australia', 
above n 55; Lana Hebden, et al, 'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of 
Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) Medical Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case 
for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public 
Health Nutrition 1 <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
273 Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 67, 12-13; Lana Hebden et al, 'Industry Self-regulation of Food 
Marketing to Children: Reading the Fine Print' (2010) 21(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 229; L 
Wallard et al, 'The Takeaway on Fast-Food Meals: A Summary of Three Fast-Food Studies in Australia' (Cancer 
Council NSW, 2012) <http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/68145/news-media/latest-news-news-media/cc-
news/fast-food-exposing-the-truth/?pp=68145>. 
274 Wallard et al, above n 273, 5; Lana Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of Foods and Beverages Marketed to 
Australian Children: How Useful are Food Industry Commitments?' (2010) 67(4) Nutrition & Dietetics 258, 
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advertising designed for a general viewing audience and screened in times that are popular 
with both adults and children.275 Administration, monitoring and enforcement processes also 
lack transparency and accountability, diminishing the initiatives’ credibility with the wider 
community.276 While industry monitoring demonstrates high levels of compliance with the 
initiatives,277 studies show numerous breaches of the codes, suggesting that the industry’s 
findings are inaccurate.278 However, as there are no penalties for non-compliance, companies 
have few incentives to improve their advertising practices.279 
Researchers draw similar conclusions about food advertising self-regulation in other 
jurisdictions.280 For example, although the US CFBAI has had some positive impact on the 
nutritional quality of foods advertised to children,281 the vast majority of food promotion is 
still for unhealthy products.282 And despite expansions to the code’s coverage of different 
advertising platforms, it still excludes product packaging and in-store promotion, as well as 
some forms of in-school marketing.283 Overall, there is little to no evidence that food industry 
self-regulation is effective.284 Corinne Hawkes argues that food advertising self-regulation is 
fundamentally limited as an obesity prevention measure because it only controls the content 
of advertising, i.e. it prohibits advertising that is misleading, deceptive, exploitive or 
explicitly encourages excess consumption.285 However, it cannot reduce the large volume of 
food advertising that children are exposed to across all media, which is the crux of the 
problem for public health researchers.286 Further, the food industry has a strong economic 
incentive to sell highly processed food and sugary beverages, but little reason to forgo 
                                                 
275 Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 67, 11-12. 
276 Reeve, above n 207. 
277 See, e.g., Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
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278 Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising Regulations in Australia' 
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280 See, e.g., Dale Kunkel, Christopher McKinley and Paul Wright, 'The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation on 
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284 See, e.g., Stuckler and Nestle, above n 48, 2; Moodie et al, above n 51, 675; Wallard et al, above n 273; 
Kraak et al, above n 280. 
285 C Hawkes, 'Self-Regulation of Food Advertising: What it Can, Could and Cannot Do To Discourage 
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revenues generated from their sales, creating a fundamental conflict between the industry’s 
profit and obesity prevention.287 Thus, self-regulation constitutes another example of market 
failure in relation to obesity, providing a strong argument for government regulation of 
unhealthy food promotion.288   
Advertising restrictions are highly cost-effective  
Research suggests that legislative restrictions on food advertising would be highly cost-
effective.289  Further, regulation could be designed that reduced the volume of unhealthy food 
advertising during children’s peak viewing times, with little effect on healthy food 
advertising.290 One Australian study evaluated the cost-effectiveness of extending regulation 
to remove most food and beverage advertising during children’s peaking viewing times.291 
The study measured benefits according to the cost per body mass index unit saved and as the 
cost per disability-adjusted life year saved.292 The costs of intervention were measured in 
terms of the stricter monitoring and enforcement of extended regulation, while cost offsets 
were assessed to be future health sector costs saved (which were deducted from the cost of 
the intervention to determine its net cost).293 The study found that the intervention would 
result in a small BMI change per child, but a large total health benefit because of the large 
number of children affected and the fact that it was low cost.294 It concluded that the 
intervention was highly cost effective, even when considering the potential lost sales of food 
manufacturers.295 In fact, advertising restrictions were one of the most cost-effective measures 
commonly considered as part of government obesity prevention programs.296 
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Public support for regulating food advertising to children 
Any proposed legislation would be subject to political scrutiny, which would involve 
considering community approval of advertising restrictions.297 However, there appears to be 
significant public support for strengthening government restrictions on unhealthy food 
advertising.298 A 2007 survey of 400 Australian parents found widespread concern about 
unhealthy food advertising to children (67.3 per cent), including the use of toys (76.4 per 
cent) and popular personalities (67.7 per cent), as well as the large volume of advertising that 
children were exposed to (79.7 per cent).299 Almost all parents (92.8 per cent) supported 
stronger government restrictions on food advertising during children’s peak television 
viewing times, with high levels of support for a ban on unhealthy food advertising during 
these times (86.6 per cent).300 A more recent survey found that the majority of participants (83 
per cent) were in favour of restrictions on televised food advertising, particularly in the 
mornings between 6am and 9am, and the evenings between 4pm and 9.30pm (43 per cent).301 
Participants supported restrictions on other forms of food promotion, including direct 
marketing to children via text message and email, sports sponsorship, and the use of toys, 
giveaways and packaging designed to appeal to children.302 Overall, research suggests high 
levels of public acceptability for policy interventions that aim to create a healthier food 
environment, including statutory regulation of food advertising.303 
8. Conclusion 
There are strong arguments for statutory regulation of unhealthy food advertising to children. 
However, the Federal government appears reluctant to regulate and instead supports 
voluntary industry initiatives. Chapter 11 describes the political and practical barriers to 
legislative restrictions on food advertising, including vigorous industry opposition and 
political ideologies that favour de-regulation and a free market economy. Thus, while it is 
widely accepted that food companies should limit food advertising directed to children, there 
                                                 
297 Wilde, above n 184, 158; Alexandra Chung et al, 'An Analysis of Potential Barriers and Enablers to 
Regulating the Television Marketing of Unhealthy Foods to Children at the State Government Level in 
Australia' (2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 1123, 1128. 
298 See, e.g., Belinda Morley et al, 'Public Opinion on Food-Related Obesity Prevention Policy Initiatives' 
(2012) 23(2) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 86; Belinda Morley et al, 'Parental Awareness and 
Attitudes about Food Advertising to Children on Australian Television' (2008) 32(4) Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health 341. 
299 Morley et al, 'Parental Awareness and Attitudes about Food Advertising to Children', above n 298. 
300 Ibid 344.  
301 Morley et al, 'Public Opinion on Food-Related Obesity Prevention Policy Initiatives', above n 298, 88. 
302 Ibid 89. 
303 Ibid. 
59 
 
is considerable debate on the scope of restrictions, what regulatory instruments should be 
used, and whether they should be implemented by government or industry. Within the 
context of this debate, this thesis evaluates the current self-regulatory regime for food 
advertising to children in Australia. I also examine ways in which states can strengthen 
voluntary forms of food regulation, without resorting to statutory measures in the first 
instance. In particular, I consider the incremental or staged introduction of different forms of 
government intervention and oversight. I refer to this as a ‘responsive’ regulatory approach, 
following the terminology used by the National Preventative Health Taskforce, and in 
literature from regulatory theory. As a first step in assessing food industry self-regulation, the 
next chapter describes the regulation of food, alcohol and tobacco advertising in Australia. 
Chapter 3 draws together literature from public health ethics and regulatory theory in order to 
provide a principled basis for state intervention into food advertising regulation. This chapter 
lays the foundation for designing an effective regulatory system that includes voluntary 
action by the food industry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Regulation of tobacco, alcohol and food advertising in Australia 
This chapter introduces the regulatory regime governing tobacco, alcohol and food 
advertising in Australia, with a particular focus on advertising directed to children. The 
chapter is ordered by moving from discussion of the strongest and most restrictive forms of 
regulation to the weakest and most permissive. First, I describe legislative restrictions on 
advertising, including consumer protection laws, tobacco control legislation and state-level 
food laws. Second, I outline the co-regulatory scheme established by the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth) for television and radio advertising. Third, I discuss the self-
regulatory system created by the Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA). 
Last, I describe a series of product-specific codes created by industry representative bodies. 
These codes include the RCMI and QSRI and the Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and 
Packaging) Code (ABAC), which are the main focus of this thesis. I also describe the 
arrangements for administering and enforcing each form of regulation. Tables 3 and 4 below 
summarise the regulatory arrangements for food and alcohol advertising in Australia. 
This chapter only covers a small part of marketing law and regulation. I focus on promotion 
separately from other elements of the ‘marketing mix’, i.e. product creation, price and 
location.1 I consider advertising as being distinct from other marketing tools, such as personal 
selling, public relations, and direct marketing.2 However, there are overlaps between the 
regulatory systems that apply to each form of commercial communication. Accordingly, I 
touch on controls on other forms of marketing, including sponsorship, product labelling and 
packaging. I describe regulation of a range of communication channels, but focus most 
closely on television advertising. Because of its influence and capacity to reach a broad 
audience, this is the most heavily regulated medium,3 as well as the most studied in research 
on food advertising.4 
 
                                                 
1 William Wells et al, Advertising: Principles and Practices (Pearson Australia, 2nd ed, 2011) 49. 
2 Ibid 52-55. See also Jef I Richards and Catharine M Curran, 'Oracles on "Advertising": Searching for a 
Definition' (2002) 31(2) Journal of Advertising 63.  
3 David Rolph, Matt Vitins and Judith Bannister, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 70. 
4 Kathy Chapman, Bridget P Kelley and Lesley A King, 'Using a Research Framework to Identify Knowledge 
Gaps in Research on Food Marketing to Children in Australia' (2009) 33(3) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Public Health 253.  
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Table 3. A summary of food advertising regulation 
Communication 
channel 
Instrument Form of 
regulation 
Key requirements 
All media and 
marketing 
Australian 
Consumer Law 
Legislation Food advertising must not be misleading, deceptive or 
untruthful. 
All advertising 
and marketing 
State Food Acts Legislation Food advertising, packaging and promotion must not be 
misleading, deceptive or untruthful. 
All advertising State Food Acts Standards Provides for the substantiation and approval of health and 
nutrition claims made in food advertising and labelling. 
Some states’ legislation requires that energy content 
information be provided on menu boards and package 
labelling in fast-food restaurant outlets. 
Free-to-air 
television 
Children’s 
Television 
Standards 2009 
Standards Regulates the scheduling, volume and content of advertising 
to children during C periods (a period when licensees screen 
programs classified as suitable for children). Restricts the 
use of persuasive techniques in advertising to children, 
including premium offers, undue pressure, prizes and 
popular characters. Food advertising must not contain any 
misleading or deceptive information about the nutritional 
quality of the product. 
Free-to-air 
television 
2010 Commercial 
Television Industry 
Code of Practice 
Co-regulation Advertising directed to children must not encourage or 
promote an inactive lifestyle, or unhealthy eating or 
drinking habits. Prohibits advertising to children that 
contains misleading or incorrect nutritional information 
about food products. Regulates the use of program hosts and 
characters in promotions to children, and references to 
sponsorship arrangements and prizes.  Extends CTS 30-34 
to advertising to children outside of  C and P periods. 
All media 
(excludes product 
labels, packaging, 
public relations, 
program 
promotions) 
AANA Code of 
Ethics 
Self-
regulation 
Regulates taste and decency in advertising, including 
discrimination, sexual appeal, violence, sex, sexuality and 
nudity, strong or obscene language and health and safety. 
All media 
(excludes product 
packaging and 
labelling) 
AANA Code for 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Communications to 
Children   
Self-
regulation 
Advertising must not promote inactive lifestyles or 
unhealthy eating and drinking habits. Prohibits advertising 
that draws upon pester power, and regulates the use of 
popular personalities and premiums. 
All media 
(excludes product 
packaging and 
labelling) 
AANA Food and 
Beverages: 
Advertising and 
Marketing 
Communications 
Code 
Self-
regulation 
Prohibits advertising that undermines parental authority, 
draws upon pester power, creates a misleading sense of 
urgency, undermines the importance of healthy/active 
lifestyles and balanced diets, or which encourages excess 
consumption. Regulates the presentation of premium offers. 
Television, radio, 
print, cinema, 
third-party 
internet sites 
(where audience is 
predominantly 
children and/or 
directed primarily 
to children). 
Responsible 
Children’s 
Marketing Initiative 
Self-
regulation 
Advertising to children must be for ‘healthy dietary choices’ 
and promote a healthy lifestyle in advertising messaging. 
Regulates the use of popular and licensed 
personalities/characters, product placement including in 
interactive games, advertising in schools and premium 
offers. 
Television, radio, 
newspapers, 
magazines, 
outdoor 
advertising, 
emails, interactive 
games, cinema 
and internet sites. 
Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry 
Initiative for 
Responsible 
Advertising and 
Marketing to 
Children 
Self-
regulation 
Advertising to children must be for ‘healthier choices’ 
and/or represent a healthy lifestyle in advertising messaging. 
Regulates the use of licensed personalities/characters, 
product placement including in interactive games, 
advertising in schools and premium offers. 
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Table 4. A summary of alcohol advertising regulation 
Communication 
channel 
Instrument Form of 
regulation 
Key requirements 
All media and 
marketing 
Australian 
Consumer Law 
Legislation Alcohol advertising must not be misleading, deceptive or 
untruthful. 
Free-to-air 
television 
Children’s 
Television 
Standards 2009 
Standards Alcohol advertisements must not be broadcast during C 
periods. Advertisements and sponsorship announcements 
broadcasting during C periods must not identify/refer to 
companies, persons or organisations whose principal 
activity is the manufacture, distribution and sale of alcoholic 
drinks. 
Free-to-air 
television 
2010 Commercial 
Television Industry 
Code of Practice 
Co-regulation Alcohol advertisements may only be broadcast in M, MA or 
AV classification periods (i.e. between 12-3pm on school 
days and 8.30pm-5am on any day). Creates an exception for 
advertisements that accompany the live broadcast of sports 
events on weekends and public holidays. 
Advertising to children must not be for, or relate in any way 
to alcohol products, or draw any association with companies 
that supply alcohol products. 
All media Alcohol Beverages 
Advertising (and 
Packaging) Code 
Quasi-
regulation 
Prohibits advertising that encourages irresponsible or excess 
consumption, underage drinking or has ‘strong and evident 
appeal’ to children. Also prohibits advertising that shows a 
connection between alcohol consumption and a change in 
mood and environment, social success, hazardous activities 
or the operation of motor vehicles. 
All media 
(excludes product 
labels, packaging, 
public relations, 
program 
promotions) 
AANA Code of 
Ethics 
Self-
regulation 
Regulates taste and decency in advertising, including 
discrimination, sexual appeal, violence, sex, sexuality and 
nudity, strong or obscene language and health and safety. 
All media 
(excludes product 
packaging and 
labelling) 
AANA Code for 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Communications to 
Children   
Self-
regulation 
Advertising to children must not be for, or relate in any way 
to alcohol products, or draw any association with companies 
that supply alcohol products. 
Outdoor and 
billboard 
advertising 
Outdoor Media 
Association’s 
Alcohol Advertising 
Guidelines 
Self-
regulation 
Prohibits alcohol advertising on fixed signs within a 150 
metre sight-line of primary schools. Members must only 
accept alcohol advertising that has been pre-vetted. 
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1. Legislative restrictions on advertising  
The Australian Consumer Protection Law 
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) contains the Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL).5 The ACL is a single national law that is applied in each jurisdiction by state and 
territory Fair Trading Acts.6 Section 18(1) of the ACL contains a general prohibition on false 
and misleading conduct in trade or commerce, including misleading and deceptive 
statements.7 Section 29 prohibits false and misleading claims and representations about the 
supply of goods or services, and claims and representations made in the course of promoting 
the supply/use of goods or services.8 The Act restricts misleading marketing and promotion, 
including misleading and deceptive representations of food in advertising.9 However, it 
applies to all misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to the manufacture and promotion 
of food and alcohol, including the provision of product information, packaging and 
labelling.10   The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) administers 
and enforces the ACL,11 including by identifying and removing misleading advertising.12 It 
possesses a wide range of enforcement options, including court-ordered injunctions,13 
corrective advertising,14 community service and probation orders,15 and enforceable 
undertakings.16 State and territory Fair Trading Acts establish consumer protection agencies 
that administer and enforce consumer protection legislation in each state.17 
 
                                                 
5 See Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. 
6 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt XIAA. See, e.g., Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) s28.  
7 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 18. 
8 Ibid s 29. 
9 LexisNexus, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 2 May 2011) 100 Consumer Protection, 'Misleading Conduct' 
[100-120]. See also Free TV Commercials Advice, Classification Handbook: An Overview of Classification 
Procedures Incorporating the A-Z Television Production Checklist (January 2010) 45-46 Commercials Advice 
Division <http://www.freetv.com.au/content_common/pg-cad-procedures-guide.seo>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt 2. 
12 Wells et al, above n 1, 77. 
13 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 232. 
14 Ibid sch 2 s 246(2)(b). 
15 Ibid sch 2 s 246.  
16 Ibid sch 2 s 218. 
17 See, e.g., Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) pt 2; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
'Advertising and Selling' (Commonwealth of Australia, January 2011) 1 
<http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/303213>; NSW Government, Fair Trading (2 April 
2013) <http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/default.html>.  
64 
 
Tobacco control legislation 
Tobacco advertising is regulated by statute because of the product’s harmfulness.18 The 
Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth) provides a comprehensive set of national 
controls on advertising in print and electronic media, outdoor advertising and tobacco 
sponsorship.19  It permits state and territory governments to pass legislation regulating forms 
of advertising that are permitted at a federal level, consistently with the Act.20 State 
legislation prohibits point-of-sale advertising and places stringent controls on the location, 
size and format of retail displays of tobacco products, as well as banning the display of 
cartons and limiting the number of packets displayed.21 In March 2012 the Federal 
government enacted legislation restricting tobacco advertising on the internet and via other 
electronic media.22 After a constitutional challenge by the tobacco industry,23 it also 
introduced the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth).24 The Act requires that all tobacco 
products be sold in drab brown packaging with a matt finish and prominent health warnings, 
with no graphic trademarks or other embellishments.25 Thus, tobacco promotion is 
comprehensively covered by both state and federal controls, with a federally-based legislative 
framework covering gaps in state-based regulation.26 
                                                 
18 Legislative restrictions also apply to advertising for gambling and lotteries, electoral advertising, advertising 
that contains immoral, obscene or indecent content, as well as advertising for other harmful goods. Shenagh 
Barnes and Michael Blakeney, Advertising Regulation (Lawbook, 1982) 70. See, e.g., the Therapeutic Goods 
Act 1989 (Cth) and Therapeutic Goods Administration, Therapeutic Goods Advertising Code 2007 (at 11 July 
2013).  
19 Christopher Reynolds, Public Health and Environmental Health Law (Federation Press, 2011) 273. The Act 
permits point-of-sale advertising so long as state legislation regulates its display or it complies with provisions 
of the Act. It also allows for the transmission of advertisements as an ‘accidental or incidental’ accompaniment 
to other broadcasts or publications. See Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth) ss 14, 16(1), 19. 
20 Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth) s 6. For relevant state and territory legislation, see, e.g., 
Public Health (Tobacco) Act 2008 (NSW).  
21 See, e.g., Public Health (Tobacco) Regulation 2009 (NSW). 
22 Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) ss 2, 16A, 16B. See also Department of Health 
and Ageing, Guide to Internet Point-of-Sale Tobacco Advertising (December 2012) Australian Government 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/gipos-tob-adv>. 
23 See JT International SA v Commonwealth; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd and Others v 
Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43. 
24 The Act is accompanied by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011 (Cth) which specify requirements 
for the presentation of retail packaging, including its physical features (pt 2 div 2.1.), colour and finish (pt 2 div 
2.2.), trademarks (pt 2 div 2.3) and brand, business, company and variant names (pt 2 div 2.4), as well as the 
appearance of tobacco products (pt 3). 
25 Andrew D Mitchell and David M Studdert, 'Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products in Australia: A Novel 
Regulation Faces Legal Challenge' (2012) 307(3) Journal of the American Medical Association 261. See 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) pt 2. 
26 Reynolds, above n 19, 87. 
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Food laws 
Food advertising is subject to regulatory requirements found in the Australia and New 
Zealand Food Standards Code (the ‘Food Standards Code’) and state-level Food Acts.27 The 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991 (Cth) establishes Food Standards Australia 
New Zealand (FSANZ) as an independent statutory authority.28 FSANZ creates standards on 
hygiene and safe food preparation, labelling and ingredients based on scientific and technical 
criteria, and in accordance with food and nutrition policy.29  Together, these standards 
constitute the Food Standards Code.30 Each state and territory automatically adopts the Code 
in state legislation,31 and central and local government agencies share responsibility for 
administering and enforcing these laws.32 State Food Acts contain provisions prohibiting 
false and misleading descriptions of food in advertising,33 as well as advertising that 
contravenes the Food Standards Code.34 Recently, NSW and South Australia amended their 
food acts to require that chain food outlets display the kilojoule content of standard food 
items on menu boards and identifying tags or labels on products.35 Other state and territory 
governments (including Victoria and Tasmania) seem likely to introduce to similar 
legislation.36 
The Food Standards Code itself contains a number of standards that are relevant to food 
advertising.37 For example, labels and advertisements must not claim therapeutic or 
                                                 
27 See Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 11 July 2013); 
Neal Blewett et al, 'Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy' (Australian Government, 2011) 
23 <http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/labelling-logic>. 
28 See Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991 (Cth) s 21; Reynolds, above n 19, 324; Food Regulation 
Secretariat, The Food Regulation System (23 January 2009) Department of Health and Ageing 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/foodsecretariat-system1.htm>. 
29 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 'Australia's Food & Nutrition'.  Cat No PHE 163 (AIHW, 2012) 45 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=10737422319>. 
30 Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 13 July 2013). 
31 Council of Australian Governments, 'Food Regulation Agreement' (3 July 2008) pt IV 
<http://www.coag.gov.au/node/272>. 
32 Reynolds, above n 19, 330. See, e.g., Food Act 2003 (NSW) s 107, which establishes the NSW Food 
Authority. Section 111 of the Act envisages that local councils will act as enforcement agencies. See also NSW 
Food Authority, Food Regulation Partnership (30 November 2012) 
<http://www.foodauthority.nsw.gov.au/industry/audits-inspections-compliance/localgovernment/>. 
33 Free TV Commercials Advice, above n 9, 45-46. See, e.g., Food Act 2003 (NSW) ss 18, 22. 
34 See, e.g., Food Act 2003 (NSW) s 21. 
35 See Food Act 2003 (NSW) s 106N; Food Regulation 2010 (NSW) pt2B; Food Act 2001 (SA) s 112; Food 
Regulations 2002 (SA) reg 10A. 
36 S MacKay, 'Legislative Solutions to Unhealthy Eating and Obesity in Australia' (2011) 125(12) Public Health 
896, 901. 
37 The Food Standards Code also regulates alcohol labelling, for example by requiring that alcohol products 
display information on the presence of allergens and mandatory warning and advisory statements (std 1.2.3). 
The recent Food Labelling Law and Policy review (the ‘Food Labelling Review’) recommended changes to the 
regulation of alcohol labelling, including the display of energy content and new warning messages about the 
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prophylactic qualities38  or that the product induces weight loss.39 Food advertisements must 
not contain material that would be prohibited on the label of the product under the provisions 
of the Code.40 The Code restricts claims about the vitamin and mineral content of foods,41 but 
it does not regulate the use of descriptors such as ‘fresh,’ or ‘organic’.42  
Standard 1.2.7, which recently commenced operation after an extensive period of 
consultation, regulates the circumstances in which advertisements can refer to the nutritional 
content of food and in which health claims can be made about a food or properties of a food.43 
Advertising and labelling making nutrition claims (for example, ‘reduced salt’) must meet 
requirements for product composition.44 Health claims must be based on food-health 
relationships that have been substantiated according to the Standard.45 Foods carrying health 
claims must also meet nutritional requirements set out in the Nutrient Profiling Scoring 
Criterion,46 which scores foods based on their total amount of energy, saturated fat, sugar and 
                                                                                                                                                        
health risks of alcohol use (see Blewett et al, above n 27, 97-83). However, the Federal government did not 
support these recommendations, with the exception of a mandatory warning of the risks of drinking while 
pregnant. The government granted the alcohol industry two years to pursue voluntary initiatives to introduce 
such warnings before it would consider action on the issue. See Legislative and Governance Forum on Food 
Regulation (convening as the Australia and New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council), Response to the 
Recommendations of Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy (2011) (10 December 2011) 
30 Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy 
<http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/home>. 
38 Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 10 July 2013) std 
1.2.7 cl 7. 
39 Ibid std s.2.7 cl 14. 
40 Ibid std 1.1.1 cl 13. See also std 1.2.7 cl 17-19, sch 1-3, which outlines the conditions under which claims 
about a relationship between vitamin/mineral and a health effect may be made. 
41 Ibid std 1.3.2 cls 4-9; st 1.2.7 cl 8. 
42 The Food Labelling Review recommended tighter regulation of claims relating to food production methods 
and processes (for example ‘organic’ or ‘halal’) through a combination of co- and self-regulation, including new 
values-based definitions and/or standards related to food production methods and processes in the Food 
Standards Code (see Blewett et al, above n 27, 104-106). The Federal government did not support amendments 
to the Food Standards Code, but endorsed self-regulation via industry codes of conduct. See Legislative and 
Governance Forum on Food Regulation, above n 37, 40-43. 
43 This replaces std 1.1A.2, although the latter remains in force concurrently with std 1.2.7 for three years, and 
companies may use either standard during that period. See also Food Standards Australia New Zealand, 
Historical Development of Draft Standard 1.2.7 - Nutrition, Health and Related Claims (January 2013)  
<http://archive.foodstandards.gov.au/consumerinformation/nutritionhealthandrelatedclaims/healthclaimsstandar
d5081.cfm>. 
44  Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 10 July 2013) std 
1.2.7. cl 10. 
45 For general level health claims, businesses can use a pre-approved relationship contained in the standard or 
they may self-substantiate a relationship using scientific evidence (std 1.2.7 cl 17 (4)(b), 18). Higher-level health 
claims can only be based on food-health relationships pre-approved by FSANZ (std 1.2.7 cl 17(1)-(3).).  
46 Ibid std 1.2.7 cl 17(2). 
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sodium, as well as their content of certain food groups and in some cases, dietary fibre and 
protein.47  
2. Co-regulation under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth)  
This section turns from direct, statutory regulation of tobacco, alcohol and food advertising to 
relevant co-regulatory schemes.  In Australia, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) sets 
out regulatory requirements for television and radio broadcasting services, as well as online 
content.48 The Act requires commercial television and radio broadcasters to be licensed and 
specifies certain licensing conditions applicable to all broadcasters.49 It charges the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) with monitoring the broadcasting industry 
and enforcing license conditions, and grants the ACMA a broad range of powers to perform 
this function.50 The Act also outlines the principles and objectives informing the ACMA’s 
regulatory role, including protecting children from harm; reflecting prevailing community 
standards; providing flexibility for licensees; and balancing public interest considerations 
against economic burdens on industry.51 In order to reduce unnecessary financial and 
economic costs to industry, the ACMA operates within a co-regulatory framework.52 Under 
these arrangements, broadcasting industry groups take responsibility for details of regulation 
in their own sector, through voluntary industry codes of practice.53 However, the ACMA 
maintains oversight of broadcasting regulation, including the power to intervene where self-
regulation fails.54 
The Children’s Television Standards 2009  
The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) empowers the ACMA to determine broadcasting 
standards where a code of practice does not appropriately address community concerns 55 or a 
                                                 
47 Ibid std 1.2.7. cls 24,25, sch 5; see also Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Nutrient Profiling and 
Nutrient Profiling Scoring Criterion (NPSC) (January 2013) 
<http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/consumerinformation/nutritionhealthandrelatedclaims/nutrientprofilingand57
86.cfm>. 
48 See Rolph, Vitins and Bannister, above n 3, 65. 
49 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) pt 4. 
50 Ibid s 5. 
51 Ibid ss 3,4. 
52 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-
Regulatory Arrangements' (Australian Government, June 2010) 5 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib311886/self-_and_co-regulatory_arrangements.pdf>. 
53 Ibid. See Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 123. 
54 Ibid. See Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 125. 
55 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 125(1). 
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particular sector of the broadcasting industry is not covered by a code of practice.56 The 
ACMA must also maintain existing standards for broadcast licensees, including those relating 
to children’s programs,57 i.e. the Children’s Television Standards 2009 (CTS 2009). The CTS 
2009 provide for the creation of children’s programming and oblige licensees to broadcast a 
certain amount of this programming per year. They also impose certain constraints on 
advertisements broadcast during designated children’s viewing times.58 Chapter 1 described 
the ACMA’s review of the CTS 2005.59 Although the ACMA decided not to restrict food and 
beverage advertising, it did restructure the CTS and strengthen some existing controls on 
advertising to children.60 The new CTS are divided into three sections: Part 1 provides 
definitions of key terms; Part 2 sets out licensee’s obligations to broadcast children’s (C) and 
preschool (P) programs and other matters related to program scheduling, requirements and 
classification, while Part 3 sets out the provisions that protect children from harmful program 
and advertising material on television.61  
 The CTS 2009 apply immediately before, during and after designated ‘C’ and ‘P’ programs, 
which are those designed specifically for child audiences and classified as suitable for 
children’s viewing by the ACMA.62 CT5 defines ‘children’ as people younger than 14 years 
of age. C programs are broadcast during set periods (the ‘C band’) namely 7 to 8am Monday 
to Friday, 4 to 8.30 pm Monday to Friday and 7 am to 8.30 pm on the weekends and school 
holidays.63 ‘P’ programs must be broadcast during the period 7 am to 4.30 pm Monday to 
Friday (the ‘P band’).64 Licensees nominate a period within these bands in which to screen C 
programs (the ‘C period’) and P programs (the ‘P period’). Licensees must broadcast at least 
30 minutes of ‘P’ programs and 30 minutes of ‘C’ programs every weekday and at least 260 
hours of ‘C’ programs per year.65  
                                                 
56 Ibid s 125(2). 
57 Ibid s 122.  
58 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: Final 
Report of the Review' (Australian Government, August 2009) 1 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 3. 
61 Ibid. 
62 ‘C’ programs must meet criteria contained in CTS 6 relating to production quality and suitability for 
Australian children. ‘P’ programs are those which are classified as suitable for viewing by pre-school children 
and which meet the same criteria. See Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television 
Standards 2009 (at 11 July 2013) CTS 5, 6.  
63 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 
2013) CTS 5. 
64 Ibid CTS 5. 
65 Ibid CTS 8, 13, 14. 
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Part three of the CTS 2009 regulates the scheduling, volume and content of advertisements in 
C periods. CTS 26 prohibits advertising during P periods and restricts advertising during C 
periods to five minutes per 30 minutes of programming.66 CTS 29 requires that during any 30 
minutes of a C period, licensees may broadcast the same advertisement no more than twice.67 
The CTS restrict advertising content that is false, or misleading and deceptive to children. For 
example, CTS 32 concerns the clear and accurate presentation of advertised goods and 
services. It provides that an advertisement for a food product must not contain any misleading 
or incorrect information about the nutritional value of that product.68 However, this is the 
only standard that deals specifically with food and beverage advertising. The CTS also 
regulate the use of some persuasive techniques commonly used in advertising to children, 
which are described in Table 5 below. 
 
  
  
                                                 
66 Ibid CTS 26. 
67 Ibid CTS 29. 
68 Ibid CTS 32(7). 
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Table 5. Restrictions on persuasive techniques found in the CTS 2009 
Technique Standard Requirements 
Prizes  CTS 24 Presenters must not recommend or endorse prizes 
offered during C programs. The value of cash prizes 
may not be mentioned. 
Pressure in 
advertisements 
CTS 31 (1) Advertisements must not put undue pressure on 
children to ask their parents to purchase a 
product/service. 
(2) Advertisements must not state/imply that a 
product makes the owner superior to their peers, or 
that a person who buys a product for a child is more 
generous than a person who does not. 
Disclaimers and premium 
offers 
CTS 33 (2) Advertisements containing a premium offer must 
not make reference to the premium in a way that is 
more than merely incidental to the reference to the 
advertised product. 
(3) Matters relevant to whether a premium offer is 
merely incidental: amount of time devoted to the 
premium compared to that devoted to product; the 
way in which sound, pictures, text or moving images 
are used to promote the premium offer. 
Promotions/endorsements 
by program characters 
CTS 35  (1) Material broadcast during or immediately before 
or after C/P periods may not contain an endorsement, 
recommendation or promotion of a commercial 
product by a principle personality/character from a 
C/P program; popular program or movie character; 
popular cartoon, animated or computer generated 
character; popular personality; licensed or proprietary 
character. 
 
The review of the CTS 2005 resulted in the ACMA strengthening provisions on pressure in 
advertisements, endorsements by program characters and premium offers. The review 
highlighted particular concern about the use of premium offers in food advertising to 
children.69 Public health advocates called for bans on the use of premium offers in food 
advertising during C periods70 or before 9pm.71 They also proposed that the CTS prohibit 
food and non-food items from being treated as a single product,72 as research showed that 
parents were concerned about food companies promoting free toys or other give-aways with 
                                                 
69 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: Final 
Report of the Review', above n 58, 13. 
70 See Choice, Submission to the Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television 
Standards Review, August 2007, 13 <http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/Childrens-
TV/childrens-television-standards-review>; Obesity Policy Coalition, Submission to Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards Review,  August 2007, 74-75 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/Childrens-TV/childrens-television-standards-review>. 
71 Rosemary Stanton, Submission to Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television 
Standards Review, 30 August 2007, 6 <http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/Childrens-
TV/childrens-television-standards-review>. 
72 Ibid. See also Obesity Policy Coalition, above n 70, 75. 
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food products because it amplified children’s pester power.73 The ACMA declined to make 
these changes, although it clarified the provision to address criticisms that it was too 
ambiguous to ensure that children were not unduly influenced by premium offers. The current 
provision emphasises that in an advertisement for a food product, any reference to a non-food 
component must be ‘merely incidental’ to the food product advertised.74  The ACMA also 
inserted into the provision a list of factors considered relevant to determining whether the 
reference to the premium offer is merely incidental.75 However, CTS 33 continues to regulate 
how premiums are portrayed, rather than prohibiting their use altogether.76 
The CTS contains some specific requirements for alcohol advertising. CTS 36 prohibits 
advertising for alcoholic drinks during C periods, during C or P programs broadcast outside C 
periods, or in a break immediately before or after any C or P program.77 Further, no 
advertisement or sponsorship announcement broadcast during a C period may identify or 
refer to a company, person, or organisation ‘whose principal activity is the manufacture, 
distribution or sale of alcoholic drinks’.78  
Researchers have identified a number of limitations in the CTS, including that they contain 
only one standard relating specifically to food advertising.79 They also have very limited 
coverage.80 The standards examined here apply during C and P periods.81 However, television 
audience measurement data from 2006 shows that the most popular weekday viewing period 
for children aged five to 12 years is 6pm to 10pm, peaking at 7 to 8pm.82 Only part of this 
                                                 
73 Ibid. See, e.g., Michele Roberts, 'Parenting in an Obesogenic Environment' (2005) 9 Journal of Research for 
Consumers 1. 
74 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: Final 
Report of the Review', above n 58, 10. The relevant provision of the CTS 2005 said that where a premium was 
offered, reference to the premium had to be ‘incidental’ to the main product or service advertised (Australian 
Communications and Media Authority Children’s Television Standards 2005 (at 11 July 2013) CTS 20), rather 
than ‘merely incidental’ as per the current provision found in CTS 33(2) of the CTS 2009. 
75 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: Final 
Report of the Review', above n 58, 10. See also Australian Communications and Media Authority Children’s 
Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 2013) CTS 33(3). 
76 Heather Morton et al, 'Food Advertising and Broadcasting Legislation - A Case of System Failure?' (2005) 
62(1) Nutrition & Dietetics 26, 27. 
77 Australian Communications and Media Authority Children’s Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 2013) 
CTS 36. 
78 Ibid CTS 36(2). 
79 This is found in CTS 32(7), described above. 
80 Obesity Policy Coalition, above n 70, 31. 
81 With the exception of CTS 24, which applies to C and P programs. 
82 Lesley A King et al, 'Consultancy Report on Inappropriate Food Marketing to the National Preventative 
Taskforce' (Institute of Obesity, Nutrition and Exercise, The University of Sydney, 2009) 6 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/engagement-and-
consultation-1lp>. See also Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Children's Viewing Patterns on 
Commercial, Free-to-Air and Subscription Television' (Australian Government, May 2007) 
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viewing time falls within the C band, which runs from 4 to 8.30pm on weekdays.83 Further, 
licensees nominate a ‘C period’ within the C band to show C programs. Consequently, the 
CTS only apply to the C period during which licensees broadcast C programs, rather than the 
times of day that constitute the C band.84 Licensees do not have to make publicly available 
their schedule for children’s viewing times, making it practically impossible for non-licensees 
to become aware of the time periods during which the CTS apply and whether licensees are 
compliant.85  
Further, research suggests that food advertisers routinely breach the Standards.86 One 2012 
study identified 619 breaches of the CTS 2009 during two months of television advertising on 
four main free-to-air channels in five large Australian cities.87 In addition to their narrow 
application, these findings suggest that the CTS are widely ignored or circumvented even 
when they do apply. Thus, public health advocates call for more effective monitoring and 
enforcement of the standards by the ACMA (described further below).88 
Broadcasting industry codes of practice  
The Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) requires that broadcasting industry bodies create 
codes of practice in consultation with the ACMA.89 Section 123 of the Act outlines content 
for the codes, including classification and broadcast of films, promoting accuracy in news 
and current affairs programs, and protecting children from harmful programming content.90 
Codes must also provide for a complaints handling mechanism, enabling public complaints 
about program content and compliance with the codes of practice.91 The ACMA registers a 
code of practice where it is satisfied that the code contains appropriate community 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310132/children_viewing_patterns_commercial_free-to-
air_subscription_television.pdf>. 
83 See also Elizabeth Handsley et al, 'Regulatory Axes on Food Advertising to Children on Television' (2009) 
6(1) Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 1, 3. 
84 See Australian Communications and Media Authority Children’s Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 2013) 
CTS 5. 
85 Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising Regulations in Australia' 
(2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846, 847. See also Elizabeth Handsley et al, 'Media, Public Health and Law: A 
Lawyer's Primer on the Food Advertising Debate' (2007) 12 Media and Arts Law Review 87 for a discussion of 
the complex and confusing nature of the CTS 2005. 
86 See, e.g., Morton et al, above n 76; Roberts et al, above n 85, Kathy Chapman, Penny Nicholas and Rajah 
Supramaniam, 'How Much Food Advertising is There On Australian Television?' (2006) 21(3) Health 
Promotion International 172; Bridget P Kelly and Josephine Y Chau, 'Children's Television Sub-Standards: A 
Call for Significant Amendments' (2007) 186(1) Medical Journal of Australia 18. 
87 Roberts et al, above n 85. 
88 Ibid 850. 
89 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 130(J). 
90 Ibid s 123(2). 
91 Ibid s 123(2)(h). 
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safeguards, has the endorsement of most service providers in the relevant broadcasting 
category and the public have been given adequate opportunity to comment.92 Industry codes 
of conduct regulate commercial and community radio, ABC and SBS radio channels, 
subscription, narrowcast and open radio, commercial television, community television, 
subscription broadcast, and internet content and mobile services. They include the: 
• 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (the ‘Free TV Code’);93 
• Commercial Radio Codes of Practice;94 and 
• Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association Codes of Practice for 
Subscription Broadcast Television, Subscription Narrowcast Television, Open 
Narrowcast Television and Subscription Narrowcast Radio.95 
Apart from the Free TV Code, this chapter does not deal with these codes as they contain few 
or no provisions that are relevant to food advertising to children. 
The Free TV Code regulates the content of commercial television in accordance with current 
community standards.96 The Code was created by the industry body representing commercial 
free-to-air television licensees (Free TV) and applies to all free-to-air television 
programming.97 It sets out a system for classifying program material based on a series of 
viewing zones, which are established with reference to the majority audience normally 
viewing at the time.98 Other provisions concern program promotions, accuracy in news and 
current affairs programs, time limits on non-program matter and complaints handling by 
licensees.99 The Code also provides for the classification and placement of commercials.100 
Free TV Australia operates the Commercial Advice Division (CAD), which reviews 
advertising against a classification system set out in the Code. Where an advertisement meets 
                                                 
92 Ibid s 123(4).  
93 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013). 
94 Commercial Radio Australia, Commercial Radio Codes of Practice (at 7 March 2013). 
95 Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Astra Codes of Practice 2007: Subscription 
Broadcast Television Codes of Practice (at 11 July 2013); Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association, ASTRA Codes of Practice 2007: Subscription Narrowcast Television (2007) (at 11 July 2013); 
Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, ASTRA Codes of Practice 2007: Subscription 
Narrowcast Radio (at 11 July 2013); Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, ASTRA Codes 
of Practice 2009: Open Narrowcast Television  (at 11 July 2013). 
96 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cl 1.1.1. 
97 Free TV Australia, Welcome to Free TV (2012) <http://www.freetv.com.au/>. 
98 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cl 2.1.1. 
99 Ibid cls 5.1.4, 5.6, 5.9, s 7. 
100 Ibid s 6. See also Free TV Australia, Explanatory Note: Revised Commercial Television Industry Code of 
Practice Registered by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (2012) 2 
<http://www.freetv.com.au/content_common/pg-code-of-practice-.seo>. 
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regulatory requirements, CAD issues an identification number that indicates which 
classification zone it can be broadcast in.101 An advertisement’s CAD number may be 
revoked in certain circumstances, for example where the ACMA or a court or tribunal 
decides that a commercial breaches relevant regulatory requirements.102 
The Free TV Code sets out restrictions on commercials ‘directed to children’.103 It defines 
‘children’ as people younger than 14 years of age.104 An advisory note to the Code lists the 
factors that licensees should consider when determining whether an advertisement is directed 
to children for the purposes of applying clause 6.23 of the Code (concerning commercials or 
community service announcements directed to children), including the nature of the product; 
the theme of the commercial; the story line and approach taken in selling the product or 
service; the visuals and language used in the commercial; the age of actors appearing in the 
commercial and its target audience.105 Commercials directed to children must exercise 
‘special care and judgment’ and comply with CTS 30-34.106 Further, only advertisements that 
satisfy G classification criteria and meet the requirements of CTS 25, 30-34, and 35-36 may 
be shown during a C period or in breaks immediately before or after a C or P period.107 The 
Code also contains requirements for advertising in programs ‘directed to children’, which are 
described in Box 1 below. 
  
                                                 
101 Free TV Commercials Advice, above n 9, 16. 
102 Ibid 30-34, 45-46. 
103 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cls 60.20-6.23. 
104 Ibid cl 6.20.1. 
105 Ibid 'Advisory Note, Commercials or Community Service Announcements Directed to Children', p 68. 
106 Ibid cl 6.20. 
107 Ibid cl 6.21. 
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Box 1. Free TV Code requirements for commercials directed to children 
 
6.24 In any program directed mainly to children – 
 
6.24.1 The host or any other regular presenter or character in the program must not sell or promote 
products or services; 
 
6.24.2 Products that have names or packaging featuring the host or any other regular 
presenter/character in the program must not be recommended or promoted within the program; 
 
6.24.3  Material in the program that recommends/promotes products or services must be presented as 
discrete segments, and its sponsorship must be advised to viewers in a way that will be clear for them; 
and 
 
6.24.4  References to prizes for competitions must be brief. 
 
 
The Code contains few provisions specifically on food advertising directed to children.108 It 
requires that advertisements directed to children for foods and beverages do not encourage or 
promote an inactive lifestyle or unhealthy eating or drinking habits.109 An ‘inactive lifestyle’ 
is defined as ‘not engaging in any or much physical activity as a way of life’.110 ‘Unhealthy 
eating or drinking habits’ are defined as ‘excessive or compulsive consumption of food 
and/or beverages’.111 In addition, food and beverage advertisements must not contain any 
misleading or incorrect information about the nutritional value of the product.112 This 
provision mirrors CTS 32, but neither provision requires the full disclosure of nutritional 
information about food and beverage products.113 To the extent allowed by state food laws, 
this permits food companies to promote a product as being high in essential nutrients, while 
omitting the fact that it is also high in fat and sugar.114 As a result, advertisers can create the 
impression that a product is healthy (when in fact it is not), without providing any false 
nutrition information. A further limitation is that the Code does not regulate the number of 
food advertisements that can be shown or their placement on free-to-air television.115 
 
                                                 
108 Ibid cl 6.23. 
109 Ibid cls 6.23.1, 6.23.2. 
110 Ibid cl 6.23.4. 
111 Ibid cl 6.23.4. 
112 Ibid cl 6.23.3. 
113 Handsley et al, 'Media, Public Health and Law: A Lawyer's Primer on the Food Advertising Debate,' above n 
85, 99. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Morton et al, above n 76, 27. 
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The Code regulates commercials that are ‘direct advertisements for alcoholic drinks’.116 
These are ‘a commercial broadcast by a licensee that draws the attention of the public, or a 
segment of it, to an alcoholic drink in a manner calculated to directly promote its purchase or 
use’.117 Advertising to children ‘must not be for, or relate in any way to, Alcohol Products or 
draw any association with companies that supply Alcohol Products’.118 Further, alcohol 
advertisements may only be broadcast in M, MA or MV classification periods.119 
Accordingly, CAD classifies such advertisements as ‘L’ (Mature –Liquor/Alcoholic Drinks) 
and requires that they only be broadcast during 8.30pm to 5am on any day, and between 12 
noon and 3pm on school days.120  
 
Alcohol advertising may be broadcast on weekends and public holidays as an accompaniment 
to the live broadcast of sporting events, or where the event is simulcast to a number of licence 
areas and a direct advertisement for alcohol is permitted in the area where the event is held.121 
This is a significant loophole in the Code’s coverage, allowing alcohol manufactures to fill 
family viewing times with alcohol promotions.122 Chapter 6 also describes the failure of 
advertising regulatory instruments to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food and 
alcohol marketing as part of sponsorship arrangements. Accordingly, public health 
researchers advocate for new legislative controls on food and alcohol promotion produced 
through industry sponsorship of sports events, teams and clubs.123 
                                                 
116 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cl 6.7. 
117 Ibid cl 6.10. The definition excludes sponsorship announcements on behalf of alcohol manufacturers, 
advertisements for restaurants, or for a company whose activities include the manufacture, distribution or sale of 
alcoholic drinks (cl 6.11). However, CAD’s classification guide says that the Code should be considered in 
relation to advertisements promoting pubs and clubs, food and wine festivals, and sports and entertainment 
events with alcohol sponsors. Free TV Commercials Advice, above n 9, 28. 
118 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013)  cl 2.13. 
119 Ibid cl 6.7.1. 
120 Free TV Commercials Advice, above n 9, 27. 
121 Free TV, 2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cls 6.8-6.13. 
122 Jill Sherriff and Mike Daube, 'Cricket: Notching Up Runs for Food and Alcohol Companies?' (2009) 34(1) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 19, 22; Standing Committee on Community Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Alcohol Toll Reduction Bill 2007 [2008] (June 2008) 16-18 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=s602>. 
123 Standing Committee on Community Affairs, above n 122, 23. See also Sandra C Jones, 'When Does Alcohol 
Sponsorship of Sport Become Sports Sponsorship of Alcohol? A Case Study of Developments in Sport in 
Australia' (2010) 11(3) International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship 250; Bridget Kelly et al, 
'Food and Drink Sponsorship of Children's Sport in Australia: Who Pays?' (2010) 26(2) Health Promotion 
International 188. 
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Enforcement of broadcast advertising regulation  
The ACMA regulates advertising by requiring compliance with standards as part of 
broadcasters’ license conditions. For example, the conditions of commercial broadcasting 
licences prohibit licensees from broadcasting tobacco advertisements.124 Licensees must also 
‘seek to comply’ with the Free TV Code,125 although the Code sets out a series of conditions 
under which breaches will be excusable.126 Members of the public complain (in writing) to 
licensees about broadcast advertising that breaches the Free TV Code. Licensees deal with 
complaints about the placement of commercials, but not the content of advertisements.127 
They also refer complaints about breaches of the CTS 30-36 to the ACMA.128 Licensees 
should ‘make every reasonable effort’ to resolve complaints promptly129 and must respond 
within 30 days of receipt.130 If the complainant does not receive an adequate response from 
the broadcaster, he or she may refer a complaint to the ACMA for investigation.131 However, 
a breach of the Code is not a breach of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth), restricting 
the ACMA’s ability to enforce compliance. The ACMA may only accept an informal or 
enforceable undertaking from a licensee, or make compliance with the Code a condition of 
the broadcaster’s license.132 
An individual may complain directly to the ACMA about a breach of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth), or a licence condition.133 The ACMA also enforces compliance with 
the CTS 2009, as compliance with the Standards is a licence condition.134 This means that the 
public complain directly to the ACMA about a breach of the Standards. The ACMA enforces 
the Standards using a broad range of sanctions,135 including imposing further licence 
conditions, accepting an undertaking or issuing a remedial direction,136 pursuing a civil 
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penalty order in the Federal Court, referring the matter for prosecution as an offence or (for 
certain categories of service) suspending or cancelling the broadcaster’s licence.137 However, 
the ACMA rarely makes use of its more punitive powers, inviting the criticism that it is a 
‘toothless tiger’.138 Further, neither the ACMA nor Free TV Australia monitors compliance 
with the CTS 2009 or the Free TV Code.139 Enforcement processes rely upon viewers making 
complaints to either licensees or the ACMA. However, the Free TV Code establishes onerous 
procedures for laying complaints, which assume that members of the public have the time, 
knowledge and expertise to monitor advertising and make complaints.140 As discussed above, 
difficulties in determining when the CTS apply may also hinder consumer complaints about 
breaches of the Standards. Thus, monitoring and enforcement of the CTS and the Free TV 
Code are inadequate, permitting routine non-compliance by licensees.141 
3. Advertising industry self-regulation 
The Australian Association of National Advertisers’ scheme  
A central component of advertising regulation is self-regulation by the advertising industry. 
Prior to 1997, the Media Council of Australia (an association of commercial media industry 
groups) ran the industry’s self-regulatory system.142 This system collapsed in 1996, and in 
1997 the Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) established a new system 
of self-regulation.143 The AANA’s scheme is based on a central Code of Ethics and a series of 
product-specific codes. The AANA also created a system handling advertising complaints, 
the main components of which are the Advertising Standards Bureau, the Advertising 
Standards Board (ASB), the Advertising Claims Board and an Independent Reviewer.144 The 
AANA sponsored the formation of the Advertising Standards Bureau and the ASB; however 
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the Bureau operates under separate management so as to maintain its independence from the 
advertising industry.145 The Advertising Standards Bureau acts as the secretariat for the ASB 
and the Advertising Claims Board. It accepts and processes complaints about advertising and 
also promotes the role of the ASB in the self-regulatory system.146  
 
The ASB considers advertising complaints made by members of the public. It comprises 20 
people from a range of age groups and backgrounds, and is gender balanced. ASB members 
serve for a fixed term, and the Bureau staggers new appointments so that the ASB retains 
expertise and knowledge in interpreting the codes, while at the same time introducing new 
members with different experiences and skills.147 The Advertising Claims Board provides a 
separate adjudication process for complaints lodged by competitors, and considers the truth, 
accuracy or legality of advertising on a user-pays basis.148 It comprises a Panel of experts in 
advertising and trade practices law.149 Both advertisers and members of the public may seek 
review of the ASB’s determinations from the independent reviewer, who assesses the validity 
of complaint determination processes or any new evidence provided by the parties.150 
Advertising industry codes of conduct  
The centrepiece of the self-regulatory system is the AANA’s Code of Ethics.151 The Code 
contains a set of broad principles that apply to advertising and marketing communications in 
all media.152 It deals with matters relating to decency, taste and community standards in 
advertising. The first section of the Code requires compliance with all relevant state and 
federal legislation, and prohibits advertising that is misleading or deceptive.153 The second 
section prohibits advertising that is discriminatory, portrays violence, or depicts material 
contrary to prevailing community standards on health or safety.154 It also restricts the 
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depiction of sex, sexuality and nudity, as well as the use of strong or obscene language.155  
The Code of Ethics is supplemented by four codes that deal with specific areas of marketing 
communication, including the Code for Marketing and Advertising Communications to 
Children (the ‘Children’s Code’)156 and the Food and Beverages: Advertising and Marketing 
Communications Code (the ‘Food Code’).157   
The Children’s Code seeks to ‘ensure that advertisers and marketers develop and maintain a 
high sense of social responsibility in advertising and marketing to children’.158 It applies to 
‘Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children’, defined as where the theme, visuals 
and language used are directed to children and are for Product.159 The Code requires that 
advertising to children not be misleading, deceptive or ambiguous.160 It covers a broad range 
of other matters, including sexualisation, safety, privacy and advertising’s compliance with 
‘prevailing community standards’.161  
The Code restates requirements found in the CTS and the Free TV Code that relate to 
parental authority, competitions, premiums, and the use of popular personalities.162 Clause 2.3 
also says that advertising to children ‘must not be for, or relate in any way to, Alcohol 
Products, or draw any association with companies that supply Alcohol Products’.163 In 
relation to food products, the code requires that advertising not encourage or promote an 
inactive lifestyle or unhealthy eating or drinking habits.164 The Code does not define the 
meaning of ‘inactive lifestyle’ nor ‘unhealthy eating or drinking habits’. Advertising to 
children must also comply with the requirements of the Food Code.165 
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The Food Code states that food and beverage advertising must not be misleading or deceptive 
or otherwise contravene prevailing community standards.166 A specific section of the code 
concerns advertising to children.167 It requires that advertising clearly present health and 
nutrition claims and prohibits advertising that uses a misleading or deceptive sense of 
urgency.168 Advertisers should not exploit children’s imagination in a way that could 
encourage excessive consumption.169 Advertising should not undermine parents’ role in 
guiding children’s eating and lifestyle habits, nor should it appeal to children to urge parents 
or caregivers to buy products for them.170 Advertising to children must only feature premiums 
where they are an ‘integral element’ of the Children’s Food or Beverage Product being 
offered.171  
The Food Code also prohibits food advertising that would undermine the importance of 
healthy or active lifestyles or balanced diets, or which encourages excess consumption.172 
However, the portrayal of excessive or compulsive consumption is unusual in food marketing 
campaigns,173 meaning that this provision is likely to have little impact on food advertising to 
children.174 Further, the provision does not regulate the types of foods and beverages 
promoted to children. Thus, it permits advertisers to promote unhealthy foods and beverages 
to children, so long as advertising meets the Code’s requirements for advertising messaging 
and the use of persuasive techniques. As with the Free TV Code, the Food Code does not 
restrict the timing, volume or placement of food advertising to children.175 
4. Industry codes of conduct  
Industry bodies in Australia have developed product-specific advertising codes of conduct. 
These codes include the ABAC and the Outdoor Media Association’s (OMA) Code of 
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Ethics.176 This last code sets out standards for outdoor media agencies and requires 
compliance with other forms of advertising regulation.177 The OMA’s Alcohol Advertising 
Guidelines prohibit the display of alcohol advertising on fixed signs that are located within a 
150 metre sight line of a primary or secondary school.178 Further, OMA members will only 
accept alcohol advertisements that have been through the Alcohol Advertising Pre-vetting 
Service (described below).179  
Food industry initiatives  
Chapter 1 described how the Australian food industry has created two initiatives that regulate 
food and beverage advertising directed to children, i.e. the RCMI and the QSRI. The 
initiatives go beyond the requirements of the AANA codes by imposing a positive obligation 
on advertising to promote and encourage healthy dietary choices.180 The terms of the 
initiatives mirror provisions found in the Food Code and the Children’s Code, but they 
contain additional restrictions on promotional techniques such as adver-gaming and in-school 
marketing.181 Unlike the Food Code, the initiatives restrict the type of food and beverage 
products that can be advertised to children to those that are ‘healthier dietary choices’.182 
Another difference is that the RCMI and QSRI are signatory based schemes, meaning that 
they only apply to companies that join the codes. In contrast, the AANA’s self-regulatory 
system applies to all advertisers and marketers. Chapter 6 discusses the terms and conditions 
of the codes in further detail.183 
Administration of the food industry’s codes 
The AANA is responsible for the overall functioning of advertising self-regulation. In 
addition, industry-specific codes are administered and enforced by bodies within the industry 
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concerned. The ASB hears complaints about breaches of the RCMI and QSRI, while the 
Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) manages the other administrative processes 
established by the codes. Chapter 7 describes the AFGC’s administration of the RCMI and 
QSRI, including monitoring food advertising,184 gathering information on companies’ 
compliance and annually reporting on the scheme,185 and commissioning external evaluation 
of its functioning.186 
The Advertising Standards Bureau operates as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for complaints about 
advertising. It receives all public (and competitor) complaints, regardless of the product 
advertised.187 Upon receipt of a complaint, the Bureau first assesses whether complaints are 
suitable to be forwarded to the ASB for determination. The ASB will not make a 
determination on certain complaints, namely those which: 188 
• Involve an advertisement the ASB has already made a recent determination on;  
• Do not deal with ‘Advertising or Marketing Communications’ for the purposes of the 
AANA codes; or 
• Would involve determining a question of law or a matter related to truth or accuracy. 
 
The ASB assesses complaints against all relevant codes, regardless of whether the complaint 
mentions a particular code or not.189 Accordingly, it will consider complaints about food 
advertising against the Code of Ethics, the Food Code, the Children’s Code and the RCMI 
and QSRI. It evaluates the complaint in light of all relevant advertising material provided by 
the advertiser, the advertiser’s response to the complaint and any other supporting material, 
representations or submissions.190 An arbiter with nutrition expertise advises the ASB on 
whether advertised products meet nutritional criteria for identifying ‘healthier choice 
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products’ that can be advertised to children, according to the terms of the QSRI and RCMI.191 
Following the ASB’s determination, the Bureau notifies the advertiser of the outcome and 
sends the advertiser a copy of the draft report. In the event of a breach, the ASB asks the 
advertiser to modify or discontinue the advertising communication within five business days 
of receiving the report. The ASB also gives advertisers the opportunity to include a statement 
in the final draft report. The Bureau publishes all complaint determinations on its website 
within ten business days of the ASB’s decision.192 
Although the ASB may ask an advertiser to modify or discontinue an advertisement, there are 
no formal mechanisms available for enforcing the codes. According to the Free TV Code, 
television and radio broadcasters are expected to ensure that their advertising complies with 
the AANA’s Code of Ethics and the Children’s Code.193 Yet, the ASB has no legal authority 
to begin court proceedings or to issue fines against advertisers who do not comply with its 
rulings.194 It may note the advertiser’s failure to respond in its final report on the complaint, 
forward the complaint to media proprietors, or refer the case to an appropriate government 
agency,195 but there is little evidence that it uses these powers in practice.196 The Commercial 
Advice Division of Free TV may also refuse to classify a (broadcast) advertisement that does 
not comply with the AANA’s codes of conduct. Broadcasters will not screen an 
advertisement without this classification,197 meaning that a refusal to classify an 
advertisement may act as additional sanction for non-compliance with advertising self-
regulation. 
Where the ASB upholds a complaint, the advertiser may ask for a review of its decision by an 
Independent Reviewer.198 Conversely, complainants can request a review of the ASB’s 
decision to dismiss a complaint. Review is only available where new or additional 
information comes to light that could substantially affect the determination; the determination 
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is clearly in error having regard to the provisions of the codes or the evidence; or there is a 
substantial flaw in the ASB’s decision-making processes.199 The Reviewer does not perform 
a merit review, but recommends whether the ASB’s original determination should be 
confirmed or submitted back to the ASB for reconsideration.200 The ASB must consider, but 
is not obliged to accept, the Reviewer’s recommendation.201 If the ASB reconsiders its 
determination, its new decision will be final and cannot be reviewed again.202 
The ABAC Scheme  
The alcohol industry created the current ABAC in 1997 after the Media Council of Australia 
dismantled its self-regulatory system.203 However, it was also a response to the adoption of a 
National Health Policy on Alcohol in 1989 by the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy.204 
This policy identified the need for a specific code on alcohol advertising, as existing forms of 
self-regulation did not adequately protect public health.205 Following consultation processes 
around the policy, the alcohol industry adopted a pre-vetting system for alcohol advertising in 
1992.206 In 1997 the four main industry bodies created the ABAC, with input from marketing 
industry associations, advertising, media and consumer bodies, Federal Ministers and 
Departments, and the ACCC.207 The four industry associations involved in the creation of the 
ABAC were the Australian Associated Brewers, the Distilled Spirits Industry Council of 
Australia, the Liquor Merchants Association of Australia and the Winemakers’ Federation of 
Australia.208 The contemporary scheme consists of the code and associated documents, the 
ABAC Management Committee, the ABAC Adjudication Panel and the Alcohol Advertising 
Pre-vetting Service. 
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Since its inception in 1997, a number of government reviews have considered the operation 
of the ABAC and whether it sufficiently protects children from alcohol advertising.209 The 
most influential of these was an investigation of alcohol advertising led by the Ministerial 
Council on Drug Strategy and performed by the National Committee for the Review of 
Alcohol Advertising (a sub-committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Drugs).210 
This inquiry resulted in significant changes to the content and scope of the ABAC, as well as 
to the governance processes attached to the code. Specifically, the alcohol industry added a 
new preamble requiring that participants adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of the Code 
and reflecting the goal that alcohol advertising should not encourage underage drinking or 
irresponsible alcohol consumption.211 The industry extended the ABAC to internet sites 
designed to promote alcohol products, as well as to banner advertising on third party sites,212 
and included a protocol on the promotion of alcohol at events.213 In 2009 the industry further 
amended the ABAC to cover the labelling and packaging of alcohol products.214 The 
evolution of the ABAC Scheme will be discussed further in later chapters. The current 
ABAC consists of four separate components, namely: 
• A preamble that includes a guiding statement about how the Panel will assess 
conformity of advertising with the ABAC;215 
• Part 1 of the Code, consisting of definitions and the substantive standards that apply to 
alcohol beverage advertising;216  
• Three ‘protocols’ covering internet advertising, retail advertisements and the 
promotion of alcohol at events;217 and 
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• Part 2 of the Code, which applies the standards contained in Part 1 to the naming and 
packaging of alcohol beverages.218 
 
The preamble states that the goal of the ABAC is:219 
… to ensure that alcohol advertising will be conducted in a manner which neither conflicts with nor 
detracts from the need for responsibility and moderation in liquor merchandising and consumption, and 
which does not encourage consumption by underage persons. 
The preamble also provides that conformity of an advertisement with the Code is to be 
assessed in terms of the advertisement’s probable impact upon a reasonable person to whom 
the advertisement is directed, taking its content as a whole.220  Part 1 sets out a series of 
specific standards to be applied to alcohol advertising, which require that such advertising not 
encourage specific behaviours or associate alcohol with particular forms of social activity.221  
Accordingly, the code prohibits alcohol advertising that: 
• Presents an irresponsible approach to alcohol consumption or encourages excessive 
consumption;222 
• Encourages underage drinking or has ‘strong or evident’ appeal to children;223 
• Suggests that the presence or consumption of alcohol beverages may contribute to a 
change in mood or environment;224 
• Depicts a direct association between the consumption of alcohol beverages and the 
operation of motor vehicles or engagement in sport or any hazardous activity;225  
• Challenges or dares individuals to drink a particular alcohol beverage;226 
• Encourages consumption in excess of the Guidelines to Reduce Health Risks from 
Drinking Alcohol;227 and 
• Brings the ABAC Scheme into disrepute.228  
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The Code also requires that advertisers comply with the AANA’s Code of Ethics.229 Sections 
(a) and (b) contain provisions on alcohol advertising’s appeal to children, which I discuss in 
Chapter 6. 
The administration of the ABAC Scheme  
The ABAC Management Committee monitors and reviews the operation of the ABAC 
Scheme. The Committee’s membership includes representatives from the Distilled Spirits 
Industry Council of Australia, the Winemakers’ Federation of Australia, the Brewers’ 
Association of Australia and New Zealand, the federal Department of Health and Ageing and 
two members of the Communications Council (an industry body representing advertising 
agencies).230 The Committee amends the terms of the ABAC and promotes it to industry 
actors. 231 It also monitors the scheme and coordinates the creation of an annual report, which 
is published on the ABAC Scheme website.232 This report provides an overview of the 
scheme’s functioning, including any amendments made to the ABAC, the number of 
complaints determined and any particular issues raised by complaint determinations. 
The Management Committee administers the Alcohol Advertising Pre-Vetting Service.233 It 
appoints two individuals from outside the alcohol industry to vet alcohol advertisements 
against the ABAC and the AANA Code of Ethics, prior to their broadcast or publication.234 
According to the ABAC, beer producers must pre-vet all advertising against this code and 
optionally against the Code of Ethics.235 Spirits advertisers must pre-vet all advertisements 
against the ABAC and the Code of Ethics, excluding internet and point-of-sale advertising 
and promotions at events.236 Wine producers must pre-vet all television, outdoor and cinema 
                                                                                                                                                        
228 Ibid pt 1(h). 
229 Ibid pt 1(f). 
230 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2011 (2011) 2 The ABAC 
Scheme <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. The Liquor Merchants Association of Australia 
withdrew from the scheme in 2006 and no longer has representation on the Committee. See Management 
Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2009 (2009) 7 The ABAC Scheme 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. 
231 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures (5 December 2012) cl 1.7 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/rules-procedures/>. 
232 The ABAC Scheme Limited, Annual Reports (2013) <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. 
233 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures, above n 231, cl 1.7. 
234 Ibid cl 5.2. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
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against the ABAC and the Code of Ethics.237 Pre-vetting of naming and packaging is optional 
for all alcohol manufacturers.238 
The ABAC Adjudication Panel hears complaints about alcohol advertising and decides 
whether such complaints breach the ABAC. It operates independently from the alcohol 
industry, although its members are paid from funds provided by the alcohol industry 
bodies.239 The Panel consists of a Chief Adjudicator with a legal background (Professor 
Michael Lavarch, a former federal Attorney-General), two members with media or 
advertising industry backgrounds and two public health representatives. A public health 
representative sits on every three person panel convened by the Chief Adjudicator to hear a 
complaint.240 Although the ABAC has its own management committee and complaints 
adjudication panel, the ASB will hear complaints about alcohol advertising falling outside the 
scope of the Code.241 Accordingly, alcohol advertising may be subject to two separate 
regulatory processes; those based within the alcohol industry and those run by the AANA. 
Complaint hearing processes under the ABAC  
The Advertising Standards Bureau forwards all complaints about alcohol product advertising 
to the ABAC Scheme’s administrative officer. The administration officer sends the complaint 
to the Chief Adjudicator, who determines whether it falls within the ambit of the ABAC. In 
making this determination the Chief Adjudicator applies a ‘negative test’ and assesses 
whether the complaint raises issues solely relating to the Code of Ethics.242 In doing so, the 
Chief Adjudicator looks only at the wording of the complaint, not at the advertisement itself. 
The Chief Adjudicator also considers whether the issue complained of would arise regardless 
of the product advertised.243 If this is the case, then the complaint does not relate to the terms 
of the ABAC, but falls within the jurisdiction of the ASB. If the complaint refers to alcohol 
as a specific product in some way, then it falls to the Adjudication Panel to determine the 
matter. Where this is the case, the Chief Adjudicator will then identify the relevant sections 
                                                 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, above n 203, 13. See also Robert J Donovan, 
Lynda Fielder and Geoffrey Jalleh, 'Alcohol Advertising Advocacy Research No Match for Corporate Dollars: 
The Case of Bundy R Bear' (2011) 20 Journal of Research for Consumers 1, 3. 
240 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures, above n 231, cls 2.4, 3.0(d). 
241 Ibid cl 3. 
242 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2005 (2005) 6 The ABAC 
Scheme <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. 
243 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2007 (2007) 6 The ABAC 
Scheme <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. 
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of the ABAC raised by the complaint.244 Unlike the ASB, the Panel limits its determination 
to the matters discussed by the complainant. However, in contrast to the ASB the Panel will 
consider new complaints about an advertisement on which it has already made a 
determination.245   
After considering the complaint, the Chief Adjudicator drafts a ‘show cause’ letter to the 
advertiser, describing the complaint, the sections of the ABAC raised by the matter and any 
questions the Chief Adjudicator has in relation to the complaint.246 Once the administrative 
officer receives the advertiser’s response, the Chief Adjudicator prepares a draft of the 
decision on the complaint.247 Three members of the Panel then meet to consider the 
complaint and the draft determination.248 Once the Panel is satisfied with the determination, 
the administrative officer notifies the complainant, the advertiser, the ABAC Management 
Committee and the pre-vetters of the Panel’s decision. The administrative officer publishes 
the Panel’s final decision on the ABAC Scheme’s website. If the Panel upholds the 
complaint, the advertiser has five business days to respond, and to state whether it intends to 
modify or discontinue the advertisement.249 Members of the three alcohol industry bodies that 
developed the Scheme are expected to comply with the Panel’s determinations.250 However, 
as with the ASB the Panel cannot enforce its determinations and there are no penalties for 
non-compliance.251 Independent review of the Panel’s decisions is not available, meaning that 
its decision is final.  
5. Conclusion  
Tobacco, alcohol and food advertising regulation in Australia are a complex mixture of 
regulatory tools, including legislation, co-regulatory arrangements and voluntary industry 
self-regulation. Of the three products, tobacco advertising is the most heavily regulated, with 
legislative bans on almost all forms of commercial communication. Tobacco advertising 
controls are less complex than those regulating food and alcohol promotion, as restrictions 
                                                 
244 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2005, above n 242, 6. 
245 However the Panel will not consider a complaint dealing with issues that have been fully considered and 
determined in a previous decision. See The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures, 
above n 231, cl 3.0(c)(i)(c).  
246 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2005, above n 242, 6. 
247 Ibid. 
248 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures, above n 231, cl 3(d). 
249 Ibid cl 3(f). 
250 Ibid cl 2.2(a). 
251 Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Alcohol Toll Reduction Bill 2007 
[2008], above n 209, 15. 
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are contained in dedicated legislation.252 Alcohol advertising to children is more heavily 
regulated by government than food advertising to children, given that there are co-regulatory 
restrictions on the placement of alcohol advertisements during children’s viewing periods. 
Food and alcohol advertising fall within the AANA’s self-regulatory system and both are 
subject to additional, product-specific controls. However, the ABAC has its own complaints 
adjudication mechanism, while the ASB hears complaints about breaches of the RCMI and 
QSRI. While most alcohol advertising is subject to pre-vetting, in other respects food 
advertising self-regulation is a more demanding voluntary scheme than the ABAC (and the 
AANA’s system). This is because the AFGC actively monitors food advertising and requires 
participants to issue compliance reports on an annual basis.  
 
 This chapter pointed out limitations in the regulation of food advertising to children. There 
are few specific provisions on food advertising in the strongest forms of regulation, i.e. the 
CTS 2009 and the Free TV Code. With the exception of tobacco, the mandatory components 
of the advertising regulatory scheme are predominantly concerned with truth and accuracy in 
advertising.253 The advertising industry’s codes of practice prohibit advertising that explicitly 
encourages excessive consumption, or which uses persuasive techniques in a manner that 
could mislead or confuse children. However there are few restrictions on the timing, 
placement and volume of food advertising or on the types of products advertised to children 
(with the exception of the RCMI and QSRI). Consequently, regulation does not affect 
children’s daily exposure to legal and truthful advertising that promotes unhealthy foods and 
beverages.254  
 
Regulatory controls also differ according to the media used in promotions. While broadcast 
advertising is highly regulated, advertisements in other media are only subject to self-
regulation. Many self-regulatory measures are ‘media neutral’, but loopholes may emerge in 
relation to new communication channels and advertising techniques, for example, internet-
based promotions and ‘advergames’.255 Another concern is that enforcement processes for 
                                                 
252 Reynolds, above n 19, 367. 
253 Ibid. 
254 C Hawkes, 'Self-Regulation of Food advertising: What It Can, Could and Cannot Do to Discourage 
Unhealthy Eating Habits Among Children' (2005) 30(4) Nutrition Bulletin 374, 380; S MacKay, et al, 'A 
Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Children from Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition 
2011) 23 <http://www.opc.org.au/whatwedo/policydocuments.aspx>. 
255 See, e.g., National Heart Forum, An Analysis of the Regulatory and Voluntary Landscape Concerning the 
Marketing and Promotion of Food and Drink to Children (2011) 60 <http://www.heartforum.co.uk/our-
work/policy/nutrition/marketing-food-and-drink-to-children/>. 
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self-regulatory instruments are much weaker than those accompanying legislation and co-
regulation, yet self-regulation is the main mechanism for restricting unhealthy food 
advertising to children. These issues will be considered more closely in the examination of 
the RCMI and QSRI in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Public health and responsive regulation: a theoretical framework 
for public health governance 
This chapter brings together public health law and regulatory studies to propose a theoretical 
framework for public health governance and, more specifically, for the problem this thesis 
addresses: persistent advertising of unhealthy food to children with little prospect of 
legislative action. First I describe the expanding scope of public health law and the creation 
of new forms of public health regulation. I also discuss literature conceptualising the state’s 
role in public health and the justifications for government intervention in public health 
problems. The second half of the chapter explores regulatory studies literature and its view of 
the state in the context of ‘regulatory capitalism’. Additionally, I describe how regulatory 
scholars design strategies that harness the capacities of self-regulation while compensating 
for its weaknesses, with a particular focus on the theory of responsive regulation. I outline 
some criticisms of a responsive regulatory approach, and show how these have been 
addressed in recent literature. Finally I identify some common themes in public health law 
and regulatory studies literature, which I use as the basis for a responsive approach to public 
health governance. 
1. The increasing scope of public health law  
The original jurisdiction of public health law was unsanitary conditions and noxious 
environments.1 Following developments in the science of disease causation, it expanded to 
include infectious disease control, as well as food safety and workplace health.2 The 
discipline’s core functions were given effect in 19th century public health acts, found in 
countries such as the United States, England, Australia and New Zealand.3 These acts dealt 
with three key matters: establishing the administrative arrangements for providing public 
                                                 
1 Christopher Reynolds, Public Health and Environmental Health Law (Federation Press, 2011) 5; Christopher 
Hamlin, 'State Medicine in Great Britain' in Dorothy Porter (ed), The History of Public Health and the Modern 
State (Rodopi, 1994) 132, 142-146. 
2 Reynolds, above n 1, 5; Hamlin, above n 1, 150; Elizabeth Fee, 'Public Health and the State: The United States' 
in Dorothy Porter (ed), The History of Public Health and the Modern State (Rodopi, 1994) 224, 236-237; Roger 
Magnusson, 'Mapping the Scope and Opportunities for Public Health Law in Liberal Democracies' (2007) 35(4) 
Global Health Law, Ethics, and Policy 571-572. 
3 These Acts continue in force in each Australian state and territory. See, e.g., Public Health Act 2010 (NSW). 
Reynolds, above n1, 179-180; Hamlin above n1; Fee above n 2; Magnusson, above n 2, 571-572; Linda Bryder, 
'A New World? Two Hundred Years of Public Health in Australia and New Zealand' in Dorothy Porter (ed), The 
History of Public Health and the Modern State (Rodopi, 1994) 313. 
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health services; granting powers to manage local environmental health problems; and more 
recently, setting out powers for responding to listed infectious diseases.4 These laws can be 
conceptualised as protecting individuals from harms inflicted without their consent (‘public 
bads’).5 State action also targeted specific identifiable causal agents that could be minimised 
or eliminated.6 Pathogens or substances that presented a ‘clear and present danger’ to health 
thus justified the use of highly coercive powers, including bans, closures, seizures, 
quarantine, compulsory vaccination and criminal sanctions.7 Such measures imposed 
significant constraints on individual and commercial freedoms in the pursuit of the common 
good.8  
During the twentieth century, non-communicable disease overtook communicable disease as 
the leading cause of global mortality and morbidity.9 Accordingly, law became a tool in 
public health efforts to address the risk factors for chronic disease, particularly the 
consumption of unhealthy food, tobacco and alcohol, as well as the social determinants of 
health.10 These latter are the social, economic and political factors that shape individual 
choices and lifestyles, and which play a fundamental role in non-communicable disease 
causation.11  
The new focus of public health law significantly expands states’ public health powers, and 
potentially impinges upon the interests of powerful industries.12 It also engages with social, 
economic and environmental policies outside of the health portfolio, implying that public 
health considerations should inform policy making across all sectors.13 In relation to obesity, 
it includes (often unpopular) measures such as ‘fat taxes’ on unhealthy foods and beverage, 
                                                 
4 Reynolds, above n 1, 179-180. 
5 Richard Epstein, 'Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defence of the "Old" Public Health' (2003) 46(3) 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine S138, S139. 
6 Ibid S145. 
7 Mark Hall, 'The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law' (2003) 46(3) Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 
S199, S206. 
8 See Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (University of California Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 
11-12; Dorothy Porter, 'Introduction' in Dorothy Porter (ed), The History of Public Health and the Modern State 
(Rodopi, 1994) 1, 10. 
9 See World Health Organisation, 'Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health' (World Health 
Organisation, 2004) 2 <http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/eb11344/en/index.html>. 
10 Magnusson, above n 2, 574. Public health law is also concerned with new infectious diseases, such as  
HIV/AIDs and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), as well as bioterrorism and gun control. See 
Christopher Reynolds, 'Public Health Law in the New Century' (2003) 10(4) Journal of Law and Medicine 435. 
11 Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot (eds), Social Determinants of Health: The Solid Facts (World Health 
Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, 2nd ed, 2003). 
12 Magnusson, above n 2, 572. 
13 Ilona Kickbusch, Warren McCann and Tony Sherbon, 'Adelaide Revisited: From Healthy Public Policy to 
Health in All Policies' (2008) 23(1) Health Promotion International 1. 
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restrictions on large sized soft drinks and statutory regulation of unhealthy food advertising.14 
Public health law also has a strong social justice focus.15 Evidence shows that unequal access 
to resources produces a gradient where those in lower socioeconomic groups have poorer 
health than those in higher groups – both within and between countries.16 Accordingly, public 
health interventions seek to reduce social inequalities to the extent that they affect health.17 
There is considerable debate about the proper role of law in preventing non-communicable 
disease. Critics argue that using legislation to shape consumption habits (and social and 
economic conditions) is an inappropriate expansion of public health law. Although chronic 
diseases affect a growing number of people, they are neither communicable nor contagious; 
consequently, they do not directly threaten collective well-being.18 This perspective frames 
obesity as a problem of individual choice and individual consequences.19 In these 
circumstances, the state can persuade, educate or inform individuals to make healthier 
choices. However, coercing them to do so would be overly paternalistic if their choices do 
not affect others.20  
The counter-argument is that chronic disease places a huge social and economic burden on 
society, including on publicly-funded healthcare systems.21 Accordingly, states have a 
legitimate interest in preventing chronic disease and in recouping costs to the public purse.22 
Further, individual choices are constrained by the broader social, economic and political 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Michelle M Mello, David M Studdert and Troyen A Brennan, 'Obesity - The New Frontier of Public 
Health Law' (2006) 354(24) The New England Journal of Medicine 2601; 
Kelly D Brownell et al, 'The Public Health and Economic Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages' 
(2009) 361(16) The New England Journal of Medicine 1599; Molly E Bond et al, 'Taxing Junk Food: Applying 
the Logic of the Henry Tax Review to Food' (2010) 193(18) Medical Journal of Australia 472; Robert H Lustig, 
Laura A Schmidt, and Claire D Brindis, 'Public Health: The Toxic Truth About Sugar' (2012) 482(7383) Nature 
27; Lawrence O Gostin, 'Banning Large Sodas is Legal and Smart' (March 13 2013) CNN 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/13/opinion/gostin-soda-ban>. 
15 Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 21 
16 See Wilkinson and Marmot, above n 11, 10; Michael Marmot, 'Social Determinants of Health Inequalities' 
(2005) 365(9464) The Lancet 1099. 
17 Magnusson, above n 2, 575; Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 21-23; Nancy E Kass, 'An Ethics 
Framework for Public Health' (2001) 91(11) Public Health Matters 1776, 1781. 
18 Epstein, above n 5, S154; Gostin, Public Health Law above n 8, 500. Research showing that obesity spreads 
within social networks challenges the idea that it is non-communicable. See Nicholas A Christakis and James H 
Fowler, 'The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network Over 32 Years' (2007) 357(4) The New England 
Journal of Medicine 370. But see also Ethan Cohen-Cole and Jason M Fletcher, 'Is Obesity Contagious? Social 
Networks vs Environmental Factors in the Obesity Epidemic' (2008) 27(5) Journal of Health Economics 1382. 
19 Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 500. 
20 Epstein, above n 5, S154. See also Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 50. 
21 See, e.g., Stephen Colagiuri et al, 'The Cost of Overweight and Obesity in Australia' (2010) 192(5) Medical 
Journal of Australia 260. 
22 Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 501. 
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environment.23 State action is needed to address these social structures (and inequalities), 
which cannot be changed by individuals acting alone, and to help shape environments that 
support healthy choices.24 
Traditional public health governance involved ‘command-and-control’ regulation,25 i.e., 
prescriptive standards developed and imposed by specialist government agencies.26 However, 
emerging forms of public health governance move away from this model,27 as described in 
Table 6 in the areas of alcohol, tobacco and food regulation. Examples of self-regulation 
purporting to achieve public health goals include corporate social responsibility strategies,28 
industry-level ‘pledges’ on food advertising to children29 and transnational forms of private 
regulation, such as the International Food and Beverage Alliance.30 There are examples of 
‘civil regulation’ where health groups create voluntary schemes that challenge the dominance 
of the industry in public health’s ‘regulatory space’.31 Finally, public-private partnerships 
represent a type of regulatory hybrid, with civil society, government and industry actors 
working together in collaborative arrangements to address complex public health problems.32 
Many have been critical of the value of voluntary schemes introduced by the food industry.33 
Nevertheless, they represent an increasingly common form of public health governance.   
                                                 
23 Ibid 52. 
24 Gostin, Public Health Law above n 8, 9, 502-503; Karen Jochelson, 'Nanny or Steward? The Role of 
Government in Public Health' (2006) 120(12) Public Health 1149, 1155. 
25 Magnusson, above n 2, 578. 
26 Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood, 'Introduction' in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and 
Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998) 1, 14. 
27 Magnusson, above n 2, 578. 
28 Michele Simon 'PepsiCo and Public Health: Is the Nation's Largest Food Company a Model of Corporate 
Responsibility or Master of Public Relations?' (2011) 15 CUNY Law Review 101. 
29 See, e.g., Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the 
Australian Food and Beverage Industry (March 2011) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi.html>. 
30 International Food and Beverage Alliance, Who We Are (undated) <https://www.ifballiance.org/about.html>. 
31 See Alcohol Advertising Review Board, About Us (2012) <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/about/>; L 
Hancher and M Moran, 'Organising Regulatory Space' in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood 
(eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998) 148. 
32 World Health Organisation, Public Private Partnerships for Health (2012) 
<http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story077/en/>; Vivica Kraak et al, 'Balancing the Benefits and Risks of 
Public-Private Partnerships to Address the Global Double Burden of Malnutrition' (2012) 15(3) Public Health 
Nutrition 503. See also, Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation, Overview (undated) 
<http://www.healthyweightcommit.org/about/overview/>. 
33 See, e.g., William H Wiist, 'The Corporate Play Book, Health and Democracy: The Snack Food and Beverage 
industry's Tactics in Context' in David Stuckler and Karen Siegal (eds), Sick Societies: Responding to the Global 
Challenges of Chronic Disease (Oxford University Press, 2011) 204; David Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni and Tetty 
Havinga, 'Actors in Private Food Governance: The Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder 
Initiatives with Civil Society Participation' (2011) 28(3) Agriculture and Human Values 353; David Stuckler 
and Marion Nestle, 'Big Food, Food Systems and Global Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>; Kelly D Brownell, 
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Table 6. Examples of different forms of public health regulation 
Form of 
regulation 
Example Description Leading sector Involvement by other 
actors  
Statutory 
regulation 
 
 
Tobacco 
Prohibition Act 
1992 (Cth).  
Australian Government 
legislation enacting a ban 
on all forms of tobacco 
advertising and promotion.  
The Commonwealth 
Government.  
Top-down approach 
excluding businesses and 
civil society from 
regulatory processes.  
Co-regulation  UK Code of 
Broadcast 
Advertising 
(BCAP Code). 
 
 
Regulates broadcast 
advertising, and includes 
restrictions on the 
placement and content of 
advertisements for 
unhealthy products that 
target children. 
OfCom retains ultimate 
responsibility for 
advertising regulation 
and remains the backstop 
enforcer of the BCAP 
Code. 
An industry-based 
organisation writes the 
code, while an 
independent body enforces 
it. 
Quasi-
regulation  
 
Alcohol 
Beverages 
Advertising (and 
Packaging) Code 
(ABAC). 
A voluntary code that 
regulates the content of 
alcohol advertisements by 
Australian alcohol 
manufacturers. 
Three alcohol industry 
bodies collaborate to 
develop, administer and 
enforce the code. 
Following a government 
review, the industry 
included government 
representation in the 
scheme’s administration 
and public health 
representation in the 
complaints hearing 
mechanism. 
Self-regulation  Australian Food 
and Grocery 
Council 
Responsible 
Children’s 
Marketing 
Initiative. 
A voluntary code that 
regulates the content and 
placement of unhealthy 
food advertising to 
children. 
A food industry trade 
association (the 
Australian Food and 
Grocery Council) created 
and administers the code. 
An independent body 
hears consumer 
complaints. There is little 
to no engagement with 
civil society, but some 
government monitoring of 
the scheme. 
‘Civil 
regulation’ 
created by 
NGOs or civil 
society actors  
Alcohol 
Advertising 
Review Board 
and Alcohol 
Advertising 
Review Board 
Code. 
An Australian public 
health organisation 
scheme to regulate the 
content and placement of 
alcohol advertisements via 
a code of conduct. 
Public health 
organisations joined 
together to create a 
‘competitor scheme’ to 
challenge the Australian 
alcohol industry’s 
ABAC Scheme 
(described above). 
Administered by public 
health representatives, and 
includes an independent 
panel to hear consumer 
complaints. 
No participation by 
industry or government 
actors. 
Public-private 
partnership  
The US Healthy 
Weight 
Commitment 
Foundation. 
A private-public 
partnership that aims to 
reduce childhood obesity 
through product 
reformulation, social 
media, school-based 
nutrition and physical 
activity programs and 
education campaigns. 
Managed by an industry-
led organisation. 
The Foundation includes 
retailers, food and 
beverage manufacturers, 
restaurants, insurance 
companies, trade 
associations, NGOs and 
professional sports 
organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
'Thinking Forward: The Quicksand of Appeasing the Food Industry' (2012) 9(7) PLoS <Medicine 1 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001254>. 
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Governments are also designing novel regulatory schemes for public health. Recent proposals 
for Australian food law and policy take a staged approach, beginning with voluntary industry 
action accompanied by government monitoring and the threat of further regulation. This was 
the approach taken by Australia’s National Preventive Health Taskforce, which suggested a 
‘responsive’ regulatory approach to restrictions on food marketing.34 The Independent Panel 
that reviewed Australian food labelling law and policy suggested a similar ‘responsive’ 
strategy.35 It sought to ‘involve stakeholders in developing self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
measures, but recognising that more prescriptive modes of regulation are often appropriate’.36 
For example, the Panel recommended that industry develop voluntary codes of practice for 
standard definitions of values-based claims such as ‘natural’ or ‘fresh’.37 This would be 
accompanied by a monitoring regime, and ‘evidence of systemic failure to provide accurate 
and consistent values-based information to consumers would trigger more prescriptive modes 
of regulation’.38  
In sum, public health law has expanded into chronic disease prevention from its original 
focus on infectious disease control. In doing so, it has drawn upon a much broader range of 
regulatory instruments than in the past, including voluntary initiatives developed by industry 
actors, public-private partnerships and incremental, staged or ‘responsive’ regulatory 
strategies. While significant debate remains about the role of law in obesity and chronic 
disease prevention, it is apparent that governments possess an array of novel instruments with 
which to implement public health policy. This suggests that rather than relying on traditional 
‘command-and-control’ regulation, a range of legal or regulatory strategies could be used to 
strengthen food advertising regulation, a theme that will be explored further in the section 
below on regulatory studies theory and literature. 
 
                                                 
34 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health Strategy - The Roadmap for Action' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 67, 125 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. See also C Hawkes and T Lobstein, 'Regulating the Commercial Promotion of Food to 
Children: A Survey of Actions Worldwide' (2011) 6(2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity 83, 90. 
35 Neal Blewett et al, 'Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy' (Australian Government, 
2011) Foreword by the Chair 
<http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/labelling-logic>. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 106. 
38 Ibid. 
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2. Conceptualising public health governance: the role of the state  
Accompanying these changes in the practice of public health regulation is new literature 
conceptualising public health law, regulation and governance. Underpinning these studies is a 
definition of public health as ‘[t]he science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and 
promoting health through the organised efforts of society’.39 This envisages a cooperative, 
coordinated approach to health, involving communities, governments and other collective 
entities.40 However, it also emphasises the central role of the state in public health. 
Governments are responsible for securing the welfare of their populations,41 and accordingly 
they should be held accountable for the nation’s health. Under international law, the state 
owes an obligation to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ the right to health (and related rights), as 
enshrined in international human rights documents.42 The right to health requires positive 
state action to promote population health, as well as forbearance to protect individual rights 
to property and liberty, for example.43 Human rights can also provide a mandate for 
                                                 
39 D Acheson, 'Public Health in England' (Department of Health, 1988), quoted in Department of Health, 1. 
What is Public Health? (17 August 2009) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Aboutus/MinistersandDepartmentLeaders/Chi
efMedicalOfficer/Features/FeaturesArchive/Browsable/DH_5017805>. This definition goes back further to CE 
Winslow, writing in 1920. See CE A Winslow, 'The Untilled Fields of Public Health' (1920) 51 Science 23, 30. 
The ideas underpinning the 'new public health' have a long history, but have evolved in response to new 
scientific knowledge, emerging threats to human health and increasing concern for human rights. See Niyi 
Awofeso, 'What's New About the "New Public Health"?' (2004) 94(5) American Journal of Public Health 705; 
Fran Baum, The New Public Health (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008). 
40 Gostin, Public Health Law, above n 8, 16; Lawrence O Gostin, 'Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights: A 
Tribute to the Late Jonathan Mann' (2001) 29(2) The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 121, 122; James F 
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cooperation between states to secure global health, as found in the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control.44 
In a report on public health ethics, the UK’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics described the 
state’s role in population health as one of ‘stewardship’.45 This encapsulates the idea that 
governments are stewards of the public’s health, and must provide the conditions that allow 
people to be healthy, especially by reducing health inequalities.46 WHO’s definition also 
emphasises the idea of government oversight, including by ‘defining the vision and direction 
of health policy, exerting influence through regulation and advocacy, and collecting and 
using information’.47 According to the stewardship model, state intervention should:48 
• Aim to reduce the risks of ill health that people might impose on each other; 
• Aim to reduce the causes of ill health by regulations that ensure the environmental 
conditions that sustain good health; 
• Pay special attention to the health of children and other vulnerable groups; 
• Promote health through the provision of information and advice, and by programs that 
help people overcome addictions and other unhealthy behaviours; 
• Ensure appropriate access to medical services; and 
• Aim to reduce health inequalities. 
States possess unique powers that justify their leadership and oversight role in public health. 
Governments use a wide range of measures to promote health and wellbeing, including 
information and education as well as compulsory measures. However, only states can compel 
conformity with publicly established standards of conduct, or expend public funds to promote 
health.49 In other words, governments can ‘insist, through force of law if necessary, that 
individuals and businesses act in ways that do not place others at unreasonable risk of 
harm’.50 While governments can draw on a range of coercive powers to safeguard the public 
health, these powers must be exercised legitimately within statutory and constitutional 
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constraints.51 Accordingly, literature on public health law takes on ‘the task of setting out, 
justifying and limiting government’s use of coercive legal powers’.52 In a highly influential 
model, Lawrence Gostin sets out a typology of government strategies for improving health.53 
These are the powers to:54 
• Tax and spend (for example, taxes on harmful products like tobacco and alcohol); 
• Alter the informational environment (as with labelling requirements and bans on 
advertising); 
• Design and alter the physical environment (for example, urban planning that promotes 
cycling and walking);  
• Intervene in the economic system by addressing socio-economic disparities (through 
education, housing and income redistribution programs); and 
• Directly regulate persons, professionals and businesses (for instance, mandating that 
motorcyclists wear helmets). 
Gostin also recognises that the state, health authorities and private citizens can regulate health 
indirectly through the tort system, i.e. by mitigating the harms of hazardous products, 
environmental pollution or exposure to toxic substances.55 Finally, deregulation can be a tool 
for public health where laws or regulations impede health-promoting activities.56  
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics describes a broad range of potential state actions, which it 
arranges on an ‘intervention ladder’.57 The bottom of the ladder depicts the least intrusive 
step, which is for the state to do nothing, or to monitor the situation at most. The ladder 
moves progressively through the following options: providing information; enabling choice; 
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guiding choice by changing the default policy; guiding choice by providing incentives or 
disincentives; and restricting and then finally removing choice through regulation.58 This 
approach bears a close resemblance to the staged or incremental public health strategies 
described above, as well as responsive regulation, which I discuss below. 
The Council also discusses the role of non-state actors in protecting public health, including 
civil society and the corporate sector.59 Companies have responsibilities towards the public’s 
health that extend beyond complying with relevant laws and regulations.60 Market failure is 
said to occur in cases where industry fails to meet these obligations, and in doing so places 
population health significantly at risk.61 As described in Chapter 1, the obesity epidemic can 
be conceptualised as a market failure on several grounds. Arguably, it constitutes a ‘negative 
externality’, whereby the food industry outsources the costs of consuming its products onto 
wider society in the form of increased healthcare expenditure and lost economic 
productivity.62 Further, children are not capable of the kind of rational decision making 
required for participation in a free market, and fairness demands that they are protected from 
advertising that takes advantage of their cognitive limitations.63 Evidence also suggests that 
self-regulation has failed to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, and 
that advertising restrictions are a highly cost-effective obesity prevention measure.64 In these 
circumstances there is a strong public interest argument for government regulation of 
unhealthy food advertising to children.65  
Evidently, there are market-based arguments for state intervention to protect children from 
food marketing, but the model of public health ethics found in the Nuffield report does not 
use economic reasoning as the primary ground for state action. Rather, it bases state 
intervention on evidence regarding the causes of ill health and the efficacy and effectiveness 
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of interventions to address these causes, combined with a precautionary approach that 
involves a scientific assessment of risk, fairness and consistency, consideration of the costs 
and benefits of action, transparency and proportionality.66 I discuss these criteria for state 
action in further detail below. 
3. Justifying state intervention in public health 
Justifications for the use of state powers is a key concern in public health law and ethics, 
given that government interventions often constrain individual liberties and generate 
economic costs.67 The Nuffield Coouncil’s intervention ladder ranks public health policies 
according to their degree of intrusion on individual choice, political and public acceptability, 
and the level of justification required for each intervention. The higher the rung on the ladder 
at which the government intervenes, the stronger the justification must be.68 The first step is 
an assessment and understanding of the health risk involved.69 Intervention should be based 
upon ‘sufficiently robust evidence to establish a causal link between a suggested risk factor 
and an illness or otherwise undesirable health outcome’.70 However, perceptions of risk are 
socially constructed, and depend upon individual subjective views, as well as what is 
acceptable to communities and society as a whole.71 Accordingly, public health interventions 
must take into account the social values that inform public assessment of risks, as well as the 
relevant scientific evidence.72 
The determinants of chronic diseases are complex, making it difficult to establish the strength 
of a causal link between one specific risk factor and harm to health.73 Accordingly, 
government intervention often takes place in the context of scientific uncertainty:74 ‘even 
where every reasonable step has been taken to ensure that evidence is robust, in practice it is 
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often incomplete or ambiguous and usually will be contested’.75 The Nuffield Council calls 
for a precautionary approach, i.e. taking action to protect populations against reasonably 
foreseeable risks, despite incomplete evidence.76 States must balance the need to act quickly 
against the possibility that measures found to be unnecessary will be seen as draconian and 
unjustified.77 Accordingly, the nature or degree of uncertainty should be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, as should the costs and benefits involved in different types of action.78 
Precautionary action should also be transparent – in other words ‘[p]ublic health agencies 
must be willing to make clear the bases for restrictive measures and openly acknowledge 
when new evidence warrants reconsideration of policies’.79 
Public health ethicists stress that governments must choose an intervention that will most 
effectively reduce or eliminate the risk identified.80 It should not be assumed that public 
health programs will achieve their stated goals. Rather, governments have a duty to prove 
(through scientific evidence) that the proposed intervention is reasonably likely to achieve a 
public health objective.81 Governments should also demonstrate that interventions will deliver 
the greatest health benefit for the least cost.82 In addition, they should seek to minimise the 
burdens of interventions on human rights and freedoms.83 In other words, governments must 
choose the least restrictive or intrusive measure that could protect the public health from the 
risk involved.84 The most coercive measures should be employed only in exceptional 
circumstances, where less intrusive measures have failed.85 Thus, education, information and 
voluntary action should precede regulation and legislation.86 This principle is enshrined in 
international human rights documents. The Siracusa Principles permit states to infringe 
personal liberties to prevent public harms, so long as such measures are legal, further a 
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legitimate social objective, are proportionate to that objective, and are no more restrictive 
than is necessary.87 
In order to achieve a collective good, it is necessary to confer benefits and impose costs and 
burdens.88 According to the dominant model of public health law and ethics,89 for the 
distribution of benefits, burdens and costs to be just, governments must examine the fairness 
of interventions.90 Elements of fairness include service allocation on the basis of need, 
imposing restrictions only where necessary to prevent a serious health risk, and avoiding 
under- and over-inclusive policies.91  
Interventions should also be publicly justified.92 In a pluralistic society, opinions on the 
benefits and burdens of public health measures will vary.93 Ethical public policy tolerates a 
certain level of dissent over the desirability of a particular intervention. However, there 
should be overall public consensus on the need for intervention.94 This requires democratic 
processes for determining which public health functions governments should engage in, 
‘recognising that some infringements of liberty and other burdens are unavoidable’.95  Thus, 
decision-making on public health law and regulation should be transparent and accountable, 
allowing affected parties to have equal input into the design and implementation of programs, 
and providing public information and justifications for proposed action.96 
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4. Regulatory theory and the state’s role in regulatory capitalism 
Public health law touches on the design of regulatory interventions. However, regulatory 
studies provide a more detailed explanation of regulatory processes and forms, and so may 
broaden our understanding of public health regulation.  
This literature also explains changes in the nature of regulation under conditions of 
‘regulatory capitalism’.97 According to regulatory scholars, growing privatisation and 
corporatisation during the late 20th and early 21st century did not lead to the removal of the 
state from social and economic life; rather, increasing capitalism was accompanied and 
enabled by public regulation.98 The outsourcing of state functions to the market, combined 
with the growth of large, multinational companies, led to heightened demand for transparent, 
public regulation of private activities –and also to calls for regulation of the state, whether by 
national and international non-state organisations, or by public agencies established as 
independent regulators of other branches of government.99 At the same time, consumers, 
government and NGOs placed pressure on the private sector to address the social and 
environmental consequences of its actions, using self-regulatory instruments such as 
corporate social responsibility programs, internal compliance systems, industry codes of 
conduct and supply contracts that impose socially responsible conditions on sub-contracting 
companies.100 
The result of these trends is an increasing proliferation of regulatory institutions, tools and 
practices, located both within and outside the state, and increasingly blurring the boundary 
between private and public ‘regulatory space’. While public agencies remain dominant in 
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some areas of regulation, theorists generally describe a ‘decentring’ of the contemporary state 
in regulatory processes.101 This expresses the idea that regulatory regimes are increasingly 
fragmented and complex, comprising overlapping forms of private and public regulation.  
Contemporary neo-liberal ideologies favour free markets, small government and individual 
choice, making direct government intervention less politically attractive.102 Command-based 
regimes are also slow and expensive to implement, highly prescriptive and impractical to 
comply with, resulting in regulatory over-load.103 Accordingly, new forms of regulation are 
evolving, including self-regulation, management-based regulation, and ‘multi-stakeholder 
standards’. The latter involve both NGOs and industry actors, and operate at national and 
international levels.104 Thus, it can no longer be assumed that the state controls regulation. 
Instead, a variety of public and private actors share the tasks of developing, implementing 
and enforcing regulatory standards.105 
Self-regulation may be growing under regulatory capitalism, but it is ‘rarely detached entirely 
from the state’.106 Contemporary self-regulation often takes the form of ‘a process whereby an 
organized group regulates the behaviour of its members’.107 This includes via codes of 
conduct created by industry bodies, which apply rules of behaviour to companies within the 
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industry.108 Industry self-regulation frequently aims to achieve social objectives, for example 
reducing environmental pollution or improving food quality and safety.109 Because of its 
underlying public interest, governments often participate in, and support the development of, 
self-regulation, frequently drawing on it for their own purposes.110 Accordingly, there is a 
‘tangled web’ of overlaps and interrelationships between the law and self-regulation.111  
Voluntary codes may provide a model for government regulation, with governments 
incorporating private standards into future legislation.112 Self-regulation may operate in the 
‘shadow of the law,’ as when the New Zealand government agreed to a voluntary scheme for 
reduing ozone depleting substances, but announced that it would introduce a broad-based 
carbon tax automatically if specified performance targets were not achieved by a certain 
date.113 Alternatively, voluntary codes may require that participants comply with relevant 
existing laws. In this way, codes build upon companies’ legal obligations by elaborating or 
refining general requirements set out in legislation.114  
Rather than thinking of self-regulation and statutory regulation as dichotomous, regulation 
can be conceptualised as operating along a continuum.115 ‘Pure’ self-regulation is located at 
one end of the continuum, and command-and-control at the other.116 In between the two lie 
various hybrids of voluntarism and command, reflecting differing levels of industry and state 
involvement in the development and implementation of standards.117 Typologies of self-
regulation describe the different interactions between the state and private regulation. For 
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example, Julia Black divides self-regulation into four categories.118 Voluntary or ‘pure’ self-
regulation results solely from industry initiative, i.e. ‘[r]egulatory rules are self-specified, 
conduct is self-monitored and the rules are self-enforced; there is little or no role for the 
state’.119 In contrast, industries develop ‘coerced’ self-regulation as a direct response to the 
threat of statutory regulation. Sanctioned self-regulation involves a degree of government 
oversight, with business formulating rules that are approved by government. Under mandated 
self-regulation, businesses develop regulatory rules within a framework established by 
government, including state-specified policy objectives or goals.120 Self-regulation and the 
regulatory state are often interdependent. The question then is not whether the state is 
involved in regulation, but to what degree and through what mechanisms. 
Regulatory capitalism’s reliance upon self-regulation suggests a new role for governments. 
This is often described as one of ‘meta-regulation’.121 Here the state exercises limited powers 
of its own, and delegates regulatory tasks to non-state actors under its supervision and 
guidance. In other words, governments create the conditions that enable self-regulation by 
industry, but in a direction that furthers public policy goals determined by the state.122 For 
example, governments can provide the legislative framework that allows for industry self-
regulation, or technical assistance for the creation of industry codes of conduct.123 These 
activities are often described as the state ‘steering’ the direction of private regulation, rather 
than ‘rowing’, i.e. directly controlling the activities of private actors.124 Adam Crawford 
describes the state’s ‘steering’ functions as: 
• Determining the goals, norms and values of regulation, and conveying them to the 
regulated community; 
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• Establishing mechanisms for checking, verifying and monitoring performance against 
the goals, norms and values set; and 
• Designing regulatory institutions and processes that draw upon, and respond to, the 
capacities of actors to regulate themselves.125 
 
While governments may not be at the centre of regulatory processes in regulatory capitalism, 
they continue to perform important oversight and steering roles.126 However, they do so by 
‘adjusting, balancing, structuring, facilitating, enabling, negotiating, but never directly telling 
and never directly trying to control’.127 
5. Designing regulatory strategies  
Self-regulation forms a key component of many contemporary regulatory schemes.128 It is 
cheaper and faster to implement than government regulation, as well being more flexible and 
sensitive to market conditions.129 Self-regulation draws upon the technical expertise and 
knowledge of industry actors, potentially leading to practical and innovative standards that 
companies can comply with more easily.130 It can create ethical standards extending beyond 
the scope of legislation, potentially pushing companies ‘beyond compliance’ with black-letter 
law.131  
However, critics argue that self-regulation often fails to achieve its objectives.132 Frequently it 
relies on weak standards, accompanied by mild and ineffective forms of enforcement.133 
Further, self-regulation represents the acquisition of power by private groups, which are not 
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accountable to the body politic through traditional democratic channels.134 Thus, consumer 
organisations and public interest groups view self-regulation as a cynical attempt by industry 
to give the appearance of regulation, thereby warding off more direct and effective forms of 
government regulation.135 There are also arguments that in practice, it proves equally 
expensive or bureaucratically complex for the state to meta-regulate using tools such as 
encouraging self-regulation or contracting-out.136 
6. The theory of responsive regulation  
Regulatory scholars are interested in how regulation can be designed to achieve public 
purposes more effectively. One prominent example is the theory of responsive regulation 
developed by Ayres and Braithwaite.137 Informed by a range of theoretical perspectives, this 
approach calls upon regulators to be flexible and responsive, tailoring regulation to the social 
context of the problem at hand and taking into account industry and company motivations to 
comply.138  
Responsive regulation is often modelled as two complementary pyramids. The regulatory 
pyramid (Figure 1 below) displays the regulatory tools available to regulators, while the 
enforcement pyramid (Figure 2 below) presents a strategy of ‘dynamic deterrence’ achieved 
through the use of a mixture of enforcement measures.139 Responsive regulation characterises 
regulatory and enforcement tools according to their level of flexibility or rigidity, their 
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timeliness and their reliance upon persuasion or legal coercion.140 The most flexible, informal 
and persuasive measures form the base of both pyramids, with both regulatory tools and 
enforcement methods becoming increasingly coercive and punitive towards the tip of the 
pyramids.141 Responsive regulation holds that under both pyramids, regulators should take a 
graduated approach to regulating companies, beginning first with persuasive and informal 
measures, and moving to more coercive and formal controls only when industry proves 
unresponsive to ‘softer’ measures.142 
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Figure 1. The pyramid of regulation 
 
 
Figure 2. The pyramid of enforcement 
 
* Adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 137. 
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In the past, academic and practitioner attention was largely focused on the enforcement 
pyramid.143 However, government agencies are showing increasing interest in the pyramid of 
regulation.144 The regulatory pyramid outlines the sequential introduction of regulatory tools 
at an industry level. Governments begin their regulatory strategy by communicating to 
industry that self-regulation is the preferred approach.145 Where self-regulation is successful, 
governments refrain from further action. However, if there are unacceptable levels of non-
compliance, weak self-regulatory schemes or enforcement mechanisms, states escalate up the 
pyramid to regulatory measures involving higher levels of intervention.146 Ayres and 
Braithwaite suggest that states move from pure self-regulation to ‘enforced self-regulation’. 
This is a form of co-regulation whereby governments first require companies to set rules 
covering a particular practice, and then ratify and enforce those rules.147 If enforced self-
regulation is unworkable or ineffective, then governments may produce specific industry 
standards, with regulatory agencies granted the discretion to sanction breaches.148 At the 
pyramid’s tip are command-and-control standards accompanied by the compulsory 
sanctioning of breaches.149  
A responsive approach could involve various combinations of instruments, beginning with 
some form of voluntary action.150 ‘Smart regulation’ expands the pyramid of enforcement to 
include third parties (commercial and non-commercial) as well as government regulators and 
regulated companies. Escalation would be possible up any side of the pyramid and across 
several different instruments. One option is to begin with voluntary action or education, 
followed by the implementation of third party audits and concluding with coercive measures 
such as command-and-control regulation or third party foreclosure of a loan.151 Regardless of 
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the specific measures used, governments delegating public authority to industry always do so 
within a framework of sustained oversight, as well as retaining the capacity and willingness 
to intervene if necessary.152  
Responsive regulation is also a dynamic approach ‘that expects, encourages, and sometimes 
requires continuous improvement’.153 If governments make explicit the threat to move up the 
pyramid, then industry actors have an incentive to self-regulate in order to avoid government 
intervention.154 Beginning with more cooperative forms of social control also gives 
companies the opportunity to demonstrate an ethical commitment to compliance. It then 
legitimates governments’ use of coercive measures when dialogue with industry fails.155 
However, it is the threat of statutory regulation that is important, rather than its actual use, 
and governments should introduce statutory regulation only as a measure of last resort.156 
Direct government intervention essentially acts as a ‘back-stop’, allowing governments to 
‘regulate at a distance’ by relying on cheaper and more efficient regulatory measures.157  
7. Criticisms of responsive regulation 
Responsive regulation seems like a promising way for governments to control powerful 
industries without directly intervening in their activities. However, there are some significant 
critiques of this approach.  It may be difficult for governments to determine whether 
escalation up the regulatory pyramid is warranted, particularly where there is conflicting 
evidence of the success of self-regulation.158 The complexity of political processes may affect 
a government’s ability to implement stronger statutory measures if self-regulation fails, 
creating a lag between non-compliance and more intrusive regulatory responses (and thus 
removing much of the power behind the threat of regulation).159 Governments may also find it 
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problematic to introduce coercive forms of regulation once they have built a cooperative 
relationship with industry, as required by measures at the base of the regulatory pyramid.160  
Sometimes it may be inappropriate to begin regulatory strategies with self-regulation. 
Australian governments maintain statutory controls on food safety because it poses a direct 
and immediate threat to public health.161 Critical health risks appear to over-ride the 
presumption of self-regulation,162 yet responsive regulation argues that governments should 
begin at the base of the pyramid of regulation even for serious matters.163 However, in this 
case a responsive approach would not be proportionate to the objective to be achieved and the 
necessity for intervention.164  
A second, more fundamental critique of responsive regulation is that it separates the technical 
features of regulation from its normative or moral concerns.165 Although situated within the 
theories of republicanism and restorative justice (particularly in later versions), responsive 
regulation is sometimes interpreted simply as a technical prescription.166 Often, regulatory 
literature claims to be theory- and value-neutral, particularly in light of the shift away from 
what have been called ‘substantively rational’ forms of law, to those described as procedural, 
reflexive, or responsive.167 According to Black, the former is designed to operate in concrete 
situations, achieving specific regulatory goals through the use of detailed prescriptions for 
social behaviour. The latter induces regulatory ends indirectly, rather than commanding 
them.168 Consequently, it moves away from considering the substantive content of regulatory 
regimes. The result is that regulatory studies often focus on the implementation of regulation 
at the expense of the values or ends that are being pursued, how these should be defined, and 
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by whom.169 Some strategies assume that regulatory design takes place when governments 
have already determined regulatory goals, meaning that policy makers do not need to 
consider the substantive objectives of regulation.170 However, this approach does not assist 
regulators when there is heated debate over what the goals of regulation should be, and how 
they might be pursued. 
Further, a focus on regulatory design does not truly result in a separation of value-concerns 
from the technical details of regulation. Instead, it leaves normative considerations 
unexamined and unjustified. It could be argued that responsive regulation (as it is commonly 
interpreted) emphasises cost-effectiveness and regulatory efficiency. As such, it mirrors the 
trend towards the ‘rationalisation’ of state activities, associated with neo-liberal forms of 
government.171 Rationalisation involves an approach to policymaking, organisational 
management and the distribution of resources in public governance that is influenced by 
objective, positivist scientific knowledge.172 Public administrative principles are increasingly 
based in economic theory, where the ultimate desired outcome is (economic) efficiency and 
accountability. This theoretical position also accepts that the separation of means and ends, 
and facts from values, is possible and indeed desirable.173 Hence the attempt by literature on 
regulation to detach regulatory processes from a particular political ideology and from 
specific substantive ends. Regulatory studies can also superficially ‘depoliticise’ pressing 
public health, labour and environmental issues.174 It presents them as technical matters that 
can be resolved by the application of neutral expertise, market forces and management 
techniques.175 In doing so, it allows existing inequalities and systemic issues to continue, 
without requiring fundamental changes to the economic institutions and practices that create 
them.176  
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8. Addressing the criticisms of responsive regulation  
New developments in regulatory theory address these criticisms by drawing regulatory 
techniques and public purpose more closely together. The dominant conception of responsive 
regulation conceptualises ‘responsiveness’ as regulation tailored to the characteristics of 
specific industries and individual companies. This includes (under Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
model of responsiveness) an industry’s willingness and capacity to comply with regulation, 
and the extent to which companies cooperate with regulatory agencies.177 It can also include 
the nature of the regulatory problem to be addressed and the policy objectives to be achieved; 
the broader institutional outcomes of the regulatory regime; the different logics of regulatory 
tools and strategies; the regime’s performance; and changes in each of these elements, as well 
as the broader social and economic context of regulation.178 Yet as discussed above, the 
primary focus of this form of responsive regulation is on regulatory techniques and strategies, 
rather than the social values and ethical concerns that underpin regulatory regimes. 
Nonet and Selznick offer an alternative idea of responsive regulation, as law that is 
responsive to social needs.179 Regulation should adapt to changing social pressures and 
demands, and should have at its heart the advancement of particular social values.180 Vincent-
Jones draws upon Nonet and Selznick’s account to argue that the idea of responsiveness 
needs to be more closely connected with the values informing regulatory design and 
implementation. This in turn necessitates consideration of the state’s purpose and role in 
society, as well as of the actors involved in policy design and implementation. According to 
Vincent-Jones, the law should be conceptualised as responding to some form of public 
interest or common good, including social as well as economic purposes. Thus the state’s 
regulatory role can be described as ‘the systematic exercise of control for the pursuit of 
public purpose’.181 
In order to determine the public interest that regulation should pursue, regulatory structures 
should enable participation by a range of stakeholders.182 This approach is based on the 
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concept of deliberative democracy, meaning ‘a polity where decisions are made on the basis 
of dialogue and public justification accessible to all citizens’.183 Accordingly, the substantive 
content of regulatory norms should be determined by modes of decision-making involving 
participation and deliberation by all affected parties, which Black refers to as 
‘proceduralisation’.184 Proceduralisation is both a form of law and a way of legitimating the 
use of law in a pluralistic society, where there is significant debate over what the right ends of 
law should be.185 Law is valid to the extent that certain procedures are followed in its 
creation, rather than because it pursues particular moral or ethical goals.186 It implies that 
regulation should contain mechanisms that facilitate external stakeholder scrutiny of and 
input into the scheme, for example public disclosure of information about its operation, and 
the incorporation of external representation on administrative bodies.187 Such procedures are 
more likely to produce regulation that reflects broad community consensus188 and is 
legitimate in the eyes of the public, and therefore more politically acceptable.189 
There are also practical benefits to involving external third parties in regulatory processes. 
Ayres and Braithwaite refer to the idea of ‘tripartism’.190 Here, public interest groups 
participate in regulatory enforcement in order to provide a check on the power of large 
companies, and to prevent ‘capture’ of regulatory agencies by corporate actors.191 
Governments can also enrol commercial parties in monitoring and sanctioning activities.192 
Larger companies use their market power to impose product and process conditions on 
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smaller ‘up-stream’ supplier companies.193 For example, large supermarket chains often 
require suppliers to comply with voluntary standards on food quality and safety.194 
Governments can harness the power of commercial third parties by facilitating their 
participation in regulatory processes, thereby enhancing both the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of regulation.195 Braithwaite refers to this idea as ‘networked governance’. Rather than 
escalate to more intrusive forms of government control, state regulators strengthen regulation 
by enlisting commercial actors and NGOs as regulatory partners.196 
Building on this argument, I suggest a connection between the public purpose of regulation, 
the degree of external stakeholder participation, and the regulatory tool used. In other words, 
the stronger the public interest underpinning the scheme, the greater the need for external 
stakeholder participation in regulatory processes, as well as the use of legal power and/or 
legislative backing.197 This requires a multi-dimensional scheme that addresses both the form 
of regulation (regulatory technique) and its function (or objective).198 In relation to the form 
of regulation, important questions to be answered are: who regulates; who is regulated and by 
what means; and how are they organized? The question of ‘who regulates’ can be broken 
down into different components: what entity initially called for regulation, and in what form? 
Who specifies the regulatory rules and codes, and how are they specified? Who enforces 
regulation, monitors the conduct of the regulated and through what mechanisms? What 
institutional arrangements are in place to administer the regulatory regime?199 In short, good 
governance calls for close attention to the design of regulatory systems, but with close 
reference to the public policy objective to be achieved. 
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9. Conclusion 
There are significant areas of overlap between public health law and regulatory studies. Most 
importantly, both stress the central role of the state in regulation and policy, although that 
role may be evolving into one of ‘meta-regulation’, leadership, or oversight. There is also a 
strong utilitarian basis to both schools of thought, i.e. that state action must only be used to 
achieve social objectives and to produce the greatest benefit for the largest number of people. 
Both value the principle of ‘minimal sufficiency’: that governments should use the least 
intrusive measure that will effectively achieve their objectives. Both call for governments to 
trial less intrusive measures before introducing legislative or coercive interventions. Finally, 
the idea of procedural fairness is common to both public health ethics and law, and regulatory 
theory. It implies that external stakeholders should be included in decision-making on the 
scope and nature of regulatory interventions, so as to improve the transparency and 
accountability of regulatory processes.  
By drawing together these two literatures – regulatory studies and public health law – we can 
build a theoretical framework that uses the fundamental concepts of responsive regulation, 
but which also engages with the ethical and moral dimensions of public health. Public health 
ethics is particularly useful in this regard because it has a strong social justice component, 
and considers issues of poverty, injustice and inequality. Like public health itself, public 
health law and regulation is explicitly normative, whereas regulatory theory tends to focus on 
the technical and design features of regulation. Accordingly, I use theorising on public health 
law to give regulatory theory a substantive and moral context. Public health ethics also 
provides in-depth reasoning on the justifications for state action, adding further dimensions to 
the idea of regulation’s ‘responsiveness’ to its social context. It suggests that governments 
must respond to the degree of risk involved, evidence on the success of interventions, and the 
benefits and burdens that regulation would impose on the community. Thus, a responsive 
approach to public health regulation can be based on the following assumptions: 
• Law and regulation (including self-regulation) should be motivated by an explicit 
social objective that is related to improving health and wellbeing; 
• Governments play a unique leadership role in public health regulation (although one 
that does not necessarily entail statutory regulation), as they are responsible for 
securing public health and the public interest more broadly; 
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• States should begin regulation with the least intrusive measure, but reserve the right to 
introduce more stringent controls where consent-based measures fail;  
• Voluntary and self-regulatory measures should operate within a framework of 
government monitoring, evaluation and oversight; 
• States should consider introducing complementary combinations of regulatory 
instruments, for example self-regulation operating within legislative ‘scaffolding’; 200 
and 
• Regulatory processes should incorporate a broad range of parties affected by 
regulation or with an interest in its outcome, for example public health organisations, 
consumer groups and other non-government actors. 
This theoretical approach can guide new forms of public health governance that involve 
voluntary action by industry and take an incremental approach to state intervention. It grants 
the government a central role in public health, while also acknowledging the constraints on 
direct state action. In the next chapter I turn this framework into a concrete set of measures by 
which to evaluate regulatory regimes that begin with voluntary industry action. Analysing 
self-regulation is the first step in a responsive regulatory approach, as the failure of self-
regulation justifies government escalation to more coercive forms of regulation.
                                                 
200 Roger S Magnusson and Belinda H Reeve, 'Regulation and the Prevention Agenda' (2013) 199(2) Medical 
Journal of Australia 89. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Assessing the effects of self-regulation 
This chapter describes studies that evaluate the effects of self-regulation on Australian 
television food advertising.  This research comprises studies performed by the food industry; 
studies conducted by public health researchers; and reviews of the evidence by government 
agencies. Table 7 summarises the methodologies and main findings from studies by the first 
two groups. After describing limitations in existing research on the RCMI and QSRI, I 
propose a different approach to assessing the efficacy of the codes. Accordingly, the second 
part of the chapter translates the theory of responsive regulation into practical measures for 
evaluating regulatory regimes that rely upon voluntary industry action. I describe some of the 
key determinants of successful self-regulation, with a focus on the design features and 
institutional supports that are required if private regulation is to advance public policy 
objectives. My overall goal is to create a detailed framework for assessing whether the RCMI 
and QSRI contain the building blocks of a successful self-regulatory regime. This chapter 
focuses on research that analyses the outcomes of the codes in terms of their impact upon 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. A number of other studies critique the 
terms and conditions of the RCMI and QSRI, the regulatory processes established by food 
industry self-regulation, and the extent of compliance with the two initiatives.1 I weave the 
findings of these studies into my substantive analysis of the codes in Chapters 6 to 11, so they 
will not be discussed in detail here. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Lana Hebden et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: Reading the Fine Print' 
(2010) 21(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 229; Lana Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of Foods 
and Beverages Marketed to Australian Children: How Useful are Food Industry Commitments?' (2010) 67(4) 
Nutrition & Dietetics 258; Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising 
Regulations in Australia' (2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846; J Lumley, J Martin and N Antonopoulos, 
'Exposing the Charade: The Failure to Protect Children from Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy 
Coalition, 2012) <http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-charade&Type=policydocuments>; L 
Wallard et al, 'The Takeaway on Fast-Food Meals: A Summary of Three Fast-Food Studies in Australia' (Cancer 
Council NSW, 2012) <http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/68145/news-media/latest-news-news-media/cc-
news/fast-food-exposing-the-truth/?pp=68145>. 
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Table 7. Industry and public health studies of the RCMI and QSRI’s effects on 
television advertising of unhealthy food to children 
Author Date Code Television 
advertising 
data used 
Included 
programming 
Coding of advertised products  Main findings  
AFGC 2010 RCMI March -May 
2010. Ads 
broadcast in 5 
Australian 
state capital 
cities. 
C and P programs, 
those where>50% of 
the audience is 
children or theme, 
visuals, images are 
directed to children. 
Signatories’ products classified 
according to nutrition criteria 
specified by them. 
Australian Guide to Healthy 
Eating/NSW Health Canteen 
Strategy used for non-members’ 
products. 
Unhealthy food 
advertising represents 
2.4% of total food and 
beverage advertising in 
children’s programs.  
AFGC 2012 RCMI 
QSRI 
14 days in 
March 2011. 
Ads on 8 
channels in 5 
Australian 
state capital 
cities. 
C and P programs, 
those where>50% of 
audience is children 
or theme, visuals, 
images are directed to 
children. 
Advertised foods classified as 
unhealthy/healthy using the 
Australian Guide to Healthy 
Eating.  
Unhealthy food 
advertising represents 
1.6% of all food 
advertising during 
children’s programs, a 
1.4% decrease from 2010. 
King et al 2010 RCMI 7 days in May 
2006 and May 
2007, 4 days in 
May 2009.  
Ads on 3 
Sydney free-
to-air channels.  
Times when no. of 
children watching 
was >25% of the 
maximum child 
audience for the day.  
Advertised foods classified as 
healthy/unhealthy according to 
the Australian Guide to Healthy 
Eating.  
RCMI participants 
reduced unhealthy food 
advertising during 
children’s peak viewing 
times more than non-
members but most food 
advertising still for 
unhealthy products. 
Hebden 
et al 
2011 QSRI 4 days in May 
2009, April 
2010. 
Ads broadcast 
on 3 Sydney 
free-to-air 
television 
channels. 
Times when no. of 
children watching 
was >25% of the 
maximum child 
audience for the day. 
Advertised products classified as 
healthy/unhealthy/fast-foods 
according to Australian Guide to 
Healthy Eating. Fast-food ads 
categorised according to 
nutritional quality, advertising 
company and type of product. 
QSRI participants 
reduced unhealthy food 
advertising during peak 
viewing times less than 
non-members. Children’s 
exposure to unhealthy 
fast-food adverts 
remained the same over 
the study period. 
King et al 2012 RCMI  
QSRI 
7 days in May 
2006, May 
2007, 4 days in 
May 2009, 
April 2010, 
May 2011. 
Ads on 3 
Sydney free-
to-air 
television 
channels.   
Children’s peak 
viewing times 
identified as: 
weekdays, 6am-9am 
and 4pm-9pm;  
weekends, 6am-12pm 
and 4pm-9pm. 
Advertised products classified as 
healthy/unhealthy based on 
Australian Guide to Healthy 
Eating. Fast-food advertisements 
coded as unhealthy/healthy/ 
brand advertising and according 
to advertising company. 
 
Unhealthy food 
advertising declined prior 
to the initiatives, but fast-
food advertising 
increased. Children still 
exposed to high levels of 
unhealthy food 
advertising in peak 
viewing times. 
Brindal 
et al 
2011 RCMI 
QSRI 
6, 4 day study 
periods during 
2008-2010. 
Ads on 5 free-
to-air channels 
and 5 pay TV 
channels in 
Adelaide and 
Whyalla. 
Times when no. of 
children watching is 
>35% of the 
maximum daily child 
audience.  For pay 
TV: times when no. 
of children watching 
was >75% of the 
maximum daily child 
audience rating. 
Food advertisements coded as 
healthy/ unhealthy as well as 
according to advertiser, brand 
owner, persuasive techniques 
used. 
Unhealthy food 
advertising was 
infrequent in children’s 
programs but common 
during peak viewing 
times. Code signatories 
advertised unhealthy 
products more than non-
signatories. No change in 
advertising rate by RCMI 
signatories and increase 
in advertising by QSRI 
participants. 
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1. Food industry studies evaluating the RCMI and QSRI 
As part of its management of the food industry codes, the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council (AFGC) monitored television food advertising in 2010 and 2011.2 Its research aimed 
to describe unhealthy food advertising directed to children, and the proportion of this 
advertising by code signatories. In a 2010 study the AFGC identified 410 individual food 
advertisements, which were broadcast approximately 80,000 times during the study period. 
Of the 410 unique advertisements, 160 were shown at least once during children’s programs.3 
Of the latter figure, 33 advertisements were for unhealthy products. Almost two-thirds of 
these unhealthy food advertisements (20) were from RCMI signatories. The AFGC also 
examined the creative content and frequency of unhealthy food advertisements that appeared 
in children’s programs. It identified a number of advertisements that it considered were not 
targeted at children, either because they screened only a few times during children’s 
programs, or because the content of the advertisement itself was not targeted to children. Of 
the unhealthy food advertisements appearing in children’s programs and directly targeting 
children, only three were by signatory companies.4 The AFGC concluded that only 2.4 per 
cent of total food advertising was for unhealthy products and directly targeted children.5 
A second study evaluated food advertising during 14 days of free-to-air television in March 
2011, across eight television channels.6 It found that of all food and beverage advertising that 
screened across these channels, three per cent was shown during children’s programs and was 
for unhealthy foods.7 This represented a 1.6 per cent decrease in unhealthy food advertising 
during children’s programming compared to 2010. Unhealthy food advertising during 
children’s programs comprised 0.7 per cent of all food and beverage advertising on the three 
main television channels. This figure had decreased by 1.7 per cent compared to 2010 (where 
it was 2.4 per cent). These decreases occurred despite a significant increase in the total 
amount of food advertising that screened during this period.8 Based on the low rate of food 
                                                 
2 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (December 
2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian Food and 
Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. At the time of 
writing the industry had not released a monitoring report on food advertising directed to children in 2012.  
3 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (2010), 
above n 2. 
4 Ibid 9. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (2012), 
above n 2, 6. 
7 Ibid 8. 
8 Ibid. 
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advertising during children’s programming, the AFGC said that, ‘Australian children are 
exposed to very low levels of non-core [unhealthy] food and beverage advertising on 
television…’9 Also, it argued that the decrease in unhealthy food advertising directed to 
children could show that the RCMI and QSRI were having a positive impact on food 
advertising to children.10 
These findings should be interpreted in light of significant limitations in the AFGC’s 
methodology. In the 2010 report, the AFGC classified food products differently according to 
whether or not the advertiser was a signatory to the RCMI. This created discrepancies in the 
classification of products from the two groups of companies.11 It also reported on the number 
of unique advertisements for unhealthy products that were directed to children, but not the 
frequency with which they were broadcast.12  By design, therefore, the study could not 
quantify the extent of children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. The AFGC also 
defined children’s programs based on a mixture of classification information and audience 
share data, rather than according to children’s peak viewing times.13 Yet data on children’s 
television viewing suggests that few or no programs have an audience share of 50 per cent or 
more children.14 The AFGC further narrowed the scope of the study by only including 
advertisements that it subjectively evaluated as targeting children.15 This excluded advertising 
directed to children but broadcast in general audience programs, as well as advertising that 
appeared in children’s programs but which appealed to a general audience.16 The AFGC’s 
                                                 
9 Ibid 10. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Lisa G Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, 'Television Marketing of Unhealthy Food and Beverages 
to Children in Australia: A Review of Published Evidence from 2009' (Australian National Preventive Health 
Agency, 2012) 12 <http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/publications>. 
12 Ibid 20; Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report' (Australian Government, 2011) 24 
<http://engage.acma.gov.au/kids-food-ads/>; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring 
of Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public Health Nutrition 1, 5 
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
13 Smithers, Lynch and Merlin, above n 11, 11. 
14 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Children's Viewing Patterns on Commercial, Free-to-Air 
and Subscription Television: Report Analysing Audience and Ratings Data for 2001, 2005 and 2006' (Australian 
Government, 2007) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310132/children_viewing_patterns_commercial_free-to-
air_subscription_television.pdf>, cited in Smithers, Lynch and Merlin, above n 11, 11. 
15 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and Beverage 
Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 12, 20. 
16 Ibid 24. 
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study seems designed not to capture all of the relevant information and as such, it presents a 
wholly distorted picture of children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising on television. 17 
2. Public health research on the effects of the codes  
The main independent research on the RCMI and QSRI has been conducted by members of 
the Physical Activity Nutrition Obesity Research Group at the University of Sydney in 
collaboration with Cancer Council NSW.  These researchers have undertaken three studies 
that attempt to quantify the impact of self-regulation on unhealthy food advertising to 
children.18  
The first study compared food advertisements by RCMI signatories and non-signatories, 
broadcast in May 2006, 2007 and 2009.19 It found that food advertising fell by 35 per cent 
between 2006 and 2009, although the volume of unhealthy food advertising remained 
relatively stable. Compared with other companies, RCMI participants reduced the amount of 
unhealthy food advertising they screened, including in children’s peak viewing periods (from 
1.8 advertisements per hour in 2007 to 1.5 in 2009).20 However, the majority of all food 
advertising continued to be for unhealthy products.21 The data also suggested that signatories’ 
reduction in unhealthy food advertising pre-dated the introduction of the initiatives.22 Thus, it 
was possible that changes in signatories’ advertising patterns were not the result of the 
initiatives per se. Instead, changing consumer sentiment motivated both reductions in 
unhealthy food advertising and the introduction of self-regulation.23 In addition, the authors 
could not rule out the possibility that food advertising was shifting from television to other 
media.24 The study concluded that ‘[t]he continued advertising of unhealthy foods during 
                                                 
17 Ibid; King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian 
Television', above n 12, 5. 
18 King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television', 
above n 12; Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or 
Responsive?' (2011) 6(2 pt 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>; Lana Hebden et al, 'Advertising of 
Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) Medical 
Journal of Australia 20. 
19 King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' above n 
18. 
20 Ibid e394. 
21 Ibid e395. 
22 Ibid e396. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. See also Michael J McGinnis, Jennifer Gootman and Vivica I Kraak (eds), Food Marketing to Children 
and Youth: Threat or Opportunity? (National Academies Press, 2006) 183; Georgina Cairns, Kathryn Angus 
and Gerard Hastings, 'The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence 
128 
 
peak viewing times… indicates that this self-regulatory code does not fully or adequately 
protect children. … ’25 
A 2011 study evaluated the effects of the QSRI on fast-food advertising on free-to-air 
television in Sydney.26 The number of fast-food advertisements increased from 1.1 per hour 
in 2009 to 1.5 per hour in 2010.27 The frequency of unhealthy fast-food advertising decreased, 
although the authors said that this was most probably an artefact caused by an increase in the 
relative share of advertising for healthier products and brand promotions.28 QSRI signatories 
were responsible for the majority of fast-food advertising (92 per cent in 2009 and 86 per cent 
in 2010). However, between 2009 and 2010 non-signatory companies reduced the frequency 
of their unhealthy food advertising (relative to all fast-food advertising) by 84 per cent, while 
signatories reduced theirs by only 17 per cent. Thus, any reductions in unhealthy fast-food 
advertising were predominantly from non-signatory companies.29 Further, the frequency of 
unhealthy fast-food advertisements remained the same during children’s peak viewing 
periods despite these reductions. The authors also raised concerns about an increase in 
advertising for company brands or branded promotions, given its proven influence on 
children’s taste preferences and consumption patterns.30  
A 2012 study evaluated the impact of both the RCMI and QSRI on television food 
advertising.31 It found a significant decline in food advertising between 2009 and 2011, from 
7.3 advertisements per hour to 5.8.32 After excluding fast-food advertisements, the mean 
frequency of unhealthy food advertising declined from 2.9 advertisements per hour in 2006 to 
1.3 in 2011. This decline occurred prior to the introduction of the RCMI in 2009, suggesting 
that participants’ advertising patterns had altered before the code came into effect.33  
The frequency of fast-food advertising increased between 2006 and 2010, despite the 
introduction of the QSRI in 2009. While this included an increase in advertising for healthier 
                                                                                                                                                        
to December 2008' (World Health Organisation, 2009) 14 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/marketing_evidence_2009/en/index.html>. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hebden et al, 'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-
Regulation', above n 18. 
27 Ibid 22. 
28 Ibid 23. 
29 Ibid 22-23. 
30 Ibid. See, e.g., Thomas N Robinson et al, 'Effects of Fast-food Branding on Young Children's Taste 
Preferences' (2007) 161(8) Archives of Paediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 792. 
31 King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television', 
above n 12. 
32 Ibid 2. 
33 Ibid 5. 
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fast-food products, the overall number of healthier food advertisements remained low (one in 
six fast-food advertisements in 2011).34 RCMI signatories continued to account for 62 per 
cent of unhealthy food advertising in 2011 (excluding fast-food advertising), while QSRI 
signatories accounted for 90 per cent of fast-food advertisements.35  Despite a reduction in 
food advertising overall, the study found that children continued to be exposed to the same 
amount of unhealthy food advertising in 2011 as they were prior to the commencement of the 
initiatives.36 The authors concluded that ‘industry self-regulation has had minimal impact in 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising on… television’.37 
In 2010, the South Australian Minister for Health contracted the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to monitor the impact of the RCMI and QSRI 
on South Australian children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.38 The study reported 
on the nature and extent of food advertising on free-to-air television and pay TV in Adelaide 
and Whyalla, for six, four days periods between October 2008 and July 2010.39 The total 
amount of food advertising remained relatively stable across the study period.40 Unhealthy 
products comprised the majority of food advertising, specifically promotions from fast-food 
restaurants, followed by advertising for sugar-sweetened drinks, chocolate and 
confectionery.41 Food advertisements made up 6.3 per cent of total advertisements in C 
programs on Adelaide free-to-air television.42 There were no clear trends in the frequency of 
food advertising during children’s peak and non-peak viewing periods.43 However, unhealthy 
food advertising was more common during programs popular with children compared to 
those that were popular with adults.44 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 6. 
38 Emily Brindal, Nadia Corsini and Gilly Hendrie, 'Television Food Advertising to Children in South Australia' 
(CSIRO, March 2011) <http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/public+content/sa+health+internet>. 
39 Ibid 5. Whyalla is a large regional town in South Australia. 
40 Ibid 3. The study found a minor increase in the total rate of food advertising per hour across the study period. 
However, the authors noted that data were obtained from two separate sources, with systematic differences 
between the data sets. When excluding information from one company that provided only two data sets (October 
2008 and May 2009), this trend disappeared and advertising rates appeared to be stable across the remaining 
time points. 
41 Ibid 157. 
42 Ibid executive summary 6. 
43 Ibid 51.    
44 Ibid 55. The study used audience data to determine the 25 most popular programs with children aged zero to 
14 years and with adults (18 years and over). 
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RCMI signatories accounted for 40 per cent of food advertising (excluding fast-foods), but 
were responsible for a higher proportion of unhealthy food advertisements than non-
signatories (for example, 78.3 per cent versus 23.5 per cent of unhealthy food advertisements 
in July 2010).45 There were no clear changes in the pattern of unhealthy food advertising by 
signatories from October 2008 to July 2010.46 Advertising by QSRI signatories comprised 70 
per cent of all fast-food advertisements in July 2010, with these companies screening more 
unhealthy food advertisements than non-signatories.47 The proportion of unhealthy fast-food 
advertising had increased since the commencement of the QSRI, for all companies (from 1.34 
advertisements per hour in October 2009 to 1.56 advertisements in July 2010).48  
The authors concluded that children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising had remained 
the same since October 2008. There were very low rates of food advertising during children’s 
programming. However, there was a much higher frequency of unhealthy food advertising 
during general programming when large numbers of children watched television, but when 
the RCMI and QSRI did not apply.49 The authors recommended redefining the initiatives to 
cover television viewing times and programs that are popular with children if self-regulation 
was to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.50 The fact that they do not 
do so already is a significant flaw in the scheme, which I return to in Chapter 6. 
3. Government reviews of the existing evidence  
In 2010, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) monitored the 
operation of the RCMI and QSRI, in order to determine ‘whether industry can adequately 
address community concern without the need for government regulation’.51 The ACMA 
based its review on stakeholder consultation, case studies of complaint determinations under 
the two codes, a review of existing research and its own analysis of the regulatory framework 
established by the initiatives. Its final report identified on-going community concern about 
unhealthy food advertising to children despite the creation of the codes.52 The ACMA noted 
                                                 
45 Ibid executive summary 10.  
46 Ibid 136  
47 Ibid 111  
48 Ibid 157. 
49 Ibid 156. 
50 Ibid 157. 
51 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and Beverage 
Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 12, 5. 
52 Ibid 6. 
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limitations in the AFGC’s monitoring activity (as described in section 1),53 but it also 
acknowledged that independent research showed some changes in advertising rates following 
the introduction of the two initiatives.54 However, the ACMA said that these studies did not 
provide a sufficient evidence base on which to determine whether the initiatives had reduced 
the frequency of unhealthy food and beverage advertising on commercial free-to-air 
television.55 It concluded that any ‘real-life’ changes in the level of children’s exposure to 
food and beverage advertising remained unclear.56  
The ACMA ceased monitoring food industry self-regulation after its 2011 report, due to the 
increasing role of the Australian National Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) in evaluating 
food advertising (introduced in Chapter 1). In its response to the report of the National 
Preventative Health Taskforce, the Federal government tasked ANPHA with monitoring and 
evaluating the two food industry initiatives.57 ANPHA is a statutory body, established by the 
Australian National Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 (Cth). Its main functions are to 
advise the different levels of government on preventive health, determine standards and 
manage programs on non-communicable disease prevention.58 This includes by monitoring, 
evaluating and building evidence in relation to preventive health strategies.59 ANPHA focuses 
on programs and policies that reduce the risk factors for chronic disease, namely tobacco use, 
harmful alcohol consumption and obesity.60 Its Strategic Plan 2011-2015 identifies unhealthy 
food advertising as a key priority area, and states that ANPHA will ‘monitor and engage with 
industry and other partners on food products and marketing, including products for children 
and marketing to which they are exposed with attention to energy-dense, nutrient-poor foods 
and beverages’.61  
Chapter 11 describes ANPHA’s monitoring activities in more detail. Importantly for this 
chapter, ANPHA released a report on the RCMI and QSRI in October 2012, comprising the 
                                                 
53 Ibid 24. 
54 Ibid 27. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 6. 
57 Australian Government, 'Taking Preventative Action: A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 
2020, The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) 47 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/>. 
58 Australian National Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 (Cth) s 2A.  
59 Other functions include facilitating a national preventive health research infrastructure; creating partnerships 
for workplace, school and community interventions; assisting in the development of the health prevention 
workforce, and coordinating and implementing a national approach to social marketing initiatives. See 
Australian National Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 (Cth) s 2A. 
60 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (2011) 1 Australian Government 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/strategic-plan>. 
61 Ibid 18. 
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first systematic evaluation of the evidence on children’s exposure to television advertising of 
unhealthy foods and beverages since the introduction of the initiatives.62 The report 
described:63 
• The amount of unhealthy food advertising on Australian television during children’s 
peak viewing times and according to program classification; 
• Changes in the amount of unhealthy food advertising on television since the 
introduction of the initiatives; and 
• Differences in the amount and nature of televised food advertising produced by 
signatory and non-signatory companies. 
 The report considered the AFGC’s monitoring reports, the studies by researchers at the 
University of Sydney and the research commissioned from CSIRO.64 It synthesised the 
evidence from these studies to create an overall narrative that addressed each of the 
objectives above, giving greater weight to findings from higher quality studies.65 The report 
found that estimates of children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertisements during peak 
viewing times varied significantly, from between 0.7 and 6.5 advertisements per hour.66 
Across all studies, unhealthy foods comprised a higher percentage of all food advertisements 
than healthy products. Since the introduction the RCMI and QSRI, participants had 
advertised unhealthy products during children’s peak viewing times at higher levels than non-
participants.67 However, the absolute difference in the frequency of advertising between 
participants and non-participants was less than one advertisement per hour.68 The amount of 
unhealthy food advertising broadcast during C programs was very low, but many children 
continued to be exposed to advertising while viewing programs with other classifications.69 
The report identified two key limitations in existing studies that impacted upon researchers’ 
ability to link the initiatives with changing trends in food advertising. First, there was no 
research establishing the pattern of unhealthy food advertising prior to the introduction of 
                                                 
62 Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, above n 11, 6. 
63 Ibid. 
64 It also considered data on food advertising from Roberts et al, above n 1, which focused on advertisers’ 
compliance with food industry self-regulation, and other regulatory instruments. 
65 Ibid 9. 
66 Ibid 2. 
67 Ibid 30. 
68 Ibid 39.  
69 Ibid 3. 
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food industry self-regulation.70 Both the CSIRO and the University of Sydney studies only 
included one or two data points prior to the introduction of the codes (2006 and 2007).71 
However, internationally agreed procedures for the analysis of time series data require 
research to have approximately ten data points in order to establish a reliable trend.72 Thus, 
while there appeared to be a decline in unhealthy food advertising, it was not possible to 
attribute this trend to the creation of the initiatives.73 
The second limitation was that existing research did not use seasonally representative data. 
For example, the University of Sydney studies used advertising data collected in April or 
May. International research suggests that advertising rates are cyclical, with one UK study 
finding that unhealthy food advertising peaked during February to May (at 65 to 70 per cent 
of all food advertising), and bottomed out (at 35 per cent) in December.74 However, studies 
did not establish whether food advertising in Australia followed a similar seasonal pattern, or 
varied according to television ratings or holiday periods.75 Thus, research on the codes could 
not show whether changes in advertising rates were due to code implementation, shifting 
advertising to other months of the year, or the influence of economic pressures such as the 
Global Financial Crisis.76 The report concluded that it was not possible to know with any 
confidence whether the introduction of the codes had directly influenced unhealthy food 
advertising to children.77 However, a common theme was that both signatory and non-
signatory companies continued to advertise unhealthy foods during children’s programs and 
at peak viewing times.78 
4. Problems with measuring the outcomes of the RCMI and QSRI 
To date, research on the effects of the RCMI and QSRI has produced inconclusive results. 
This is partly because studies on the impact of food industry self-regulation are relatively 
new, both in Australia and overseas.79 However, disagreements about the scheme’s success 
                                                 
70 Ibid 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid 25. 
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Fernando  Rodríguez-Artalejo, 'Compliance with Self-Regulation of Television Food and Beverage Advertising 
Aimed at Children in Spain' (2009) 13(7) Public Health Nutrition 1013; Dale Kunkel, Christopher McKinley 
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are not simply the result of a lack of empirical research. They reflect disagreement between 
key stakeholders about what the objectives of the code are, or what they should be, and how 
objectives should be measured. The food industry states that the initiatives regulate 
advertising targeted directly to children, whether considering the theme, visuals and language 
used in the advertisement, or its placement in media directed to children, defined with 
reference to audience share or the rating of the program.80 It claims that the codes are 
successful in reducing such advertising, as evidenced by the low rates of unhealthy food 
advertising during designated children’s programming.81 However, public health researchers 
argue that the codes should aim to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, 
regardless of whether advertising targets children or older age groups.82 They remain 
concerned about children’s persistently high exposure to unhealthy food advertising during 
peak viewing times.83  
A further complication is that each study used varying definitions of unhealthy/healthy foods, 
‘children’ and children’s programs or peak viewing times.84 For example, some studies 
reported on food advertising during children’s peak viewing times, while others examined 
advertising during children’s programs.85 Further, the definition of children’s peak viewing 
time or children’s programs differed according to the proportion of the audience that 
comprised children (ranging from more than 25, 35 or 50 per cent), by weekdays and 
weekends, by age group (zero to four years versus five to 12 years of age) and according to 
whether advertising was on free-to-air or pay television.86 For this reason, ANPHA’s report 
concluded that ‘… there remains a great deal of unexplained heterogeneity in rates and 
prevalence across studies that is, at least partly, due to different sampling and sources of 
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data’.87 The Australian debates reflect similar issues about research on advertising and 
childhood obesity internationally, where the relevant literature contains a number of gaps and 
studies are inconsistent in their method and focus.88  
Some of the difficulties in measuring the codes’ effects stem from the design of the self-
regulatory systems themselves. As with many other voluntary codes, the RCMI and QSRI do 
not contain clearly defined objectives or measurable targets.89 This creates scope for 
disagreement about their objectives, and how to define and evaluate effectiveness.90 The 
codes also lack mechanisms for systematically gathering evidence of their success, which are 
required for effective monitoring and oversight.91 Further, each RCMI signatory company 
interprets the main code document differently in its company action plan. The ambiguity and 
variability in company commitments make it difficult for independent researchers to evaluate 
compliance.92 I return to these problems in Chapter 7. 
More fundamentally, differences of opinion on the success of self-regulation relate to the 
politically charged nature of advertising regulation, and the disputed connections between 
food advertising and childhood obesity. Public health advocates argue that children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising makes a significant (if small) contribution to 
childhood obesity.93 Accordingly, reducing children’s exposure to this form of advertising 
would produce social benefits that outweigh the economic costs of regulation. This is 
particularly the case where advertising restrictions form part of a ‘basket of interventions’ 
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that together addressed the causes of obesity.94 Researchers also say that self-regulation 
insufficiently reduces children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, justifying public 
rather than private regulation.95  
In contrast, the food industry’s position is that there is no proven causal link between 
advertising and childhood obesity.96 Accordingly, it argues that the cost of government 
intervention would be disproportionate to the uncertain benefits conferred by advertising 
restrictions.97  The same argument was made by the ACMA in its review of the Children’s 
Television Standards 2005, as I discussed in Chapter 1.98 
Both industry and public health groups use evaluations of efficacy to support their policy 
positions, suggesting that measuring the success of voluntary codes is not simply a technical 
or objective exercise.99 Rather, understandings (and measurements) of efficacy are socially 
constructed and reflect the policy objectives of the different actors engaged in evaluative 
processes.100 Given these competing and contested understandings of ‘effective’ self-
regulation, there is unlikely to be one final answer to the question of whether voluntary 
initiatives can successfully promote public health goals. However, this does not absolve the 
parties involved from responsibility for their actions or inactions, nor does it mean that 
measures should not be taken to address the influence of unhealthy food advertising on 
children’s dietary health. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the precautionary principle requires 
that governments act on the probable impact of self-regulation, rather than waiting for a 
definitive answer on the scheme’s success.101 
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5. A different approach to evaluating food industry self-regulation 
Given the uncertain impact of self-regulation on advertising unhealthy food, this thesis 
proposes a different approach to assessing the efficacy of self-regulation. Although I consider 
research on the outcomes of self-regulation, I focus on whether the RCMI and QSRI establish 
the building blocks of a potentially successful self-regulatory regime. This involves 
considering the terms and conditions of the codes themselves, as well as the efficacy of 
processes for managing, monitoring, enforcing and reviewing the scheme. In other words, I 
am concerned with the design and implementation of the food industry’s self-regulatory 
scheme, within its broader political and social context.102 Although some studies take a 
similar approach,103 regulatory design is a less frequently considered aspect of the RCMI and 
QSRI. Certainly there has been no academic research that considers both code content and 
regulatory processes under one overarching conceptual framework. 
Analysing regulatory design is a weaker measure of self-regulation’s success than evaluating 
its actual impact on public policy objectives, and such an analysis does not remove the need 
to assess the substantive outcomes of voluntary schemes.104 There is also a danger that 
focusing on processes of code development and implementation will deflect attention away 
from the substance of codes, and whether they actually have or can produce changes in 
industry behaviour.105 Public health researchers raise these concerns in their evaluation and 
criticisms of food and alcohol industry self-regulation. According to Wendy Loxley and 
colleagues, governments focus on continually refining alcohol industry advertising codes, but 
overlook ‘the essential question of whether it serves the public interest to allow promotion of 
products that have considerable adverse impacts on public health’.106  Thus, focusing on the 
details of self-regulation may distract attention from more fundamental issues, such as 
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whether companies should be allowed to promote products that have a serious impact on 
public health.107   
In addition, socio-legal analysis often contains normative assumptions about the failure of 
state intervention and the desirability of using market-based techniques to secure public 
objectives.108 Thus, analysing self-regulatory structures and processes risks validating and 
legitimising industry discourses on the value of self-regulation, in turn contributing to the 
dominance of industry interests in policy debate.109 When I published some of this research as 
a peer-reviewed journal article, the anonymous reviewers raised similar points. One said that 
considering self-regulatory processes without also evaluating the codes’ efficacy risked 
producing research that reads as ‘how to gain credibility without actually doing much’. 
Another commented that improving the accountability and transparency of self-regulation 
(the focus of my article) did not ‘count for that much if they serve only to legitimise [self-
regulation] without delivering improved social outcomes’. Ronen Shamir argues that this is a 
perennial danger for regulatory and sociolegal scholars. In attempting to describe and design 
new regulatory tools that foster the social responsibility of companies, researchers provide 
technical expertise that upholds and legitimises the desirability of private rather than public 
regulation, and contributes to the transformation of normative and ethical issues into 
instruments of business management that enhance companies’ profitability, rather than 
furthering public objectives.110 
According to the reviewers of my paper, my research implicitly assumes that voluntary 
approaches can improve the food marketing environment, so long as schemes are designed 
effectively and operate within an institutional environment that supports their objectives. 
Their comments reflect the position that self-regulation cannot significantly reduce children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising, even if implemented perfectly.111 This is due to an 
inherent conflict of interest between the food industry’s profit motive and public health 
objectives, meaning that the industry will never unilaterally introduce an effective scheme. In 
light of the failure of self-regulation, as well as the extent of the obesity epidemic, 
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government regulation is needed to restrict the placement of unhealthy food advertising in 
media with significant child audiences.112  
Despite public health researchers’ concerns, I argue that there is value in assessing the 
efficacy of the RCMI and QSRI against process- as well as outcome-based criteria, especially 
considering the debate over what the objectives of food industry self-regulation are, or should 
be, and whether the codes have achieved those goals. Literature on ‘reflexive,’ ‘procedural’ 
or ‘responsive’ regulation suggests connections between the substance of regulation and its 
institutional design, which are often overlooked by public health researchers. Self-regulation 
frequently lacks mechanisms that make it transparent and accountable to the public.113 This 
undermines the legitimacy of private regulation, as it operates outside of democratic norms 
that call for citizens’ participation in regulatory decision-making.114 Regulatory scholars 
argue for private forms of regulation that include mechanisms for public participation and 
deliberation as a means to secure regulatory objectives that work to meet social goals.115 This 
is because incorporating external stakeholders in regulatory processes fosters self-regulation 
that is more democratic, and is more likely to reflect public rather than private interests.116 In 
other words, where industry actors control self-regulatory processes, the terms and objectives 
are more likely to reflect industry interests than to serve public health goals.117 
This argument implies that it is important to analyse regulatory processes as a way of 
shedding light on the nature of the codes’ content, as well as the strengths and limitations in 
the design of the scheme. Using a process-based analysis to evaluate the impact of food 
industry self-regulation may provide an explanation as to why the RCMI and QSRI have 
failed to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, and under what conditions 
(if any) they could be expected to achieve public health objectives. This kind of 
understanding is necessary before governments can be persuaded that self-regulation is an 
inadequate vehicle for achieving public interest goals, and that some form of regulation or co-
regulation is required. This is particularly the case considering the contemporary focus on 
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‘evidence-based’ based policy making and the demands of regulatory impact criteria.118 
Distinct from content-related concerns, code development and implementation processes 
should be fair and representative of public opinion if the community is to support private, 
industry-based systems of regulation.119 
In order to address concerns about the weaknesses of process-based evaluation (i.e. that it 
may be tokenistic, or may simply affirm the value of self-regulation), my analysis draws upon 
independent studies that evaluate the impact of the  RCMI and QSRI on children’s exposure 
to unhealthy food advertising. Studies that analyse the codes’ outcomes use television 
advertising data to measure the frequency and nature of food advertising during children’s 
peak viewing times or in television programs classified as suitable for children.120 As a 
sociolegal researcher, this form of analysis lies outside my skill set, and so I do not directly 
measure the outcomes of the initiatives in terms of changes in the nature and volume of food 
advertising on television. However, there are an increasing number of studies using this 
methodology, both in Australia and internationally, and they consistently find that the 
frequency of unhealthy food advertising remains high during children’s peak viewing 
periods, suggesting that food industry initiatives have done little to protect children from 
exposure to this advertising.121 I use this research to provide evidence-based criteria against 
which to evaluate the success of the RCMI and QSRI, defined in terms of their impact on 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising (which Chapter 1 identifies as the 
appropriate goal of food industry self-regulation).  
Chapter 11 outlines the argument that government regulation of food advertising to children 
is likely to develop slowly and in stages, if at all. This argument is based on the history of 
tobacco and alcohol advertising, as well the fact that self-regulation remains the preferred 
option for restricting unhealthy food advertising to children in many jurisdictions.122 
Combined with the Federal government’s reluctance to restrict food advertising directly, 
these factors suggest that statutory regulation is unlikely to eventuate in the immediate future. 
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When governments do act, it is more likely that they will build on an existing scheme rather 
than replacing it with an entirely new legislative model.123 It follows that understanding the 
limitations of food industry self-regulation is crucial if government action takes the form of 
regulatory or legislative ‘scaffolds’ that are added onto the existing scheme.124  
Further, policy makers need practical suggestions for strengthening the current regime 
incrementally, at least as an interim measure, and an analysis of regulatory processes 
provides a basis for understanding how governments might improve self- or co-regulatory 
regimes. Accordingly, the next section of the chapter sets out a framework for assessing the 
components of effective self-regulation. This framework will be used to evaluate the 
voluntary scheme established by the RCMI and QSRI and to make recommendations for 
ways in which it could be improved. 
6. The components of an effective self-regulatory regime 
According to Gunningham and Rees, the effectiveness of self-regulation ‘varies enormously 
among industries… .’125 This is due to the social and economic environment of self-regulation 
as well as the institutional design of voluntary schemes themselves.126  Given the importance 
of context to the efficacy of self-regulation, it is not possible to design one optimal scheme 
that can apply in all circumstances.127 However, researchers describe some general factors 
that are more likely to make it successful, and specify some processes and principles for 
designing effective regulation.128 This chapter identifies the key determinants of an effective 
voluntary system and divides them into the following categories: 
• Scheme design; 
• Company practices; 
• Industry characteristics; and  
• Institutional pressures. 
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Table 8 translates these criteria into specific goals, requirements and indicators that voluntary 
schemes must meet if they are to be successful. These criteria provide a framework that I use 
to evaluate the operation of food industry self-regulation.129 To create this framework I 
selected and compiled recommendations from theoretical literature on regulation and 
regulatory scheme design,130 as well as empirical studies of the operation of various 
regulatory regimes.131 I also considered proposals for effective advertising regulatory models 
based on studies of Australian advertising self-regulation.132 Finally, I drew upon government 
guidelines on the creation of voluntary codes and other self-regulatory measures.133 
Governments in a number of jurisdictions have promulgated such guides, reflecting 
increasing state reliance on self-regulation to further public objectives.134 
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Table 8. Criteria for effective self-regulation 
Aspect Goal  Requirements and indicators 
Scheme design  Clear goals that further regulatory 
objectives. 
 
 
 
Self-regulatory processes facilitate 
transparent and accountable self-
regulation. 
• Adequate resourcing.  
• Clear terms and definitions.  
• Concrete objectives that can be measured. 
• Processes are in place for monitoring, 
information dissemination, redressing 
complaints, enforcement and review. 
• Public disclosure of scheme objectives, 
signatories, annual compliance reports.  
• Capacity for independent review.  
• Incorporation of external stakeholders in 
regulatory processes. 
Corporate 
practices 
 
Companies internalise the norms 
contained in self-regulatory 
instruments. 
 
• Scheme requirements are incorporated into 
internal policies. 
• Processes of implementation and 
enforcement are in place, e.g. review of 
compliance by designated staff members. 
• Senior management are committed to self-
regulation. 
Industry 
characteristics  
Industry demonstrates willingness 
and ability to implement self-
regulatory regime.  
 
• Significant participation by industry. 
• Industry cohesion and cooperation. 
• Mechanisms for collective industry action, 
e.g. active industry associations.  
• Coincidence of private and public interests  
• Existence of a ‘community of shared fate’. 
Institutional 
pressures  
Creation of an institutional 
environment that encourages 
industry to adhere to an effective 
self-regulatory scheme. 
 
• External stakeholder participation in 
administration, monitoring, enforcement 
and review. 
• Government monitoring and oversight of 
voluntary scheme. 
• Explicit threat of government regulation.  
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Scheme design  
Good institutional design and adequate resourcing play a critical role in effective self-
regulation.1 Literature on regulatory design recommends that voluntary schemes contain clear 
terms and definitions, including terms of reference, decision-making arrangements, voting 
rights of members and funding arrangements.2 The success of voluntary regimes also depends 
on the extent to which external parties have confidence in these schemes, and perceive them 
as a legitimate form of governance.3 Accordingly, effective self-regulation contains 
mechanisms for fostering transparency and accountability to affected parties outside the 
industry, for example consumers, NGOs and governments.4 Transparency and accountability 
mechanisms include the collection and dissemination of information about the operation of 
voluntary schemes, as well as provision for external stakeholder input in regulatory 
processes, particularly monitoring and review of the functioning of self-regulation.5  
For the purposes of monitoring and enforcement, voluntary codes should establish a system 
for independent management of consumer complaints, including a review process that 
incorporates external stakeholders or organisations.6 Self-regulatory schemes tend to require 
companies to report on their progress towards achieving full regulatory compliance.7 To 
complement companies’ self-reporting, self-regulation should establish external mechanisms 
for monitoring and evaluating companies’ behaviour.8 External oversight of voluntary codes 
is particularly important to enhance their credibility in the eyes of the public.  
Effectiveness also depends upon enforcement measures in cases of non-compliance.9 
Voluntary schemes often draw upon informal and persuasive measures for enforcement. 
However, researchers agree that punitive sanctions should be available to deter non-
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3 Ibid; Julia Black, 'Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes' (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137; Lars H Gulbrandsen, 'Accountability Arrangements in 
Non-State Standards Organisations: Instrumental Design and Imitation' (2008) 15(4) Organisation 563.  
4 Gunningham and Rees, above n 89, 382-385; Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders and Laggards: 
Next-Generation Environmental Regulation (GreenLeaf, 2002) 146-147. 
5 Ibid; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 130, 12. 
6 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 133, 10. See also Gunningham, 'Environment, 
Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care', above n 131, 72-74; Harker, above n 
132, 101-102. 
7 Gunningham and Sinclair, 'Designing Environmental Policy', above n 127, 146. See, e.g., Rees, above n 131; 
Cashore, Auld and Newsom, above n 131. 
8 See Cohen, above n 104, 50; Gunningham and Sinclair, 'Designing Environmental Policy', above n 127, 146. 
9 OfCom, above n 133, 23; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 133, 11. 
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compliance and to support the use of softer enforcement methods.10 Finally, the operation of 
self-regulation is enhanced by education and promotional activities that raise the profile of 
the scheme with both the public and the regulated community.11 Giving self-regulation wide 
publicity ensures that the public and consumer groups are aware of the scheme, enabling 
external stakeholder participation in processes of enforcement, for example by laying 
complaints about non-compliance or boycotting non-compliant companies. 
Company practices  
Self-regulation attempts to achieve policy outcomes by requiring members to implement 
internal controls on their behaviour.12 These range from relatively simple statements of 
compliance to sophisticated systems of policy development, planning processes, training and 
education of staff, monitoring and audits of compliance.13 Voluntary schemes should also 
require participants to have some form of in-house system to ensure compliance.14 Other 
corporate practices associated with meaningful compliance include a demonstrated 
commitment from high-level management to implement and comply with the scheme; the 
existence of an ‘internal compliance constituency’, i.e., in-house compliance officers with the 
‘organisational muscle’ to influence managerial and employee practices; and the 
institutionalisation of regulatory requirements into everyday operating procedures, decision-
making, performance appraisal and award systems.15  
The capacity of internal controls to shape corporate practices may be impacted by 
organisational incompetence, limited uptake or symbolic forms of compliance.16 For example, 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Ayres and John Braithwaite, above n 130, ch 2; Andrew King and Michael Lenox, 'Industry Self-
Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program' (2000) 43(4) The Academy 
of Management Journal 698. 
11 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 133, 11. 
12 See Parker, above n 115. 
13 Ibid 18. See also, Stepan Wood, 'Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary Environmental Standards, 
Public Law and Private Authority in Canada' in Law Commission of Canada (ed), New Perspectives on the 
Public-Private Divide (UBS Press, 2004) 123; Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, 'Corporate 
Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?' (2009) 41(3) Administration & Society 3. 
14 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 133, 10. See also Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, 'Corporate Responsibility: Private Initiatives and Public Goals' (OECD, 2001) 
77-76 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/>; S Prakash Sethi and Olga Emelianova, 'A Failed 
Strategy of Using Voluntary Codes of Conduct by the Global Mining Industry' (2006) 6(3) Corporate 
Governance 226, 230.  
15 See Parker, above n 115, 53-57. 
16 The latter is where companies adopt management systems that give the appearance of self-regulation, without 
making significant changes to corporate practices. See Lauren B Edelman, 'Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic 
Structures: Organisational Mediation of Civil Rights Law' (1992) 97(6) The American Journal of Sociology 
1531; Lauren B Edelman and Mark C Suchman, 'The Legal Environments of Organisations' (1997) 23 Annual 
Review of Sociology 479. See also Parker and Nielsen, above n 147; Lawrence A Cunningham, 'The Appeal and 
Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills' (2003-2004) 29 Journal of Corporate law 267. 
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small- and medium-sized enterprises are more likely than large businesses to lack the 
expertise, knowledge and resources necessary to monitor the legal environment and 
implement business controls.17 They are also more likely to be focused on short-term 
economic survival, making it more difficult to justify staff training, new technology or formal 
management systems that present immediate costs to the business, but which would produce 
long-term economic benefits and enhanced compliance practices.18  
Also, organisational structures may inherently encourage irresponsible business practices, by 
diffusing responsibility for corporate decision making through a chain of individuals, placing 
pressure on individuals to behave unethically, or by separating employees’ personal ethical 
values from their commitment to business objectives.19 However, Parker argues that when 
combined with appropriate resources, values, and management expertise, management 
systems can assist in overcoming corporate irresponsibility by creating changes in 
organisational structures and activities that open up companies to social and ethical 
concerns.20  
Industry-level characteristics  
Successful self-regulation relies upon industries having the capacity and collective will to 
regulate themselves. Accordingly, studies suggest that self-regulation works most effectively 
in industries dominated by a small number of large companies.21 In a more concentrated 
industry, actors are more likely to have similar interests and to be able to agree on common 
standards to apply to all companies.22 Given that self-regulation is based on information 
exchange, consensus and learning between companies, industry cohesion is also important, 
particularly the presence of an industry association that is able to negotiate on behalf of its 
members.23 Industry actors must also possess the desire to act collectively to establish self-
regulation and to monitor each other’s behaviour and identify non-compliance. The impetus 
                                                 
17 Parker, above n 115, 56; Neil Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton and Robert A Kagan, 'Motivating 
Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection' (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 289. 
18 See, e.g., Charlotte Yapp and Robyn Fairman, 'Factors Affecting Food Safety Compliance Within Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises: Implications for Regulatory and Enforcement Strategies' (2006) 17(1) Food Control 
43. 
19 Parker, above n 115, 32-37. 
20 Ibid; Parker and Nielsen, above n 147, 28. 
21 Gunningham and Rees, above n 89, 393-394.  
22 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-Regulatory 
Arrangements' above n 133, 10. 
23 Ibid. See also Gunningham and Rees, above n 89; Anil K Gupta and Lawrence J Lad, 'Industry Self-
Regulation: An Economic, Organisational and Political Analysis' (1983) 8(3) The Academy of Management 
Journal 416, 422. 
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for policing other companies’ practices may stem from the existence of a ‘community of 
shared fate’ within the industry, where the poor performance of one member undermines the 
reputation of the entire industry.24 Such circumstances can lead to the mobilisation of industry 
peer pressure to ensure that no one company ‘lets the side down’ by breaching voluntary 
standards.25 However, it may create the possibility of collusion, where companies conspire to 
protect their own interests and keep other players out of the market.26 
Self-regulation is most likely to succeed when there is a coincidence between industry self-
interest and that of the general public.27 A coincidence of interests exists where the industry 
takes a long-term view of its relationship with consumers or the community and its 
responsible operation in society, or where compliance efforts coincide with industry best 
practice.28 For example, in the area of environmental protection, it may be in the interests of 
both the industry and the general public for producers to adopt new technologies that use 
fewer raw materials and less energy, and generate less waste.29 This can be characterised as a 
‘win-win’ situation, since improved environmental performance occurs as a result of 
companies seeking to improve their economic performance.30 However, often there is a 
substantial gap between industry profit and public interests, especially where it is possible for 
companies to ‘externalise’ the costs of production processes (or of using the product) onto 
workers, consumers or the public.31 Where the gap is large, it is unlikely that self-regulation 
can deliver improvements in company performance unless there is some form of external 
pressure to comply with voluntary standards.32 Thus, Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees 
identify the necessary conditions for effective self-regulation as either a strong natural 
coincidence between public and private interest in establishing self-regulation or a source of 
external pressure sufficient to create such a coincidence of interest artificially.33  
                                                 
24 See Rees, Hostages of Each Other, above n 131, 50; Joseph Rees, 'Development of Communitarian 
Regulation in the Chemical Industry' (1997) 19(4) Law & Policy 477, 489-490. 
25 Neil Gunningham, Darren Sinclair and Peter Grabosky, 'Instruments for Environmental Protection' in Neil 
Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair (eds), Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(Clarendon Press, 1998) 37, 54. 
26 Cohen, above n 104, 45-46. 
27 Gunningham and Rees, above n 89, 389-390. 
28 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-Regulatory 
Arrangements', above n 133, 10. 
29 Gunningham, Sinclair and Grabosky, 'Instruments for Environmental Protection', above n 159, 53. 
30 Ibid. See also Gunningham and Rees, above n 89. 
31 Gunningham and Rees, above n 89, 390. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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Institutional pressures  
External pressures for industry compliance can come from a variety of sources, including 
governments, consumers, NGOs and the market itself. Hostile consumer action often 
provides impetus for the creation of self-regulation.34 Activist groups and NGOs also trigger 
self-regulation through boycotts, media campaigns and litigation, which are particularly 
effective where industry actors rely upon their corporate reputation to sell products.35 
Researchers conclude that self-regulation is unlikely to be successful without meaningful 
third-party involvement and influence.36 However, the effectiveness of external pressures 
brought to bear by consumers and NGOs varies according to the regulatory context, including 
the proximity of industry participants to the final consumer goods, the type of product, the 
type of market, the industry’s ‘reputational sensitivity’ and the depth of public sentiment 
about the issue at hand.37 For example, self-regulation is more likely to be effective in a 
competitive market, as companies have a greater incentive to respond to consumer demands, 
and to adopt measures that differentiate their products from those of competitors. It is less 
successful where products are varied and difficult to compare, making it harder for 
consumers to distinguish between products, and for companies to detect whether competitors 
are engaging in misleading practices.38 
Researchers point to evidence that the fear of government regulation drives the majority of 
self-regulatory initiatives in a range of jurisdictions.39 Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 
voluntary codes will perform effectively in the absence of some form of government 
oversight.40 Specifically, government intervention may be necessary to prevent ‘free-riding,’ 
in which companies agree to self-regulate but merely feign compliance, or where a subsection 
of the industry refuses to join a voluntary code of conduct.41 Peer group pressure can be used 
to constrain free-riding in the first scenario, particularly if the industry is relatively cohesive 
and/or dominated by large actors that are willing to police the conduct of smaller 
                                                 
34 Ibid 391. 
35 See Haufler, above n 113, 26-27. 
36 Gunningham and Rees, above n 89, 402-403. See also Gunningham and Sinclair, 'Designing Environmental 
Policy', above n 127, 373. 
37 Gunningham and Sinclair, 'Designing Environmental Policy', above n 127, 149-150; Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-Regulatory 
Arrangements', above n 133, 10-11. 
38 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-Regulatory 
Arrangements', above n 133, 10. 
39 Gunningham, Sinclair and Grabosky, 'Instruments for Environmental Protection', above n 159, 55. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid 150. 
149 
 
companies.42 However, if a significant number of companies refuse to join a self-regulatory 
program, then governments may need to intervene so that participating companies are not put 
at a competitive disadvantage by the actions of non-members.43 Governments could address 
the free-rider problem by monitoring compliance and threatening to regulate at a later time if 
the evidence suggests that voluntary codes have failed to achieve regulatory objectives. 
However, this strategy is only effective when there is a credible threat of government 
regulation. As noted by David Cohen, ‘when the driving force behind the privatisation of 
regulation is the inability of governments to regulate effectively due to budgetary restraints, 
then compliance with voluntary codes becomes increasingly problematic’.44 Researchers 
conclude that voluntary codes are most likely to be effective when they operate together with 
government intervention (and other external pressures), meaning that co-regulatory 
frameworks may be most appropriate for achieving regulatory objectives.45 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter described studies evaluating the effect of food industry self-regulation on 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. In light of uncertainty around self-
regulation’s success, it proposed a new way of evaluating the RCMI and QSRI based on 
regulatory processes and design. It also defended the value of evaluating the design of self-
regulatory schemes, in addition to their outcomes. Accordingly, the second part of the chapter 
identified building blocks for effective self-regulation. Successful self-regulation depends 
upon the commitment of individual companies and the industry as a whole to implement 
voluntary schemes, and their ability to develop effective regulatory arrangements. However, 
the institutional environment constitutes a critical determinant of industry’s adoption of, and 
adherence to, demanding voluntary schemes. In particular, external stakeholder groups 
provide a check on industry control of self-regulation, ensuring it is more likely to advance 
public objectives than to simply provide benefits to industry actors.  Strong regulatory design 
harnesses institutional pressures by providing for external stakeholder participation in all 
aspects of self-regulatory processes, including code creation, administration, monitoring, 
enforcement and review. The thesis draws upon these insights to explore whether the 
conditions exist for effective self-regulation of food advertising directed to children. It also 
                                                 
42 Ibid 151. 
43 Ibid. See also Cohen, above n 104, 42-44. 
44 Cohen, above n 104, 51. 
45 See, e.g., Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible 
Care', above n 131, 86-90; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, above n 148, 74. 
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examines whether it is possible (and desirable) to create such conditions where they do not 
exist already.  
Studies of regulation are predominantly concerned with techniques for effective regulation of 
industry practices. As described in Chapter 2, regulatory theory tends to pay less attention to 
the content of schemes, and to the political and social issues underlying their operation. 
However, debates on food industry self-regulation often concern the substantive constraints 
on industry conduct imposed by the RCMI and QSRI. Thus the following chapters will 
evaluate food industry self-regulation according to:  
• The terms and conditions of the RCMI and QSRI, and their regulatory design; 
• The steps taken by food industry actors to comply with the initiatives; 
• The characteristics of the food industry, its capacity to self-regulate and rationale for 
creating voluntary codes of conduct; 
• Public health involvement in the self-regulatory scheme, including participation in, 
and resistance to industry self-regulation; and  
• Government oversight of food industry self-regulation, and whether there is a credible 
threat of government regulation.  
The next chapter describes my research methods, while the following chapter begins my 
substantive analysis of food industry self-regulation. It assesses the content of the two food 
industry codes using advertising complaint determinations, and compares their terms to the 
alcohol industry’s ABAC Scheme. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Research methods 
This chapter describes the types of data and methods of analysis used in my thesis research. 
Although this thesis compares tobacco, food and alcohol advertising regulation, I focused my 
empirical research on the food and alcohol industries. These two industries play an active role 
in advertising regulation, while the tobacco industry does not. I used two main sources of 
data for my study: public documents on food and alcohol advertising regulation, and semi-
structured in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. Accordingly, my study draws on a 
mixed-method research design. I describe some of the issues involved in conducting research 
on large and powerful companies, as well as accessing business elites for interviews. The 
chapter concludes by briefly outlining the content of the substantive chapters of the thesis, 
and signposting the different ways in which data are used in each chapter.  
1. Document analysis 
I conducted a close analysis of regulatory instruments that apply to food and alcohol 
advertising, most importantly industry codes of conduct. I also examined documents 
produced by food and alcohol manufacturers and quick service restaurants, including social 
responsibility reports, company action plans written to meet the requirements of the RCMI 
and QSRI, annual reports and company-owned websites. In addition, I analysed documents 
produced by the bodies that administer advertising self-regulation, including the ABAC 
Management Committee and the Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC). I performed 
a detailed case analysis of complaint determinations concerning food and alcohol advertising 
directed to children, the results of which are reported in Chapter 6. Finally, I analysed 
government documents that reviewed or reported on food and alcohol advertising self-
regulation, including those produced by the Australian National Preventive Health Agency 
(ANPHA) and the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). Table 9 
summarises the types of documents used in my research, and provides examples of key texts.  
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Table 9. Key texts analysed in the thesis 
Author Type of document  Example  
Industry associations Advertising codes of conduct The Responsible Children’s 
Marketing Initiative (RCMI). 
  The Quick Service Restaurant 
Industry Initiative for Responsible 
Marketing and Advertising to 
Children (QSRI). 
  The Alcohol Beverage Advertising 
(and Packaging) Code (ABAC). 
 Annual reports on the operation of 
advertising codes 
ABAC Annual Report. 
  RCMI Activity Report.  
Complaints hearing bodies Advertising complaint determinations  Advertising Standards Board 
determinations on food advertising 
directed to children. 
  ABAC Adjudication Panel complaint 
determinations on alcohol 
advertising’s appeal to children. 
Companies  Social responsibility reports  PepsiCo Performance with Purpose 
Sustainability Summary 2010. 
 Internal advertising codes Diageo Marketing Code: Promoting 
Responsible Drinking 
 RCMI and QSRI company action 
plans 
Nestlé The Responsible Children’s 
Marketing Initiative Company Action 
Plan. 
Government agencies Review of food industry-self 
regulation  
Industry Self-Regulation of Food and 
Beverage Advertising to Children: 
ACMA Monitoring Report. 
 Review of alcohol industry self-
regulation  
Review of the Self-Regulatory System 
for Alcohol Advertising by the 
National Committee for the Review 
of Alcohol Advertising. 
 Documents on nutrition policy and 
chronic disease prevention  
Australia: The Healthiest Country by 
2020. Report of the National 
Preventive Health Taskforce.  
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2. Interviews 
Recruitment 
I supplemented document analysis with interviews intended to provide in-depth detail on how 
companies complied with advertising regulation, as well as their perspectives on the strengths 
and limitations of industry self-regulation. I undertook purposive sampling for the interview 
component of my research. Initially I focused on food and alcohol industry actors that 
participate in the advertising regulatory system. I contacted the AFGC to ask their staff to 
participate, and to request their assistance with recruiting representatives of RCMI and QSRI 
companies for interviews. The AFGC was receptive to my inquiries and agreed to participate 
in the study, and to help with recruitment. I contacted the three alcohol industry trade 
associations that are involved in the ABAC Scheme, as well as the ABAC Management 
Committee. The alcohol trade associations declined to participate in my research unless the 
Committee did so as well. Their reluctance was because the chief executive of each of the 
trade associations sits on the Management Committee. The relationships between the trade 
associations and the Management Committee made it a powerful gatekeeper that determined 
my access to other alcohol industry actors.1 This was also true of the AFGC, but it affected 
my research to a lesser extent as the AFGC was more cooperative than the ABAC 
Management Committee. 
 The ABAC Management Committee initially refused to participate in my study. In fact, a 
representative of the Committee emailed other individuals with an interest in the ABAC 
Scheme and asked them not take part in my research. However, after contacting the 
Committee I wrote to the ABAC Adjudication Panel, representatives of which agreed to be 
interviewed. At this point, the Management Committee and the three alcohol industry bodies 
agreed to participate in the study. The alcohol industry’s defensive reaction to my research 
seemed to be related to its history of interactions with public health researchers. The ABAC 
has been subject to numerous evaluations by government bodies and independent researchers, 
several of which have produced serious critiques of the scheme.2 There is also pronounced 
animosity between some alcohol researchers and sectors of the alcohol industry. Accordingly, 
industry actors were concerned about my motivations and whether I would simply reproduce 
the criticisms of other researchers. In contrast, research on self-regulation of food advertising 
                                                 
1 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2012) 139. 
2 See the discussion in Chapter 10.  
154 
 
was relatively new at the start of my study. Perhaps for this reason the AFGC seemed more 
open to my research, and believed that my findings could reflect positively on the industry.  
In order to recruit RCMI and QSRI participants, I asked the AFGC to send an email on my 
behalf to all signatory companies, asking if a company representative could take part in an 
interview. Following this email, two RCMI companies (out of 17 signatories) contacted me to 
be interviewed, and one quick service restaurant chain (out of four companies) also agreed to 
participate.3 I used a publicly available list of signatory companies to follow up the AFGC’s 
email with a letter from my supervisor requesting interview participants, followed by four to 
five telephone calls if there was no initial reply. This process resulted in another six RCMI 
companies agreeing to be interviewed for the study. The alcohol trade associations largely 
refused to assist with recruiting alcohol manufacturers for me to interview, so I used their 
websites to identify wine makers, breweries and distilled spirits producers that are subject to 
the ABAC. I contacted 20 companies in total, of whom five agreed to be interviewed.  
In relation to the food industry I was only interested in companies that had joined the RCMI 
and QSRI, meaning that I could not broaden my pool of potential participants. Although there 
were more potential interviewees in the alcohol industry, time constraints limited my 
recruitment efforts. I struggled to recruit both food and alcohol manufacturers for the study, 
with some companies refusing to participate and others simply failing to return my calls. 
However, I am grateful to those companies that agreed to be interviewed, particularly 
considering the risk that I would be critical of their industry’s implementation of self-
regulation. 
When I became concerned that I would not be able to recruit enough food and alcohol 
industry participants, I re-designed the study to include other key stakeholders in food and 
alcohol advertising regulation. I recruited representatives from the advertising industry bodies 
involved in the advertising self-regulatory system, specifically the Communications Council, 
the Australian Association of National Advertisers and the Advertising Standards Bureau. I 
also interviewed a senior executive at ANPHA, as it monitors and evaluates food and alcohol 
advertising regulation. I approached the ACMA, but this agency declined to participate. I 
recruited informants from public health organisations, as well as academics with an interest in 
food or alcohol advertising regulation. In total, eleven public health representatives agreed to 
                                                 
3 Seven quick service restaurant chains participate in the QSRI (Chicken Treat, Hungry Jack’s, KFC, 
McDonald’s Australia, Oporto, Pizza Hut and Red Rooster) but these are owned by four companies (QSR 
Holdings, Hungry Jack’s, McDonald’s Australia and Yum! Brands). 
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be interviewed. During the recruitment process, I visited England for a conference, and I used 
this trip as an opportunity to speak with the UK government broadcasting authority, OfCom, 
and members of the Advertising Standards Authority and the Committee of Advertising 
Practice – the two main bodies involved in advertising industry self-regulation in the UK.4 
Although this interview data does not make a large appearance in my thesis, it proved useful 
to gaining an understanding of the UK advertising regulatory system, which I have used as a 
point of contrast to the Australian regulatory scheme in Chapter 11. 
In total, I interviewed 39 individuals from 35 organisations. Twenty-one participants were 
women and 18 were men. All interviewees were senior within their organisation, with most 
holding senior executive positions such as director or manager of a particular business or 
organisational unit. Interviewees were based in all six Australian states, as well as the 
Australian Capital Territory. Twelve interviewees were located in Sydney, eight in Canberra 
five in Melbourne and four in London (UK), with the remainder being spread across 
Australia.  Table 10 below provides an overview of the different groups of participants that I 
interviewed and how many interviews I conducted in each sector.  
Of the 11 commercial companies involved, all were of a significant size, with 100 to 85,000 
employees in Australia. All but two companies were part of larger multinational 
organisations that operated in numerous countries and employed thousands of people. The 
food manufacturers had diverse product ranges, which included savoury and sweet baked 
goods, chocolate and confectionery products, dairy products, frozen and canned goods, pre-
prepared meals and non-alcoholic beverages. Because the alcohol industry is dominated by a 
small number of large manufacturers, I cannot disclose the specific sectors of the industry 
from which my interview participants were drawn. In some parts of the industry there are 
only a handful of significant players, so this information could identify which companies 
participated in the study, in breach of the guarantee of confidentiality given to these 
informants. 
 
                                                 
4 I also discuss these organisations in Chapter 11. Very briefly, OfCom is the UK government’s communications 
regulator, operating under the Communications Act 2003 (UK). It co-regulates with the Advertising Standards 
Authority, an independent organisation established by the advertising industry to administer its codes of 
conduct. These codes are written by the Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice and the Committee of 
Advertising Practice, comprising representatives of advertisers, media agencies, media owners and other 
industry groups. See OfCom, About (undated) <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/>; Committee of Advertising 
Practice, Our Committees (2013) <http://www.cap.org.uk/About-CAP/Who-we-are/Our-committees.aspx>; 
Advertising Standards Authority, About ASA (2013)  <http://www.asa.org.uk/About-ASA.aspx>. 
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Table 10. Type and number of organisations participating in the research 
Type of organisation  Sector  No. of organisations 
that participated 
Total number of 
interviewees  
Companies     
 Food manufacturers 7 8 
 Alcohol companies 4 4 
Industry bodies     
 Food industry 1 2 
 Alcohol industry  4 6 
 Advertising industry 
(UK and Australia) 
6 6 
Public health groups      
 General 4 4 
 Obesity specific  3 3 
 Alcohol specific  4 4 
Government agencies     
 Australia 1 1 
 UK 1 1 
Total  35 39 
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Researching self-regulation 
The difficulties I experienced accessing food and alcohol industry interviewees point to more 
fundamental problems related to obtaining information on self-regulation. Government 
regulatory agencies are subject to accountability requirements that authorise or mandate them 
to publicly disclose enforcement and compliance information.1 Researchers can also use 
freedom of information legislation to acquire information on the activities of public bodies. In 
contrast, the increasing use of private regulation places a growing amount of data in the hands 
of businesses, industry associations and civil society actors, who are not obligated to release 
information into the public domain in the same manner as public agencies.2 Thus, conditions 
of ‘regulatory capitalism’ make it more difficult for researchers to gain access to information 
about regulatory systems, particularly where self-regulation makes no provision for the public 
disclosure of information about its operation. However, where industries point to their own 
voluntary programs as fulfilling a public purpose (and as eliminating the need for government 
regulation), then it is entirely appropriate that those initiatives be rigorously examined in 
terms of whether they embody the features of good governance. 
As I discuss in Chapter 7, food and alcohol advertising regulation contain some mechanisms 
for data collection and disclosure. However, as with many other forms of self-regulation, the 
main source of information on corporate compliance with the RCMI and QSRI is company 
self-reports.3 Concerns can be raised about the reliability and validity of the data obtained 
from self-reports, because firms may refuse to disclose commercially sensitive information or 
discuss serious instances of non-compliance that tarnish their reputation.4 If regulation is to 
be responsive to business compliance, it is important that there be independent evaluation of 
corporate behaviour;5 yet the fact that food and alcohol companies retain a large degree of 
control over information about their self-regulatory practices makes this difficult. The lack of 
independent information on the implementation of food and alcohol industry advertising 
codes illustrates one of the limitations of these regulatory systems, namely the lack of 
                                                 
1 Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen, 'The Challenge of Empirical Research on Business Compliance in 
Regulatory Capitalism' (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Society 45. 59. 
2 Ibid 59. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid 61-63. 
5  Ibid 46. 
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objective criteria by which to evaluate the schemes’ effects, as well as systematic monitoring 
of the schemes against these criteria.6 I discuss this problem further in Chapter 7. 
Data reliability  
I attempted to ensure the rigour of my data through a process of triangulation.7 I compared 
interview data to publicly available documents on companies’ compliance practices. I also 
compared my findings on companies’ implementation of the RCMI to those of the 
independent review of the scheme, conducted in 2012.8 The independent review of the RCMI 
used a similar methodology to my own, but the reviewer had access to all of the code 
signatories, as well as to advertising industry bodies and the AFGC. Additionally, I referred 
to the findings of a separate independent report on the QSRI, produced in 2011.9 However, 
both of these reviews relied upon information provided by participants themselves, i.e. the 
reviewers did not have access to an independent source of data on signatories’ advertising 
and compliance practices. My study also relied on self-reports and information provided in 
interviews with company representatives. To the extent that my findings match those of the 
independent reviews, it may simply mean that the same limitations are found in all three data 
sets.10  
Further, it should not be assumed that combining data from multiple sources will generate an 
objective ‘truth’ about self-regulatory processes, nor enhance the validity of research.11 To 
begin with, texts are socially situated and written for an intended purpose and to convey a 
particular impression about the author.12 The documents I analysed may produce a different 
perspective to the interview data because they were written for a different purpose to this 
                                                 
6 See also Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or 
Responsive?' (2011) 6(2 pt 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case 
for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public 
Health Nutrition 1 <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>; 
Belinda Reeve, 'Private Governance, Public Purpose? Assessing Transparency and Accountability in Self-
Regulation of Food Advertising to Children' (2013) 10(2) Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 149. 
7 Norman K Denzin, The Research Act in Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods 
(Butterworths, 1970) ch 10; Nigel G Fielding and Jane L Fielding, Linking Data (Sage, 1986) 23-53. 
8 Susannah Tymms, 'Responsible Advertising to Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and 
Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes' (AGFC, October 2012) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
9 Healthy Kids Association, Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising to Children (2011) Australian Food and Grocery 
Council <http://www.afgc.org.au/tools-guides-.html>. 
10 Parker and Nielsen, above n 5, 63. See also Fielding and Fielding, above n 11, 31. 
11 Fielding and Fielding, above n 11, 35; Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (Sage, 2nd ed, 2000) 5. 
12 Bryman, above n 1, 510. 
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thesis. However, by combining interview data with document analysis, I aim to produce a 
richer and more detailed picture of the workings of advertising self-regulation.13 
When I discussed my research with my colleagues, friends and family, they often questioned 
whether food and alcohol industry participants told me ‘the truth’ about the industry’s 
practices. Some people thought I was getting little more than the ‘official line’ on regulatory 
compliance.14 This is particularly the case considering that senior executives ‘are often 
expected to speak on behalf of a formal organisation – even to speak as if they were the 
organisation’.15 Business elites may also receive media training in how to avoid answering 
questions.16 It is certainly the case that participants offered me only a partial view of how 
their organisation operated, not necessarily because they set out to deliberately deceive me, 
but because they occupied a certain position within that organisation and did not know how 
other units operated, or because they held different perspectives to their colleagues.17 
However, I saw little reason for participants to try and mislead me. Although interviewees 
may have had an interest in enhancing the reputation of their industries, participation in the 
research offered them and their company few direct benefits (particularly considering that 
participant companies remained anonymous) and presented potential threats to the industry’s 
reputation. 
From another perspective, questions about truth telling in interviews are irrelevant to my 
research. I assume there is no one objective ‘truth’ about the effects of food and alcohol 
advertising regulation that can be accessed through social research.18 The goal of my 
interviews was to gain a greater understanding of how participants understood self-regulation 
and interpreted its effects.19 A related point is that participants gave the impression that they 
                                                 
13 Fielding and Fielding, above n 11, 33.  
14 See also Catherine Welch et al, 'Corporate Elites as Informants in Qualitative International Business Research' 
(2002) 11(5) International Business Review 611, 615. 
15 Robert J Thomas, 'Interviewing Important People in Big Companies' (1993) 22(1) Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 80, 85. 
16 William S Harvey, 'Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews' (2011) 11(4) Qualitative Research 431, 438. 
17 Ayres and Braithwaite describe how corporate organisations are not monolithic entities, but have multiple 
units, sub-units and employees with varying motivations and goals. Individuals can also be separated into 
various ‘selves’, with differing commitments to regulatory goals. This suggests that individuals and corporate 
departments can respond in a range of ways to regulatory requirements, depending upon their location within the 
organisation and their individual values and motivations. See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 20-35. Christine Parker also 
discusses internal organisational dynamics and the influence of organisations on individuals’ commitment to 
compliance. See The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 32-37, and the discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
18 See Jody Miller and Barry Glassner, 'The "Inside" and the "Outside": Finding Realities in Interviews' in David 
Silverman (ed), Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice (Sage, 2004) 125. 
19 See Bryman, above n 1, 380. 
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genuinely believed that their company acted responsibly. Some informants went to great 
lengths to demonstrate this to me, for example by showing me corporate policy documents 
and advertising schedules and describing their operation. The view of industry participants 
seemed to reflect a different perspective to public health participants on what self-regulation 
should aim to achieve, where the responsibilities of parents and companies lay in relation in 
children’s viewing and eating habits, as well as on the connections between advertising and 
obesity. In other words, what participants told me made sense or was credible according to 
their belief systems and normative assumptions. Thus, I take interviewees to be telling me the 
‘truth’ (or their ‘truth’) about compliance practices, as far as they know it.20 However, taking 
this position does not mean that I cannot critically evaluate interviewee’s narratives; hence 
my use of comparative sources of data as a way of presenting multiple (and sometimes 
conflicting) perspectives on self-regulation. 
Data collection  
I developed semi-structured interview schedules to guide interactions with participants. I 
created interview schedules that were specific to the individual or organisation being 
interviewed, but the questions fell into the following general categories: 
• The participants’ role in the regulatory system; 
• What they understood to be the rationale for adopting self-regulation in their company 
or industry; 
• Whether they thought self-regulation worked effectively, and if so why; 
• Whether they perceived self-regulation to have any limitations, and whether there 
were any ways in which the scheme could be strengthened; and 
• Whether there should be greater government involvement in food or alcohol 
advertising regulation, and if so, in what ways. 
In the interviews with food and alcohol company representatives, I questioned participants on 
how their company implemented advertising codes, and any challenges the company 
experienced in doing so. Interviews were conducted in-person where possible, although nine 
were conducted by telephone, sometimes because of the time and expense involved in 
travelling to visit the interviewee, or when the interviewee requested it. One participant 
                                                 
20 See Miller and Glassner, above n 22. 
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emailed answers to my questions, but did not want to be interviewed over the telephone or 
face-to-face. All other interviews were audio-taped with participant consent.  
Ethics and consent  
I obtained permission to undertake the research from the University of Sydney’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee. The interviews were conducted in accordance with the ethics 
requirements set by the Committee. I secured written consent from participants to the 
interview, and assured participants that:  
• Interviewees were speaking on behalf of their organisation (in the case of industry 
trade associations, regulatory bodies or government agencies) and that interviewees 
themselves would not be identified in reports of the data;  
• For interviews with companies and public health actors, that both the organisation and 
the interviewee would remain anonymous, and all identifying details would be 
removed in reports of the data; and 
• Participation was entirely voluntary and the interviewee could withdraw from the 
study at any point. 
In addition, all material was stored in a secure location at the University of Sydney, and made 
available only to me. 
There is a growing concern for research organisations to demonstrate their ethical credentials. 
This is done in order to protect research participants from harm, but also to protect the 
institution from any reputational and legal risks associated with researchers behaving 
unethically.21 In the social sciences, ethics requirements draw upon a framework developed 
from biomedical research.22 This framework assumes that participants are in a position of 
vulnerability compared to researchers, and need to be protected from exploitation or harms 
that might result from their involvement in the research, as well as from being coerced into 
participating in research.23 However, this model of ethics does not fit well with some social 
                                                 
21 See Bryman, above n 1, 131; Maurice Punch 'Politics and Ethics in Qualitative Research' in Norman K 
Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 1994) 83; Will C 
Van Den Hoonaard, 'Is Research-Ethics a Moral Panic?' (2001) 38(1) Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 19. 
22 Rachel Aldred, 'Ethical and Political Issues in Contemporary Research Relationships' (2000) 42(5) Sociology 
887, 888. 
23 See, e.g., National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian Research Council and Australian Vice-
Chancellor’s Committee, 'National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research' (Australian Government, 
2007) s 2 < http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/e72>. 
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science research, particularly studies of powerful business elites (such as senior managers and 
executives) and large organisations.24 This type of research often involves a power imbalance 
that favours the research subject rather than the researcher.25 Accordingly, researchers have to 
consider a different set of ethical considerations than those found in studies of marginalised 
social groups - a traditional concern of sociological research.26 They may have to protect their 
study from conflicts of interest and affiliation bias, particularly where it is funded by 
corporate organisations.27 They may also face attempts by industry or government to obstruct 
or influence the conduct of the research, including any resulting publications.28 
 Such issues arose in relation to my interviews with elites representing food and alcohol 
companies. First, I encountered difficulties in accessing these individuals. As a PhD student I 
had few means by which to convince anyone to participate in the study. Although 
participation could provide reputational benefits to the interviewee’s industry, it could also 
expose irresponsible advertising practices, and negative findings risked generating further 
criticism of the industry. The large, powerful organisations that I targeted for interviews often 
had multiple ‘lines of defence’ in place for controlling access to staff members and to 
corporate information.29 For example, I often encountered layers of gatekeepers from whom I 
had to seek permission to interview a particular employee. I was also at a power disadvantage 
during the interview process itself, given my lesser social standing as a student and the age 
gap between myself and the interviewee.30 In some interviews I found it difficult to ask 
critical or demanding questions, and to challenge interviewee’s assertions about the success 
of self-regulation, or the ethics of their advertising practices.31 On the other hand, the fact that 
I was a young student and an ‘outsider’ may have encouraged informants to provide a fuller 
account of the relevant issues than they would have if I was more senior or had a background 
in public health, or food and alcohol policy research. 
At one point in the recruitment process, the AFGC proposed that my PhD research form part 
of an independent review of the food industry codes. To my mind, this immediately raised 
                                                 
24 Aldred, above n 26, 888. 
25 Ibid; Emma Bell and Alan Bryman, 'The Ethics of Management Research: An Exploratory Content Analysis' 
(2007) 18(1) British Journal of Management 63. 
26 Bell and Bryman, above n 29, 66-67. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See, e.g., Susan A Ostrander, '"Surely You're Not in This Just to Be Helpful": Access, Rapport and Interviews 
in Three Studies of Elites' (1993) 22(1) Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 7, 14; Neil Pearce, 'Corporate 
Influences on Epidemiology' (2008) 37(1) International Journal of Epidemiology 46. 
29 Robert J Thomas, above n 19, 82. 
30 Welch et al, above n 18, 615. 
31 Ibid. See also Ostrander, above n 32, 18-22. 
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questions about protecting the independence and integrity of my research. I approached the 
research office at the University of Sydney, as well as the unit responsible for industry 
partnerships. However, I found little guidance on whether it was desirable for me to conduct 
the review and if I did so, what steps I should take to safeguard my research from any form of 
undue influence.32  
In the end, my supervisor and I drafted some preliminary conditions that would apply if I 
conducted the independent review. The AFGC eventually decided to use an independent 
consultant, and this incident had few practical repercussions for my thesis. Further, the fact 
that the AFGC considered my involvement may have helped me obtain access to food 
industry participants. However, my experiences may suggest that ethical guidelines need to 
account for the full range of research relationships and power relations encountered by 
researchers, as well as the political processes of gaining access to powerful interviewees. 33 
Data management and analysis 
I transcribed interviews verbatim and analysed the resulting data manually, rather than with 
the assistance of data management software, mostly because of personal preference and 
resource constraints. I had a relatively small number of interview transcripts (37 in total), 
making it easier to manage the data manually than if I had a larger group of interviewees. 
Participants fell into several distinct groups (including representatives from businesses, trade 
associations, health organisations and government agencies) and in many cases I was 
identifying themes in the interviews within each group rather than between them. This also 
made manual coding more manageable than if I was running a project with large numbers of 
participants and a large amount of complex coding and data annotation. 
I used a general inductive approach in my analysis, drawing upon models developed by 
David Thomas,34 Nigel King and Christine Horrocks, 35 and David Silverman.36 This 
approach is not tied to a specific ‘tradition’ or theory, although it draws upon many of the 
analytical techniques used in grounded theory, namely inductive coding, the development of 
                                                 
32 See also Ostrander, above 32. 
33 See Aldred, above n 26, 984. See also Punch, above n 25. 
34 David R Thomas, 'A General Inductive Approach for Analysing Qualitative Evaluation Data' (2006) 27(2) 
American Journal of Evaluation 237. 
35 Nigel King and Christine Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research (Sage, 2010). 
36 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interactions (Sage, 3rd 
ed, 2006). 
164 
 
categories and memo writing. 37 However the general inductive approach differs to grounded 
theory in that the coding process is less formal, for example it does not divide the analytic 
process into open and axial coding.38 It also allows for a deductive component in the analysis, 
in that the research design, collection and analysis of the data are guided by specific research 
questions that derive from a theoretical concern.39 This approach accorded with the overall 
aim of my research, which was to evaluate the theory of responsive regulation, within the 
context of food advertising to children, rather than to build a detailed theoretical model 
inductively from the data. 
The basic characteristics of my analytic approach were multiple close readings of the text to 
identify themes that emerged from the data; the creation of codes that reflected these themes; 
linking codes to create an explanatory model or framework; and the use of memos describing 
the themes in more depth.40 I began with an initial process of ‘deductive’ coding based on the 
schedule and the objectives of my research (for example, ‘steps taken to implement self-
regulation’).41 I also coded ‘inductively’ by coding for themes that spontaneously arose out of 
participants’ narratives. For example, I coded data that discussed the links between 
advertising and obesity because many participants offered their opinion on this topic, despite 
the fact that I did not ask a question on it specifically.  A second coding step focused on 
grouping together descriptive codes that shared a common meaning under interpretive or 
‘inferential’ codes, which drew data together into more meaningful units of analysis (for 
example, ‘justifying self-regulation’).42 A third stage involved identifying overarching themes 
that captured key concepts in the analysis (for example, ‘form of regulation’).43 The final step 
in my analysis was to build a framework that linked important themes and categories in the 
data and related my findings back to responsive regulation.44  
3. Subsequent chapters  
Chapters 6 to 11 report on the substantive findings of my research, based on the factors 
outlined in the framework in Chapter 4. I use the data from my analysis in different ways in 
                                                 
37  See Barney G Glaser and L Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). 
38 David R Thomas, above n 38, 240-241. 
39 Ibid 240. See also Robert K Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage, 4th ed, 2009) 35. 
40 David R Thomas, above n 38, 241-242. 
41 King and Horrocks, above n 39, 152. 
42 Ibid 15. 
43 Ibid 156; David R Thomas, above n 38, 242. 
44 David R Thomas, above n 38, 240. 
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each of the chapters. Chapter 6 critiques the content of food and alcohol advertising codes, 
while Chapter 7 analyses the regulatory processes established by food and alcohol industry 
self-regulation. These chapters rely solely on documentary analysis, particularly of the code 
documents themselves, as well as advertising complaint determinations (in Chapter 6). 
Chapter 8 describes the institutional context of food and alcohol advertising regulation. This 
chapter relies heavily upon the documentary analysis, but also makes reference to relevant 
interview data in some places. In Chapter 9 I report on the steps taken by food and alcohol 
manufacturers to implement advertising codes of conduct. This chapter is based almost 
entirely on interviews with food and alcohol companies, although I also make reference to the 
independent review of food industry self-regulation, as well as corporate social responsibility 
literature produced by food and alcohol companies. Chapters 10 and 11 describe government 
and public health involvement in food and alcohol industry advertising initiatives. These final 
chapters draw upon a mixture of interview and documentary data. The conclusion of the 
thesis summarises my findings and their implications for strengthening food industry self-
regulation. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The content of food and alcohol advertising codes 
Food industry self-regulation has two basic components: a code of practice setting out 
guidelines for marketing to children, and processes for establishing, monitoring and enforcing 
the code.1 This chapter examines the substantive content and coverage of the two main food 
industry initiatives regulating food advertising (the RCMI and QSRI),2 while the subsequent 
chapter explores the self-regulatory processes established by the codes. I also compare the 
RCMI and QSRI to the Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (ABAC).3 
After an outline of the food and alcohol industry codes, with a specific focus on advertising 
to young audiences, I discuss the meaning of ‘children’ and the definition of media ‘directed 
primarily to children’ contained in the RCMI and QSRI. I describe how these initiatives also 
apply to advertising content that is ‘directed primarily to children’.  I compare this aspect of 
the codes to the ABAC’s provisions on alcohol advertising with strong or evident appeal to 
children.4 Next I consider the communication channels and persuasive techniques covered by 
each code and describe the RCMI and QSRI’s application to a sub-set of unhealthy food 
products. The final section of the chapter considers the advertising messaging requirements 
of the food industry initiatives. The major conclusion reached in the chapter is that the codes 
contain a number of loopholes that undermine their impact on children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising. Thus, throughout the chapter I comment on the potential to 
strengthen the codes and the feasibility of such improvements happening through self-
regulation. 
As described in Chapter 2, the Advertising Standards Board (ASB) hears complaints from the 
public about food advertising. I used the ASB’s determinations under the RCMI and QSRI to 
                                                 
1 C Hawkes, 'Self-Regulation Of Food Advertising: What It Can, Could And Cannot Do To Discourage 
Unhealthy Eating Habits Among Children' (2005) 30(4) Nutrition Bulletin 374. 
2 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food 
and Beverage Industry (March 2011) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi.html>; Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
Marketing to Children (June 2009) Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. 
3 The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (March 2012) 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/thecode/>. 
4 Ibid pt 1 (a)(ii), (b). 
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analyse the codes’ key terms and definitions.5 I obtained key concepts and definitions from 
complaint determinations because the codes themselves are vague and open to interpretation. 
Accordingly, they must be read in the context of the ASB’s determinations, which are the 
major source of substantial definitions for the initiatives. I considered complaints 
determinations made between 2009 (when the codes were introduced) and 2012, but not those 
from 2013. This is because the food industry amended both initiatives in 2012, to take effect 
from June 2013.6 This means that the ASB will decide some complaints made in 2013 using 
different criteria. Analysing complaint determinations under the new versions of the codes 
would add an extra layer of complexity to what is already a technical and confusing scheme. 
Thus, I describe the changes to the wording of the RCMI and QSRI, but not the details of 
complaints made under the revised versions of the codes.  
My analysis of the ABAC draws upon complaint determinations made by the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel concerning advertising’s appeal to children.7 Unlike food industry self-
regulation, the ABAC covers matters other than advertising directed to children. However, its 
provisions on alcohol advertising’s appeal to children are comparable to the RCMI and QSRI. 
While food and alcohol codes contain similar restrictions on advertising directed to, or 
appealing to children, their complaint determination procedures differ quite substantially.  
The ABAC Panel produces detailed determinations that explore the reasoning behind its 
decision, the limitations of the ABAC Scheme and the public policy considerations 
underpinning the code. In contrast, the ASB’s determinations tend to be shorter and less 
detailed and the ASB does not provide a rationale for its final decision. Because of the 
similarities between the food and alcohol codes, an analysis of the ABAC Panel’s 
determinations may point to problems with food industry self-regulation that are not 
discussed in the ASB’s more limited determinations. 
Table 11 summarises the decisions I used from the ASB and the ABAC Adjudication Panel. 
From 2009 to 2012 the ASB determined a total of 61 complaints under the RCMI and QSRI. 
                                                 
5 The ASB’s determinations are available from the Advertising Standards Bureau’s website: 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
6 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Food and Grocery Council Position Statement in 
Response to Responsible Advertising to Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and Beverage 
Industry Self-Regulatory Codes (1 November 2012)  <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian Food and Grocery Council, AFGC QSRI Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children (2013) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-
to-children/qsr-initiative.html>. 
7 The ABAC Adjudication Panel’s determinations are available on the ABAC Scheme’s website: 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/adjudication-decisions/>. 
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Of these, the ASB upheld ten complaints and dismissed 51. During this period, the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel considered 61 complaints on advertising’s appeal to children and/or 
advertising which encouraged underage drinking. It upheld 22 of these complaints and 
dismissed 39. The purpose of this chapter is not to critique the complaints-handling process 
itself, nor to quantify the number of complaints received by the two bodies, as is the approach 
in other studies of advertising regulation.8 Rather, the chapter analyses the substance of 
complaint determinations in order to uncover the limitations and gaps of self-regulation of 
food and alcohol advertising, particularly as it applies to young audiences. 
Table 11. Complaints to the ASB under the RCMI and QSRI, and complaints to the 
ABAC Adjudication Panel concerning advertising’s appeal to children, or encouraging 
underage drinking 
 RCMI/QSRI determinations ABAC determinations (concerning 
appeal to children/underage drinking) 
Year Upheld Dismissed Total Upheld Dismissed Total 
2009 2 1 3 3 13 16 
2010 4 14 18 3 8 11 
2011 3 15 18 7 4 11 
2012 1 21 22 9 14 23 
Total 10 51 61 22 39 61 
% 16.4 83.6 100 36 64 100 
  
                                                 
8 See, e.g., J J Boddewyn, Advertising Self-Regulation and Outside Participation: A Multinational Comparison 
(Quorum Books, 1988); Michael Volkov, Debra Harker and Michael Harker, 'Complaint Behaviour: A Study of 
the Differences Between Complainants About Advertising in Australia and the Population at Large' (2002) 
19(4) Journal of Consumer Marketing 319; Debra Harker, 'Towards Effective Advertising Self-Regulation in 
Australia: The Seven Components' (2003) 9(2) Journal of Marketing Communications 93; Rob Van Zanten, 
'Consumer Complaints Against Alcohol Advertisements: An Evaluation' 2005 17(3) International Journal of 
Wine Marketing 25. 
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1. An outline of the food and alcohol industry codes  
The RCMI and QSRI 
The RCMI’s core principle prohibits the promotion of food and beverage products to children 
under 12 in media unless: 9 
1. Those products represent healthy dietary choices, consistent with established scientific or Australian 
government standards 
And 
2. The advertising and/or marketing communication activities reference, or are in the context of, a healthy 
lifestyle, designed to appeal to the intended audience through messaging that encourages: 
• Good dietary habits, consistent with established scientific or government criteria 
• Physical activities.  
 
RCMI signatories use nutrient profile models to identify products that are ‘healthier choices’ 
and that can be advertised to children.  The initiative permits companies to use either 
government or NGO developed models or their own ‘in-house’ nutrition criteria.10 
Companies’ own criteria must be based on nutrition research (as per the requirements of the 
core principle), but there are no processes in place for assessing whether these models are 
based on rigorous scientific studies, or that they set comparable standards to those contained 
in government or NGO nutrient profiling schemes. 
The RCMI places restrictions on the use of certain advertising techniques to which children 
are vulnerable, namely popular personalities and characters; product placement; the use of 
products in interactive games; advertising in schools; and premium offers.11 
The QSRI takes the same form as the RCMI. According to the initiative’s core principle, 
advertising or marketing communications to children under 14 for food and/or beverages 
must:12 
(a) Represent healthier choices (as determined by defined nutrition criteria) and/or 
(b) Represent a healthy lifestyle, designed to appeal to the intended audience through messaging that 
encourages: 
                                                 
9Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 2, 2.  
10 Ibid. Companies must specify the criteria they are using in the company action plan they create to implement 
the core code document (ibid 1). 
11 Ibid.  
12 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 1-2. 
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(i) healthier choices, (as determined by the nutrition criteria), and 
(ii) physical activity. 
 
Unlike the RCMI, the QSRI contains a nutrient profile model in an appendix to the main code 
document. This model sets out nutrient criteria that children’s meals must meet if they are to 
be advertised to young audiences.13 It requires that children’s meals comprise at least a main 
meal and a beverage, and not exceed maximum limits for energy, saturated fat, sugar and salt 
content.14 
As with the RCMI, the QSRI restricts some advertising techniques that particularly appeal to 
children, including the use of products in interactive games, advertising in schools and 
premium offers.15 The code also contains requirements for on-pack nutrition labelling and the 
availability of nutrition information that are not included in the RCMI.16 
The ABAC 
Chapter 2 outlined the main provisions of the ABAC, which include conditions on alcohol 
advertising’s appeal to children. Section (a)(ii) of Part 1 of the code prohibits advertisements 
for alcohol beverages that encourage under-age drinking.17 Section (b) requires that alcohol 
advertising not have ‘strong or evident appeal to children or adolescents’. Specifically,18  
i) Adults appearing in advertisements be over 25 years of age and clearly depicted as adults; 
ii) Children and adolescents depicted in advertisements must only appear in ‘natural situations’ (for 
example, a family barbeque) where there is no implication that they will consume or serve alcohol, 
and  
iii) Adults under the age of 25 years may only appear as part of a natural crowd or background scene. 
 
                                                 
13 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Appendix 1 - Nutrition Criteria for Assessing Children's Meals (2010) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/qsr-initiative.html>.  
14 Ibid. The QSRI nutrition criteria are based on the National Health and Medical Research Council’s Nutrient 
Reference Values for Australia and New Zealand, and the 2007 Australian National Children’s Nutrition and 
Physical Activity Survey.  See National Health and Medical Research Council, 'Nutrient Reference Values for 
Australia and New Zealand Including Recommended Dietary Intakes' (Department of Health and Ageing and 
National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian Government, and Ministry of Health, Government of 
New Zealand, 9 September 2005) <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/n35-n36-n37>; 
Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Preventative Health National Research 
Flagship and the University of South Australia, Children's Nutrition and Physical Activity Survey: Main 
Findings (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008) 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/phd-nutrition-childrens-survey>. 
15 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code, above n 3, pt 1(a)(ii). 
18 Ibid pt 1 (b)(i)-(iii). 
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The ABAC applies these standards to the naming and packaging of alcohol products and to 
internet sites ‘primarily intended for advertising developed by or for producers or importers 
of alcohol products available in Australia… and to banner advertising of such products on 
third party sites’.19 A section on alcohol promotion at events obliges alcohol companies ‘to 
endeavour to ensure’ that the attendees of these events are over 18 years of age and that any 
promotional activities such as giveaways are only provided to persons of legal drinking age.20 
Having outlined the terms of the food industry initiatives and the ABAC, I turn to a close 
examination of the definitions and provisions contained in each code. 
Food and alcohol codes’ definition of ‘children’ 
The RCMI defines ‘children’ as persons less than 12 years of age,21 while the QSRI applies to 
children who are under 14 years of age.22 The RCMI’s definition of children is consistent 
with food industry advertising codes in other jurisdictions,23 but not with definitions found in 
other Australian advertising regulatory instruments. For example, the Children’s Television 
Standards 2009 (CTS 2009) applies to children aged younger than 14 years of age. 24 The 
ABAC defines a child as ‘a person under 14 years of age’ and an adolescent as ‘a person aged 
14-17 years’ inclusive’.25 As young people under 12 years of age are most vulnerable to 
advertising, food advertising codes typically make this age the cut-off point for restrictions.26  
However, Chapter 1 described evidence that older children and adolescents (as well as adults) 
are also vulnerable to food advertising.27 Further, ‘[m]arketing targeted at adults and 
teenagers often reaches children, meaning that a narrowly-defined age range may not fully 
                                                 
19 Ibid 3, pt 2. 
20 Ibid 3-4. 
21 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 2, 4. 
22 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 3. 
23 Corinna Hawkes and Jennifer L Harris, 'An Analysis of the Content of Food Industry Pledges on Marketing to 
Children' (2011) 14(8) Public Health Nutrition 1403, 1406. 
24 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards 2005 (at 11 July 2013) 
CTS 5. However, the Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice applies to ‘children of, or below primary 
school age,’ with Australian children traditionally finishing primary school around 12 years of age. Free TV, 
2010 Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice (at 11 July, 2013) cl 3.3.3. 
25 The ABAC Scheme, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code, above n 3, 1. 
26 Corinna Hawkes, 'Regulating and Litigating in the Public Interest: Regulating Food Marketing to Young 
People World Wide: Trends and Policy Drivers' (2007) 97(11) American Journal of Public Health 1962; 
Kathryn C Montgomery and Jeff Chester, 'Interactive Food and Beverage Marketing: Targeting Adolescents in 
the Digital Age' (2009) 45(3) Journal of Adolescent Health S18, S23-S24. 
27 See, e.g., Montgomery and Chester, above n 26; Jennifer L Harris, Kelly D Brownell and John A Bargh, 'The 
Food Marketing Defence Model: Integrating Psychological Research to Protect Youth and Inform Public Policy' 
(2009) 3(1) Social Issues and Policy Review 211. 
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protect younger children from the impact of marketing’.28 Thus, public health advocates call 
for regulation of advertising to a wider range of ages, including children up to 16 years of 
age.29  
2. Media ‘directed primarily to children’ 
The RCMI  
To fall within the ambit of the RCMI, advertising must appear in media that are ‘directed 
primarily to children’, defined as the following:30 
…. television, radio, print, cinema and third-party internet sites where the audience is predominantly 
children and/or having regard to the theme, visuals, and language used are directed primarily to 
children. In regards to television, this includes all P and C programs; all programs where more than 
50% of the audience is children under 12 years; plus those G rated programs that meet the criteria 
above as being designed for children. 
Of the 61 complaints under the RCMI and QSRI from 2009 to 2012, 42 concerned television 
advertising. Thus, many determinations hinge on whether the relevant/associated television 
program is directed to children. Based on the definition above, the ASB uses three criteria to 
decide whether a television program is directed primarily to children.  The first is its 
categorisation: C and P programs automatically fall within the scope of the RCMI. Second is 
the likely audience share of the program and the third is its content, i.e. whether the theme, 
language and visuals used in the program create the overall impression that it is designed 
specifically for children.  
The vast majority of unhealthy food advertising takes place in general audience (G and PG) 
programming,31 meaning that the ASB rarely considers advertisements that appear in C and P 
                                                 
28 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children' (World Health Organisation, 2012) 12 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/framework_marketing_food_to_children/en/>. 
29 See, e.g., S MacKay et al, 'A Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Children from Unhealthy Food 
Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2011) 30 <http://www.opc.org.au/whatwedo/policydocuments.aspx>; 
Jennifer L Harris et al, 'Defining "Child-Directed Advertising" to Reduce Unhealthy Television Food 
Advertising' (2013) 44(4) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 358, 363.  
30 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 2, 1. 
31 Kathy Chapman, Penny Nicholas and Rajah Supramaniam, 'How Much Food Advertising is there on 
Australian Television?' (2006) 21(3) Health Promotion International 172; Bridget Kelly et al, 'Television Food 
Advertising to Children: The Extent and Nature of Exposure' (2007) 10(11) Public Health Nutrition 1234; 
Bridget Kelly et al, 'Trends in Food Advertising to Children on Free-to-Air Television in Australia' (2011) 35(2) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 131; Lisa G Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, 
'Television Marketing of Unhealthy Food and Beverages to Children in Australia: A Review of Published 
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programs. More often it will consider the audience share of general audience shows. 
However, there are no general audience programs where children comprise 50 per cent or 
more of the viewing audience, because they constitute a small proportion of the population 
overall.32  For example, despite being the highest rating programs for children aged between 
five and 12 years, Junior Masterchef, Modern Family and The Simpsons do not have a 
viewing audience of 50 per cent or more children.  Accordingly, the ASB has held that they 
do not come within the RCMI’s definition of ‘media directed primarily to children’.33  Thus, 
the RCMI does not apply to programs that are watched by a large number of child viewers, 
but where children do not make up the majority of the audience.34 As a result, the code has 
little effect on children’s overall exposure to unhealthy food advertising.35 Further, the 
initiative’s definition of audience share means that advertisers can circumvent the code’s 
restrictions by advertising during family programs that are widely viewed by children, rather 
than in C and P programs.36 
Following the independent review of the RCMI, the AFGC agreed to revise the audience 
threshold down to 35 per cent, effective in June 2013.37 This aligns the code with voluntary 
initiatives in other jurisdictions, including the US Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising 
                                                                                                                                                        
Evidence from 2009' (Australian National Preventive Health Agency, October 2012) 38 
<http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/publications>. 
32 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Children's Viewing Patterns on Commercial, Free-to-Air 
and Subscription Television: Report Analysing Audience and Ratings Data for 2001, 2005 and 2006' (Australian 
Government, 2007) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310132/children_viewing_patterns_commercial_free-to-
air_subscription_television.pdf>. See also MacKay et al, above n 29, 11; Lesley A King et al, 'Consultancy 
Report on Inappropriate Food Marketing to the National Preventative Taskforce' (Institute of Obesity, Nutrition 
and Exercise, The University of Sydney, 2009) 12 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/engagement-and-
consultation-1lp>.  
33 MacKay et al, above n 29, 24. See Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0441/10 (10 November 2010) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>; Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 
0439/10 (24 November 2010) <http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>; Advertising 
Standards Bureau, Case Report 0052/11 (23 February 2011) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
34 MacKay et al, above n 29, 11.  
35 Smithers, Lynch and Merlin, above n 31, 4. See also Lesley A King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of 
Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' (2010) 6(2) International Journal of Paediatric 
Obesity e390 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>; Lana Hebden et al, 
'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 
195(1) Medical Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of 
Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public Health Nutrition 1 
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
36 Harris et al, 'Defining "Child-Directed Advertising" to Reduce Unhealthy Television Food Advertising',  
above n 29, 359.  
37 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Position Statement in Response to Responsible Advertising to 
Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes, above 
n 6, 8. 
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Initiative (CFBAI).38 However, this reduced threshold is unlikely to capture many more 
programs that are popular with children. One study quantified the amount of advertising 
viewed by children that was covered by the CFBAI, which applies to television programming 
with an audience share of 35 per cent or more children.39 It found that approximately half of 
all food and beverage advertisements viewed by children were not subject to the code 
because they appeared during programming with an audience share of less than 35 per cent 
children.40 Conversely, expanding the US code to cover programming with an audience share 
of 20 per cent or more children would capture 70 to 71 per cent of food advertising viewed by 
children.41  The revision of the RMCI does not, therefore, represent a significant concession 
by the food industry. 
If a program is not directed to children according to its rating or audience share, the ASB will 
then examine whether the design of the program means that it is targeted to children. 
However, the ASB has only upheld three complaints on this basis. One complaint related to 
the placement of an advertisement for Oreo cookies in television programs that were clearly 
designed for young children, including Dora the Explorer and Ben 10 Alien Force.42 Two 
other complaints concerned advertisements located in ‘family movies’ such as Robots 43 and 
Bee Movie.44 These movies screened in the early evening and had a large adult audience, so 
they did not meet the audience share requirement. However, their creative content was 
designed to be appealing to children, meaning that fell within the ambit of the RCMI. An 
appendix to the RCMI explicitly exempts a range of programs that children would find 
appealing, but which could be said to be designed for a general audience. They include 
Malcolm in the Middle, Home and Away and Masterchef.45 This appears to be an additional, 
                                                 
38 Susannah Tymms, 'Responsible Advertising to Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and 
Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes' (AGFC, October 2012) 58 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. See Better Business Bureau, Children's Food and 
Beverage Advertising Initiative (2013) <http://www.bbb.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-
initiative/>; EU Pledge, Enhanced 2012 Commitments (2013) <http://www.eu-pledge.eu/content/enhanced-
2012-commitments> 
39 Harris et al, 'Defining "Child-Directed Advertising" to Reduce Unhealthy Television Food Advertising',  
above n 29. 
40 Ibid 361. 
41 Ibid 362. 
42 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0409/10 (22 September 2010) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
43 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0407/10 (13 October 2010) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
44 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0136/11 (11 May 2011) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. See also Advertising Standards Bureau, Case 
Report 0409/10, above n 42. 
45 Australian Food and Grocery Council,  Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 2, app II. 
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specific exclusion that is intended to narrow the scope of application of the RCMI. As a 
result, the program content criterion captures only a small proportion of advertisements to 
which children are exposed. 
In summary, most complaints fall outside of the RCMI because they are not placed in media 
that are directed primarily to children. From 2009 to 2012, the ASB dismissed 21 complaints 
under the RCMI. It dismissed over half (11) of these on the basis that the advertisement 
appeared in media directed to adults according to its creative content, or because it was 
watched by an audience of largely adult viewers. 
Reducing the amount of unhealthy food advertising children see would require regulation 
with more comprehensive placement restrictions, including within media that attracts large 
numbers of children.46  Time-based restrictions have been widely advocated by public health 
advocates, for example, watershed bans on advertising before 9pm or controls based on 
children’s peak viewing times.47 Yet, the food industry is unlikely to accept regulation that is 
based on absolute numbers of children watching, rather than the proportion of children in the 
audience.48 This would significantly impair advertisers’ ability to reach an adult audience, 
because regulation would apply to shows watched by large numbers of both children and 
adults.49 For this reason, the AFGC is not willing to consider restrictions on advertising in 
evening viewing times.50 The food industry also argues that children are being supervised by 
adults during this time, meaning that parents should take responsibility for monitoring what 
their children are watching.51 Consequently, regulation that seeks to significantly restrict the 
placement of unhealthy food advertising is likely to require government intervention.52 
                                                 
46 See MacKay et al, above n 29, 12; Lana Hebden, Lesley King and Bridget Kelly, 'Art of Persuasion: An 
Analysis of Techniques Used to Market Foods to Children' (2011) 47(11) Journal of Paediatrics and Child 
Health 776, 781. 
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The QSRI  
The QSRI defines ‘medium’ as ‘television, radio, newspapers, magazines, outdoor billboards 
and posters, emails, interactive games, cinema and internet sites’.53 Unlike the RCMI’s 
definition of ‘media’, it does not make reference to the rating or audience share of television 
programs. On this basis the ASB has held that the program in which the advertisement is 
shown is not relevant to determining whether the advertisement is directed primarily to 
children.54 In other words, to determine whether an advertisement is directed to children, the 
ASB will only consider the content of the advertisement and not whether it is placed in C and 
P programs or those with a large child audience. As a result, the QSRI has a narrower 
application than the RCMI, as it does not prohibit advertisements for unhealthy products that 
appeal to a general audience, but which are screened or published in media that large 
numbers of children see. Following the independent review of the QSRI, the quick service 
restaurant industry extended the initiative to advertisements placed in media that are directed 
primarily to children.55 The revised version of the QSRI contains a section on ‘scope,’ which 
states that the initiative captures ‘Advertising and Marketing Communications to Children’ 
where:56 
• The medium is directed primarily to children (in relation to television this includes all 
C and P programs and G rated programs that are directed primarily to children); 
and/or 
• The medium attracts an audience share of greater than 50 per cent of children.  
In June 2013 the quick service restaurant industry agreed to reduce the audience share 
threshold from 50 per cent down to 35 per cent.57 This will align the RCMI and QSRI, but it 
is unlikely that the revised definitions of media/medium will reduce children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising (as discussed above). 
                                                 
53 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 4. 
54 See, e.g., Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 084/11 (13 April 2011) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
55 See Healthy Kids Association, Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising to Children (2011)  <http://www.afgc.org.au/tools-
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56 Australian Food and Grocery Council, AFGC QSRI Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children, above n 6, 1. 
57 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Position Statement in Response to Responsible Advertising to 
Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes, above 
n 6, 8. 
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The ABAC 
Unlike the RCMI and QSRI, the ABAC does not contain a definition of media. Accordingly, 
it applies to the content of alcohol advertising in all media.  However, the ABAC does not 
restrict the placement of advertisements.58 This means that the ABAC Adjudication Panel 
cannot make judgments on whether it is appropriate for an alcohol advertisement to be placed 
in a particular medium. The Panel has dismissed complaints concerning the placement of 
advertisements in train stations,59 on billboards in shopping centres,60 and on vehicles.61 The 
issue in these complaints is not that the content of the advertisement appeals to children, but 
that its location means that large numbers of children will see it. For example, one complaint 
involved an advertisement for Lion Australia’s XXXX Summer Lager located on a website 
that targeted young children (yepi.com).62 The Panel noted that the complaint raised a ‘very 
legitimate concern about the presence of an alcohol advertisement on a children’s website’,63 
but the advertisement’s placement on the website did not offend the terms of the ABAC per 
se. As the content of the advertisement did not have strong or evident appeal to children, it 
did not breach any of the standards contained in the ABAC and the Panel was obliged to 
dismiss the complaint.64  
The ABAC’s lack of placement restrictions means that it has little impact on young people’s 
exposure to alcohol advertising. Yet research shows high levels of exposure to televised 
alcohol advertising among Australian young people.65 As with food advertising, systematic 
reviews of research suggest that exposure to alcohol advertising is associated with the 
likelihood that adolescents will start drinking alcohol, or that those already drinking will 
increase their intake.66 Further, studies show that advertising affects young people’s beliefs 
and intentions to drink alcohol and their actual drinking behaviours, regardless of the target 
                                                 
58 See Simone Pettigrew, Rebecca Johnson and Mike Daube, 'Introducing and Applying a New Australian 
Alcohol Advertising Code' (2012) 13(1) Journal of Public Affairs 72. 
59 ABAC Complaints Panel, Determination No: 78/10 (17 December 2010) 
<http://www.abac.org.au/adjudication/78-10/>. 
60 ABAC Complaints Panel, Determination No: 76/10 (17 December 2010) 
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<http://www.abac.org.au/adjudication/108-09/>. 
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audience.67 Accordingly, the ABAC does not address one of the key mechanisms through 
which alcohol advertising influences young people’s alcohol consumption patterns, i.e. their 
exposure to a large volume of alcohol marketing, as opposed to advertising messages that 
directly target them.  The failure to limit children and adolescents’ exposure to unhealthy or 
inappropriate advertising is a similarity that the ABAC shares with the RCMI and QSRI. 
3. Advertising directed primarily to children 
Food advertising codes  
When the ASB concludes that an advertisement is not placed in a medium that is directed to 
children, it then will consider whether the creative content of the advertisement itself is 
directed to children. This approach is based on the codes’ definition of ‘advertising to 
children’. In the RCMI this is:68 
… advertising or marketing communications, which, having regard to the theme, visuals and language 
used, are directed primarily to Children and are for Product. 
The QSRI contains much the same definition:69 
Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children means Advertising or Marketing 
Communications, which, having regard to the theme, visuals and language used, are directed primarily 
to Children and are for food and/or beverage products. 
The ASB determines whether an advertisement directly targets children according to the 
overall impact of its visuals, language and themes, as well as the advertiser’s intended target 
audience.70 However, this approach lends itself to a very narrow and literal interpretation of 
the phrase ‘directed primarily to children’,71 as is evident from the ASB’s determinations. For 
                                                 
67 Petra Meier et al, 'Independent Review of the Effects of Alcohol Pricing and Promotion' (School of Health 
and Related Research, University of Sheffield, 2008) 91 
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71 Ibid 19. 
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example, the ASB considered an advertisement for Allen’s Snakes confectionery (owned by 
Nestlé), which showed children and adults in a street setting and a giant doll blowing bubbles 
over the crowd.72 Some of the bubbles changed into lollies, and the advertisement featured a 
scene of a child eating one. The nursery song ‘This Old Man’ played in the background. The 
complaint alleged that the advertisement breached the RCMI because it advertised a product 
that was not a ‘healthy dietary choice’ and that it contained elements that would appeal to 
children. These included visual images of a doll and bubbles, as well as children catching and 
eating lollies; the use of a children’s song; and the themes of fantasy and imagination.73  
The ASB acknowledged that the advertised product was not a ‘healthy dietary choice’.74 To 
decide whether the advertisement was directed to children, the ASB first considered the 
media that the advertisement appeared in, which included television programs such as Home 
and Away.75 While popular with children, these programs did not have an audience of 50 per 
cent or more children and so were not ‘directed primarily to children’. The ASB then 
considered the advertisement’s content. It noted that the advertiser’s intent was to ‘create a 
nostalgic scene which would remind adults of their childhoods’, as evidenced by the choice 
of an old-fashioned nursery rhyme and the images of a doll (rather than a more contemporary 
child’s toy).76 The ASB said that the advertisement ‘would be of considerable attraction to 
children’, but its overall impact meant that it was not ‘specifically directed or designed to be 
clearly directly primarily appealing to children’.77  
By focusing on the advertisement’s impact on adults, the ASB’s decision allows advertisers 
to circumvent the RCMI and QSRI by designing advertising that appeals to adults or families 
as well as to children.78 Further, this illustration of how the ASB interprets the standards 
contained in the RCMI suggests an industry going to extreme lengths to protect itself from 
the application of its own weak standards. Even if this is not an example of a cynical exercise 
in giving the pretence of regulation, it nevertheless undermines the credibility of the food 
industry’s scheme. 
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73 Ibid 1-2. 
74 Ibid 5. 
75 Ibid 6. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Hebden, King and Kelly, above n 46, 780. 
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The ABAC  
Similar to the food codes, the ABAC prohibits advertising that has ‘strong or evident appeal 
to children and adolescents’. The code does not define this phrase, nor does it identify 
advertising content that may be appealing to children.79 From its prior determinations the 
ABAC Panel has established criteria for assessing whether an advertisement has strong and 
evident appeal to children:80 
(a) The advertiser’s intention as to the target audience is not material; it is the ‘probable’ 
impact of the advertisement on a reasonable person that is important; 
(b) An advertisement can have consequential or residual appeal to children or adolescents 
and not breach the ABAC; and 
(c) Assessment of an advertisement’s appeal to children is undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis, making reference to imagery, colour, use of characters and context to decide the 
overall impact of the advertisement. 
The Panel’s approach is stronger than that of the ASB, given that it uses a reasonable person 
standard rather than considering the advertiser’s intended audience. However, as with food 
advertising codes, the requirement that advertising have ‘strong or evident’ appeal to children 
means that advertising content must be targeted to children to be covered by the ABAC. This 
permits advertisers to use creative content that appeals to children so long as the overall 
design of the advertisement addresses adults. For example, research shows that the use of 
animal characters in alcohol advertising enhances its appeal with young people and 
influences their intention to purchase the advertised product or brand.81 Several complaints to 
the ABAC Adjudication Panel concern the ‘Bundy R Bear’ character that Diageo uses to 
market Bundaberg Rum. According to the ABAC Adjudication Panel, this character can 
appeal to children given its resemblance to other characters that are popular with children.82  
However, whether advertisements featuring Bundy Bear move from incidental to strong 
                                                 
79 Section (b) contains some specific restrictions on the portrayal of children and adolescents in alcohol 
advertising (listed above). See The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) 
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appeal depends upon the context within which the character is used,83 and the overall impact 
of the advertisement on children.84  
In one determination the Panel ruled that an advertisement featuring Bundy Bear strongly 
appealed to children as it featured a party theme, visuals of balloons and party-goers wearing 
cowboy hats.85 In that instance, the Panel’s ruling went against the alcohol industry. 
However, another determination concerned a website for Bundaberg rum, which showed 
Bundy Bear in a western style gunfight. 86 In contrast to previous campaigns, it used a 
computer generated bear that looked more masculine and human-like. The complaint said 
that the Western theme and the computer-generated nature of the character would appeal to 
children, particularly given similarities between the advertisement and a computer game that 
was popular with youth. Further, survey data showed that a majority of children identified the 
character with Bundaberg Rum and that they associated the bear with positive attributes.87 
The Panel’s determination noted that Diageo had altered the Bear’s appearance so that it 
more closely resembled a human rather than a popular children’s character. Further, a 
computer-generated character could not be assumed to be particularly appealing to children. 
Considering that the movie western genre was also widely popular, the advertisement as a 
whole could not be said to have ‘strong or evident appeal to children’. 88 
Both the ASB and the ABAC Adjudication Panel consider advertising features that appeal to 
children within the context of the advertisement as a whole. This approach is problematic as 
advertisements that are aimed at adults may be equally or more appealing to children.89 The 
messages in alcohol advertising may be directed to young adults, but inevitably they reach 
older teenagers and may also be attractive to children.90 Similarly, food advertisers 
increasingly address parents in order to promote children’s foods.91 These promotions often 
feature imagery that depicts children as happy and enjoying foods offered to them by parents. 
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Such themes appeal to children and can affect their attitude towards the advertised product. 92 
They suggest to parents that children will be happier and healthier consuming these foods, 
which may influence what foods parents give to their children.93  Additionally, this creative 
content blurs the boundaries between parent and child-targeted food advertising, making it 
more difficult to regulate. Such problems are compounded by the narrow interpretative 
approach taken by the ABAC Adjudication Panel and the ASB. 
4. Media channels and marketing techniques  
Food advertising codes  
The scope of the RCMI and QSRI is based on the term ‘media’.94 However, both codes 
exclude a range of communication channels from their definitions of this term, as illustrated 
in Table 12 below. The RCMI exempts novel forms of marketing, such as text messages, 
emails and viral marketing, as well as product packaging and labelling and point-of-sale 
material.95 The QSRI excludes point-of-sale advertising and packaging, which fast-food 
restaurants frequently use in marketing to children.96  The codes also contain inconsistent 
definitions of the term, with the QSRI covering a wider range of media than the RCMI.  
The exclusion of company-owned websites is a particularly significant loophole in the RCMI. 
The ASB has dismissed six complaints on the basis that they concern advertisements 
appearing on company websites or micro-sites produced by RCMI signatories. One complaint 
involved a website for the Nestlé confectionery product ‘Smarties’ (smarties-
australia.com.au).97 The complainant argued that the website was directed primarily to 
children and advertised a product that was high in sugar and saturated fat.98 However, the 
RCMI did not apply to the website as it was owned by Nestlé. On this basis, the ASB 
                                                 
92 See, e.g., Harris, Brownell and Bargh, above n 27, 231. 
93 Hebden, King and Kelly, above n 46, 780; Sonya A Grier et al, 'Fast-Food Marketing and Children's Fast- 
Food Consumption: Exploring Parents' Influences in an Ethnically Diverse Sample' (2007) 26(2) Journal of 
Public Policy and Marketing 221. 
94 See p p. 172-174 of this chapter for the codes’ definition of this term. 
95 J Lumley, J Martin and N Antonopoulos, 'Exposing the Charade: The Failure to Protect Children from 
Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2012) 14 
<http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-charade&Type=policydocuments>. 
96 Hawkes and Harris, above n 23, 1410. See also Lana Hebden et al, 'A Menagerie of Promotional Characters: 
Promoting Food to Children through Food Packaging' (2011) 43(5) Journal of Nutrition Education and 
Behaviour 349. 
97 See Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0414/10 (13 September 2010) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
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dismissed the complaint without considering the substantive content of the site or whether the 
advertised product was a ‘healthier choice’.99 
Table 12. Communication channels covered by the RCMI and QSRI 
Code RCMI QSRI 
Included 
media 
Television, radio, print, cinema, third-
party internet sites. 
Television, radio, newspapers, magazines, 
outdoor advertising, emails, interactive 
games, cinema, internet sites. 
Excluded 
media  
Outdoor and billboard advertising, 
packaging, point-of-sale, email, text 
messages, word-of-mouth marketing, 
company-owned websites. 
Point-of-sale, packaging, labels. 
 
Although food companies spend the most money on television advertising, evidence suggests 
that they are increasing their budget in new media. For example, in 2009 US food companies 
spent $122.5 million on advertising to children through company and other websites, digital 
media, word-of-mouth and viral marketing.100 This represented a 50.5 per cent increase from 
expenditure in these media in 2006.101 Given that the Australian initiatives exempt many of 
these communication channels, companies may shift their advertising spend to new media in 
order to circumvent the codes, and also because these media are increasingly significant in 
children’s lives.102 This was the tobacco industry’s response to advertising restrictions that 
applied only to radio and television advertising.103 One study of tobacco advertising bans in 
77 developed countries found that limited advertising restrictions had little or no effect on 
tobacco consumption.104 This was because tobacco companies simply moved their advertising 
to non-banned forms of media. In contrast, more comprehensive bans did affect tobacco 
                                                 
99 When considering whether the advertisement was directed to children for the purposes of the AANA Food 
and Beverages Advertising and Marketing Communications Code, the ASB concluded that the visuals, theme 
and language used on the website created an overall impression that it was not directed primarily to children, 
although it would be attractive to children. According to the ASB, this was because information on entering the 
competition was directed to adults, even though the competition was only open to children (ibid 5). 
100 Jon Leibowitz et al, 'A Review of Food Marketing to Children and Adolescents: Follow-up Report' (Federal 
Trade Commission, December 2012) 6 <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/foodmarketing.shtm>. 
101 Ibid. See also Mary Story and Simone French, 'Food Advertising and Marketing Directed at Children and 
Adolescents in the US' (2004) 1(1) International Journal of Behavioural Nutrition and Physical Activity 3, 12-
13; Susan E Linn, 'Food Marketing to Children in the Context of a Marketing Maelstrom ' (2009) 25(3/4) 
Journal of Public Health Policy 367, 370. 
102 MacKay et al, above n 29, 28. 
103 Henry Saffer and Frank Chaloupka, 'The Effect of Tobacco Advertising Bans on Tobacco Consumption' 
(2000) 19(6) Journal of Health Economics 1117, cited in MacKay et al, above n 29, 28. 
104 Ibid 1134. 
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consumption, suggesting that the efficacy of advertising restrictions can be undermined by 
restricting only a sub-set of communication channels.105 
Persuasive techniques  
As summarised in Table 13, the RCMI and QSRI place restrictions on the use of certain 
promotional techniques that children are particularly vulnerable to. 
Table 13. Controls on persuasive techniques in the RCMI and QSRI 
Code Popular 
personalities 
Product 
placement 
Interactive 
games 
Advertising in 
schools 
Premium offers 
RMI Popular 
personalities/ 
program characters/ 
licensed characters 
must not be used in 
advertising unless it 
is for healthy dietary 
choices/references 
healthy lifestyle 
messages (as per 
core principle). 
Not to be used in 
any medium 
directed 
primarily to 
children unless 
products are 
healthy dietary 
choices.  
Interactive games 
must use healthy 
dietary choice 
products/reference 
healthy lifestyle 
messaging (per 
core principle). 
 
 
 
Must be 
requested by 
school for 
educational/ 
informational 
purposes, or 
related to healthy 
lifestyle 
activities. 
Not to be used 
unless the 
reference to the 
premium is 
‘merely 
incidental’ to 
advertised 
product. 
 
QSRI Popular 
personalities/licensed 
characters are not to 
be used in 
advertising unless it 
is for healthy dietary 
choices/references 
healthy lifestyle 
messages (as per 
core principle). 
Not to be used in 
any medium 
directed 
primarily to 
children unless 
products are 
healthy dietary 
choices. 
Interactive games 
using signatories’ 
products must 
reference healthy 
lifestyle. 
Must be 
requested by 
school for 
educational/ 
Informational 
purposes or 
related to healthy 
lifestyle 
activities. 
Not to be used in 
media directed 
primarily to 
children unless 
reference is 
‘merely 
incidental’ to 
advertised 
product. 
 
 
The codes exclude a number of persuasive techniques used to promote unhealthy food to 
children. The RCMI and QSRI’s definition of ‘popular personalities and licensed characters’ 
permits the use of ‘equity brand’ or proprietary characters developed and owned by food 
advertisers, for example Cadbury’s ‘Freddo Frog’ and Kellogg’s ‘Coco the Monkey’.106 This 
is in contrast to the CTS 2009, which restrict the use of proprietary characters to endorse 
products during designated children’s viewing periods.107 The initiatives also exclude sports 
sponsorship, fundraising in schools, and brand advertising. The latter is excluded because the 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
106 See National Heart Forum, An Analysis of the Regulatory and Voluntary Landscape Concerning the 
Marketing and Promotion of Food and Drink to Children (2011) 42-43 <http://www.heartforum.co.uk/our-
work/policy/nutrition/marketing-food-and-drink-to-children/>. See also Hawkes and Harris, above n 23, 1408. 
107 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Children’s Television Standards 2009 (at 11 July 2013) 
CTS 35(1). 
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codes’ definition of advertising requires promotions to be for ‘product’, i.e. foods and 
beverages.108 On this basis, the ASB interprets the initiatives as applying only to advertising 
that promotes specific food and beverages, not to promotions for companies themselves, their 
brands or outlets.109  
For example, one complaint to the ASB concerned McDonald’s Happy Meal website 
(HappyMeal.com.au).110 The website did not make direct reference to Happy Meal products. 
Rather, it featured the Happy Meal logo, images of characters from a popular children’s 
movie, games and activities for children and information about children’s parties at 
McDonald’s. The ASB held that the site did not fall with within the scope of the QSRI 
because it did not meet the code’s definition of an advertisement, which is:111 
 … any matter generated by a participant which is published or broadcast using any medium for 
payment or other valuable consideration and which draws the attention of the public, or a segment of it, 
to a product… in a manner calculated to promote…directly or indirectly that product… 
According to the ASB, the website did not draw the attention of children to Happy Meals in a 
manner calculated to promote the product,112 as the website contained only ‘one substantive 
reference to McDonald’s or Happy Meals in the form of the Happy Meal logo’.113 However, 
this is in contrast to the position of the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA), which investigated a program that featured promotional material for McDonalds, 
although no actual products or services were endorsed. 114  The ACMA held that under the 
Free TV Code brand promotion could constitute the promotion of products and services. 
According to the AMCA, references to McDonald’s characters, the ‘Golden Arches’ and 
advertising slogan ‘I’m lovin’ it’ increases recognition of the brand and brand awareness, 
                                                 
108 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 2, 1, 4; 
Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 3. 
109 See Handsley et al, above n 47, 3; Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 95, 12-13; Hebden et al, 
'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation', above 
n 35, 23. 
110 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0103/11 (13 April 2011) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>. 
111 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 3. 
112 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0103/11, above n 110, 8. 
113 Ibid. See also Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0221/12 (13 July 2012) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations> where the ASB held that a similar website did 
constitute an advertisement as it included a number of pictures of Happy Meals themselves as well as prominent 
images of the product logo. 
114 Australian Communications and Media Authority, Investigation Report No 2782 (1 June 2012) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/acma-i/Investigation-reports/Television-investigations/television-
operationsvic-commercial-tv-investigations>, cited in Lumley Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 95, 15-16. 
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which enhances consumers’ ability to link the brand name, logo and characters to the 
products and services sold by McDonald’s.115  
The ACMA’s decision recognises that brand advertising is highly influential on children. 
Brand promotion aims to create a set of positive associations between the brand, product 
attributes and values that encourage sales.116 Food marketers expend considerable resources 
in communicating their brand images to children, including through product placement, 
packaging, signage at point-of-sales, celebrity endorsements and promotional tie-ins.117 As a 
result, children can recognise specific brands from as early as two years of age. Between two 
and six years of age they can recognise familiar brand names, packaging, logos and 
characters, and associate them with particular products.118 Brand advertising aims to create 
life-long customers, rather than stimulating immediate sales.119 It can also influence taste 
perceptions: in one study, children preferred the taste of food that they thought was from 
McDonald’s compared to identical unbranded products.120 However, the effect of the ASB’s 
interpretive approach is that the codes regulate advertising that directly promotes food and 
beverage products, but not advertising that uses creative and emotional techniques to build 
brand (and category) power with children.121  
The ASB’s determinations limit coverage of persuasive techniques that are included in the 
codes’ terms. One example is its approach to the initiatives’ provisions on premium offers. 
The RCMI and QSRI define a premium as ‘anything offered free or at a reduced price and 
which is conditional upon the purchase of a children’s food or beverage product’.122  The 
initiatives permit the use of premium offers so long as the reference to the premium is 
‘merely incidental’ to the product being advertised.123 Premiums encourage children to 
                                                 
115 Ibid 4-5. 
116 See Harris, Brownell and Bargh, above n 27, 229. 
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Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 2, 4. 
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purchase companies’ products and enhance brand reputation.124 Critics also argue that 
premiums are designed to increase ‘pester power’, i.e. they influence children to ask their 
parents to purchase the meal due to their desire to obtain the premium, rather than the product 
itself.125 Australian research shows high rates of food advertising using premium offers during 
children’s peak television viewing periods. This advertising largely promotes unhealthy 
products, including chocolate and other confectionery, fast-food restaurant meals and sugary 
breakfast cereals.126 
The ASB has held that the toys contained in McDonald’s Happy Meals and in Hungry Jack’s 
Kid’s Club Meals are not premium offers,127 nor are the toys contained in Kinder Surprises.128 
In contrast, the ACMA has determined that the toys in McDonald’s Happy Meals constitute a 
premium offer for the purposes of the CTS 2009.129 According to the ACMA, the inclusion of 
the toy is intended to induce the purchase of the product by children, having regard to the 
nature of the advertisement, the target consumer of the product (children), and the appeal of a 
toy to this audience.130 Public health advocates asked the ASB to reconsider its position on 
premium offers in light of the ACMA’s views.131 However, the ASB refused to do so,132 
despite research showing high levels of public support for restrictions on the use of toys and 
giveaways by food companies.133 Thus, the ASB’s interpretation is out of step with the views 
of the community, as well as those of the government broadcasting regulator.134  Its approach 
renders the premium offer provisions of the codes virtually meaningless, as companies can 
                                                 
124 Story and French, above n 101, 11-12. 
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131 See for example Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 0103/11, above n 110. 
132 Ibid 89. 
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advertise free toys so long as they comprise a single package along with the food product 
being offered.135  
Extending the initiatives’ coverage of communication channels and persuasive techniques 
As interpreted by the ASB, the initiatives allow companies to use a wide range of 
communication channels and promotional techniques to advertise unhealthy products to 
children. However, the food industry recently took action to close off some of the codes’ 
loopholes. The independent review in 2012 found that the different definitions of media in 
the RCMI and QSRI created ambiguity and confusion, and left the self-regulatory scheme 
open to criticism.136 In response, the AFGC said it would extend the initiatives to include 
marketing and advertising on all internet sites, including company-owned and brand 
websites.137 Following a separate review of the QSRI, the quick service restaurant industry 
also agreed to extend its initiative to children’s sport promotions. From 2013, signatories 
could only give away food and beverage products (or vouchers as prizes or awards) if these 
products were ‘healthy dietary choices’.138  
These changes still leave some forms of media and promotional techniques outside the scope 
of the RCMI and QSRI, including product packaging, outdoor media and sponsorship (in the 
case of the RCMI) and direct or viral marketing to children.139 Yet food companies 
increasingly use integrated marketing campaigns that combine a wide range of media and 
multiple persuasive techniques.140 One US study of 77 food advertisers’ websites found that 
73 per cent of these sites posted at least one game, with one site containing 67 games.141 
These websites also incorporated viral marketing, sales promotions, branded ‘extras’ and 
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embedded television commercials.142 Because of the initiatives’ limited terms, the ASB 
cannot consider the overall effects of a campaign that uses multiple forms of media and 
different promotional techniques. The effects of integrated marketing may be more profound, 
but also more insidious than those of single instance advertisements in building brand 
awareness and long-term dietary preferences and habits.143 This is particularly the case given 
that food advertisers increasingly use digital forms of marketing that more directly target 
children, and blur the boundaries between commercial messaging and other forms of 
content.144 
Media channels and promotional techniques covered by the ABAC 
The ABAC does not contain a definition of ‘media,’ nor does it define the meaning of 
‘alcohol advertisement’. This allows the ABAC Adjudication Panel to draw new forms of 
media and marketing techniques into the scope of the code. For example, it has held that a 
Facebook page can be an alcohol advertisement for the purposes of the ABAC.145 ‘Surrogate 
marketing’ is also covered by the code, defined as ‘the indirect promotion of a product 
through the marketing of an associated product’.146 Conversely, the Panel recently decided 
that product placement did not constitute an advertisement under the ABAC,147 when 
considering a music video that featured images of Midori, a melon-flavoured liqueur. 
According to the Panel, the ABAC distinguished between advertising and other forms of 
promotion, including product placement of alcohol products in media.148 Although the Panel 
has significant discretion to widen the code’s ambit, this creates uncertainty for the public and 
industry members about the codes’ application to different communication channels and 
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marketing techniques. It also has the potential to create gaps in the ABAC’s coverage where 
the Panel decides that forms of promotion fall outside the code. 
The terms of the ABAC have been extended to include packaging and labelling, retail 
advertising and promotions at events.149 However, the ABAC Scheme still excludes some 
forms of promotion, most notably sports sponsorship.150 Thus, the ABAC Adjudication Panel 
cannot rule on complaints about sponsorship, although it can examine advertisements that are 
incorporated in, or flow from, sponsorship deals.151 However, the Panel can only undertake 
‘an incomplete and narrow scrutiny of sponsorship, via the occasional intersection of the 
arrangements with the ABAC Scheme where an “alcohol beverage advertisement”… is 
produced’.152 An additional concern is that the code is based on the idea of marketing as a 
single advertisement published in relatively static media, such as print, television or radio.153 
As with food advertising, contemporary alcohol marketing increasingly involves ‘packages of 
promotions’ that draw upon inter-related marketing activities across a range of media.154 
Thus, the ABAC Scheme sits uneasily with promotional strategies that combine multiple 
forms of marketing and advertising.155 Like the ASB, the Panel has difficulties assessing 
campaigns involving an overall theme and incorporating a range of different media and 
marketing techniques.156  
Sports sponsorship and food and alcohol advertising codes  
Food and alcohol advertising codes contain critical loopholes around sponsorship. It seems 
likely that the ABAC excludes sponsorship because ‘[t]he nexus between sport and alcohol is 
a long-standing and accepted one and is buttressed by alcohol sponsorship of both 
professional and amateur sport’.157 A similar relationship exists between food companies and 
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sports organisations in Australia.158 Sponsorship of major Australian professional and 
community sporting organisations is a widespread practice among both food and alcohol 
companies, 159 with companies promoting unhealthy foods more likely to support children’s 
sports.160 Tobacco companies were also a major sports sponsor until the late 1980s, when 
state and federal legislation progressively banned tobacco sponsorship.161  Food and alcohol 
sponsorship combines logo exposure during the event itself, naming of series, advertising at 
sports stadia, promotional clothing for players and fans, and endorsements by sports 
personalities in television advertising.162 Sponsorship builds brand recognition and enhances 
the reputation of the food and alcohol industries,163 as well as providing much needed funding 
for community sporting and cultural events.164 However, links between alcohol and sports 
events create mixed messages about the appropriate role of alcohol in community life.165 
Sports organisations also become reliant upon food and alcohol industry funding (as was the 
case with tobacco industry sponsorship), meaning that they become supporters of industry 
interests and resist any efforts to moderate alcohol sponsorship of sports.166  
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A further concern is that sports sponsorship influences children and parents’ brand recall and 
beliefs, as well as their preferences for sponsoring companies’ products.167 One study of 
Australian children aged from 10 to 14 years found that over 74 per cent of children were 
aware of the businesses that sponsored their local sports club.168 Sixty-nine per cent thought 
that food and beverage sponsors were ‘cool’ and 59 per cent said that they would buy 
sponsors’ products.169 Most children had received a voucher from a food or beverage 
company to reward good sporting performance, and of these 30 per cent reported liking the 
company more after receiving this reward.170 As discussed above, the QSRI was recently 
amended so that food prizes and gift vouchers from food company sponsors must be for 
‘healthier choices’. However, this provision only covers ‘children’s sporting events’ so that 
companies can still promote unhealthy products to children at other events or training 
sessions.171 
Public health advocates argue that sports sponsorship by food and alcohol companies should 
be replaced by government or health promotion organisation funding, similar to the model 
used to replace tobacco sponsorship.172 They also call for sponsorship to be restricted by 
advertising regulatory instruments.173 For example, the RCMI and QSRI could prohibit the 
use of sports celebrity endorsements in advertising for unhealthy products.174 While the food 
industry has taken some action in this area, the government shows little interest in expanding 
regulation of sponsorship arrangements. For example, the 2003 review of the ABAC by the 
National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising did not recommend that 
sponsorship be defined as advertising for the purposes of the code.175  
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As part of the National Binge Drinking Strategy, the Federal government granted $25 million 
to a Community Sponsorship Fund, which provides sporting organisations with an alternative 
source of funding to alcohol sponsorship.176 The Fund is a first step towards reducing the 
dependence of sporting and cultural organisations on alcohol sponsorship.177 Yet some of 
Australia’s main sporting codes have not joined this voluntary program, including Australian 
Football League (AFL) and the National Rugby League (NRL).178 Further, the amount of 
funding allocated to the program is dwarfed by alcohol industry spending on sports 
sponsorship arrangements, estimated to be approximately $50 million per year.179 Thus, the 
Fund is unlikely to effective in reducing the amount of alcohol advertising viewed by 
children unless it is accompanied by stronger restrictions on sponsorship (and other forms of 
promotion) that appeal to young audiences, or to which young people are widely exposed.180 
At present, sports sponsorship presents a relatively intractable barrier to comprehensive 
coverage of food and alcohol marketing that children are exposed to. 
5. Advertising ‘healthier dietary choices’ under the food industry codes  
Under the RCMI and QSRI, the ASB must consider whether an advertised product is a 
‘healthier dietary choice’ that can be advertised to children. As discussed above, the RCMI 
does not contain uniform nutrition criteria for distinguishing between healthy and less healthy 
products.181 Instead, signatory companies use either an existing government or health 
organisation criteria, or their own company-developed nutrient profile model. To date, the 17 
signatory companies have nominated approximately 14 different sets of criteria for use, with 
each one comprising different nutrition criteria in relation to total energy, salt, sugar and 
saturated fat. Five companies use their own nutrient profiling models,182 and research on these 
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criteria found that they were more lenient than those created by government and health 
organisations, setting higher thresholds for undesirable nutrients.183 Their permissive 
approach allowed companies to advertise a wide range of unhealthy foods to children, 
including some that would be restricted in marketing under independent nutrient profiling 
schemes.184 These products included Kellogg’s Nutri-Grain breakfast cereal, of which 32 per 
cent of the kilojoule content is from added sugars, and Nestlé’s Kit Kat chocolate, containing 
31 per cent of the kilojoule content as saturated fats and just under 40 per cent from sugars.185  
The QSRI contains a nutrient profiling scheme that all signatories must use to identify 
‘healthy choice products’ that can be advertised to children.186 It applies only to ‘children’s 
meals’ and sets out required meal composition, maximum energy levels and limits on 
undesirable nutrients.187  Given that only a small proportion of fast-food advertising is 
specifically for children’s meals, the QSRI criteria covers a minority of all marketing.188 For 
example, they do not extend to family meals that are intended for consumption by both adults 
and children, and which contain energy levels far in excess of children’s requirements.189 
Additionally, the QSRI allows signatories to advertise products that combine foods and 
beverages of varying nutritional quality. McDonald’s Happy Meals include healthier options 
such as apple slices and low fat milk, along with the hamburger, French fries and soft drink 
that traditionally comprise the meal.190 McDonald’s may advertise this healthier choice 
Happy Meal to children, while it continues to retail other less healthy options.191  
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6. Advertising message requirements  
A final factor that the ASB will consider under the RCMI and QSRI is whether an 
advertisement promotes healthy eating options and physical activity. For example, the RCMI 
states that in advertising to children, the advertised product must be a healthy dietary choice, 
and advertising messaging must encourage good dietary habits and physical activity. 192  This 
is a less frequently considered aspect of the codes, because most determinations turn on 
whether an advertisement is directed primarily to children. However, one example comes 
from an animated television advertisement for Unilever’s Paddle Pops, which was set in a 
jungle.193 The ASB found that Paddle Pops were a healthier choice option, and that the 
advertisement was ‘clearly directed primarily to children’.194 The RCMI permitted healthy 
choice products to be advertised to children, provided that advertising messaging referenced a 
healthy lifestyle.195 However, the code required that advertising promote both good dietary 
habits and physical activity. Further, companies had to actively promote good dietary habits 
and a healthy lifestyle, rather than simply refraining from encouraging excessive 
consumption.196 While not depicting unhealthy eating habits, the advertisement did not meet 
this second, positive requirement,197 and the fact that the advertisements depicted a jungle 
scene and described an ‘adventure’ did not amount to an encouragement of physical activity. 
Thus, the advertisement did not meet the advertising messaging requirements of the RCMI.198 
The ASB takes a relatively strong position on the advertising messaging provision, requiring 
RCMI participants to promote a healthy lifestyle and to encourage both healthy consumption 
and physical activity. Given that the ASB rarely considers this element of the codes, its 
determinations are unlikely to benefit the majority of complainants. Further, researchers 
question whether promoting physical activity or healthy lifestyles in food advertising can 
ameliorate the effects of unhealthy food promotion.199 Food marketing traditionally creates an 
association between unhealthy products and exercise (for example, through the use of sports 
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celebrities in advertising), giving promotions a ‘healthy halo’.200 This approach obscures the 
fact that some products (such as large sized fast-food meals) would require individuals to run 
a marathon to expend the calories these products contain.201 Also, research has found that 
participants who viewed exercise promotions increased their consumption of snack food,202 
although a more recent study produced the opposite effect.203 
7. Conclusion  
Although the RCMI and QSRI’s conditions look comprehensive at first glance, in practice 
they contain numerous ‘escape’ clauses, and the findings from the ASB’s determinations 
confirms the food industry’s willingness to use them. The escape clauses are summarised in 
Table 14 below. The cumulative impact of the initiatives’ terms and definitions is that their 
substantive controls rarely operate, and when they do, they make few demands of advertisers. 
The escape clauses in the various terms and conditions help to explain the research findings 
that the RCMI and QSRI do not significantly reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food 
and beverage advertising, nor are they likely to reduce the persuasive power of this 
advertising.204  
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Table 14. The RCMI and QSRI’s escape clauses 
Element of the initiatives Escape clause  
Definition of children  The codes only apply to a narrow range of ages (i.e. children 
under 12 or 14 years of age). 
Media directed to children The codes contain a limited definition of media that is 
‘directed primarily to children’, which does not apply to 
children’s peak television viewing times or to general 
audience programs that are popular with children. 
Advertising content directed to children The codes only cover advertising that is ‘directed primarily to 
children’ according to its creative content. This criterion is 
interpreted narrowly by the ASB, meaning that children are 
exposed to advertising that they find appealing but which is 
directed to a general audience. 
Media channels and promotional techniques  The codes do not cover all media channels and promotional 
techniques that are used to advertise food to children. 
Further, the ASB narrowly interprets the restrictions on 
persuasive techniques contained in the RCMI and QSRI, 
meaning that they do not apply in most cases. 
Advertising for food and beverage products The codes cover a restricted range of foods and beverages, 
allowing companies to market the majority of their 
(unhealthy) products to children. 
Advertising messaging requirements While the RCMI and QSRI create a positive requirement to 
promote healthy lifestyles, the ASB is rarely required to 
consider this component of the initiatives. 
 
A comparison of food and alcohol advertising codes illustrates some of the fundamental 
limitations of advertising self-regulation. Self-regulation attempts to carve out and restrict a 
small segment of advertising that specifically targets children, while ignoring the potential 
influence of adult-directed advertising on young people. It regulates some forms of 
advertising content, narrowly defined, but rarely an advertisement’s placement. It often 
defines advertising in a way that excludes important marketing techniques such as 
sponsorship. Since the self-regulatory schemes governing alcohol advertising and food 
advertising to children have been designed to have minimal impact on current advertising 
practices, government intervention will be required if the goal of reducing children’s 
exposure to such advertising is to be achieved.205   
Table 15 outlines some of gaps that would need to be covered in the food industry’s scheme, 
if it is to provide more wide reaching restrictions that reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising, as well as advertising’s persuasive power. In the conclusion of this thesis I 
consider how these improvements might be implemented in a step-wise manner, in order to 
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incrementally strengthen the existing voluntary scheme.206 The flaws in the content of the 
RCMI and QSRI are exacerbated by failures in the self-regulatory processes established by 
these codes.207 In order to effect changes to the nature and volume of food advertising to 
children, improvements to the substantive controls in the codes would need to be 
accompanied by changes in the design and implementation of the self-regulatory scheme. 
Thus, the next chapter considers the governance processes established by the initiatives, and 
whether they are likely to foster effective and credible self-regulation. 
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Table 15. Proposed improvements to the terms and conditions of the RCMI and QSRI 
Element of the codes Proposed improvement 
Definition of children Includes children under the age of 16 at a minimum, but preferably up 
to the age of 17, given that older children and adolescents are 
vulnerable to the influence of food advertising.208 
Media directed to children  Defined as marketing communications intended exclusively for children 
(e.g., C and P television programs), those with a marked appeal to 
children (according to the creative content of the media) and media 
viewed by a large number of children.209 This could include restricting 
advertising during children’s peak television viewing times (e.g., from 
6-9am and 4-9pm on weekdays and 6am-12pm and 4-9pm on weekends 
and during school holidays).210 Alternatively, unhealthy food 
advertising could be prohibited before 9pm.211 
Advertising directed to children  Defined as advertisements that are intended/likely to appeal to children, 
regardless of whether they also appeal to other age groups, as well as 
advertisements that are likely to be seen and heard by children.212 
Specific factors to be considered include the circumstances in which the 
advertisement was communicated (the mode, location, timing and 
placement of the advertisement), its execution (e.g. the use of humour) 
and the type of product advertised.213 
Media channels and promotional 
techniques 
The definition of ‘media’ should apply to all communication channels, 
including social networking sites, product labelling and packaging and 
point-of-sale material.  
The codes should be based on a broad definition of marketing that 
includes non-specific brand advertising, premium offers and other 
giveaways and sponsorship arrangements.214 
Advertising and promotion could be restricted at events and in settings 
where large numbers of children gather, including child care centres, 
schools and playgrounds.215 
Advertising for food and beverage 
products 
The codes should be based on uniform nutrition criteria that place 
demanding standards on participating companies, and are determined by 
an independent organisation and/or a government agency.216 
Alternatively, restrictions apply to all food and beverage advertising to 
children, with the exception of fresh fruit and vegetables.217 
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CHAPTER 7 
The design of food industry self-regulation 
This chapter complements Chapter 6, which analysed the substantive content of the food 
industry’s voluntary initiatives. Here I assess the RCMI and QSRI against recommendations 
for the design and implementation of self-regulatory codes drawn from government and 
academic literature. I divide these recommendations into the different stages of the regulatory 
process, namely: 
• The development of code objectives;  
• Administration, monitoring and data collection;  
• Complaints handling;  
• Enforcement; and 
•  Review.  
Table 16 summarises the comparison between food industry self-regulation and best practice 
principles for regulatory design.1 The chapter explores each principle in turn. A key focus of 
the chapter is whether regulatory processes foster self-regulation that is transparent and 
accountable to external stakeholder groups.  This is a key element in effective and credible 
private regulation, especially where public interests (including the public health interest) are 
involved.2 The chapter largely draws upon my documentary analysis, although I also consider 
findings from the independent review of the two codes conducted in 2012.3 In addition, I 
make reference to the Australian alcohol industry’s ABAC Scheme,4 as well as to other 
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guides-.html>. 
4 The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (March 2012) 
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advertising regulatory instruments in Australia and other jurisdictions. I use these to illustrate 
how the self-regulatory processes attached to the RCMI and QSRI could be strengthened. 
Table 16. Comparing the RCMI and QSRI with recommendations for best practice for 
the design of self-regulatory schemes 
Aspect of scheme Objectives Administration Monitoring 
and data 
collection 
Complaints 
handling 
Incentives 
for 
compliance 
Review  
Recommendation 
 
Code should 
identify the 
goal to be 
achieved and 
measurable 
objectives. 
Consultation 
with external 
parties in 
processes of 
code 
development. 
Fair and 
transparent 
management 
through a 
committee 
including 
external 
stakeholders. 
Alternatively, 
use of an 
independent 
body for 
administration. 
Monitoring 
of 
compliance 
and 
outcomes by 
an 
independent 
organisation, 
with reports 
made 
publicly 
available. 
The code 
should 
establish a 
complaints 
handling 
mechanism 
with recourse 
to an 
independent 
body. 
Wide range of 
sanctions 
available for 
non-
compliance, 
tailored to the 
seriousness of 
the breach. 
The code is 
widely 
publicised, 
including 
details of poor 
performers 
and high 
achievers. 
Structured, 
regular review 
of the scheme 
by an external 
third-party. 
RCMI 
 
 
Vague goals 
related to 
responsible 
marketing 
and 
promoting 
healthier 
products/ 
lifestyle 
choices. 
No identified 
targets for 
participants 
to achieve. 
Little 
consultation 
with external 
parties when 
developing 
code. 
An industry 
body (the 
AFGC) 
administers the 
RCMI through a 
formal 
management 
structure, 
including 
monitoring, 
reporting on and 
encouraging 
compliance. 
Relies upon 
company 
self-reports 
and AFGC 
monitoring 
activities. 
Results of 
monitoring 
are publicly 
released in 
the annual 
Compliance 
Report and 
Activity 
Report. 
ASB hears 
complaints 
about food 
advertising. 
Operates 
independently 
from the 
advertising 
and food 
industries.  
ASB may 
order 
modification 
or removal of 
advertisement 
but no 
evidence that 
this affects 
companies’ 
behaviour. 
Little 
evidence of 
active 
enforcement 
by ASB or 
AFGC. 
AFGC 
commissioned 
independent 
review of the 
RCMI and 
QSRI in 2012, 
but has not 
established a 
program of 
on-going 
review. 
QSRI  As above. 
 
 
 
AFGC took over 
administration 
from 2011, 
previously 
managed by the 
AANA. 
No 
monitoring 
and reporting 
until the 
AFGC took 
charge of the 
code in 
2011. 
As above. As above. Healthy Kids 
Association 
reviewed the 
scheme in the 
first year of 
operation, part 
of a second 
independent 
review in 
2011. 
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1. Developing codes objectives  
Voluntary codes should set out the goals that they aim to achieve, as well as an explicit set of 
objectives that relate to these goals.5 Identifying self-regulation’s objectives helps participants 
choose appropriate methods of compliance and explains to interested parties the intent behind 
the scheme.6 The objectives of the code should be framed in a manner that allows them to be 
measured; this ensures that the success or failure of the code can be quantified through 
monitoring and audits.7 Ideally, codes should include performance indicators developed with 
reference to criteria for good regulatory design, as well as defined targets for participants to 
achieve.8 Concrete targets enable information about companies’ performance to be collected 
and analysed, and for comparisons to be made between companies (benchmarking).9  The 
capacity for objective assessment of the performance of the scheme also enhances its 
credibility in the eyes of the public.10 
 Self-regulation can be made more transparent by including representation from multiple 
interests in processes of code creation.11 External stakeholder representation can also help to 
identify the problems that self-regulation should address, and to ensure that the goals of the 
code reflect its underlying public purpose.12 However, where industry leads the development 
of voluntary schemes, companies may challenge the participation of external stakeholders. 
Industry actors may dispute the inclusion of consumer and advocacy groups on the basis that 
                                                 
5 Neil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible Care' 
(1995) 17(1) Law & Policy 57, 71; Department of Treasury and Finance, 'Victorian Guide to Regulation' (State 
of Victoria, August 2011) 21 <http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Publications/Victoria-Economy-
publications/Victorian-guide-to-regulation>. 
6 Department of Treasury and Finance, above n 5, 21; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
'Guidelines for Developing Effective Voluntary Industry Codes of Conduct' (ACCC, July 2011) 6 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/658186>. 
7 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 6. 
8  Ibid 13; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 'Corporate Responsibility: Private 
Initiatives and Public Goals' (OECD, 2001) 70 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/>; Neil 
Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation 
(Greenleaf, 2002) 145-146. 
9 Gunningham, above n 5, 71. 
10 Ibid; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 13. 
11 Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 2, 241. 
12 Government of Canada, Voluntary Codes: A Guide for Their Development and Use (March 1998) 12-13 
Industry Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca00863.html>; Taskforce on Industry Self-
Regulation, 'Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000) 60 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1123>. See also Debra Harker and Michael Harker, 
'The Role of Codes of Conduct in the Advertising Self-Regulatory Framework' (2000) 20(2) Journal of 
Macromarketing 155, 157-159; Sarah MacKay, 'Food Advertising and Obesity in Australia: To What Extent 
Can Self-Regulation Protect the Interests of Children?' (2009) 35 Monash University Law Review 118, 123; 
National Heart Forum, An Analysis of the Regulatory and Voluntary Landscape Concerning the Marketing and 
Promotion of Food and Drink to Children (2011) 107 <http://www.heartforum.co.uk/our-
work/policy/nutrition/marketing-food-and-drink-to-children/>. 
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these groups do not understand the nature of the industry in question and are not subject to 
the regulatory scheme being created.13 Thus, industry bodies need to carefully balance the 
interests of internal and external stakeholders in developing voluntary programs.  Due to the 
concerns of their members, industry bodies may prefer a lower level of external stakeholder 
involvement in code creation, including from government, consumers and other affected 
parties.14  
The objectives of food industry self-regulation 
The RCMI and QSRI contain vague objectives relating to social responsibility in advertising 
and promoting healthier foods and lifestyle choices to children.15 The goal of the RCMI is ‘to 
ensure a high level of social responsibility in marketing food and beverage products in 
Australia’.16 The QSRI ‘provides a common framework for quick service restaurant 
companies to ensure that only food and beverages that represent healthier choices are 
promoted directly to children…’ 17 The 2012 review of the codes pointed out that these 
objectives are subjective and imprecise, making them difficult to measure.18 They also allow 
for wide-ranging interpretation by participant companies, potentially creating variation in 
how companies modify their marketing practices to comply with the codes.19 Further, the 
industry claims that it created the initiatives to address concerns about advertising and 
childhood obesity,20 yet the codes make no reference to public health objectives like changing 
children’s eating patterns or improving dietary health.21 
 
                                                 
13 Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001) 18. 
14 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 5; European Advertising Standards Alliance, 
International Guide to Developing a Self-Regulatory Organisation (2009) 16  <http://www.easa-
alliance.org/Publications/Guides-on-Self-Regulation/page.aspx/267>; Australian Government, 'Best Practice 
Regulation Handbook' (Australian Government, 2011) 43-44 <http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/proposal/gov-
requirements.html>. 
15 Tymms, above n 3, 53-54. 
16 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative of the Australian 
Food and Beverage Industry (March 2011) 1 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids.html >. 
17 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to 
Children (June 2009) 1 Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm >. 
18 Tymms, above n 3, 53. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report 
(December 2010) 5 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids/rcmi-reports-2009.html >. 
21 See Nancy E Kass, 'An Ethics Framework for Public Health' (2001) 91(11) Public Health Matters 1776, 1777. 
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Not only is there confusion among participants about what the codes aim to achieve, other 
stakeholders also debate the goals of the RCMI and QSRI. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
food industry argues that the initiatives aim to reduce a very specific form of marketing 
activity, i.e. unhealthy food advertising that directly targets children.22 In contrast, WHO 
recommends that restrictions should aim to reduce children’s exposure to, and the persuasive 
power of, unhealthy food marketing.23 This is a more meaningful objective than eliminating 
marketing that directly targets children.24 Accordingly, the initiatives should create clear, 
measurable objectives that relate to this goal, for example, by reducing the frequency of 
unhealthy food advertising during children’s peak television viewing periods.25 Measurable 
objectives with timeframes for meeting them would allow the scheme’s success to be 
assessed more accurately, including by parties external to industry.26   
The initiatives’ ambiguous goals reflect the processes behind the development of the scheme. 
The AFGC formed a working group with its member companies to write the RCMI’s core 
principles and definitions.27 It also liaised with the Australian Association of National 
Advertisers (AANA) to ensure that the RCMI aligned with their existing codes of conduct.28 
The creation of the QSRI did not involve a central organising body. This voluntary pledge 
resulted from collaboration between Australia’s four main quick service restaurants, in 
consultation with the AANA.29  However the food industry did not consult with government, 
consumers, public health advocates or other affected stakeholders when developing either 
code. By contrast, incorporating appropriate consultation mechanisms is critical to fostering 
                                                 
22 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (May 
2012) 5 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
23 World Health Organisation, 'Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages to Children' (World Health Organisation, 2010) 8 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/marketing-food-to-children/en/>. See also the recommendations of the 
National Preventative Health Taskforce: National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health 
Strategy - The Roadmap for Action' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 125 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
24 See, e.g., Georgina Cairns, Kathryn Angus and Gerard Hastings, 'The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food 
Promotion to Children: A Review of the Evidence to December 2008' (World Health Organisation, 2009) 32 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/marketing_evidence_2009/en/index.html>. 
25 World Health Organisation, 'Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages to Children', above n 23, 8. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Interview with Australian Food and Grocery Council representative, Canberra, ACT, 8 July 2011. 
28 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report 
(2010) 5 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids.html>. 
29 Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 17, 1. 
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more transparent and democratic forms of governance.30 For example, the Canadian 
Government’s guide to developing voluntary codes recommends the inclusion of external 
stakeholders from the very inception of self-regulation, including in working groups that draft 
code documents, as well as in the implementation and review of the resulting scheme.31  
Food industry self-regulation was prompted by consumer concerns about unhealthy food 
advertising to children and its link to obesity.32 Yet by failing to consult with external 
stakeholders, the AFGC missed an opportunity to clarify the exact content of those 
concerns.33 In contrast, a range of parties had input into the development of the ABAC, 
including advertising, media and consumer bodies, federal government ministers and 
departments, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.34 In retrospect, it 
cannot be said whether external stakeholder consultation would have produced clearer 
objectives or stronger regulatory standards in the food industry’s scheme. However, by 
refusing to consult with external interested parties, the industry failed to gain consensus on 
the goals of the initiatives.35 Accordingly, it defined the code’s objectives in a way that is 
unacceptable to public health groups and which does not substantially address one of their 
main concerns, i.e. children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.36 In these 
circumstances, there is a strong argument that the industry adopted the codes to give the 
appearance of regulation, while not truly addressing community concerns.37  
                                                 
30 See, e.g., European Advertising Standards Alliance, above n 14, 16; David Cohen, 'The Role of the State in a 
Privatised Regulatory Environment' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public 
Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 
2004) 25. 
31 Government of Canada, above n 12, 12-15. 
32 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 2005: 
Report of the Review' (Australian Government, 2008) 12 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310262>; Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report' 
(Australian Government, 2011) 9-11 <http://engage.acma.gov.au/kids-food-ads/>.  
33 See Kernaghan Webb, 'Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary 
Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science 
and Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 2, 18. 
34 National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 'Review of the Self-Regulatory System for 
Alcohol Advertising. Report to the Ministerial Council of Drug Strategy' (Minister for Health Victoria, 2003) iii 
<http://docs.health.vic.gov.au/docs/doc/2E4E141E5A719092CA2578A1000A1CB0/$FILE/ncraareport.pdf>. 
35 See National Heart Forum, above n 12, 107. 
36 See Webb, above n 33, 18. 
37 MacKay, above n 12, 128-129. See also Thomas R Wortruba, 'Industry Self-Regulation: A Review and 
Extension to a Global Setting' (1997) 169(1) Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 38. 
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2. Administration and monitoring of voluntary codes 
Good regulation is administered in a fair and transparent manner by an accountable body.38 
Industry associations typically manage administration by incorporating a code management 
committee into their existing infrastructure.39 The role and functions of this committee should 
be written into the main code document, including monitoring compliance, reporting on the 
scheme’s operation, and sanctioning breaches.40 The committee should comprise 
representatives from stakeholder groups such as governments, consumer organisations and 
NGOs.41 External representation in administrative processes provides a ‘public window’ into 
voluntary schemes, making them more likely to be accepted as legitimate by external 
stakeholders.42  
Voluntary schemes should also incorporate tools for collecting data and monitoring 
companies’ compliance.43 Industry codes often require companies to self-report on their 
performance.44 Some only require companies to report on their success in implementing 
regulatory procedures,45 but more rigorous regimes require reporting on progress towards 
meeting concrete objectives.46 Administrative committees should regularly monitor codes 
independently of member companies.47 In relation to advertising self-regulation, this involves 
systematically reviewing advertising across all media and the extent to which it complies 
with applicable codes of conduct.48 Based on these data, administrative committees can 
produce reports that identify systemic problems in the voluntary scheme and areas for 
improvement.49 Reports also provide important feedback for industry actors, enabling them to 
improve their performance and increase compliance.50 Public reporting facilitates external 
                                                 
38 Department of Finance and Treasury, above n 5, 31. 
39 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 8.  
40 Ibid 7-8. 
41 Ibid 8. 
42 Ibid 8-9. 
43 Department of Finance and Treasury, above n 5, 29. 
44 Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, 'Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective' (1997) 19(4) Law 
& Policy 363, 384. 
45 See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Deanna Newsom, Governing Through Markets: Forest 
Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority (Yale University Press, 2004) 234. 
46 Gunningham, above n 5, 71. 
47 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 12. 
48 Debra Harker, 'Towards Effective Advertising Self-Regulation in Australia: The Seven Components' (2003) 
9(2) Journal of Marketing Communications 93, 102. See also European Advertising Standards Alliance, above n 
14, 16; Jean J Boddewyn, Advertising Self-Regulation and Outside Participation: A Multinational Comparison 
(Quorum Books, 1988) 19. 
49 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 12. 
50 Ibid; Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, above n 12, 60. 
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scrutiny of the scheme’s effectiveness, enhancing consumer confidence in its operation.51  
Further, code enforcement is more effective (and therefore more credible) if compliance can 
be effectively monitored by outside parties and non-compliant behaviour easily detected.52  
Administration and monitoring of the RCMI and QSRI  
The AFGC secretariat administers the codes through a formal management structure, 
including a code administration manager.53 While the AANA originally managed the QSRI, 
the AFGC took charge of both initiatives from 2011.54 The AFGC communicates with 
signatories, undertakes advocacy and promotion for the codes, monitors compliance and 
publishes an annual report on the scheme’s operation.55 Its activities include contacting 
participants and non-participants that breach the codes and encouraging them to comply.56 
Both initiatives require participants to write a ‘company action plan’ outlining how they will 
put the codes’ principles into practice,57 and to report annually on this plan.58 The AFGC 
coordinates companies’ compliance reports and makes publicly available a summary of 
companies’ activities in its annual report.59  The code secretariat also informs signatories 
about government activity and any threats to self-regulation, including the actions of the 
Australian National Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA).60   
All participants have produced a company action plan that is consistent with the codes’ core 
principles. However, the terms of the initiatives grant signatories discretion to shape these 
                                                 
51 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 12; Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation, 
above n 12, 79. 
52 Bryne Purchase, 'The Political Economy of Voluntary Codes' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary Codes: 
Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and 
Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 77, 87. 
53 Interview with Australian Food and Grocery Council representative, Canberra, ACT, 8 July 2011. 
54 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report (2011) 5 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/component/content/article/15-industry-codes/1218-qsr-initiative-reports.html>. 
55 Tymms, above n 3, 47.  
56 Ibid 49. 
57 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 16, 3; Australian 
Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 17, 2. RCMI participants must also include the nutrition criteria that 
they will use to identify healthier choice products that can be advertised to children (Australian Food and 
Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 16, 2). 
58 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 16, 3. QSRI 
participants only reported on compliance from 2011, following changes to the scheme’s administration. See 
Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible 
Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 54. 
59 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance 
Report, above n 28; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report (2011)  <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-
2009.html>. 
60 Tymms, above n 3, 49. 
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plans to their own practices and product lines.61 This creates variation in the implementation 
of the codes at a company level.  
Chapter 5 described how RCMI signatories use different nutrition criteria to identify healthier 
dietary choice products that can be advertised to children, including extremely lenient criteria 
developed by companies themselves.62 In other cases companies have set advertising 
standards that are more stringent than the codes’ minimum requirements. For example, the 
RCMI specifies that unhealthy food advertising must not appear in television programs where 
more than 50 per cent of the total audience is aged 12 years or under.63 Kraft has adopted a 
lower audience share of 35 per cent children aged between two and 12 years of age,64 while 
Mars will not advertise in media where more than 25 per cent of the audience is composed of 
viewers under the age of 12.65 While it is admirable that these companies have gone ‘beyond 
compliance’ with the codes, variation in company-level commitments means that ‘a 
supposedly uniform, industry-wide effort to “change” food marketing to children is actually a 
highly complex picture with numerous exceptions and inconsistencies’.66  
To date, all code participants have reported on compliance for the years that they are 
members of the scheme.67 Table 17 summarises RCMI signatories’ reports in 2011. The 
strength of company self-reporting is that participants must describe their advertising 
practices, as well as steps taken to ensure compliance with the codes. Some companies also 
report on measures taken to improve product formulation and marketing, in addition to the 
terms of the initiatives.  
                                                 
61 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 16, 3; Australian 
Quick Service Restaurant Industry, above n 17, 2. See also Corinna Hawkes and Jennifer Harris, 'An Analysis of 
the Content of Food Industry Pledges on Marketing to Children' (2011) 14(8) Public Health Nutrition 1403, 
1412. 
62 See also Lana Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of Foods and Beverages Marketed to Australian Children: 
How Useful are Food Industry Commitments?' (2010) 67(4) Nutrition & Dietetics 258, 265. 
63 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 16, 1. 
64 Kraft Foods, The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative Company Action Plan (2009) 3 Australian Food 
and Grocery Council <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/company-action-
plans.html>. 
65 Mars Snackfood Australia, The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative Company Action Plan (2009) 5 
Australian Food and Grocery Council <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi/company-action-plans.html>. See also Hawkes and Harris, above n 61, 1406-1407. 
66 Hawkes and Harris, above n 61, 1411. 
67 A QSRI Compliance Report is only available for 2011 due to QSRI participants not being required to report 
until that date. See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry 
Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 54, 6. 
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However, the quality of participants’ responses varies widely. In 2011, 12 companies 
reported on the specific steps they had taken to comply with the RCMI, but five did not.68 In 
2009 two RCMI signatories failed to provide nutrient criteria used to assess the nature of 
their products.69 These companies claimed that they did not advertise to children, meaning 
that they did not need to publish their nutrient criteria.70 Yet the fact that not all companies 
disclosed criteria undermines the transparency of the scheme. Variation in companies’ 
reporting also creates difficulties for consumers in understanding the scheme’s operation,71 
and by reporting on compliance with their own interpretation of the codes’ principles, 
companies can be described as ‘marking their own exam papers’.72 Thus, companies’ self-
reports are not systematic, and rely upon signatories providing complete information on their 
advertising practices and compliance processes.73 However, participants are unlikely to reveal 
poor behaviour that would damage their reputation.74 
  
                                                 
68 At the time of writing the AFGC had not yet released its report on compliance with the scheme in 2012. 
69 See Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of Foods and Beverages Marketed to Australian Children', above n 
62, 265. 
70 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 32, 13. 
71 Lana Hebden et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: Reading the Fine Print' (2010) 
21(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 229, 234. 
72 Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 8, 143. 
73 See also Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or 
Responsive?' (2011) 6(2 pt 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390, e396 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>.  
74 Gunningham and Rees, above n 44, 384. 
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Table 17. Signatory companies’ compliance with the RCMI in 201175 
Company Marketing to 
children? 
Steps taken to 
meet RCMI 
requirements* 
Other reported 
activity** 
Breaches 
identified during 
audit period. 
Complaints to 
the ASB 
Campbell 
Arnott’s 
Yes (Tiny Teddies 
TV ad) 
Yes  Labelling, 
reformulation 
1 ad in children’s 
program 
None 
Cereal 
Partners  
No None reported >25% audience 
share threshold 
Fully compliant None 
Coca-Cola 
South Pacific 
No Yes >35% audience 
share threshold 
30 ads  in 
children’s 
programs/movies 
None 
Fonterra Yes (school 
promotion) 
Yes Ads targeted to 
adults 
Fully compliant None 
Ferrero No Yes Member of IFBA 2 ads in children’s 
programs 
None 
General Mills No Yes  None reported Fully compliant None 
George 
Weston 
No Yes  None reported 1 ad in children’s 
program 
None 
Kellogg No None reported Member of IFBA Fully compliant 1 complaint 
dismissed 
Kraft Foods Yes (Vegemite 
sponsorship) 
Yes 
 
Yes (‘Be 
Treatwise’ 
campaign) 
14 ads in 
children’s 
programs 
1 complaint 
upheld; 1 
complaint 
dismissed 
Lion Dairy 
and Drinks 
Yes (Go Gurt, Yo 
Go, ‘Big M’ 
promotion) 
Yes Ads targeted to 
adults 
Fully compliant  None 
Mars No None reported Making Chocolate 
Better’ campaign 
64 ads screened in 
children programs 
2 complaints 
dismissed 
Nestlé No None reported >25% audience 
share threshold 
4 ads in children’s 
programs 
2 complaints 
dismissed 
Patties Foods  No None reported Ads targeted to 
adults 
Fully compliant None 
PepsiCo No Yes None reported 18 ads screened in 
children’s 
programs 
None 
Sanitarium Yes (Weetbix 
marketing) 
Yes None reported Fully compliant None 
Simplot No Yes None reported Fully compliant   
Unilever  Yes (Paddle Pop 
promotion) 
Yes None reported 6 ads screened in 
children’s 
programs 
One complaint 
upheld 
Total 6 companies 
marketed to 
children 
5 companies did 
not report in this 
category 
6 companies did 
not report in this 
category 
9 companies 
breached the 
RCMI 
2 complaints 
upheld; 6 
dismissed 
 
* Steps taken to meet the RCMI’s requirements included changes to internal procedures for approving 
marketing material; auditing of media placement schedules; staff training and education; and dissemination of 
information to external agencies and media buyers (discussed further in Chapter 9). 
** Some companies described how they targeted their marketing to adults, particularly for products consumed 
by children. 
 
                                                 
75 Adapted from: Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report, above n 59.  
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The AFGC purchases food and beverage advertising data to review signatories’ marketing 
activities against the terms of the code. The AFGC makes the results of this monitoring 
publicly available in an annual ‘Activity Report’, the results of which I described in Chapter 
4.76 The AFGC will continue to purchase food and beverage television advertising data 
periodically to assess the activities of signatory and non-signatory companies against the 
RCMI’s core principles and to measure the frequency of advertising during children’s 
viewing periods.77 The AFGC’s 2010 and 2011 Activity Reports find that the RCMI is 
successful in reducing unhealthy food advertising directed to children.78 However, Chapter 4 
discussed significant flaws in the AFGC’s evaluation, meaning that it captures only a small 
amount of the unhealthy food advertising that children see.79 In particular, the AFGC’s 
reports measure television advertising of unhealthy food that is ‘directed primarily to 
children’, according to either the rating of the program that an advertisement appears in, the 
program’s creative content, or whether it has an audience share of 50 per cent or more 
children. In contrast, public health research evaluates the amount of unhealthy food 
advertising during children’s peak viewing times, which represents children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising more accurately.  
In addition to the Activity Report, the AFGC produces an annual ‘Compliance Report’ that 
summarises companies’ annual reports, its own monitoring activities and any public 
complaints under the initiatives.80 The 2010 and 2011 reports state that compliance with the 
initiatives was high during both years and that all signatory companies had put in place 
processes to implement the code’s core principles.81 An audit of food and beverage 
advertising by the AFGC found that some signatories screened unhealthy food 
advertisements during children’s programming. However, these instances of non-compliance 
were largely due to television networks awarding companies ‘bonus’ advertising slots that 
                                                 
76 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report 
(2010), above n 20; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity 
Report (2012), above n 22. 
77 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (2010), 
above n 20, 18. 
78 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food Adverts to Children Fall to Almost Zero (8 May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/media-releases/1196-food-adverts-for-children-fall-to-almost-zero.html>. 
79 See, e.g., Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 32, 23-24. 
80 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report, above n 59; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant 
Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 54. 
81 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28, 18; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report, above n 59, 21. 
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were not accounted for in companies’ media buying schedules.82 Participants took steps to 
remedy this problem, including reclassification of advertisements and strengthening training 
programs for their media agencies.83 In 2010 the ASB upheld three complaints for breaches of 
the RCMI,84 and two in 2011.85 The 2010 Compliance Report concludes that ‘RCMI 
companies are fully committed to meeting their commitments to the RCMI and are 
demonstrating due diligence to reduce their marketing of HFSS [high fat, sugar, salt] foods to 
children aged less than 12 years’.86 The 2011 reports on the RCMI and QSRI reach the same 
conclusion.87 
Although the AFGC reports high levels of compliance with the codes, independent research 
suggests otherwise.88 One study measured compliance with the RCMI, QSRI and the 
Children’s Television Standards 2009 (CTS 2009) on free-to-air television in five main 
Australian cities.89 It identifed 332 breaches of the food industry initiatives during a two 
month period.90 There were fewer breaches of the QSRI than the RCMI, partly because the 
former has fewer signatories and is less stringent than the latter.91 The study used broadcast 
scheduling data obtained from the Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA). It found discrepancies between this data and the results published the AFGC’s 
2010 Compliance Report.92 For example, Ferrero, Coca Cola and Kraft aired advertisements 
for unhealthy foods during C periods (in breach of the RMCI’s requirements), despite 
reporting that they had not undertaken any promotions to children younger than 12 years of 
                                                 
82 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28, 15; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report, above n 59, 16-18. 
83 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28, 15; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 
Compliance Report, above n 59, 16. See also the discussion in Chapter 9. 
84  Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28, 16-17. 
85 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance Report, 
above n 59, 19-21. 
86 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report, 
above n 28, 18. 
87 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 54, 10; Australian Food 
and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance Report, above n 59, 21. 
88 Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising Regulations in Australia' 
(2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 847. 
91 Ibid 848. 
92 Ibid. 
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age.93 Simplot reported that it had occasionally (and inadvertently) aired a commercial for 
fish fingers during C periods.94 However, the study identified a total of 139 repetitions of this 
advertisement during these times, indicating that the problem was more systemic than 
suggested by the company.95 This research questions the credibility of company self-reports 
on compliance, underscoring the importance of independent monitoring in accordance with 
best practice principles for self-regulation. Yet at present, there is no framework for ongoing, 
independent monitoring of the RCMI and QSRI.96 
Food industry self-regulation should provide for a comprehensive, transparent and 
independent monitoring system.97 WHO recommends that policy frameworks on food 
marketing to children include  ‘a set of core process and outcome indicators, clearly defined 
roles and assignment of responsibility for monitoring and evaluation activities and 
mechanisms to parties that have no conflict of interest’.98 Governments may need to establish 
monitoring frameworks and targets, as industry organisations tend to be narrow and selective 
in their reporting criteria.99 Monitoring should be based on indicators that relate to the codes’ 
objectives, in addition to companies’ compliance with the scheme.100 High levels of 
compliance do not necessarily indicate that regulation is reducing children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising, because adherence to weak restrictions can result in little 
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significant change to advertising practices.101  Thus, indicators should be specific and 
measurable, and place demanding requirements on participants.102 They could include: 103   
• The number of complaints received about non-compliance with the codes; 
•  The frequency of breaches and trends in this number over time;  
• Steps taken by participants towards compliance;  
•  The frequency of unhealthy food advertising in key media and at times/locations 
when large numbers of children are likely to be exposed to it; and 
• Content analysis of the messaging and persuasive techniques used in food advertising 
and the healthiness of advertised products.  
Baseline data on the nature and volume of food advertising (prior to the codes’ introduction) 
would also help to verify the claim that the initiatives have reduced the amount of food 
advertising directed to children.104 
A more transparent and accountable system would include broader governance 
arrangements.105 For example, the 2012 review of the initiatives recommended that the AFGC 
establish a code administration committee comprising representatives from key stakeholder 
groups, including signatories, consumers and government. This committee would take charge 
of code development, monitoring and evaluation and would oversee the scheme’s future 
direction.106 Members would be given equal voting rights, creating an authentic partnership 
between industry and external parties.107 Chapter 10 canvasses the idea of incorporating 
external stakeholders in the scheme’s regulatory processes. For example the committee that 
manages the ABAC Scheme includes a representative from the federal Department of Health 
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and Ageing.108 However, I question whether incorporating external representation into an 
industry-based scheme represents a meaningful form of public health governance, and 
whether it is likely to further public health objectives. 
Chapter 11 describes government monitoring of the RCMI and QSRI. The ACMA oversaw 
the initiatives for a year, but decided not to continue with this activity after the establishment 
of ANPHA.109 Chapter 4 introduced ANPHA’s role in monitoring and evaluating the RCMI 
and QSRI. In May 2012, ANPHA held a seminar on unhealthy food advertising to children, 
attended by government, industry and public health representatives.110 The seminar 
established an government-industry working group (the National Working Group on Food 
Marketing to Children), to develop a framework for the regular and independent monitoring 
of food marketing to children.111 In early 2013, ANPHA released two proposals on the 
structure of this framework.112 Depending on the results of ANPHA’s activities, the AFGC 
will ‘consider’ establishing an independent code administration committee or steering group, 
as recommended by the independent review.113 However, it rejected another recommendation 
that it engage an independent organisation to compile the codes’ annual compliance report.114 
According to the AFGC, an independent organisation would not produce a substantially 
different report and would be costly.115 Thus, at the time of writing arrangements for 
independent administration and monitoring of the codes remain in flux. 
3. Complaints mechanism 
Complaints from the public trigger enforcement processes attached to advertising codes of 
conduct. Thus, it is crucial that codes provide a fast, easily accessible complaints handling 
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mechanism.116 Public complaints may be directed to companies or trade associations in the 
first instance. However, an independent body should be made available for complaints 
resolution in the event that consumers are unhappy with the industry’s response.117 An 
effective complaints mechanism enhances consumer confidence in the scheme and enables 
industry to identify and remedy systemic problems with its operation.118 The provision of an 
independent complaints handling body is important so that ‘justice is seen to be done’ as well 
as actually being done. Industry associations exist to benefit member companies, meaning 
that the public may not perceive them as an acceptable independent body to review 
complaints.119 The publication of complaint determinations also enhances the transparency 
and credibility of the system.120 
Public complaints under the RCMI and QSRI 
The RCMI and QSRI allow for complaints about non-compliance to be laid with the 
Advertising Standards Board (ASB).121 An independent arbiter makes the determination of 
whether the product represents a healthy choice (according to criteria nominated by 
participants to the RCMI, or according to the nutritional profile model attached to the QSRI) 
while the ASB determines whether the advertisement is directed primarily to children.122 The 
ASB publishes reports of its determinations on the Advertising Standards Bureau’s website 
(the ASB’s secretariat arm).123 The ASB’s independence from industry and its representative 
membership is consistent with the goal of public participation in self-regulatory schemes, like 
that of the food industry.124 The idea of community standards in advertising guides the ASB’s 
decisions; thus it explicitly claims to operate as the public’s voice in the complaints-hearing 
process.125 The independent reviewer found that the use of the ASB to hear complaints about 
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food advertising was a strong aspect of the food industry’s voluntary scheme, and met criteria 
for best practice models of complaint resolution.126 In contrast, members to the EU Pledge 
accept similar restrictions on advertising unhealthy food to children, but this industry 
initiative appears not to accept consumer complaints.127 
However, the complexity of advertising self-regulation undermines the role of the complaints 
mechanism in providing for public input on the Australian scheme’s operation.128 The RCMI 
and QSRI operate within a broader advertising regulatory system that is technical and 
confusing.129  In addition to the food industry initiatives, the ASB hears complaints under 
codes developed by the advertising industry, some of which impact on food advertising to 
children.130 Each code contains different terms and conditions, and applies to different 
advertisers and products, media, and age groups of children.131 Variations between individual 
company action plans add an additional layer of complexity to the system.132 As a result, it is 
difficult to identify instances of non-compliance, the correct code to complain under and 
whether a complaint is warranted.133 Further, the ASB may refuse to consider a complaint 
about an advertisement that is no longer running, or where it has already considered a 
complaint about the same advertisement.134 The complaint handling process deters the public 
from complaining about breaches of the codes, particularly given the time, money and 
expertise required to do so.135 Accordingly, the number of complaints the ASB receives may 
not truly reflect the level of consumer concern about food advertising to children, nor does it 
provide an accurate measure of participants’ compliance. 
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The complaints hearing process might be improved by creating an independent panel to hear 
alleged breaches of the RCMI and QSRI.136 This panel could be similar to the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel, which hears complaints about alcohol advertising under the ABAC.137 
The Panel includes a public health representative along with experts in marketing and media 
and a Chairperson with a legal background.138 As I will discuss in Chapter 10, alcohol policy 
researchers question whether the panel is truly independent from the alcohol industry, casting 
doubt on the quality of its decision-making.139 However, a complaints panel including equal 
representation from external interests (such as consumer affairs and parent groups) could 
provide for a robust complaints hearing mechanism.140 Other options might be for public 
complaints to be made to a consumer ombudsman, as is found under the Swedish Radio and 
Television Act 1996,141 or to an independent body that manages both monitoring and 
enforcement of the food industry’s initiatives.142 
4. Enforcement  
Self-regulation should contain incentives for company compliance, including penalties to 
deter non-compliance, and rewards for good behaviour.143  Providing for a wide range of 
sanctions enables enforcement action to be tailored to the seriousness of the breach,144  
including persuasion, warnings, fines, expulsion from the scheme or ejection from the 
industry association as a measure of last resort.145 Voluntary schemes tend to rely on informal 
sanctions and peer pressure for their enforcement, i.e., using negative publicity to ‘name and 
shame’ non-compliant companies into raising their standards.146 However, research suggests 
that self-regulation requires external sanctions to deter companies from ‘free-riding’ on other 
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members’ compliance with the scheme.147 Enforcement action should be supported by 
promotional and educational activities that raise the profile of self-regulation with both the 
public and the industry concerned.148 Information on the codes should be made widely 
available to the public, including the main code document, a list of signatories and procedures 
for laying complaints.149 Disseminating information about the scheme enhances consumer 
understanding of self-regulation and their participation in regulatory processes, for example 
by laying complaints.150 It also helps pledge participants to understand their obligations and 
the consequences of failing to abide by the code.151 Further, the public disclosure of 
disciplinary action allows for ‘naming and shaming’ action to work effectively, and enables 
the development of precedent on unacceptable forms of advertising.152  
Enforcing food industry self-regulation 
The RCMI and QSRI state that ‘[s]anctions may be imposed on participants who fail to meet 
their obligations under the terms of this initiative’.153  However, they do not specify what 
sanctions will be applied to non-compliant companies, nor is there any evidence that the 
AFGC has penalised signatories that breach the codes, despite identifying a number of non-
compliant advertisements. The main route for enforcement seems to be the complaints 
handling mechanism provided by the ASB. If the ASB decides that an advertisement 
breaches the initiatives, it can order the withdrawal or modification of the advertisement. 
However it has no means of enforcing this order, nor can it award financial penalties for 
breaches.154  If the advertiser does not withdraw or modify the advertisement, the ASB may 
refer the case to the appropriate government agency, comment on the advertiser’s lack of 
response in its determination or forward it to media proprietors.155 The advertising industry 
argues that withdrawal or modification of campaigns has significant reputational and 
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financial implications for companies and thus encourages compliance.156 Yet this sanction is 
often applied by the ASB after a campaign is finished, when exposure to the advertisement 
cannot be prevented.157 Accordingly, it provides little incentive to ensure that an 
advertisement is compliant before it is broadcast or published.158 Further, there is no evidence 
of the ASB using more punitive measures in response to breaches. 
Australian food industry self-regulation largely relies upon soft sanctions for its enforcement, 
i.e. companies being ‘named and shamed’ by having a complaint upheld and the ASB’s 
decision made public.159 Negative publicity may be an effective sanction, given that RCMI 
and QSRI signatories are all large, high profile companies with a significant economic 
investment in their brands. Supporting this position is the fact that there are very high levels 
of compliance with the ASB’s determinations.160 Nevertheless, it appears that some 
participants fail to take the ASB’s rulings seriously.161 In 2009, the ASB held that Hungry 
Jack’s breached the QSRI by advertising a Kids Club Meal that did not meet the initiative’s 
nutritional criteria.162 Soon after, Hungry Jack’s ran another advertisement for the same meal, 
featuring characters from the television show The Simpsons.163 In the second case (also 
upheld by the ASB), Hungry Jack’s said that it was aware that the meal did not meet the 
criteria, but that it did not have a compliant children’s meal available for promotion.164  This 
suggests that the ASB’s determinations do not sufficiently deter companies from (knowingly) 
running non-compliant campaigns.  
As the food industry’s scheme matures, it is unlikely to become effective without more 
punitive sanctions. If the AFGC strengthens the codes’ standards, then companies are more 
likely to weigh up the benefits of compliance against the impact on their profit margins.165 
                                                 
156 Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection, above n 2, 22-23; European Advertising Standards 
Alliance, above n 14, 9; SA Health, above n 96, 16. 
157 SA Health, above n 96, 16; Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 129, 18. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection, above n 2, 22-23; European Advertising Standards 
Alliance, above n 14, 25. 
160 Advertising Standards Bureau, Submission to Inquiry into the Regulation of Billboard and Outdoor 
Advertising, above n 125, 10. 
161 Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 129, 18. 
162 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 573/09 (9 December 2009) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>, cited in Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, 
above n 129, 18. 
163 Advertising Standards Bureau, Case Report 32/10 (10 February 2010) 
<http://www.adstandards.com.au/casereports/determinations>, cited in Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, 
above n 129, 18. 
164 Ibid 4. 
165 Tymms, above n 3, 62 
221 
 
Yet if the scheme attracts smaller, less publicly visible companies, food industry self-
regulation also risks developing a ‘free-rider’ problem.166  Thus, the independent review 
recommended that the AGFC provide incentives for compliance (potentially set by 
government) as well as commercially significant sanctions for breaches.167 The latter would 
lend ‘softer’ enforcement options (such as negative publicly) greater weight, as the AFGC 
could legitimately threaten companies with more punitive options if they failed to comply 
with the codes.168 The AFGC responded to the independent review by saying that it supported 
the idea of incentives to encourage compliance, but it could not issue financial penalties.169 
However, it noted its power to rescind companies’ membership of the organisation, as well 
the ASB’s ability to require corrective advertising from companies in breach of the 
initiatives.170 Together with the censuring effect of the ASB’s determinations, the AFGC 
claimed that these measures comprised sufficient penalties for non-compliance.171  
Another way of preventing non-compliance would be to require pre-clearance of food 
advertising, similar to alcohol advertising.172 Chapter 2 described how the ABAC Scheme 
requires pre-vetting for alcohol advertising in some media, with requirements differing for 
the beer, wine and spirits sectors.173 An adjudicator evaluates advertising material against the 
ABAC, the AANA Code of Ethics and prevailing community standards on advertising.174 He 
or she may recommend against the advertisement being published or broadcast, or that it is 
modified to meet required regulatory standards.175 Pre-vetting reduces the number of 
complaints and provides a higher level of public protection from exposure to non-compliant 
advertisements.176 The significant costs involved in withdrawing or modifying offending 
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advertisements may deter advertisers from developing campaigns that breach regulation.177 
Pre-vetting food advertising could be more complex than alcohol advertising (given the 
diverse array of food and non-alcohol beverage products), but it would lessen children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising.178 Alternatively, the AFGC or Advertising Standards 
Bureau could provide non-binding copy advice on an advertisement’s compliance with the 
RCMI or QSRI, prior to its broadcast or publication.179 However, this may not be practical 
given the large volume of food advertising broadcast on television, and the resources that 
would be required to provide advice on each campaign. 
Disseminating information about food industry self-regulation  
The food industry scheme contains a number of mechanisms for disclosing information about 
the codes’ operation, and for opening up the system to external scrutiny. Information 
disclosure systems include participants’ annual reports, the AFGC’s monitoring activities and 
its annual compliance report. With the exception of companies’ annual reports, the AFGC 
makes these documents available on its website.180 The public disclosure of the ASB’s 
determinations provides self-regulation with a measure of transparency, and allows for 
scrutiny of its interpretation of the codes. There is also a greater level of transparency than 
found in relation to other voluntary advertising codes. For example, the ABAC Scheme 
makes publicly available annual reports on its operation, as well as the complaint 
determinations from the ABAC Adjudication Panel.181 However, unlike the RCMI and QSRI 
it does not require participants to self-report on compliance and to release the results to the 
public.  
The food industry publicises the self-regulatory scheme to a limited extent. The ACMA 
performed an audit of RCMI signatories’ websites and found that very few provided easily 
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accessible links to their company action plans, or to the terms of the initiative.182 Further, it is 
not easy to find documents relating to the RCMI and QSRI on the AFGC’s website. These 
barriers to acquiring information about the codes add to the difficulties consumers face in 
laying complaints with the ASB, particularly considering the scheme’s complexity.183 The 
AFGC could encourage compliance by giving greater publicity to the scheme, including to 
instances of non-compliance and good behaviour.184 However, Chapter 8 discusses the fact 
that most consumers are not aware of the scheme, and would be unlikely to purchase products 
from companies that participate in self-regulation, even if the codes were heavily publicised. 
Accordingly, there is little potential for further consumer influence over self-regulation, as 
mediated through market mechanisms.185  
5. Reviewing the operation of self-regulation 
The terms of voluntary codes should provide for structured, regular reviews of the system’s 
operation.186 The review framework should include the baseline data that will be collected to 
judge effectiveness, performance indicators that can be used to measure success, and 
timeframes for evaluation.187 Periodic review ensures that regulation is meeting its objectives 
and is still appropriate to the public purpose it seeks to address.188  It encourages continuous 
improvement and revisions to the codes’ terms that reflect the needs and concerns of affected 
parties.189 It can be difficult to identify which organisations should review or audit self-
regulation.190 Industry actors tend not to trust NGOs to objectively evaluate corporate 
performance.191 Rather, their preferred option is auditing by professional third-party bodies, 
such as the Australian Standards Association.192 However, an independent body comprising a 
wide range of stakeholders enhances the credibility and transparency of review procedures.193 
                                                 
182 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 32, 28. 
183 Ibid. 
184 See, e.g., Karen Yeung, 'Government by Publicity Management: Sunlight or Spin?' (2005) 2 Public Law 360. 
185 See John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Edward 
Elgar, 2008) 95. 
186 Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 2, 24; Department of Finance and Treasury, above n 5, 27; Government 
of Canada, above n 12, 16. 
187 Department of Finance and Treasury, above n 5, 27. 
188 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 13; Government of Canada, above n 12, 16. 
189 Government of Canada, above n 12, 24. 
190  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, above n 8, 78; Gunningham and Rees, above n 
44, 384-385. 
191 Haufler, above n 13, 72-74. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. See also Gunningham, above n 5, 72-74; National Heart Forum, above n 12, 111. 
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Review of the RCMI and QSRI 
The quick service restaurant industry contracted the Healthy Kids Association (HKA) to 
monitor the impact of the QSRI over the 12 months from its commencement.194 The HKA is a 
non-government, not-for-profit health promotion organisation. Its main role is to assist NSW 
schools to implement government policies on the provision of healthy foods in school 
canteens.195 It is also a critic of food industry marketing to children; therefore, it is 
commendable that the industry engaged the HKA to undertake the review. Equally, it was a 
brave decision for the HKA to accept this position, as it risked its reputation as an 
independent advocate through its assocation with the food industry. 
The HKA reviewed signatories’ marketing activities against the QSRI during two auditing 
periods in 2010 and 2011, using information provided by signatory companies.196 Its final 
report found that the majority of advertising complied with the QSRI and that there had been 
decreases in the use of popular personalities to endorse products.197 However, it also 
identified ten non-compliant advertisements across the two auditing periods.198 The HKA 
recommended improvements to the QSRI, including updating the initiative’s definitions to 
align them with other advertising regulatory instruments.199 The AFGC responded to the 
report by speaking with non-compliant companies, who gave undertakings to modify their 
marketing practices.200 The AFGC also agreed to strengthen the terms of the initiative in 
accordance with the HKA’s recommendations.201 The HKA will not continue to review the 
QSRI; from 2011 the AFGC conducted ‘in-house’ monitoring of the initiative.202 This aligns 
the administrative arrangements for the RCMI and QSRI, but it also removes one source of 
external scrutiny of the QSRI’s operation. 
                                                 
194 See Healthy Kids Association, Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick 
Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising to Children, above n 3; Australian Quick 
Service Restaurant Industry, above n 17, 3. 
195 Healthy Kids Association, History of HKA (undated) <https://healthy-kids.com.au/category/85/history>. 
196 Healthy Kids Association, Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising to Children, above n 3, 7-8. 
197 Ibid  9. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid 19. 
200 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Response: In Response To: Healthy Kids Association Incorporated - 
Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising to Children (9 January 2012)  4 <http://www.afgc.org.au/tools-guides-.html>. 
201 Ibid 5. 
202 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 58, 5. 
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The AFGC commissioned an independent review of the RCMI and QSRI in 2012.203 The 
AFGC contracted Susannah Tymms, a consultant, to assess the operation of the initiatives 
and to provide recommendations for enhancing the voluntary program. The review did not 
measure compliance, nor the effect of the initiatives on children’s exposure to unhealthy food 
advertising.204 Rather, the key question for the review was: ‘[d]o the advertising to children 
initiatives have the attributes of well-run and effective self-regulatory codes?’205 The review’s 
methodology involved interviews with representatives of RCMI and QSRI participants, as 
well as the AFGC and ASB.206 The AFGC developed a supplementary questionnaire that it 
sent to signatory companies, which asked how they implemented the codes, whether the 
ASB’s complaints mechanism was adequate and their opinion of the AFGC’s administration 
of the scheme.207 
The independent reviewer released her report in early 2013.208 Tymms recommended a series 
of improvements to the terms of the initiatives, as well as strengthening the administration, 
monitoring and enforcement processes attached to the codes. Many of her suggestions are 
incorporated into this thesis and will not be restated here. However, one of the review’s main 
aims was to increase the clarity of the codes and to make them consistent with other forms of 
Australian advertising regulation, as well as international best practice in food advertising 
self-regulation. For example, the report suggested that the terms and conditions of the RCMI 
and QSRI be aligned with those of the CTS 2009, particularly in relation to premium 
offers.209 It also recommended that the industry work towards establishing a set of universal 
nutrition criteria that RCMI signatories could use to identify healthier choice products that 
can be advertised to children.210 A similar revision was made to the most prominent food US 
advertising pledge, the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative.211 The AFGC 
                                                 
203 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance Report, 
above n 54, 22. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Tymms, above n 3, 33 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid 56-57. 
210 Ibid 59. 
211 See Elaine D Kolish and Magdalena Hernandez, 'The Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative: A 
Report on Compliance and Progress During 2011' (Council of Better Business Bureaus, 2012) 7 
<http://www.bbb.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-initiative/>. 
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responded positively to the majority of the review’s recommendations and plans to have a 
revised version of the RCMI in effect by January 2014.212 
It is commendable that the AFGC undertook an independent review of the scheme, and that it 
is committed to acting on the reviewer’s recommendations. A critical next step is for the 
AFGC to seek periodic review of the scheme on an on-going basis, for example every three 
years.213 As recommended by WHO, processes of review should include a system to evaluate 
the impact and effectiveness of self-regulation against its overall objective, using a set of 
clearly defined indicators.214 In other words, the review should report on both regulatory 
processes and outcomes, unlike the 2012 audit which focused on the design and 
implementation of the scheme.215 The AFGC also seems to have had a significant degree of 
control over the design of the 2012 review. A stronger process would incorporate external 
interested parties and allow them full control over the terms and conditions of the evaluation. 
For example, contracting a public health organisation to undertake the next review might 
address the criticism that self-regulation is largely window dressing. A truly independent, 
external review would provide another mechanism for fostering the scheme’s accountability 
and making it more responsive to external stakeholder concerns. 
6. Conclusion 
The terms of the RCMI and QSRI do not meet criteria for the effective design and 
implementation of self-regulation. The codes lack clear goals and targets, independent 
administration, systematic and objective monitoring, meaningful sanctions for non-
compliance and on-going external review.216 Public health advocates question the credibility 
of the food industry initiatives, and this is hardly surprising given that the codes fail to meet 
best practice principles for effective self-regulation. Further, regulatory processes are 
relatively ad hoc and have evolved over time. The developing nature of the scheme impacts 
upon its transparency: the main code documents do not always specify who is responsible for 
administration and enforcement, and information on these functions is spread across a range 
of documents.  
                                                 
212 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Position Statement in Response to: Responsible Advertising to 
Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes, above 
n 113. 
213 Tymms, above n 3, 30. 
214 World Health Organisation, 'Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages to Children', above n 23, 12. 
215 Tymms, above n 3, 30. 
216 See also Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 2, 242.  
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The changing nature of the regulatory framework does not necessarily mean that it is a sham. 
One of the benefits of self-regulation is its flexibility and ability to be improved over time.217 
However, the extent to which the scheme develops more robust administrative processes 
depends upon the food industry’s willingness to respond to criticism. The AFGC states that it 
is ‘committed to further developing and strengthening these industry codes to address 
community concerns about the nature and extent of food and beverage advertising to 
children’.218 Its intention revise the terms of the QSRI and RCMI supports this statement.219 
However, to produce a truly effective self-regulatory system, the AFGC will need to consider 
broad ranging changes to how the scheme is administered, enforced and reviewed. Table 18 
provides a summary of recommendations for improvements to the self-regulatory processes 
established by the codes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
217 Government of Canada, above n 12, 4. Chapter 8 also discusses this point, and how the standards contained 
in the RCMI and QSRI might be strengthened to improve food industry advertising practices. 
218 Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising: ACMA Monitoring Report', above n 32, 28. 
219 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Position Statement in Response to: Responsible Advertising to 
Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes, above 
n 113. 
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Table 18. Recommendations for improving the self-regulatory framework established 
by the RCMI and QSRI 
Scheme Aspect Recommendation  
Objectives Objectives based on reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising and 
measurable targets related to this objective. 
Administration Administration by an independent body including government, consumer and public 
health representation. The codes should specify the body’s functions and 
responsibilities, including monitoring, oversight and enforcement. 
Monitoring A framework for regular and systematic monitoring by an independent third party 
across all media, including the collection of data related to objectives set out in the 
codes. 
Complaints handling Complaints could be heard by the independent administrative body, or a separate 
panel comprising equal representation from parties external to industry. 
Enforcement  A range of sanctions for non-compliance and incentives/rewards for good behaviour. 
Copy advice or pre-clearance may prevent children from viewing unhealthy food 
advertising. Greater publicity given to the scheme, including by pledge participants. 
Review  The AFGC should commit to ongoing, independent review of the scheme, using 
processes that incorporate external stakeholders. 
 
Another important finding is that the food industry adopted the codes with very little 
consultation with external stakeholders. Excluding external stakeholders from the 
development and administration of the initiatives provides support for the public health 
argument that the RCMI and QSRI largely reflect the food industry’s interests, rather than 
those of consumers and public health advocates. In other words, the industry’s intention was 
to appease community concerns, rather than to meaningfully address them. Without some 
form of external involvement in the development and administration of the RCMI and QSRI, 
self-regulation fails to address the concerns of key stakeholder groups and these groups are 
unlikely to view the initiatives as a credible source of governance.220 It is also more likely that 
the food industry will continue to face criticism and the threat of further government 
regulation remains a possibility.  
A more fundamental problem is that food industry self-regulation is presented as an 
alternative to government regulation, yet the public appears not to have a meaningful voice in 
how this private regulatory system is run.221 In these circumstances, if government is reluctant 
to impose its own regime, consideration should be given to how the public interest could be 
more strongly incorporated into the voluntary codes, and to ensuring that a wide range of 
stakeholders have an opportunity to participate in the implementation and review of these 
                                                 
220 Haufler above n 13, 2. See also See also Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation 
and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2002); A Ogus, 'Regulatory Institutions and Structures' (2002) 
73(4) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 627; Julia Black, 'Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy 
and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes' (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137. 
221 Haufler, above n 13, 2.  
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initiatives.222 Chapters 10 and 11 discuss two important ways in which the transparency and 
accountability of food industry self-regulation could be improved. The first is the inclusion of 
public health stakeholders in regulatory processes, while the second involves government 
intervention to secure the public’s interest in the self-regulation. Before considering these 
possible improvements to the scheme, Chapters 8 and 9 examine how food industry self-
regulation operates at industry and company levels. 
 
                                                 
222 Webb, above n 33, 2. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The institutional influences on food industry self-regulation 
This chapter focuses on the industry-level factors that contribute to successful self-regulation. 
According to literature from regulatory studies and government guides, self-regulation works 
best when the following conditions are present:1  
• A high level of industry cohesion, i.e. the industry is dominated by a few large 
companies; 
• Product homogeneity: the products produced are similar and easy to compare; 
• There is industry-wide commitment and capacity to self-regulate, including the 
existence of a trade association that can administer the scheme;  
• A strong rationale exists for creating codes of conduct;  
• There are tangible economic benefits for companies that join the scheme; and 
• Public and private interests coincide, i.e. self-regulation represents a ‘win-win’ 
situation for the industry concerned and the public.  
In this chapter, I examine whether the conditions listed above are present in the Australian 
food industry and in relation to the RCMI and the QSRI. Chapters 8 and 9 also expand the 
comparison of food and alcohol advertising self-regulation begun in Chapter 6 and 7. While 
both food and alcohol have special systems of regulation for their advertising, the structures 
and institutions of the two industries differ, as do the products themselves. Additionally, since 
the ABAC was introduced in 1998, there has been considerable opportunity to assess its 
performance. In contrast, the food industry’s scheme is relatively new and has been subject to 
less analysis and evaluation. Below I consider whether some of the shortcomings in alcohol 
advertising self-regulation also apply to the food industry initiatives. From this I draw some 
                                                 
1 Chapter 4 describes how I selected these criteria. See, e.g., Joseph Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The 
Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Neil 
Gunningham and Joseph Rees, 'Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective' (1997) 19(4) Law & 
Policy 363, 370; Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Guidelines 
for Developing Effective Voluntary Industry Codes of Conduct' (Commonwealth of Australia, July 2011) 
<http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/658186>; Australian Communications and Media 
Authority, 'Optimal Conditions for Effective Self- and Co-Regulatory Arrangements' (ACMA, September 2011) 
Commonwealth of Australia <http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/optimal-conditions-for-effective-self-and-
coregulatory-arrangements>; Australian Government, 'Best Practice Regulation Handbook' (Australian 
Government, 2011) 43-44 <http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/proposal/gov-requirements.html>. 
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general conclusions about the value of industry self-regulation as a public health measure, as 
well as industry’s likely response to public demands to improve its products and marketing 
practices.2  
The chapter begins by describing the structure of the food and alcohol industries, their 
interests and key players. Next, I compare the nature of food and alcohol products, the 
capacity of each industry to self-regulate, and the administrative arrangements for food and 
alcohol industry codes. Finally I consider the rationale behind the adoption of self-regulation 
in the two industries and whether it benefits both consumers and participating firms. To 
compare the food and alcohol industries, I draw upon data from a range of sources, including 
RCMI and QSRI participants’ company action plans,3 the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council’s (AFGC) reports on the scheme,4 the independent review of the codes,5 and my 
interviews with representatives from the AFGC, alcohol industry trade associations, the 
Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA), public health organisations, and 
food and alcohol industry companies. 
1. Industry structure 
Self-regulation works best in industries dominated by a small number of large companies,6 
because it is easier to achieve wide code coverage in a concentrated industry, where large 
firms share similar interests and can agree on common standards.7 Companies are also more 
likely to self-regulate in a competitive industry, because there are stronger commercial 
incentives for companies to respond to consumer demands, motivating companies to join 
voluntary schemes as a way of differentiating their products or for fear of losing market 
share.8 In turn, the existence of market incentives to comply with self-regulation increases the 
                                                 
2 The introduction of this thesis outlines other reasons for my comparison of tobacco, food and alcohol 
advertising regulation. 
3 These are available on the Australian Food and Grocery Council’s website. See Australian Food and Grocery 
Council, Signatories (2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/company-
action-plans.html>; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Signatories (2010) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/component/content/article/15-industry-codes/1217-qsr-initiative-signatories.html>. 
4 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, RCMI Reports (2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian Food and Grocery Council, QSR 
Initiative Reports (2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/qsr-
initiative/initiative-reports.html>. 
5  Susannah Tymms, 'Responsible Advertising to Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and 
Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes' (AGFC, October 2012) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
6 Gunningham and Rees, above n 1, 394. 
7 Australian Communications and Media Authority, above n 1, 10. 
8 Ibid; Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, 'Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets' (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2000) 48 <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1123>. 
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scheme’s chance of success.9 Where large firms dominate the self-regulatory system, the 
content of standards is likely to benefit them to the detriment of smaller actors. If smaller 
firms see little to gain from voluntary schemes, they are unlikely to join, meaning that the 
scheme will not benefit the industry as a whole.10 Thus, the structure of the industry has 
implications for the coverage of the scheme, which is an important determinant of successful 
self-regulation. 
The food industry  
The food industry is highly diverse, with a range of interests, institutions and players.11 It is 
divided into four main components: primary production; processing raw food commodities 
for consumption; retailing food products to consumers; and distribution and wholesale 
networks linking the production, processing and retail sectors.12  The industry encompasses a 
huge array of companies that produce and retail food and beverages.  In addition, there are 
the enterprises that support the industry by making and selling fertilizer, seeds and feed, 
providing machinery, labour, real estate and financial services, and transporting, storing, 
distributing and exporting its products.13 This chapter focuses on the manufacturing and food 
service sectors, as food manufacturers and quick service restaurants are the targets of food 
advertising codes.14  
Food and beverage manufacturing makes a significant contribution to the Australian 
economy, with a total turn-over of $87.4 billion in 2010-11.15 Food manufacturing is also 
Australia’s largest manufacturing sector, employing approximately 296,300 people and 
accounting for over a quarter of the total number of people employed in the manufacturing 
                                                 
9 Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, above n 8, 48. 
10 Anil K Gupta and Lawrence J Lad, 'Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organisational and Political 
Analysis' (1983) 8(3) The Academy of Management Journal 416. 
11 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 'Australian Food Statistics 2010-2011' (Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012) 25 <http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/publications/afs>. 
See also Christopher Reynolds, Public Health and Environmental Health Law (Federation Press, 2011) 325. 
12 Robert Delforce, Andrew Dickson and John Hogan, 'Australia's Food Industry: Recent Changes and 
Challenges' (2005) 12(2) Australian Commodities 379. 
13 Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health (University of 
Cambridge Press, 2002) 11.  
14 The foodservice sector encompasses all the businesses that sell meals to consumers, including takeaway food 
outlets and quick serve restaurants, independent restaurants, cafés and other dining venues, as well as food sales 
at leisure, travel and event venues. See S Spencer and M Kneebone, 'FOODmap: An Analysis of the Australian 
Food Supply Chain' (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2012) 82-88 
<http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/food/publications/foodmap-a-comparative-analysis>. 
15 Australian Food and Grocery Council, State of the Industry 2012. Essential Information: Facts and Figures 
(2012) 2 <http://www.afgc.org.au/media-releases/1295-state-of-the-industry-2012-report-underlines-
challenging-conditions.html>. 
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industry.16 Australian food manufacturers operate in a highly competitive global market, with 
local manufacturers competing with emerging export countries such as Brazil and China.17 
Over the past few decades, deregulation and microeconomic reform have facilitated mergers 
and acquisitions within food manufacturing, as well as vertical integration with agricultural 
businesses.18 Once the supply chain was segmented according to ownership; now companies 
operate across the production, manufacturing and retailing sectors.19 Additionally, there is a 
strong international presence in the Australian industry: multinational corporations make up 
23 of the top 50 food and beverage manufacturers, and produce approximately one third of 
Australia’s processed foods and beverages.20 
Quick Service Restaurant (QSR) chains make up the largest segment of the takeaway retail 
food market, which also includes small, independent take-away retailers, mobile and street 
vendors, and leisure venues serving food and beverages (such as cinemas, theatres and 
racecourses).21 QSR companies typically run their outlets on a franchise basis, and ‘meal 
ingredients are centrally purchased and supplied according to tight specifications through 
sophisticated logistics and management practices’.22 The leading companies in the Australian 
industry are Domino’s, Hungry Jacks (an Australian owned franchisee of Burger King), 
McDonald’s and Yum! Brands, which owns KFC, Pizza Hut and Taco Bell.23 Other 
prominent QSRs in Australia are Donut King, Eagle Boys, Subway, Nando’s and Quick 
Service Restaurant Holdings, which is wholly Australian-owned and controls Red Rooster, 
Oporto’s and Chicken Treat.24 Between 1998 and 2010, the share of weekly household 
expenditure on food and beverages devoted to meals out and takeaway food prepared away 
from home rose from 23 to 27 per cent.25 Despite the economic downturn, and signs of 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 See, e.g., Delforce, Dickson and Hogan, above n 12; Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
National Food Plan Green Paper 2012 (Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2012) 4 
<http://www.daff.gov.au/nationalfoodplan/development/green-paper>. 
18 Shauna Phillips and Fredoun Z Ahmadi-Esfahani, 'Export Market Participation, Spillovers, and Foreign Direct 
Investment in Australian Food Manufacturing ' (2010) 26(3) Agribusiness 329. See also Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 'Australian Agriculture and Food Sector Stocktake' (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2005) 75 <http://www.daff.gov.au/agriculture-food/agfoodgroup>. 
19 Delforce, Dickson and Hogan, above n 12, 379-380.  
20 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 'Australian Agriculture and Food Sector Stocktake', above 
n 18. 
21 MarketLine, Fast-Food in Australia (2012) 6 <http://www.marketline.com/>. See also Spencer and 
Kneebone, above n 14, 86. 
22 MarketLine, above n 21, 86. 
23 Ibid; Yum! Brands Our Brands (undated) <http://www.yum.com/brands/ >.  
24 See Spencer and Kneebone, above n 14, 86; Quick Service Restaurant Holdings, Welcome to QSR Holdings 
(2012) <http://www.qsrh.com.au/>.  
25 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 'Australian Food Statistics 2010-2011', above n 11, 11. 
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saturation in the market, investment in the industry remains high and the large QSR chains 
continue to open new outlets across the country.26  
‘Big Food’ dominates all sectors of the food industry, comprising large multinational 
companies that operate in hundreds of markets around the world, and across all elements of 
the food supply chain.27  Rather than being a competitive market, the global food system can 
be described as an oligarchy, particularly considering the rapid expansion of Big Food in low 
and middle-income countries.28 The main business of Big Food is manufacturing and retailing 
processed products, a significant proportion of which are high in fat, salt and sugar.29 
Through transnational food production and marketing (facilitated by trade liberalisation), 
large food manufacturers and retailers shape national and global eating patterns, shifting 
consumers’ diets towards more highly processed products and sugar sweetened beverages.30 
Between 2000 and 2005 the global value of sales of packaged food increased from US$1.095 
billion to US$1.455 billion, with the fastest growth in snack bars (48 per cent value growth), 
ready meals (45 per cent) and chilled processed food (41 per cent).31 Studies link frequent 
consumption of these and other processed products with obesity and weight gain, as well as 
associated diseases such as cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes.32 For these reasons, 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 See Kelly D Brownell and Kenneth E Warner, 'The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and 
Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food?' (2009) 87(1) The Milbank Quarterly 259, 263; David Stuckler and 
Marion Nestle, 'Big Food, Food Systems and Global Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>. 
28 Stuckler and Nestle, above n 27; Lawrence Busch and Carmen Bain, 'New! Improved? The Transformation of 
the Global Agrifood System' (2004) 69(3) Rural Sociology 321; David Stuckler et al, 'Manufacturing 
Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including 
Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001235>. 
29 Stuckler and Nestle, above n 27; Stuckler et al, above n 28; David S Ludwig and Marion Nestle, 'Can the 
Food Industry Play a Constructive Role in the Obesity Epidemic?' (2008) 300(15) Journal of the American 
Medical Association 1808, 1810.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Corinna Hawkes, 'The Influence of Trade Liberalisation and Global Dietary Change: The Case of Vegetable 
Oils, Meat and Highly Processed Foods' in Corinna Hawkes et al (eds), Trade, Food, Diet and Health 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 35, 54. 
32 See, e.g., Mattias B Schulze, et al, 'Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Weight Gain and Incidence of Type 2 
Diabetes in Young and Middle-Aged Women' (2004) 292(8) Journal of the American Medical Association 927;  
Mark A Pereira et al, 'Fast-Food Habits, Weight Gain, and Insulin Resistance (the CARDIA Study): 15-Year 
Prospective Analysis' (2005) 365(9453) The Lancet 36; Vasanti S Malik, Mattias B Schulze and Frank B Hu, 
'Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review' (2006) 84(2) American Journal 
of Clinical Nutrition 274; Luis A Moreno and Rodriguez Gerardo, 'Dietary Risk Factors for Development of 
Childhood Obesity' (2007) 10(3) Current Opinion in Clinical Nutrition & Metabolic Care 336. 
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public health advocates view Big Food as a significant contributor to the ‘industrial 
epidemic’ of obesity and overweight.33  
Consolidation of the food industry creates the potential for effective self-regulation, as it 
enables industry cooperation and collaboration as well as broad coverage of advertising 
codes. Global food companies are more likely than small businesses to undertake large-scale 
marketing campaigns that include a wide range of promotional activities. The top 
multinational food companies are Ferrero, General Mills, Grupo Bimbo, Kellogg’s, Kraft 
Foods, Mars, Nestlé, PepsiCo, The Coca-Cola Company and Unilever. Together these 
companies account for around 80 per cent of the global advertising spend in the food and 
beverage industry, and collectively have annual revenues in excess of $350 billion.34 Apart 
from Grupo Bimbo, all of these companies have a presence in the Australian market. 
Accordingly, convincing them to join advertising pledges would result in the regulation of a 
large proportion of food advertising.  
In practice the RCMI and QSRI have limited coverage. A particular problem is that the 
AFGC does not require compliance with the codes as a condition of its membership. Yet 
trade associations often specify that members must comply with voluntary schemes as a 
means of increasing participation in self-regulation.35 Table 19 below outlines the companies 
that are signatories to the RCMI, their brands and core products, and some examples of 
prominent companies that have not joined the code. In 2009, only 11 of the 36 food 
companies advertising on television were signatories to the RCMI.36 Since 2009, three new 
companies have joined the code, bringing its total membership from 14 to 17.37  The RCMI 
thus covers less than half of the food companies that advertise on television.  
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Nestle, above n 13;  Stuckler and Nestle, above n 27; Stuckler et al, above n 28; Kelly D Brownell 
and Katherine Battle Horgen, Food Fight: The Inside Story of the Food Industry, America's Obesity Crisis and 
What We Can Do About It (McGraw-Hill, 2004); Eric Schlosser, Fast-Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-
American Meal (Harper Perennial, 1st Harper Perennial ed, 2005); Rene I Jahiel and Thomas F Barbor, 
'Industrial Epidemics, Public Health Advocacy and the Alcohol Industry: Lessons from other Fields' (2007) 
102(9) Addiction 1335; Nicholas Freudenberg, 'The Manufacture of Lifestyle: The Role of Corporations in 
Unhealthy Living' (2012) 33(2) Journal of Public Health Policy 244. 
34 Tara Acharya et al, 'The Current and Future Role of the Food Industry in the Prevention and Control of 
Chronic Diseases: The Case of PepsiCo' in David Stuckler and Karen Siegal (eds), Sick Societies: Responding to 
the Global Challenges of Chronic Disease (Oxford University Press, 2011) 187, 191. 
35 Tymms, above n 5, 42. 
36  Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' 
(2011) 6(2 pt 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390, e394 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>. 
37 Tymms, above n 5, 52. 
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The AFGC estimates that 2012 membership of the RCMI represented a market share of 80 
per cent of all food advertisers.38 However, it does not provide the criteria it used to 
determine this figure. Also, there are no data quantifying the percentage of food and beverage 
marketing to children that is undertaken by signatory companies, making it impossible to 
confirm that the RCMI applies to the majority of food advertising.39 However, researchers 
note that levels of participation in the Australian scheme are substantially lower than the US, 
where 71 per cent of food advertisers participate in the Children’s Food and Beverage 
Advertising Initiative (CFBAI).40 Some of the food manufacturers that have not joined the 
RCMI are Goodman Fielder, Schweppes, and Snack Brands Australia.41  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid 51. 
39 Ibid 61. 
40 King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' above n 
36, 7. 
41 Obesity Policy Coalition, Policy Brief: Food Advertising Voluntary Codes (2011) 2 
<http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=volcodes_polbrief&Type=policydocuments>. 
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Table 19. Participants and non-participants to the RCMI* 
RCMI participants Major products and brands  Examples of 
non-participants  
Major brands and products  
Campbell Arnott’s Baked snacks, prepared meals and 
beverages. Brands include Country 
Ladle, Tim Tam, Tiny Teddy, Shapes. 
Bulla Dairy 
Foods 
Dairy products and frozen desserts, 
including cream, ice-cream and 
frozen yoghurt. 
Coca-Cola South 
Pacific  
 
 
Soft drinks including Coke, Diet Coke, 
Coke Zero, Fanta and Lift, bottled 
water, bottled tea, fruit drinks, sport 
drinks, dairy-based beverages. 
Frucor 
Beverages 
Fruit juices, fruit drinks, energy 
drinks, water, soft drinks. Brands 
include ‘V’ energy drink, H2Go 
water, Fresh-Up. 
Ferrero  
 
Confectionery products like Kinder 
Surprise, Tic Tac, Ferrero Rocher and 
the Nutella spread. 
Go Natural Snack bars, nuts, meal bars and 
fruit snacks, all using the Go 
Natural brand. 
Fonterra Brands  Dairy products such as milk, yoghurt, 
cheese, ice-cream and butter. Brands 
include Mainland, Anchor and Calci 
Yum. 
Goodman 
Fielder  
Bread, baking ingredients, baked 
goods, dairy products, condiments, 
spreads and oils. Brands include 
Helga’s, Edmonds, White Wings. 
General Mills  Baking mixes and Italian and Mexican 
meal kits. Brands include Latina, Old 
El Paso and Nature Valley. 
Jalna Dairy 
Foods 
Yoghurt and sour cream, marketed 
through the Jalna brand.  
George Weston 
Foods  
Grain smallgoods and hot beverages, 
marketed through brands like Tip Top, 
Bürgen and Twinings. 
McCain Foods Frozen fruits and vegetables, 
pizzas, meals and snacks, 
promoted under the McCain brand. 
Kellogg’s  Breakfast cereals and snack foods. 
Brands include Cornflakes, Coco Pops 
and Rice Bubbles. 
Schweppes Non-alcoholic beverages and 
cordials, including Schweppes soft 
drinks and Gatorade sports drink.  
Kraft Foods Confectionery products and spreads, 
including Cadbury Dairy Milk 
chocolate and Kraft peanut butter.  
Snack Brands 
Australia  
Snacks and potato chips including 
Thins chips, CCs corn chips, and 
Kettle chips. 
Lion  Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages 
and dairy products. Brands include 
Pura, Berri, Coon, Tooheys, Hahn, 
Boag and Heineken.  
  
Mars Snackfood  Confectionery, gum, pasta sauce, 
cereals and petfoods. Brands include 
Mars, M&Ms, Extra, Dolmio, Uncle 
Bens, Dine and Pedigree. 
  
Nestlé Beverages, confectionery, ice-cream 
and chilled dairy products. Brands 
include Milo, Peters and Uncle Toby’s. 
  
Patties Foods Frozen food products, including Four 
n’ Twenty pies, Nanna’s frozen 
desserts and Patties’ party foods. 
  
Sanitarium Cereals, soy milks, spreads, easy-cook 
vegetarian meals, nuts and dried foods.  
  
Simplot Convenience meals, chilled, frozen and 
canned foods. Brands include Birds 
Eye, John West and Lean Cuisine.  
  
Pepsico Snackfoods including Smith’s and Red 
Rock Deli chips, Doritos corn chips, 
Pepsi, and beverages like Pepsi, Pepsi 
Max and Gatorade. 
  
Unilever  Beverages, spreads, ice-creams, soups, 
sauces and seasonings. Brands include 
Streets, Liptons and Continental. 
  
* Note that Cereal Partners Worldwide is also a signatory to the code, however as this entity is a joint venture 
between Nestlé and General Mills (both signatories in their own right), I have not included it in the table. See 
Cereal Partners Worldwide, Combining Forces over Two Decades (2008) 
<http://www.cerealpartners.com/cpw/company.html>. 
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Table 20 sets out the companies that participate in the QSRI, as well as QSRs that operate 
outside the scheme. The code’s membership has remained the same since its creation, with 
only seven restaurant brands participating in the scheme.1 Further, these brands are owned by 
four major companies, meaning that in practice the QSRI has only four signatories. Together 
these companies hold a significant share of the QSR market.2 However, several prominent 
companies have not joined the scheme, including Domino’s, Nando’s and Eagle Boys Pizza.3 
Subway committed to becoming a member of the scheme in 2012, but there is no evidence 
that it has in fact done so.4 Internationally, it appears that QSR chains are joining self-
regulation at lower rates than food manufacturers.5 For example, there are 17 signatories to 
the US CFBAI, but McDonald’s and Burger King are the only two restaurants that participate 
in the scheme. Other leading QSRs (including Yum! Brands and Subway) remain outside the 
initiative.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ibid. 
2 See Spencer and Kneebone, above n 14, 86. 
3 J Lumley, J Martin and N Antonopoulos, 'Exposing the Charade: The Failure to Protect Children from 
Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2012) 10 
<http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-charade&Type=policydocuments>. 
4 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Response: In Response To: Healthy Kids Association Incorporated - 
Final Report on the Compliance of Signatories to the Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for 
Responsible Advertising to Children (9 January 2012) 5 <http://www.afgc.org.au/tools-guides-.html>. The 
relevant page on the AFGC’s website does not list Subway as a signatory to the QSRI. See Australian Food and 
Grocery Council, Signatories (2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/component/content/article/15-industry-
codes/1217-qsr-initiative-signatories.html>. 
5 Consumers International, 'Left Wanting More: Food Company Policies on Marketing to Children' (Consumers 
International,  March 2009) 10  <http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/resource-zone/left-
wanting-more-a-survey-of-food-companies-policies-on-marketing-to-children#.UbbB3h9-_cs>; Vivica I Kraak 
et al, 'Industry Progress to Market a Healthful Diet to American Children and Adolescents' (2011) 41(3) 
American Journal of Preventive Medicine 322; Corinna Hawkes and Jennifer L Harris, 'An Analysis of the 
Content of Food Industry Pledges on Marketing to Children' (2011) 14(8) Public Health Nutrition 1403, 1406. 
6 Better Business Bureau, Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative (2013) 
<http://www.bbb.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-initiative/>. See also Kraak et al, above n 46, 
326. 
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Table 20. Participants and non-participants to the QSRI 
QSRI participants Main products and brands Non-
participants 
Main products and brands  
Hungry Jack’s 
 
Hamburgers, desserts, drinks 
and salads, and meals 
including the Whopper and 
Whopper Junior Burger 
Meals and Hungry Jack’s 
Kids Meals. 
Domino’s Pizza Ready-to-eat pizzas, drinks, 
desserts and sides. 
McDonald’s Australia  Fast-food meals and snacks, 
including breakfast-foods, 
burgers, French fries, salads 
and wraps, frozen desserts 
and drinks. Meal options 
include the children’s Happy 
Meal.  
Donut King  Donuts, hot dogs, frozen 
desserts and cakes.  
QSR Holdings Chicken meals and products, 
including roasted chicken, 
burgers, baguettes and salad, 
marketed through the Oporto, 
Red Rooster and Chicken 
Treat brands. 
Eagle Boys Pizza  Ready-to-eat pizzas, sides, 
breads and desserts.  
Yum! Brands Chicken, pizza and Mexican-
style products. Yum! owns 
restaurant brands KFC and 
Pizza Hutt.  
Nando’s Cooked chicken, chicken 
burgers, kid’s meals, snacks 
and sides.  
 
Chapter 9 describes how code signatories perceive that the activities of non-participants 
hamper the schemes’ operation.7 Accordingly, the independent reviewer recommended 
making compliance a condition of AFGC membership.8 She also suggested gathering data on 
the extent of code ratification amongst all food and beverage manufacturers in Australia, and 
the extent of code coverage in terms of the percentage of all food and beverage marketing 
directed to children. This would provide the baseline data necessary for developing a code 
recruitment strategy, and for monitoring progress on recruiting new companies.9 Regardless 
of the method used to increase membership, more companies that engage in food advertising 
must join the codes if self-regulation is to be effective.10 This would create a more level 
                                                 
7 See also Tymms, above n 5, 42, 60-61. 
8 Ibid 61. 
9 Ibid 63. 
10 See also SA Health, 'Discussion Paper: Australian Children’s Exposure to the Advertising and Marketing of 
Energy-Dense, Nutrient-Poor Foods and Beverages: Strengthening Current Arrangements' (Government of 
South Australia, 9 May 2012) 15 
<http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/879776804b29e174af00afe79043faf0/Food+marketing+semi
nar_9+May+2012_Discussion-
paper.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=879776804b29e174af00afe79043faf0>. 
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playing field across the industry, ensuring that code signatories are not operating at a 
competitive disadvantage.  
The alcohol industry  
Like the food manufacturing industry, the alcohol industry is marked by an increasing degree 
of concentration and foreign ownership following rapid global consolidation.11  A few large 
local and multi-national companies own Australian alcohol beverage operations. Several of 
these companies also produce food and non-alcoholic beverages, creating overlaps between 
the food and alcohol manufacturing industries.12 Alcohol manufacturing is divided into three 
sectors: beer, wine and spirits. Each of these sectors has varying patterns of employment, 
profit and competition and different shares of consumer alcohol consumption.13 Spirit 
manufacturing is much smaller than beer and wine, while the wine market is bigger than beer 
on all measures except for value added.14 In 2010-2011, per capita consumption of pure 
alcohol consisted of 4.23 litres of beer, 3.74 litres of wine and 1.32 litres of spirits (and an 
additional 0.70 litres of ‘Ready-to-Drink’ (RTDs) or premixed beverages).15 
The three sectors are also marked by different degrees of consolidation and foreign 
ownership. The beer industry is dominated by two foreign-owned companies (SABMiller and 
Lion Nathan), which together control almost 90 per cent of the Australian market. A number 
of smaller and boutique producers make up the remaining market share, including the 
privately-owned Coopers brewery.16 Two of the top three wine-makers are also foreign-
owned, but the wine industry retains a higher degree of Australian control than beer or spirits 
                                                 
11 Tim Stockwell and David Crosbie, 'Supply and Demand for Alcohol in Australia: Relationships Between 
Industry Structures, Regulation and the Marketplace' (2001) 12(2) International Journal of Drug Policy 139; L 
Hill, 'The Alcohol Industry' in Kris Heggenhougen and Stella Quah (eds), International Encyclopaedia of Public 
Health (Academic Press, 2008) 124; David H Jernigan, 'The Global Alcohol Industry: An Overview' (2009) 
104(S1) Addiction 6, 7; Thomas Barbor et al, Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed, 2010) ch 5. 
12 Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy, 'Alcohol in Australia: Issues and Strategies' (Commonwealth 
Department of Health and Aged Care, 2001) 17 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/alc-
strategy/$FILE/alcohol_strategy_back.pdf>. 
13 See David Richardson, The Liquor Industry. Technical Brief No. 14 (August 2012) The Australia Institute 
<http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/069EF4B635757D09CA257A22001E4D48/$
File/Submissionper cent2036per cent20-per cent20Foundationper cent20forper cent20Alcoholper 
cent20Researchper cent20andper cent20Educationper cent20-per cent20Attachmentper cent20A.pdf>. 
14 Ibid 2. ‘Value added’ refers to the sales revenue of an industry after deducting the costs of inputs.   
15 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Apparent Consumption of Alcohol in Australia 2010-2011 (cat no 
4307.0.55.001) (3 May 2012) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4307.0.55.001main+features32010-11>.  
16 Richardson, above n 54, 4-5. 
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and a larger number of small companies.17  As a result, it is much more competitive than the 
beer industry, with the largest player holding just 11.5 per cent of the market.18 The spirits 
industry is smaller in scale than the other two sectors. It focuses its activities on re-packaging 
imported spirits for the local market, and mixing spirits with soft drinks to create RTDs (also 
called ‘alcopops’).19 Five main players control 82 per cent of spirits manufacturing in 
Australia: Diageo Australia; LINZ Group Holdings; Coca-Cola Amatil; Foster’s Group; and 
Bacardi Lion.20 Of the major players, only Coca-Cola Amatil is Australian-owned, although 
The Coca-Cola Company (US) owns a 29.5 per cent share of the company.21  
The monopolistic nature of the alcohol industry suggests a degree of cohesion, with the 
potential for cooperation between industry actors, as well as wide code coverage. For 
example, the 2007 ABAC Annual Report states that: 22 
Australia’s alcohol beverage sector is a mature industry, within which there has been a gradual 
consolidation of brands over many decades. One desirable consequence of this long-term trend is 
that… [t]he ABAC Scheme can achieve tremendous reach via a manageable number of signatories. Of 
the top 50 advertisers, which represents the vast majority of all advertising, more than 98 per cent of 
the [advertising] spend is covered by companies using the ABAC system. 
However, interviews with alcohol industry actors suggested that competition between the 
different sectors affected the ABAC’s operation. For example, one wine industry actor said 
that wine advertising was less problematic than beer and spirits, because wine makers 
advertised less than the other two groups, and because wine advertising emphasised attributes 
of the product or the region it came from rather than associating the beverage with sport, 
adventure or sexual themes.23 Because of the smaller quantity of wine advertising, originally 
wine makers were not required to submit their advertising to the pre-vetting system.24 All 
alcohol manufacturers that are ABAC participants must now participate in pre-vetting, 
                                                 
17 Ibid 6; Stockwell and Crosbie, above n 52, 142. 
18 Richardson, above n 54, 6. 
19 With the exception of Bundaberg Rum, which is manufactured in Australia by Diageo (ibid 9. See also 
Stockwell and Crosbie, above n 52, 142). 
20 Richardson, above n 54, 9-10. 
21 Ibid 10. 
22 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, ABAC Annual Report 2007 (2007) 3 The ABAC Scheme 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/annual-reports/>. 
23 See also Simone Pettigrew et al, 'The Extent and Nature of Alcohol Advertising on Australian Television' 
(2012) 31(6) Drug and Alcohol Review 797, which found that beer advertisements were more likely to use 
themes of humour and mateship or sexual themes than advertisements for wine or spirit products. 
24 National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, 'Review of the Self-Regulatory System for 
Alcohol Advertising: Report to the Ministerial Council of Drug Strategy' (Minister for Health Victoria, 2003) 
17-19 
<http://docs.health.vic.gov.au/docs/doc/2E4E141E5A719092CA2578A1000A1CB0/$FILE/ncraareport.pdf>. 
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following recommendations made by the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS) in its 
2003 review of the ABAC Scheme.25 Yet while the alcohol industry unites against some 
forms of government intervention, it cannot be assumed that the interests of the various 
sectors are always aligned.26 For example, in relation to taxation of alcohol products there is 
often rivalry rather than cooperation between the different groups within the industry.27 This 
in turn may affect the coverage and effective operation of industry-based schemes such as the 
ABAC. For example, the scheme may not capture smaller players that the larger actors view 
as responsible for a majority of contraventions of the code.28 
A related problem is that the ABAC only applies to alcohol manufacturers; it does not cover 
other actors in the supply chain, particularly alcohol retailers. Coles and Woolworths have 
progressively increased their presence in alcohol retailing by purchasing major independent 
retailers and liquor retailing chains, with the two companies now owning approximately half 
of Australia’s liquor retail outlets.29 Coles and Woolworths produce many advertisements, 
both for alcohol sold in or adjacent to supermarkets, and for their liquor stores.30 It is difficult 
to quantify exactly how much, as there is limited data on the extent and nature of alcohol 
retail advertising in Australia. Simone Pettigrew and colleagues found that around one in five 
advertisements on Australian free-to-air television originated from alcohol retailers (21.1 per 
cent of total alcohol advertising via this medium).31 One study of alcohol advertising in two 
Victorian newspapers found that between 1989 and 2009, large liquor stores increased their 
share of print advertising from 30 to 70 per cent. During the same period, boutique or 
                                                 
25 Ibid, although the requirements for pre-vetting differ between the three sectors. See Chapter 2. See also The 
ABAC Scheme Limited, The Development of Australia’s Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code 
(undated) <http://www.dsica.com.au/content/detail/about_alcohol_alcohol_advertising_and_regulation>; The 
ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures (5 December 2012) cl 5.0 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/rules-procedures/>. 
26 Stockwell and Crosbie, above n 52, 158. 
27 Ibid. See also Tim Stockwell, 'Working with the Alcohol Industry on Alcohol Policy: Should We Sometimes 
Sit at the Same Table?' (2007) 102(1) Addiction 1; Brewers Association of Australia and New Zealand, 
Submission No 18 to the Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Draft Report: Exploring the Public 
Interest Case for a Minimum (Floor) Price for Alcohol, 3 December 2012 
<http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/minimum-price-alcohol-issues-paper>. 
28 National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising, above n 65, 11. See also Chapter 9, where large 
alcohol manufacturers that I interviewed expressed concern that smaller companies did not adhere to the 
ABAC’s standards. 
29 Evan Jones, 'Liquor Retailing and the Woolworths/Coles Juggernaut' (2005) 55 Journal of Australian 
Political Economy 1; Geoffrey Munro, 'Advertising Alcohol: When the Best Isn't Good Enough' (2006) 4(2) Of 
Substance 12. 
30 Ingrid Wilson et al, 'A Historical Analysis of Alcohol Advertising in Print Media 1989-2009' (Victorian 
Health Promotion Foundation, December 2011) 18 <http://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/Publications/Alcohol-
Misuse/Historical-analysis-of-alcohol-advertising-report.aspx>. 
31 Pettigrew et al, above n 64, 799. 
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specialist outlets decreased their share from 30 to five per cent of all alcohol advertisements.32 
These studies suggest that Coles and Woolworths play an important role in the alcohol 
advertising environment. However, the ABAC Scheme lacks formal monitoring mechanisms 
that could be used to quantify the total alcohol marketing promotions by retailers as 
compared to manufacturers. Such data could be used to determine the true extent of the 
ABAC’s coverage.33  
In June 2013 the alcohol industry announced that Woolworths had joined the ABAC 
Scheme.34 As well as complying with the ABAC’s requirements, Woolworths would commit 
funding towards the scheme and participate in pre-vetting for advertising, naming and 
packaging of alcohol beverages. However, Coles (and other retailers) remain outside the 
scheme, despite the ABAC containing a provision on print advertisements by alcohol 
retailers.35  The ABAC Adjudication Panel will hear public complaints about alcohol retail 
advertising, and Coles and Woolworths largely cooperate with the complaints adjudication 
process (for example by withdrawing or modifying advertisements that breach the code).36 
However, there is significantly less normative pressure on Coles to do so, given that it is not a 
member of the scheme and shows little interest in joining. Further, its advertisements are not 
subject to pre-vetting, which is a crucial part of the alcohol advertising regulatory process. 
The growing prevalence of advertisements for alcohol retail outlets would seem to refute the 
industry’s claim that the ABAC covers the vast majority of alcohol beverage advertising, 
although recruiting Woolworths to the scheme is a positive step.37 
                                                 
32 Wilson et al, above n 71, 21. 
33 The Commonwealth Government charged the Australian Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) with 
monitoring the compliance of the alcohol industry with voluntary codes of practice and other commitments on 
responsible alcohol advertising. See Australian Government, 'Taking Preventative Action: A Response to 
Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020, The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) 94 <http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/>. ANPHA’s Operational Plan 
2012-2013 states that it will review the ABAC and the effectiveness of the code in addressing community 
concern (see Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Operational Plan 2012-2013 (undated) 8 
Australian Government <http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/anpha-operation-plan-2012-
2013> . At the time of writing this review was in progress, but it is unclear whether ANPHA will play an on-
going role in monitoring alcohol advertising. See also the discussion in Chapter 10; Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency, Alcohol Advertising: The Effectiveness of Current Regulatory Codes in Addressing 
Community Concerns. Issues Paper (December 2012) 
<http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/alcohol-advertising-issues-paper-html>. 
34 The ABAC Scheme Limited, Woolworths Liquor Group Becomes a Signatory to the Alcohol Beverages 
Advertising Code (20 June 2013) <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/media/>. 
35 See The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and Packaging) Code (March 2012) 3 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/thecode/>. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See also Peter Jones, David Hiller and Daphne Comfort, 'The Leading Spirits and Beer Companies and 
Corporate Social Responsibility' (2013) 13(3) Corporate Governance 249, 258. The authors argue that alcohol 
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The case of retail alcohol advertisements points to similar problems with food industry self-
regulation.  As with the ABAC, the RCMI applies to food manufacturers, but not to retailers. 
The Australian grocery retail environment is highly concentrated, with the three main 
supermarkets (Coles, Woolworths and IGA) accounting for 92 per cent of supermarket 
sales.38 Of the three, Coles and Woolworths dominate, holding a 78 per cent share of total 
supermarket sales.39 Australian families purchase the majority of their groceries at 
supermarkets.40 Accordingly, these large companies effectively influence national diets 
through their store locations, promotional strategies, product pricing and availability 
policies.41 Supermarkets carry a wide range of unhealthy products that use packaging, labels 
and give-aways that appeal to children.42 However, the RCMI does not extend to product 
packaging and labelling, nor to forms of in-store promotion that encourage ‘pester power’.43 
In the independent review, one RCMI signatory also raised concerns about the fact that as 
owners of private labels, supermarkets were not covered by the RCMI, creating an uneven 
playing field in the marketing environment.44 This is a significant exception, given that 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies’ commitment to promoting responsible drinking may be undermined by major retailers and pub and 
night club owners offering cheap alcohol promotions. 
38 Australian Food and Grocery Council, 2020: Industry At A Crossroads (2011) 14 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/2020-industry-at-a-crossroads-report.html>. See also Jon Wardle and Michael 
Baranovic, 'Is Lack of Retail Competition in the Grocery Sector a Public Health Issue?' (2009) 33(5) Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 477. 
39 Australian Food and Grocery Council, 2020: Industry at a Crossroads, above n 79, 41. 
40 Spencer and Kneebone, above n 14, 10, 80. In its report on the competitiveness of retail grocery pricing, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission estimated that large supermarket chains accounted for 
approximately 55 to 60 per cent of consumer expenditure on groceries in 2007. However, it noted the difficulty 
of establishing this figure precisely, given the various methods used to measure retail grocery turnover. See 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the Competitiveness of 
Retail Prices for Standard Groceries' (ACCC, July 2008) 46-48 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml?itemId=838251>. 
41 Wardle and Baranovic, above n 79, 480; Corinna Hawkes, 'Dietary Implications of Supermarket 
Development: A Global Perspective' (2008) 26(6) Development Policy Review 657; Libby Hattersley and Jane 
Dixon, 'Supermarkets, Food Systems and Public Health: Facing the Challenges' in Geoffrey Lawrence, Kristen 
Lyons and Tabatha Wallington (eds), Food Security, Nutrition and Sustainability (Earthscan, 2010) 188. 
42 Kathy Chapman et al, 'The Extent and Nature of Food Promotion Directed to Children in Australian 
Supermarkets ' (2006) 21(4) Health Promotion International 331. 
43 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the Australian 
Food and Beverage Industry (March 2011) 4 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi.html>. See Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 44,12-14; Helen Dixon, Maree Scully and 
Kristiina Parkinson, 'Pester Power: Snackfoods displayed at Supermarket Checkouts in Melbourne, Australia' 
(2006) 17(2) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 124; Sarah Campbell et al, 'A Mixed-Method Examination 
of Food Marketing Directed Towards Children in Australian Supermarkets ' (2012) Health Promotion 
International  (Advance Access) 1 
<http://heapro.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/11/14/heapro.das060.short>. 
44 Tymms, above n 5, 42. 
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Australian supermarkets are increasingly developing their own private labels and competing 
with other products that they stock.45 
In theory, increased consolidation in the food and alcohol industries creates the conditions for 
effective self-regulation. However, in practice advertising codes do not sufficiently cover all 
industry players, particularly the large supermarkets that dominate food and alcohol retailing 
and produce an array of marketing materials for these products. This points to one of the 
fundamental problems with self-regulation, namely that it is unlikely to ‘cover the field’.46 In 
contrast, legislative bans on tobacco advertising apply to all forms of tobacco promotion 
regardless of location, media used, or the company producing the advertisement.47 
2. The nature of the product 
Regulating advertising for food and non-alcoholic beverages 
This section considers how the nature of food and alcohol products affects the feasibility of 
advertising regulation that protects children’s health. Successful self-regulation depends on a 
degree of product homogeneity, i.e. the characteristic that products are alike and easy to 
compare.48 However, the food industry makes a profusion of snacks, cereals, meals, 
confectionery and beverages,49 with product diversity increasing as the market becomes more 
competitive.50 Participants in advertising pledges own a vast array of products and brands, 
with portfolios that contain both healthy and unhealthy processed foods. High levels of 
variation between products makes it difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to identify 
which company owns a particular brand or product and whether that company is a signatory 
to advertising codes. In real terms, this cancels out one of the benefits of self-regulation, 
namely that customers can use voluntary codes to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad 
apples’ and make purchase choices based on whether companies practice responsible 
                                                 
45 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Report of the ACCC Inquiry into the 
Competitiveness of Retail Prices for Standard Groceries', above n 81, ch 16. See also David Burch and Geoff 
Lawrence, 'Supermarket Own Brands, Supply Chains and the Transformation of the Agri-Food System' (2005) 
13(1) International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 1. 
46 Management Committee of the ABAC Scheme, The ABAC Scheme Annual Report 2005 (2005) 8 The ABAC 
Scheme <http://www.abac.org.au/publications/>. 
47 See, e.g., Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth); Public Health (Tobacco) Act 2008 (NSW). 
48Australian Communications and Media Authority, above n 1, 10. 
49 Karen Z Walker et al, 'Product Variety in Australian Snacks and Drinks: How Can the Consumer Make a 
Healthy Choice?' (2008) 11(10) Public Health Nutrition 1046, 1051. 
50 Busch and Bain, above n 28, 330. 
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advertising.51  Consumers cannot ‘sanction’ non-compliant companies by boycotting their 
products, unless they are able to inform themselves of the company’s product range and are 
prepared to forego purchasing any of those products. Product complexity also makes it more 
difficult for code participants to monitor the behaviour of competitor companies and to detect 
if they are breaching self-regulation.52 
A second problem with food advertising regulation is that food products are nutritionally 
complex, and the harm they cause is the result of prolonged or over-consumption, rather than 
consumption per se.53 Also, a range of factors determine individual nutritional intake, 
including the type of foods and beverages consumed, their portion size, the frequency of their 
consumption and the variety of different foods that comprise an individual’s diet.54 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that some products (i.e., those high in salt, fat and/or sugar) 
make a greater contribution to weight gain than others.55 For this reason, obesity prevention 
initiatives (such as food labelling and advertising restrictions) often draw on nutrient profiling 
that categorises foods according to their nutritional composition (for example, high fat or 
high salt),56 or by their effects on health (for example, ‘healthy’, ‘less healthy’ or ‘good for 
your heart’).57  
The use of nutrient profiling is complicated by disagreement over how the nutritional quality 
of food and beverage products should be conceptualized. The food industry argues that there 
are no ‘good’ and ‘bad’ foods, and that all of its products can form part of a balanced diet.58 
However, the public health community argues that some foods are markedly better than 
others, and that individuals clearly need to increase their intake of fruits and vegetables, and 
decrease their consumption of highly processed products, fast-foods and sweetened 
                                                 
51 Tim Bartley, 'Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private 
Regulation of Labour and Environmental Conditions' (2007) 113(2) American Journal of Sociology 297, 307. 
52 Australian Communications and Media Authority, above n 1, 10. 
53 See Nestle, above n 13, 1-2; Derek Yach et al, 'The World Health Organisation's Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control: Implications for Global Epidemics of Food-Related Deaths and Disease' (2003) 24(3-4) 
Journal of Public Health Policy 274, 275. 
54 G Sacks et al, 'Applications of Nutrient Profiling: Potential Role in Diet-Related Chronic Disease Prevention 
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298, 304. 
55 See Moreno and Gerardo, above n 32; Pereira et al, above n 32; Schulze et al, above n 32; Malik, Schulze and 
Hu, above n 32; Carlos Monteiro 'The Big Issue is Ultra-Processing' (2010) 1(6) World Nutrition 1. 
56 Sacks et al, above n 95; Mike Rayner, Peter Scarborough and Asha Kaur, 'Nutrient Profiling and the 
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57 Sacks et al, above n 95. 
58 See, e.g., Nestle, above n 13, pt 1; Brownell and Horgen, above n 33, 16-17. 
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beverages.59 Debates about the healthiness of food products mean that complicated decisions 
have to be made about what products advertising restrictions will cover, and how the 
nutritional quality of foods will be defined.  Both the RCMI and QSRI use nutrient profile 
models to distinguish ‘healthier choice’ products that can be advertised to children from less 
healthy products that cannot.60 As I discussed in Chapter 7, these nutrient criteria create gaps 
in the coverage of self-regulation, allowing companies to advertise a wide range of unhealthy 
products to children.61 Variation between RCMI participants’ nutrient criteria also makes 
regulating food advertising a complicated exercise, impacting upon consumers’ ability to lay 
complaints about breaches of the code. 
Regulating alcohol beverage advertising   
Alcohol beverages are highly diverse, varying widely in product price, quality and alcohol 
content.62 However, the advertising of alcohol products may be easier to regulate than 
advertising of food and non-alcoholic beverages, since products are unified by the basic 
property of containing alcohol. Alcohol is a drug with toxic effects,63 to which young people 
are more vulnerable than adults.64 Accordingly, sales of alcohol in Australia are restricted to 
individuals 18 years of age and over.65 In light of restrictions on the sale of alcohol to young 
people, there is a strong argument for corresponding limits on advertising that appeals to 
underage drinkers. As a result, the restrictions contained in the ABAC apply to all alcohol 
beverage advertisements produced by signatories to the scheme.  
Similar arguments apply to advertising for tobacco products: cigarette smoking is toxic, 
addictive and health damaging, with prohibitions on sales to those under the age of 18 years.66 
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However, unlike alcohol, there is no safe level of tobacco use, making it easier to justify 
statutory bans on all tobacco advertising, as opposed to the ‘quasi-regulatory’ restrictions on 
alcohol advertising in Australia.67 The fact that advertising restrictions apply to one product 
(with little variation between different brands) also facilitates wide-ranging bans on tobacco 
marketing.68 In contrast, the nutritional complexity of food and non-alcoholic beverages, 
combined with the diverse array of products, companies and brands, makes food advertising 
regulation a more complicated exercise than regulating either alcohol or tobacco promotion. 
3. Industry capacity to self-regulate 
Effective self-regulation requires industries to have the will and capacity to act collectively.69 
Given that self-regulation is based on information exchange, consensus and learning between 
companies, industry cooperation and cohesion are important.70 Industries must also possess 
institutional structures that facilitate self-regulation; namely, a strong industry association.71 
A representative body can collect information about the industry, analyse this information, 
monitor firm behaviour for compliance, and detect and enforce non-compliance.72 More 
fundamentally, trade associations can use voluntary codes of conduct to create an ‘industrial 
morality’ within the industry, i.e. ‘a set of industrial principles and practices that defines right 
conduct as it spells out the industry’s public commitment to moral restraint and aspiration’.73 
However, this relies upon the industry body being able to manage a number of different and 
potentially competing roles, namely representing the interests of its members as well as 
acting as a ‘mediating institution’ between individual companies and the state.74 
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The food industry and the AFGC 
Big Food drives the creation of institutions that represent the food industry’s interests. 
Consequently, the industry is highly organised and well-resourced, employing lobbyists, 
lawyers and trade associations to pursue its political agenda.75 In 1994, the Australian 
processed food industry formed the AFGC, an advocacy and lobbying group based in 
Canberra.76 The AFGC has more than 170 members, subsidiaries and associates, who 
together represent 85 per cent of the gross dollar value of food and beverage manufacturing 
sector sales.77 Its members include multinational companies operating in Australia, such as 
Cadbury Schweppes, Coca-Cola, Ferrero, Kellogg’s, Mars and Nestlé. Some member 
companies also manufacture alcohol beverages, including Bundaberg Brewed Drinks, 
Foster’s Group, Lion and Coca-Cola.78 This illustrates the flow of funds, people and activities 
between the food and alcohol industries, as well as the tobacco industry.79 For example, 
Philip Morris acquired Kraft and General Foods during the 1980s, making it one of the 
largest companies in the food and beverage industry.80 It also had a substantial shareholding 
in SABMiller, which now owns Australian breweries Fosters and Carlton United Breweries.81 
Past and present tobacco company executives sit on the boards of these large alcohol 
companies, strengthening the connections between the alcohol, food and tobacco industries.82  
The AFGC’s governing body is the AFGC Full Council, comprising the CEOs of all full 
member companies.83 The Council is responsible for the AFGC’s overall policy, strategic 
direction and resourcing. The AFGC’s Board of Directors determines policy, establishes 
priorities, formulates strategy and allocates resources on behalf of the Council.84 The Board is 
supported by four Standing Committees on Health, Nutrition and Scientific Affairs, 
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Corporate Affairs, Supply Chain and Sustainable Practices.85 The AFGC Secretariat supports 
the work of the Council and the Committees, including by administering the RCMI and 
QSRI.86 The AFGC describes its advocacy role as follows:87  
 We provide a strong, united voice from industry to government at all levels, along with NGOs, 
retailers/trading partners, industry groups and the media… As part of our advocacy role, we advance 
best practice policy, promote industry’s views, and make submissions to governments on the 
development of policy and regulation impacting members.  
The AFGC has created a suite of voluntary initiatives, including Daily Intake Guide 
Labelling, a front-of-pack nutrition-labelling scheme adopted in 2006,88 and codes of practice 
on food labelling, as well as the RCMI and QSRI.89 It also participates in the Food and Health 
Dialogue, which is a collaborative initiative involving industry and government actors that 
aims to improve nutrition through a program of voluntary product reformulation.90 
Additionally, in 2012 the AFGC launched its own initiative to address chronic disease 
(‘Together Counts’), including by reducing the salt, fat and energy content of products from 
participating companies.91 
The alcohol industry’s self-regulatory capacity  
 Unlike food manufacturing, alcohol manufacturers are not united behind one industry body; 
instead, separate trade associations represent each of the three sectors of the industry. The 
Distilled Spirits Industry Council of Australia led the creation of the ABAC Scheme, along 
with the Brewer’s Association of Australia and New Zealand, the Winemaker’s Federation of 
Australia, and the Liquor Merchants Association of Australia.92 Alcohol industry actors also 
cooperated to form DrinkWise, an industry-based organisation that focuses on promoting 
responsible drinking through consumer education (discussed further in Chapter 9).93  
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However, while the Australian alcohol industry has a presence in the alcohol policy and 
regulation field, its initiatives do not form part of a comprehensive approach to self-
regulation, as found in the food industry, despite the fact that the alcohol industry is facing 
similar regulatory threats such as health warning messages and the display of energy content 
on alcohol beverage labelling.94  
In summary, the processed food industry benefits from having a strong trade association 
coordinate its activities, allowing for a unified position on a range of issues and the 
development of a comprehensive self-regulatory strategy on food and nutrition. This may 
facilitate adoption of the standards contained in food advertising codes, particularly as self-
regulation becomes accepted practice within the industry. In contrast, there appears to be 
more limited scope for self-regulation in the alcohol industry because of competition between 
the three separate industry sectors. Nevertheless the alcohol industry has developed relatively 
sophisticated administrative arrangements for the ABAC Scheme, as will be discussed below.  
4. Administration of industry codes 
The role of the AFGC in food advertising self-regulation 
This section evaluates the extent to which arrangements for the administration of food and 
alcohol advertising self-regulation in Australia meet the conditions for successful self-
regulation.  The administrative arrangements for the RCMI and QSRI were introduced in 
Chapter 7. The AFGC monitors participants’ adherence to the codes, coordinates self-reports 
of compliance and publishes an annual report on the schemes’ operation.95 In 2012 the AFGC 
also contracted a consultant to perform an independent review of the RCMI and QSRI, after 
self-regulation had been had been operating for three years.96 The Advertising Standards 
Board (ASB) handles complaints about breaches of the two codes; however, the AFGC pays 
for an arbiter with a background in diet and nutrition who participates in the advertising 
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complaints determination process.97 The arbiter makes a decision about whether an advertised 
product (that is subject to a complaint) represents a ‘healthy dietary choice’ according to the 
nutrition criteria used by RCMI and QSRI companies. The ASB then considers whether the 
advertisement meets the other rules contained in the code.98  
Apart from its monitoring and review activities, the AFGC disseminates information to 
participants on how the scheme works. For example, it provides guidance on the scope of the 
RCMI and what programs are considered ‘directed primarily to children’, according to the 
terms of the initiative.99 The AFGC also publicises the scheme through media releases on the 
codes’ success in reducing food advertising directed to children, as well on its website.100 The 
independent review found that the majority of RCMI signatories (10 out of 17 companies) 
were happy with the AFGC’s management of the code.101 The remaining seven signatories 
reported ‘neutral’ feedback on the performance of the AFGC’s secretariat, and there were a 
number of suggestions for improving its work. Some companies wanted the AFGC to play a 
greater role in advising on how advertising campaigns could be developed to comply with the 
codes.102 Others sought more regular updates about the RCMI, its coverage, associated 
advocacy activities and recent interpretations of the code’s text.103 Some signatories 
suggested that governance could be improved by granting the Australian Association of 
National Advertisers (AANA) administration of the codes, linking the food advertising 
schemes more closely to the AANA’s advertising codes of conduct. However, others felt that 
this would place a significant burden of work on the AANA, particularly as the RCMI and 
QSRI require a level of reporting and monitoring that is not demanded by the AANA’s 
scheme.104  
Food industry self-regulation benefits from tapping into the existing advertising regulatory 
framework. As the body responsible for hearing and determining complaints about 
advertising in Australia, the ASB is a well-established component of the advertising self-
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regulatory system. The independent review found that signatories to the RCMI and QSRI 
whose food advertising practices had been subject to a complaint held the ASB in high 
regard.105 The AANA provides additional oversight of the scheme, as it is responsible for 
coordinating all of the components of the advertising self-regulatory system. Many members 
of the AFGC are also members of the AANA, meaning that there are connections between 
the two associations in relation to self-regulation of food advertising. For example, a senior 
executive at the AANA said that: 
… because the food advertising issue touches on so many players within the industry, we work very 
cooperatively with our other industry associations, so I know the people at the AFGC well and we have 
an on-going dialogue in relation to the initiatives. 
Thus, the AFGC and AANA work cooperatively on food advertising regulation, providing 
support for the food industry’s scheme.  
Although participants are largely happy with the AFGC’s management, I argue that it is not 
the most appropriate body to administer the RCMI and QSRI. The AFGC acts as the ‘voice’ 
of the food industry, which may affect whether it can manage the scheme effectively and 
impartially.106 Some studies suggest that trade associations can be pivotal to industry-based 
schemes, but this occurs where they can draw companies together into a community that is 
united behind a set of guiding principles.107 Whether trade associations are able to act as a 
moral authority in the industry depends on a range of factors, including the design of the 
regulatory scheme, the association’s ability to use peer pressure to shame deviant companies 
and the threat of more punitive measures for on-going non-compliance.108 However,  more 
often industry interests dominate the work of trade associations, meaning that they are at 
significant risk of regulatory ‘capture’ and are unlikely to be effective regulators.109   
Chapter 7 suggested that the AFGC appears reluctant to formally sanction companies that 
breach the RCMI and QSRI, relying upon persuasion and peer pressure to convince 
participants to change their practices. This may undermine the credibility of self-regulation in 
the eyes of the public. Further, it is unlikely to be an effective enforcement method if there is 
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no threat that the AFGC will follow up with more punitive measures in response to 
continuing non-compliance.110 
The absence of effective enforcement makes food industry self-regulation vulnerable to free-
riding. There are two versions of this problem: the first is where companies agree to the terms 
and conditions of self-regulation, but simply feign compliance. The second is where a 
significant part of the industry refuses to join the scheme but nevertheless derives 
reputational benefits from its existence.111 In the first case, industry regulators can control 
free-riding by monitoring compliance and punishing non-compliance. Yet the food industry 
may find this difficult in light the AFGC’s failure to enforce the codes effectively.  
Television networks operate as an intermediary between advertisers and access to broadcast 
media, meaning that they can control free-riding to some extent.112 For example, Free TV’s 
Commercial Advice Division may refuse to classify an advertisement that fails to meet the 
requirements of the RCMI and QSRI, meaning that it cannot be broadcast on free-to-air 
television.113 However, there is no evidence of Free TV rejecting any non-compliant 
advertisements, despite research showing multiple breaches of the codes during children’s 
programming.114 In addition, the industry’s ability to control free-riders is hampered by the 
fact that customers may not be able to identify compliant companies, nor may they 
necessarily value compliant behaviour (discussed further below).115 As discussed above, there 
are also significant sectors of the industry who are not members of the codes, thereby 
undermining the code’s coverage and the development of sector-wide norms for food 
advertising to children. 
There is also the question of whether the AFGC gives the appearance of independence from 
industry. Regardless of how well it administers the scheme, groups outside the food industry 
are unlikely to view the AFGC as a credible administrator. Given the difficulties that trade 
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associations face in maintaining actual and apparent independence, effective self-regulation 
relies on structuring regulatory tasks so that there is a degree of separation between the 
industry creating the scheme and the body that administers it.116 As described in Chapter 7, 
the AFGC’s administration of the scheme is almost entirely industry based, with few formal 
processes for incorporating external input in the codes’ governance processes.117 Only the 
ASB and the independent review provide some form of outside influence on the scheme’s 
operation; apart from this, the codes do not establish structures for consulting or engaging 
with external stakeholders in routine administrative and monitoring processes.118 Without 
external involvement, the public is unlikely to accept the scheme as a credible form of self-
regulation, nor is the scheme likely to give voice to public health concerns. 
Management of the ABAC Scheme  
Similar issues arise in the governance of the ABAC Scheme, which is administered by the 
ABAC Management Committee.119 As mentioned in previous chapters, the Committee 
originally comprised the executive directors of the main alcohol industry trade associations, 
as well as a member of the advertising industry’s representative body.120  Following the 2003 
review of the scheme, the alcohol industry included a representative from the federal 
Department of Health on the Management Committee.121 It also appointed a public health 
representative to the ABAC Adjudication Panel, which previously comprised only the Chief 
Adjudicator, and representatives with media or marketing backgrounds.122 Despite these 
changes, governance of the scheme is still industry-based and membership of the 
Management Committee and the Adjudication Panel is unequally weighted in favour of the 
industry.123   
Chapter 10 describes how alcohol industry ‘quasi-regulation’ points to the dangers of 
incorporating external interests in schemes that are led by industry actors. In these 
circumstances, external representation is likely to be tokenistic, rather than representing a 
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balance of interests in the scheme’s administration. Accordingly, the example of the ABAC 
Scheme suggests the need for independent administration of the food industry codes. Below, 
I discuss other grounds for external involvement in food and alcohol industry self-regulation, 
namely the industries’ rationale for adopting voluntary programs and their economic 
incentives to self-regulate. 
5. Industry rationales for adopting self-regulation  
The food industry 
Industries self-regulate in response to changed market conditions, pressure from outside 
forces, catastrophic events, dwindling natural resources and broad socioeconomic and 
political trends.124  The food industry has been placed on the defensive by claims that it 
‘seduces children into a lifestyle of unhealthy eating, infiltrates schools and other social 
institutions, buys loyalty from scientists and pressures administration officials into accepting 
weak and ineffective nutrition policies’.125 The transnational companies that dominate the 
industry are particularly vulnerable to consumer, public health and NGO demands, given that 
their business strategy is based on the creation of high profile brands.126 This allows NGOs to 
direct boycotts and protests at highly visible companies like McDonald’s and Starbucks, 
creating negative publicity about their marketing practices, as well as their approach to food 
safety and quality, environmental protection, labour rights and animal welfare.127 Thus, the 
industry faces the threat that regulation or legislation could restrict advertising to children, as 
well as sales in schools, nutrition labelling and product size.128 
                                                 
124 See Marc Schneiburg and Tim Bartley, 'Regulating American Industries: Markets, Politics and the 
Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation' (2001) 107(1) American Journal of Sociology 101; 
Marc Schneiburg and Tim Bartley, 'Organisations, Regulation and Economic Behaviour: Regulatory Dynamics 
and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century' (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 31; 
Lisa L Sharma, Stephen P Teret and Kelly D Brownell, 'The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to 
Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures' (2010) 100(2) American Journal of Public Health 240. 
125 Brownell and Warner, above n 27, 262-263. See also Nestle, above n 13; Brownell and Horgen, above n 33. 
126 Busch and Bain, above n 28, 332-333. See also Naomi Klein, No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs 
(Picador, 2002). 
127 Ibid. 
128 Brownell and Warner, above n 27, 260; Laurian  J  Unnevehr and Evelina Jagmanaite, 'Getting Rid of Trans 
Fats in the US Diet: Policies, Incentives and Progress' (2008) 33(6) Food Policy  497; Kate Carey, 'Heart 
Foundation Calls for Mandatory Salt and Saturated Fat Levels in Processed Foods', Australian Food News 
(online) 12 November 2012 <http://www.ausfoodnews.com.au/2012/11/12/heart-foundation-calls-for-
mandatory-salt-and-saturated-fat-levels-in-processed-foods.html>; Gary Sacks, 'Denmark Scraps Fat Tax in 
Another Big Food Victory', The Conversation (online) 17 November 2012 
<http://theconversation.com/denmark-scraps-fat-tax-in-another-big-food-victory-10689>; Conal Urquhart, 
'Childhood Obesity: Jeremy Hunt Threatens Food Industry with Legislation', The Guardian (online) 6 January 
2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/jan/05/childhood-obesity-fatty-sugary-foods>; Lawrence O 
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The development of self-regulatory schemes by the food industry can be understood as a 
response to the business threats posed by negative public attitudes and the prospect of 
government regulation.129 The creation of advertising codes by the Australian food industry 
appears to be no exception.  For example, a representative of the AFGC described the RCMI 
as a response to growing community concerns about food advertising to children and its link 
with obesity. A senior executive at the AFGCsaid that pressure from government also 
provided impetus for a self-regulatory scheme, as did international developments:  
… probably going back… to the year 2000… the issue of childhood obesity became prominent, both in 
terms of it being a public health concern, but also highlighted in the media…. The Government responded 
by asking the Australian Communication and Media Authority… to review the Children’s Television 
Standards [2005] …The review…concluded that there was no strong causal evidence between the levels of 
advertising to children and childhood obesity… But… it did say that the industry should be mindful of 
community concerns… So this organisation turned its mind to [whether there] could be a role for some 
form of voluntary code to help address the… community issues… the advertising industry was already 
thinking about some sort of pledge, because this issue had been bubbling along overseas as well, and some 
of the companies overseas had formed a pledge… voluntarily restricting advertising to children… 
Chapter 9 discusses the reasons given by individual companies for joining the codes. In 
interviews, company representatives talked about the importance of improving the company’s 
reputation and that of the industry as a whole. They discussed other motivations for self-
regulation, including the creation of a level playing field, and an ethical responsibility to 
advertise to children in a way that encouraged healthy eating.130  
Martin Caraher and John Coveney describe the food industry’s quick response to consumer 
trends favouring local, fresh and organic foods, as well as concerns about the environment, 
food production processes and genetically modified food.131 However, they argue that these 
responses are not based on promoting public health, but on the impact of consumer concerns 
on sales and profits. 132 Self-regulation allows the industry to present itself as more responsive 
to consumers than government bodies, but in doing so, ‘the private sector hopes to remove 
itself from the front line of any negative publicity that emerges concerning food safety, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gostin, 'Banning Large Sodas is Legal and Smart', CNN (online)13 March 2013 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/13/opinion/gostin-soda-ban>. 
129 Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 165, 243. 
130 See also Tymms, above n 5, 34-35. 
131 Martin Caraher and John Coveney, 'Public Health Nutrition and Food Policy' (2004) 7(5) Public Health 
Nutrition 591, 595. 
132 Ibid. 
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environmental or other food-related crises’.133 A similar conclusion can be drawn about the 
RCMI and QSRI – that the industry created the codes to appease consumer concerns, stave 
off government regulation and enhance the industry’s reputation, rather than to improve the 
marketing environment or to change children’s consumption behaviours.134  This conclusion 
is strengthened by the fact that the codes do not, in fact, reduce children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising and for that reason are unlikely to improve children’s diets or 
nutrition.135 
The alcohol industry 
Alcohol industry interviewees described a complex range of factors that shaped the 
development of the ABAC and compliance with its terms. In particular, they spoke of a 
desire to protect credibility and reputation at both company and industry levels. Further, 
participants said that alcohol advertising had to accord with community views on appropriate 
advertising, if the industry was to maintain its social licence to operate. This related to the 
fact that alcohol is ‘no ordinary commodity’, and significant health and social harms result 
from its misuse.136 For example, a representative of one alcohol manufacturers’ trade 
association said that:  
I look at the… ABAC Scheme, and we rightly say that it does lead the world… we’re an industry that’s 
always been… about partnerships and working with the government and the community and respecting 
community in this space….. ABAC’s… been built around… rules… about the model’s age you can 
actually use and the target audience… and issues around the appeal of alcohol… whether it has any 
impact upon performance… those are very good things that reflect… alcohol…. having a legitimate 
place [in society]… you have to maintain a pretty clean nose if you’re going to maintain your 
legitimacy.  
As with food industry self-regulation, the alcohol industry’s rationale for creating the ABAC 
stemmed from a mixture of economic and ethical motivations, government, consumer and 
NGO pressure, and a related concern for protecting the legitimacy and credibility of the 
industry. Yet self-regulation that is primarily designed to address reputational concerns may 
be less effective compared to schemes that aim to protect physical resources upon which the 
                                                 
133 Busch and Bain, above n 28, 243.  
134 See also Sharma,Teret and Brownell, above n 165, 243. 
135 See King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' above 
n 36; Lana A Hebden et al, 'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of 
Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) Medical Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case 
for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public 
Health Nutrition  1 <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
136 Barbor et al, above n 52. 
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industry depends, for example the sustainability of fisheries stocks.137 Stronger forms of self-
regulation would also seem more likely where there is a clear link between the industry’s 
products and significant harms to public health.138 However, the alcohol, food (and tobacco) 
industries deny any connection between advertising and increased consumption of their 
products.139 Further, alcohol and tobacco companies joined voluntary codes while continuing 
with marketing practices that target and appeal to young people.140 A similar pattern is 
apparent in the food industry, leading researchers to draw the conclusion that voluntary codes 
are little more than cynical window dressing.141 Successful self-regulation seems to require a 
clear connection between an industry’s activities or products and harm to the public. Since 
the food industry does not share the conviction that its products contribute to obesity there is 
unlikely to be any commitment or incentive to moderate advertising to children. 
6. Economic incentives for self-regulation  
The food industry  
Self-regulation presents a series of economic risks and benefits for those participating in the 
scheme. Accordingly, companies must perceive that the benefits of self-regulating outweigh 
its costs if they are to join a scheme and comply with its standards.142  Chapter 9 explains how 
RCMI and QSRI participants found the codes costly to implement.143 However, Big Food 
faces changing public perceptions about the appropriateness of advertising food products to 
children and increased scrutiny of its business practices, as well as growing demand for 
                                                 
137 See Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 165, 243; Andrew A King and Michael J Lenox, 'Industry Self-
Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program' (2000) 43(4) Academy of 
Management Journal 698; Tavis Potts and Marcus Haward, 'International Trade, Eco-Labelling, and Sustainable 
Fisheries - Recent Issues, Concepts and Practices' (2007) 9(1) Environment, Development and Sustainability 91. 
138 For example, the nuclear power and chemical industries created self-regulatory schemes following 
catastrophic disasters, where the harm from the industries’ products was incontrovertible. See Gunningham and 
Rees, above n 1; Rees, Hostages of Each Other, above n 1; Rees, ‘Development of Communitarian Regulation 
in the Chemical Industry', above 110; Gunningham above n 149. 
139 See, e.g., Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report 
(2012), above n 136, 4; S M Carter, 'Cooperation and Control: The Tobacco Institute of Australia' (2003) 
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et al, 'Failure of Self-Regulation of UK Alcohol Advertising' (2010) 370 British Medical Journal 1102. 
141 See Sharma, Teret and Brownell, above n 165, 245. 
142 Purchase, above n 156, 87. 
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healthier products.144 These trends may enhance the economic benefits of joining advertising 
codes, particularly where companies invest in the development of healthier products and 
promote themselves as supporting healthy eating. Self-regulation could also have other more 
indirect or diffuse benefits for participants. For example, two companies told the independent 
reviewer that while there were few economic incentives for joining the RCMI, self-regulation 
facilitated a more cooperative approach to issues faced by the industry.145 Chapter 9 describes 
these more intangible benefits in further detail, including the perception that self-regulation 
improved corporate reputations and credibility in the eyes of consumers and the public. 
We can question whether the profits from improved reputation outweigh the losses that 
companies incur from accepting significant restrictions on advertising that targets or appeals 
to children.146  Food companies have a legal obligation to increase their sales and maximise 
returns to shareholders.147 However, the Australian domestic market has reached maturity and 
its growth depends upon encouraging consumers to purchase products with higher profit 
margins.148 The industry’s most profitable products are highly processed snack foods, cereals 
and ‘convenience foods’ that largely consist of refined starch, concentrated sugars and low-
quality fats, as well as sugary beverages.149 Although there is growing demand for healthier 
options, this leads to the expansion of companies’ product portfolios rather than reduced 
production of unhealthy foods and beverages.150 Accordingly, while some advertising may 
promote responsible consumption and physical activity, ‘[a]dvice to eat less often, eat foods 
                                                 
144  Ibid 34-35. See also Australian Food and Grocery Council, State of the Industry 2012, above n 15, 51-52; 
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in smaller portions and avoid high-calorie foods of low-nutritional quality undermines the 
fundamental business model of many companies’.151 
Further, it is unlikely that either parents or children would be aware of the RCMI and QSRI 
and consider the codes’ membership when making choices about what foods and beverages 
to buy.152 There is evidence that most consumers make food purchasing decisions according 
to price, rather than health considerations, suggesting that compliance with advertising self-
regulation is not a significant influence on consumers’ purchasing decisions.153 I interviewed 
several representatives from public health organisations who said that this was a fundamental 
limitation of food advertising self-regulation – that there was simply no economic basis for 
companies to modify their advertising practices. For example, one public health advocate said 
that:  
… on a general level… self-regulation’s just unlikely to work given the impact that limiting advertising 
could have on profit margins, so they’re just not motivated… to really bring about effective restrictions 
if that would mean they can’t market their foods in the way that they want to. 
As David Ludwig and Marion Nestle remark, visionary CEOs and enlightened companies 
exist within the food industry.154 Indeed, Chapter 9 finds that some Australian companies 
seem genuinely committed to responsible marketing practices. But for the majority of the 
industry it is more profitable to engage in marketing practices that encourage children to eat 
unhealthy products – which self-regulation should aim to prevent.155 It appears that the only 
real economic grounds for advertising restrictions are reputation protection and avoiding 
government regulation.156 The threat of having advertising completely banned may provide a 
commercial incentive to self-regulate.157 However, as I will discuss in Chapter 11, there is 
little credible threat of government regulation of food advertising in Australia.  This may help 
to explain why Australia currently has, in the RCMI and QSRI, two weak, voluntary regimes 
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that make few demands on signatories conduct and achieve little in terms of moderating 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.  
The alcohol industry  
Public health interviewees raised similar concerns about the regulation of alcohol advertising 
that targets young people. Alcohol marketing forms a critical part of producers’ strategies to 
gain market share and maximise alcohol consumption, in order to provide the greatest return 
to shareholders.158 This is particularly the case as alcohol production networks become 
increasingly globalised, with alcohol marketing taking place on an international scale.159 
Alcohol manufacturers advertise to young audiences as a means to recruit new drinkers and 
establish loyalty to the company’s brand.160 They associate their brands with youth markets 
through promotions using new media, by targeting university students and by sponsoring 
music and cultural events that are popular with young people.161 Public health participants 
said that there was a conflict of interest between meaningful restrictions on the content and 
placement of alcohol advertisements and the industry’s economic motivation for advertising 
to young people. For example, the representative of one public health organisation said that:  
The track record suggests that if you do leave [regulation] to the industry they won’t impose 
meaningful restrictions, and…it’s because that would actually harm their bottom line and that’s really 
what their… primary goal [is], and if you’re really not affecting the drinking patterns or preferences of 
adults, then you have to attract a new market or you have to seek new drinkers, and that’s where…the 
real tension lies, that if you’re trusting them to self-regulate, knowing full well that they have to target 
this new market, the chances are that that’s not going to happen to the extent that it would give any 
public health gains. 
Food and alcohol companies may be willing to accept some restrictions on advertising that 
directly targets children. However, they are unlikely to accept broader ranging restrictions 
that affect their ability to market products to an adult and youth audience – yet this is 
necessary if we are to reduce children’s exposure to food and alcohol advertising.162 The same 
public health interviewee quoted above summed up this problem in relation to alcohol 
advertising restrictions:  
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… the difficulty with exposure levels is that you would have to impinge on the right of people over 25 
or over 18 to view alcohol advertising in order to preserve the rights of the more vulnerable in society, 
which is the under 25s or under 18s… But…from a public health perspective, the preference is 
to…impose a slight burden on the people who are better able to protect themselves than to risk the 
health of people who aren’t able to protect themselves to the same extent. 
For private regulation to serve a public purpose it must represent a ‘win-win’ situation for 
both consumers and industry actors, i.e. both the public and industry must have an interest in 
its success.163 However, in the case of food and alcohol self-regulation, there is a fundamental 
conflict between companies’ economic imperative to advertise their products to a wide 
audience and the public health goal of reducing young people’s exposure to advertising. The 
lack of economic incentives for compliance has two important implications for food and 
alcohol advertising codes. First, it will be difficult to attract new members to codes, limiting 
the extent to which self-regulation can achieve broad coverage of the relevant industry. 
Second, it may be problematic to strengthen the standards contained in the codes, as this will 
simply increase the costs of compliance, placing participants at a greater disadvantage to non-
members. In these circumstances, there is a strong argument that some sort of external 
pressure will be required to deliver a more effective food advertising scheme.164 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter described the institutional determinants of successful self-regulation, and then 
evaluated the extent to which they apply in the food and alcohol industries. Increased 
consolidation and concentration in the food industry enhances its capacity to self-regulate, as 
does the creation of governance structures and processes that support voluntary initiatives. 
However, there are significant industry-level constraints on Australian food industry self-
regulation. First, the RCMI and QSRI do not apply to all actors in the food industry, 
particularly the large supermarkets that produce an increasing amount of advertising and have 
a growing influence on individual eating habits. Second, food advertising restrictions are 
based on a distinction between healthy and less healthy products, making regulation a 
complex exercise.  
A third concern is the AFGC’s administration of the food industry’s scheme. The AFGC is a 
relatively strong trade association, particularly in comparison to the alcohol industry bodies. 
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However, the absence of strong enforcement makes the RCMI and QSRI vulnerable to free-
riding, potentially undermining the codes’ continuing operation. Further, administration of 
the scheme is not independent, diminishing the scheme’s credibility and legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public. The governance processes attached to the ABAC speak to the dangers of 
industry-based administration, namely that self-regulation will never be perceived as credible 
by public health groups, even when industry attempts to open up the scheme to outside 
influences (which has not yet occurred with the RCMI and QSRI). 
The most fundamental problems with food industry self-regulation relate to the industry’s 
rationale for creating the scheme and the economic incentives for compliance. The drivers of 
food industry self-regulation are complex, but mainly appear to be addressing community and 
government concerns about food advertising and obesity, with the overall goal of protecting 
the industry’s reputation. Self-regulation may enhance the public image of food and alcohol 
companies, yet the benefits of a genuinely demanding scheme are unlikely to outweigh the 
costs of marketing restrictions that would affect companies’ ability to reach an adult 
audience. However, reducing children’s exposure necessarily implies constraints on adults’ 
exposure to advertising in programs with substantial child and adult audiences – something 
that is likely to be unacceptable to the food industry.   
The following chapter will build on this position by examining the steps taken by individual 
food and alcohol companies to implement advertising self-regulation, within the broader 
context of food and alcohol industry corporate social responsibility strategies.  Taken 
together, these chapters demonstrate that industry self-regulation is inherently limited as a 
public health measure, as the food industry has little incentive to accept significant 
restrictions on its advertising practices. This argument lays the foundation for government 
intervention in food industry self-regulation, which I argue is necessary if the scheme is to 
offer children adequate protection from unhealthy food advertising. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Corporate practices and the implementation of self-regulation  
The success of self-regulation depends upon whether companies internalise the social norms 
contained in voluntary codes.1 Accordingly, this chapter describes how and why food and 
alcohol companies comply with voluntary advertising initiatives (to the extent that they do). 
It draws upon interviews conducted with representatives of signatories to the RCMI, QSRI 
and ABAC. I interviewed spokespeople from six Australian food manufacturers (out of 17 
RCMI participants), one quick serve restaurant chain (out of seven QSRI participants) and 
four alcohol manufacturers (out of approximately 315 ABAC participants).2 Interviewees 
have been given pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. The chapter also analyses selected 
food and alcohol company corporate social responsibility documents, as well as findings 
from the independent review of food industry self-regulation, published in 2012.3 I describe 
how transnational food and alcohol companies have attempted to meet public demands for 
more responsible marketing practices through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
practices.4 Then I describe the reasons that Australian food and alcohol companies give for 
adopting advertising self-regulation (foreshadowed in Chapter 8) and how they integrated 
code requirements into their marketing activities.  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Christine Parker and Sharon Gilad, 'Internal Corporate Compliance Management 
Systems: Structure, Culture and Agency' in Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen (eds), Explaining 
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approximate figure of 300 members (email from Yvonne McClaren to Belinda Reeve, 18 July 2013). See also 
Brewers Association of Australia and New Zealand, About Us (undated)  <http://www.brewers.org.au/about-
us/>; DSICA, Members of DSICA (2011)  <http://www.dsica.com.au/content/detail/members_of_dsica>.  
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Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes' (AGFC, October 2012) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
4 CSR involves firms’ recognition of their ethical, legal, social and environmental responsibilities to society in 
addition to their fiduciary duties to shareholders. See Lois Dorfman et al, 'Soda and Tobacco Industry Corporate 
Social Responsibility Campaigns: How Do They Compare?' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine e1001241, 1-2 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001241>. See also Archie B 
Carroll, 'A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance' (1979) 4(4) The Academy of 
Management Review 497; Sun Young Lee and Craig E Carroll, 'The Emergence, Variation and Evolution of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Public Sphere, 1980-2004: The Exposure of Firms to Public Debate' 
(2011) 104(1) Journal of Business Ethics 115. 
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I present the paradox that some companies are adhering tightly to voluntary initiatives, yet 
self-regulation has had little impact on children’s overall exposure to food and alcohol 
advertising. One explanation for the codes’ lack of impact lies in their weak substantive 
standards. While this is not fatal to the success of self-regulation, I conclude that food 
companies have few incentives to adopt the more demanding restrictions that could 
significantly improve the food marketing environment. 
1. Corporate social responsibility in the transnational food and alcohol industries 
Big Food faces increasing pressure from consumers and public health advocates troubled by 
rising rates of obesity, as well as the threat of legislative measures such as food taxes, 
advertising bans and mandatory product labelling.5 In response to these pressures, large food 
companies began introducing CSR measures from the late 1990s, with these policies 
becoming increasingly sophisticated as concerns about obesity rose.6 Transnational firms 
such as Nestlé, Kellogg’s and McDonald’s have implemented multi-pronged strategies to 
develop and market healthier products, operating alongside more traditional labour, 
environment and sustainability programs.7  
Big Food has supplemented company-level strategies with national and regional advertising 
pledges, public-private partnerships and other voluntary initiatives with obesity prevention 
objectives.8 For example, the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA) brings 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Gary Sacks, 'Denmark Scraps Fat Tax in Another Big Food Victory', The Conversation (online) 17 
November 2012 <http://theconversation.com/denmark-scraps-fat-tax-in-another-big-food-victory-10689>; 
Conal Urquhart, 'Childhood Obesity: Jeremy Hunt Threatens Food Industry with Legislation', The Guardian 
(online) 6 January 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/jan/05/childhood-obesity-fatty-sugary-
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6 Consumers International, 'Left Wanting More: Food Company Policies on Marketing to Children' (Consumers 
International, March 2009) 8 <http://www.consumersinternational.org/news-and-media/resource-zone/left-
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Lang, Geof Rayner and Elizabeth Kaelin, The Food Industry, Diet, Physical Activity and Health: A Review of 
Reported Commitments and Practice of 25 of the World's Largest Food Companies (March 2006) Centre for 
Food Policy, City University <http://www.city.ac.uk/arts-social-sciences/sociology/research/centre-for-food-
policy/publications>. 
7 See, e.g., Dorfman et al, above n 4; Derek Yach et al, 'The Role and Challenges of the Food Industry in 
Addressing Chronic Disease' (2010) 6 Globalisation and Health 10 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-6-10.pdf>; Tara Acharya et al, 'The Current and Future 
Role of the Food Industry in the Prevention and Control of Chronic Diseases: The Case of PepsiCo' in David 
Stuckler and Karen Siegal (eds), Sick Societies: Responding to the Global Challenges of Chronic Disease 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) 187; Michele Simon, 'PepsiCo and Public Health: Is the Nation's Largest Food 
Company a Model of Corporate Responsibility or Master of Public Relations?' (2012) 15 CUNY Law Review 
101.  
8 See, e.g., Epode European Network, Tackling Obesity and Non-Communicable Diseases (undated) 
<http://www.epode-european-network.com/en/background/tackling-obesity-and-ncds.html>; Vivica I Kraak and 
Mary Story, 'A Public Health Perspective on Healthy Lifestyles and Public-Private Partnerships for Global 
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together multinational food and beverage companies to make progress towards WHO’s 
Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health.9 It has commitments on product 
reformulation; providing nutrition information to consumers; globally extending initiatives on 
responsible advertising to children; raising awareness on the need for balanced diets and 
exercise; and creating public-private partnerships that support the Global Strategy.10  
The picture among RCMI and QSRI participants is much the same as it is internationally 
because the majority of signatories are subsidiaries, franchisees or the Australian arm of a 
larger multinational company. Participants’ parent companies comprise some of the world’s 
largest and best-known food and beverage manufacturers and quick service restaurants, 
including The Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo, Kraft, Kellogg’s, Nestlé, Unilever and 
McDonald’s. As with their parent companies, signatories have adopted complex CSR 
strategies that include responsible marketing policies, product reformulation and nutrition 
information requirements. By way of example, Box 2 summarises the Nutrition Policy of 
Fonterra, a global, cooperatively-owned company that produces milk and dairy products, and 
participates in the RCMI.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Childhood Obesity Prevention' (2010) 110(2) Journal of the American Dietetic Association 192; C Hawkes and 
T Lobstein, 'Regulating the Commercial Promotion of Food to Children: A Survey of Actions Worldwide' 
(2011) 6(2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity 83. 
9 International Food and Beverage Alliance, Our Commitments (undated) <https://www.ifballiance.org/our-
commitments.html>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Fonterra, Company Overview (2013) <http://www.fonterra.com/global/en/About/Company+Overview>. 
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Box 2. Fonterra Brands Nutrition Policy 
Product Composition • Use minimum amounts of sugar and salt in all products without affecting 
taste and safety. 
• Evaluate fat levels in all products, appropriate for the nutritional status 
and age of the target consumer. 
Marketing practices  • Market foods in the context of a healthy lifestyle that includes a healthy 
eating plan and regular physical activity. 
• Act responsibly when marketing products for children. 
Consumer 
information/labelling 
• Help consumers to make informed product choices by providing 
information on labels that is easy to read and understand. 
• Ensure nutrition and health messages are an accurate assessment of the 
weight of scientific evidence. 
Research and innovation • Develop a portfolio of food products that are healthy and nutritious.  
• Support research into nutritional science for product innovation. 
• Ensure all claims are scientifically substantiated. 
Regulations • Actively work with key stakeholders to help develop food regulations 
• Ensure compliance with existing national regulations, food and nutrition 
policies and guidelines. 
Employees/lifestyle 
action 
• Provide a workplace environment that encourages healthy choices. 
• Establish and promote workplace schemes that encourage health and 
fitness among employees and families. 
 
To support their CSR programs, RCMI and QSRI signatories participate in a range of 
voluntary initiatives. In addition to advertising pledges, these include the Australian division 
of the World Action on Salt and Health (AWASH),12 the Food and Health Dialogue13 and the 
Daily Intake Guide Labelling scheme.14 There are close connections between the national and 
international activities of Big Food, with national programs often forming one component of 
companies’ global CSR programs. For example, McDonald’s cites the QSRI as an example 
of the company implementing its internal guidelines on marketing to children on a worldwide 
basis. The McDonald’s corporate website’s page on ‘sustainability’ states that McDonald’s 
Australia ‘took a leadership role in the initiation, development and introduction’ of the 
QSRI’.15 Accordingly, the RCMI and QSRI need to be considered within the context of food 
industry global governance efforts.16 
                                                 
12 AWASH - Australian Division of World Action on Salt and Health, Drop The Salt! Campaign (undated) 
<http://www.awash.org.au/drop-the-salt-campaign/>. 
13 Department of Health and Aging, Welcome to the Food and Health Dialogue Website (23 May 2012) 
Australian Government <http://www.foodhealthdialogue.gov.au/internet/foodandhealth/publishing.nsf>. 
14 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Daily Intake Guide: Healthy Eating Made Easy (2011) 
<http://www.mydailyintake.net/>. 
15 McDonald’s Leading by Example Global Advertising Campaigns (2013) 
<http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/sustainability/library/best_practices/nutrition_and_well_being/leading_
by_example.html>. 
16 See also David Vogel, 'Private Global Business Regulation' (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political Science 
261. 
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Alcohol manufacturers have also created complex CSR strategies in response to public health 
concerns.17 In 2005, 13 out of 24 global alcohol corporations had CSR policies or social 
reports on their websites,18 although the quality of CSR information varied significantly 
between these firms.19  Alcohol company strategies acknowledge the health risks of alcohol 
misuse, while promoting the benefits of moderate consumption and advocating for 
responsible drinking.20 These programs also include philanthropy; partnering with 
government, the police and retailers in responsible drinking campaigns; product 
reformulation; responsible marketing policies; and disseminating information to consumers.21  
Australian alcohol manufacturers take a similar approach, given that many local wine, spirit 
and beer manufacturers are owned by larger international companies.22 For example, Lion is 
an Australian food and beverage company that produces dairy products and both alcoholic 
and non-alcoholic drinks.23 It is owned by Kirin Holdings, a large Japanese company that 
originally operated as a brewery.24 Since it merged with National Foods in 2009, Lion is also 
a signatory to the RCMI.25 The Lion 2011 Sustainability Report sets out the company’s 
approach to ‘growing sociability and wellbeing’.26 Under the heading ‘sustainable products’, 
the company lists product development and reformulation, including the expansion of its 
alcoholic beverage range to include lower and no-alcohol beverages.27  The report also 
stresses the importance of responsible marketing, as well as providing consumers with 
information to enable them to make ‘healthy dietary and lifestyle choices’.28 Finally, 
                                                 
17 Sally Casswell, 'Alcohol Industry and Alcohol Policy - The Challenge Ahead' (2009) 3(Suppl 1) Addiction 3. 
18 L Hill, 'The Alcohol Industry' in Kris Heggenhougen and Stella Quah (eds), International Encyclopaedia of 
Public Health (Academic Press, 2008) 124, cited in Thomas Barbor et al, Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2010) 333. 
19 Peter Jones David Hillier and Daphne Comfort, 'That's the Spirit: Exploring the Approach of the World's 
Leading Spirits' Producers to Corporate Social Responsibility' (2013) 13 Journal of Public Affairs 3; Peter 
Jones, David Hiller and Daphne Comfort, 'The Leading Spirits and Beer Companies and Corporate Social 
Responsibility' (2013) 13(3) Corporate Governance 249. 
20 Jones, Hillier and Comfort, 'That's the Spirit: Exploring the Approach of the World's Leading Spirits' 
Producers to Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 7; Jones, Hillier and Comfort, 'The Leading Spirits 
and Beer Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 252-253. See also Barbor et al, above n 
18, 233. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Chapter 8, above. 
23 Lion, Company (2013) <http://lionco.com/company/>. 
24 Kirin Holdings, Corporate Profile (2013) <http://www.kirinholdings.co.jp/english/company/index.html>. 
25 Lion, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative Company Action Plan (18 June 2012) Australian Food 
and Grocery Council <http://afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/company-action-
plans.html>; Lion, Our History (2013) <http://lionco.com/company/our-history/>. 
26 Lion, 2011 Sustainability Report (2011) <http://www.lionco.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/LionSR2011.pdf>.  
27 Ibid 38-40.  
28 Ibid 40. 
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consumer education measures contribute to the company’s attempt to ‘help shape a country’s 
eating and drinking culture’.29   
Industry-level initiatives complement individual alcohol companies’ CSR strategies. For 
example, the global alcohol industry has established ‘social aspects’ organisations in Europe, 
the US and emerging markets in Asia and Africa.30 The industry funds these organisations to 
promote responsible drinking messages and consumer education.31 The Australian equivalent 
is DrinkWise, described as an independent organisation ‘focused on promoting… a healthier 
and safer drinking culture in Australia’, but which has significant industry involvement in its 
funding and management.32 Public health researchers critique social aspects organisations for 
supporting policies that are ineffective in reducing underage drinking while hiding their real 
function, which is to influence political decision-making and public sentiment towards the 
industry.33 Health advocates remain deeply sceptical about the value of food and alcohol 
companies’ CSR strategies, as well as their role in chronic disease prevention more broadly.34 
Using advertising codes as an example, this chapter explores whether food and alcohol 
companies’ CSR activities can make a meaningful contribution to protecting children from 
marketing for unhealthy products. As a first step, I consider the reasons that Australian food 
and alcohol companies give for joining the RCMI, QSRI or ABAC. 
2. Food companies’ rationale for joining the RCMI and QSRI 
When explaining their reasons for adopting the Australian initiatives, interviewees made 
reference to their parent companies’ participation in other national or international self-
regulatory programs and private-public partnerships.35 Thus, their commitment to responsible 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Barbor et al, above n 18, 233; Peter Anderson, The Beverage Alcohol Industry's Social Aspects 
Organisations: A Public Health Warning (March 2003) Eurocare 
<http://eurocare.sydesy.com/resources/policy_issues/alcohol_beverage_industry/eurocare_papers>.  
31 Ibid. 
32 DrinkWise Australia, About (2012) <http://www.drinkwise.org.au/about/about-drinkwise/>. 
33 See, e.g., Hill, above n 18, 123; Wayne D Hall and Robin Room, 'Assessing the Wisdom of Funding 
DrinkWise' (2006) 185(11/12) Medical Journal of Australia 635; Peter G Miller et al, 'Health Experts Reject 
Industry-Backed Funding for Alcohol Research' (2009) 190(12) Medical Journal of Australia 713; Peter G 
Miller et al, 'Vested Interests in Addiction Research and Policy. Alcohol Industry Use of Social Aspect Public 
Relations Organisations Against Preventative Health Measures' (2011) 106(4) Addiction 1560. 
34 See, e.g., Kelly D Brownell and Kenneth E Warner, 'The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played 
Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar is Big Food?' (2009) 87(1) The Milbank Quarterly 259; Anna B Gilmore, 
Emily Savell and Jeff Collin, 'Public Health, Corporations and the New Responsibility Deal: Promoting 
Partnerships with Vectors of Disease?' (2011) 33(1) Journal of Public Health 2; David Stuckler and Marion 
Nestle, 'Big Food, Food Systems and Global Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>. 
35 See also Tymms, above n 3, 34.  
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marketing has its origins in the international environment in which food companies operate. 
The Corporate Communications Manager at Sugartec said that:  
Sugartec… [has] major commitments… around the world in regards to our products. A part of that is 
[joining] self-regulatory pledges and working with advertising commitments….  Sugartec had already 
become a signatory of the EU Pledge and a participant to the Canadian pledge, so it was consistent with 
[Sugartec’s] international position… to be a member of an Australian pledge… 
Nine RCMI signatories are members of the IFBA. Ten RCMI/QSRI parent companies are 
signatories to the US Children’s Food and Beverage Initiative (CFBAI), which is similar to 
the RCMI and QSRI.36 Thus, for many companies, ratification of the Australian initiatives 
reflects the culture and policy position taken by the global parent company.37 Participants in 
the independent review of the codes said that the passing of WHO’s recommendations on 
food marketing to children also prompted them to develop new marketing policies and 
healthier products.38  
All participants said that their companies joined self-regulatory initiatives because of a 
genuine desire to ‘do the right thing’. Four signatories told the independent reviewer that they 
were committed to improving the health and well-being of Australians.39 Three other 
companies referred to the importance of restricting advertising to children in light of their 
vulnerability to advertising and their difficulty in understanding complex messages about 
health and diet.40 Many of my interviewees said that their company prided itself on its good 
corporate citizenship and perceived itself as a leader in responsible marketing practices. 
Accordingly, adoption of the RCMI and QSRI aligned with the company’s core values and 
overall business approach.41 For example, a nutritionist at FoodCorp said that adoption of the 
RCMI accorded with fundamental principles underpinning the firms’ activities:  
                                                 
36 See the description of this code in Table 1, Chapter 1. See also, Better Business Bureau, Children’s Food and 
Beverage Advertising Initiative Program and Core Principles Statement (3rd ed, September 2010) Council of 
Better Business Bureaus <http://www.bbg.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-
initiative/info/#key%program>. See also Better Business Bureau, Company Pledges (2013) Council of Better 
Business Bureaus <http://www.bbb.org/us/children-food-beverage-advertising-initiative/2010-pledges/>. 
37 Tymms, above n 3, 34. 
38 Ibid. See also Consumers International, above n 6, 8; World Health Organisations, 'Set of Recommendations 
on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children' (World Health Organisation, 2010) 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/recsmarketing/en/>. 
39 Tymms, above n 3, 34. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Vogel, 'Private Global Business Regulation', above n 16, 268-269; David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: 
The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Brookings Institution Press, 2006) ch 2; Simon 
Zadeck 'The Path to Corporate Responsibility' in Walther Ch Zimmerli, Claus Richter and Markus Holzinger 
(eds), Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance (Springer, 2007) 159. 
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…FoodCorp has a set of values that we run our business by… Part of that value set is being open and 
honest and conducting business in an ethical way, so definitely [the RCMI] would be aligned to our 
business values. 
Companies were also alert to community, public health and government concerns about food 
advertising and childhood obesity. Signatories were all large, high profile companies, with a 
significant investment in the reputation of their brands. Since these brands were highly visible 
to the public, public criticism carried the risk of harm to their reputation and revenues.42 The 
participant from Sugartec said that the company had a duty to market its products in 
accordance with community expectations about responsible marketing. Further, it made sense 
from a long-term economic perspective: 
[I]f we’re out of step with what [consumers] believe to be responsible, they’ll tell us… they won’t buy 
our products or they’ll communicate back to us. And that should never be forgotten because 
fundamentally we exist to be in the business long-term. And if you’re doing something slick in the 
short-term, you’re certainly going to suffer in the long-term. So there’s a fundamental business 
principle involved in getting this right. 
For most participants, the codes served as a communications tool that helped them manage 
their relationship with consumers, public health actors and government, thereby improving 
company image and reputation.43 Participants to the independent review said that industry 
self-regulation also helped to avoid government regulation that would inevitably restrict 
competition and innovation.44 The Public Affairs Manager at Fast-Food Global said that ‘… 
the… industry knows that if we don’t get involved and regulate ourselves we open ourselves 
up to being regulated by the government…’ However, while participants referred to the idea 
of deflecting government regulation, consumer concerns seemed a much stronger motivator 
for companies’ adoption of the codes.  
It is easy to assume that food companies simply act as ‘amoral calculators,’ and adopt self-
regulation purely for instrumental reasons, i.e. to increase their profitability or to forestall 
government regulation.45 However, pressures from consumers, government and public health 
groups created an environment where companies came to view responsible marketing as a 
                                                 
42 See Lauren B Edelman, 'Legal Environments and Organisational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process 
in the American Workplace' (1990) 95(6) The American Journal of Sociology 1401.  
43 See also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 'Corporate Responsibility: Private 
Initiatives and Public Goals' (OECD, 2001) 18 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/>. 
44 Tymms , above n 3, 35. 
45 See Robert A Kagan and John T Scholz, 'The ''Criminology of the Corporation'' and Regulatory Enforcement 
Strategies' in Keith Hawkins and John M Thomas (eds), Enforcing Regulation (Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984) 67. 
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legitimate and appropriate part of good business practices. Accordingly, my interviewees 
discussed closely related ethical and economic reasons for adopting self-regulatory codes of 
conduct, suggesting a more nuanced basis for responsible marketing strategies.46 Further, the 
adoption of the codes cannot be considered an entirely ‘voluntary’ measure, but resulted 
partly from external forces operating on the industry, including consumer demands, the threat 
of government regulation and the stance of global parent companies.47 
Interviewees stressed the importance of a collective response to external stakeholder concerns 
if the industry was to improve its public image and reputation. For example, legal counsel 
from Fast-Food Global said that:  
It’s not going to make any difference to the way the industry’s run unless all of us agree that we’re all 
going to comply with the same standards…you’re not really responding to consumer sentiment if only 
one [company] of the entire industry is actually making an effort…. 
Respondents to the independent review said that the initiatives codified existing values and 
practices in the industry, but also added reporting requirements, external monitoring and 
penalties, making companies’ commitments more transparent and credible.48 Additionally, 
self-regulation was a mechanism for rolling out ‘best practice’ standards across the industry 
and ensuring that all companies adhered to the same responsible marketing principles.  
However, interviewees were concerned about whether other industry actors were joining and 
adhering to the codes. In the independent review, some companies said that other code 
signatories engaged in ‘creative compliance,’ i.e. exploiting loopholes in the scheme’s 
operation or doing just enough to implement a code.49 They asked these signatories to comply 
with the ‘spirit and intent’ of the initiatives rather than seeking ways to advertise to children 
that could be perceived as circumventing their objectives while technically within the terms 
of the codes.50 One company described a QSRI signatory using banner boards on the back of 
taxis and awnings covering large transport trucks to advertise in a way that appealed to 
children, despite the fact that the code covered outdoor billboards and posters.51 Signatories 
                                                 
46 See also Neil Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton and Robert A Kagan, 'Motivating Management: Corporate 
Compliance in Environmental Protection' (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 289, 312. 
47 Vogel, 'Private Global Business Regulation', above n 16, 265; Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, above n 43, 17; Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation 
in a Global Economy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). 
48 Tymms, above n 3, 34. 
49 Ibid 42. 
50 Ibid 34. 
51 Ibid 42. 
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were concerned that these forms of advertising reduced the scheme’s credibility. They were 
especially frustrating to those whose company action plans went beyond the minimum 
requirements of the codes.52 
Interviewees also felt that the industry’s reputation was being challenged by the irresponsible 
behaviour of companies that were not signatories to the initiatives.53 The Corporate Affairs 
Manager at Snack Co said that smaller companies had less economic incentive to regulate 
their advertising practices than large companies, or the expertise and resources to do so: 
… it’s like any kind of regulation with small business, they potentially don’t have the resources that the 
larger companies have to bring across it… I think it creates a bit of an uneven playing field just because 
bigger companies tend to have the resources and the knowledge, whereas the smaller companies… a lot 
of them don’t even know what the laws are sometimes. 
Interviewees’ concern with other companies’ behaviour suggests that a ‘community of shared 
fate’ operated within the food industry, i.e., any high-profile incident of irresponsible 
marketing had the potential to affect the reputation of the entire industry.54 Thus, self-
regulation enabled companies to police each other’s behaviour, ensuring that other actors did 
not undermine the industry’s credibility in the eyes of consumers. However, Chapter 8 
described how both codes have struggled to recruit new participants. This ‘points to the 
challenge of imposing standardised and restrictive conditions on business activities that seek 
to limit competition in such a fiercely competitive space’.55 Yet interviewees concerns 
suggest that the AFGC must broaden the scheme’s membership if it is to be effective in 
uniformly improving industry standards of marketing. 
3. Alcohol companies’ rationale for joining the ABAC Scheme  
As the ABAC Scheme commenced in 1997, it has been in operation much longer than the 
food industry codes.56 Accordingly, alcohol industry interviewees said that compliance with 
the ABAC was a taken-for-granted part of good corporate practices, with one participant 
describing the code as ‘a fundamental mechanic in the way we do businness’. Alcohol 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Joseph Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island 
(1994); Neil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical Industry: Assessing Responsible 
Care' (1995) 17(1) Law & Policy 57, 64. 
55 Tymms, above n 3, 42. 
56 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The Development of Australia’s Alcohol Beverages Advertising (and 
Packaging) Code (undated) 
<http://www.dsica.com.au/content/detail/about_alcohol_alcohol_advertising_and_regulation>. 
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industry interviewees described a pre-existing commitment to responsible marketing 
practices that dictated their compliance with the ABAC, rather than vice versa. For example, 
the Corporate Affairs Manager at BevCo said that: 
… one of the core values of the company is around responsible drinking… And so with that comes… 
an absolute respect for managing the social impact of alcohol and delivering it in a positive and 
responsible way. So BevCo is not directed by ABAC… we live up to it because of our guiding 
corporate philosophy.  
Like food industry interviewees, alcohol industry interviewees said that their firms complied 
with the ABAC in response to government, public health and community scrutiny of industry 
practices. Interviewees said that because of the potential harms of alcohol misuse, the 
industry relied upon a social licence to operate. To retain the right to market its products to 
consumers, it had to meet community expectations about responsible marketing practices and 
avoid advertising that external stakeholders deemed unacceptable.57 Accordingly, the Brand 
Communications Manager at Drink Inc said that: 
… we as a business take our obligations very seriously regarding responsible conduct and… 
responsible marketing. We understand that we operate with a social licence and that how we 
communicate and how [we] market our products is very much with a certain expectation from the 
community.  
Alcohol companies were responsive to consumer sentiment in the same manner as food 
companies, but the threat of government regulation seemed more salient in the alcohol 
industry. The interviewee from BevCo felt that irresponsible marketing could ‘limit the 
potential of the industry to communicate about its brand’, i.e. result in more stringent controls 
on alcohol marketing. One participant described the industry as operating in a ‘politically 
hostile’ environment, and another said that there was ‘an air of inevitability’ about 
government regulation of alcohol advertising.  
Several alcohol company representatives also discussed the recent review of food labelling 
law and policy.58 Following this review the Federal government expressed support for 
mandatory product labelling that warned about the risks of drinking alcohol while pregnant, 
                                                 
57 See Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, 'Social License and Environmental 
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance' (2004) 29(2) Law & Social Inquiry 307, 308.   
58 Neal Blewett et al, 'Labelling Logic: Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy' (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011) 
<http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/labelling-logic>. 
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as well as displaying energy content on alcohol beverage labels.59 For some participants, this 
implied that the regulation of alcohol advertising could be next on the government’s agenda. 
However, the participant from Drink Inc suggested that government sentiment was often 
confused with that of the anti-alcohol lobby, when in fact the Federal government took a 
positive view of the ABAC. Two alcohol industry participants felt that anti-alcohol lobby 
group pressure had increased in recent years. Thus, companies risked criticism from vocal 
advocacy groups should they fail to maintain responsible marketing practices. The 
interviewee from BevCo drew a connection between the activities of anti-alcohol groups and 
government regulation: 
I think if [we] go back in time… we can look at liquor marketing in the ‘60s and ‘70s. That type of 
behaviour wouldn’t be considered today, and if somehow it found its way into the public space there 
would be a very noisy and active lobby group looking for further tightening of regulations on liquor. 
Interviewees also pointed to the fact that governments and advocacy groups drew connections 
between the alcohol and tobacco industries and their products.60 Interviewees distinguished 
alcohol from tobacco products on the basis that the harms caused by alcohol were different in 
nature (and significantly less) than those caused by smoking.61 However, some participants 
were concerned that the alcohol industry would be ‘demonised’ in the same manner as the 
tobacco industry. For example, a Marketing Manager at AlcoBrands said that: 
… the industry compares itself to cigarettes and to tobacco, not because they want to, but because they 
see the trend… it’s easy and perhaps politically expedient to create alcohol as another social ill, and 
that then does have very quick and regulatory outcomes as a result...  
Despite the apparent value of a collective responsive to stakeholder concerns in the form of a 
self-regulatory code, interviewees felt that some sectors of the industry were less likely to 
comply with the ABAC than others. Several spokespeople from the wine and spirits sectors 
                                                 
59 Legislative and Governance Forum on Food Regulation (convening as the Australia and New Zealand Food 
Regulation Ministerial Council), Response to the Recommendations of Labelling Logic: Review of Food 
Labelling Law and Policy (2011) (10 December 2011) 28-32 Review of Food Labelling Law and Policy 
<http://www.foodlabellingreview.gov.au/internet/foodlabelling/publishing.nsf/content/home>; Foundation for 
Alcohol Research and Education, Alcohol Product Labelling (2011) <http://www.fare.org.au/2011/10/slider-
feature-2/>. 
60 See, e.g., Laura Bond, Mike Daube and Tanya Chikritzhs, 'Selling Addictions: Similarities in Approaches 
Between Big Tobacco and Big Booze' (2010) 3(6) Australasian Medical Journal 326; Mike Daube, 'Alcohol 
and Tobacco ' (2012) 36(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 108. 
61 While cigarette smoking is always harmful, alcohol can be consumed in small quantities with little risk to 
health. Moderate alcohol usage may also have cardiovascular benefits for middle-aged drinkers. See the 
discussion in Chapter 11. See, e.g., Arthur L Klatsy and Natalia Udaltsova, 'Alcohol Drinking and Total 
Mortality Risk' (2007) 17(5) Annals of Epidemiology S63; National Health and Medical Research Council, 
'Australian Guidelines to Reduce Health Risks from Drinking Alcohol' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 39  
<http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/ds10> . 
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said that breweries were less likely to market responsibly than other alcohol manufacturers.62 
Smaller companies were also less likely to self-regulate because they had a greater interest in 
short-term profits than larger companies.  The interviewee from BevCo said that one of the 
benefits of self-regulation lay in ensuring that smaller companies matched the ethical 
advertising practices of larger companies: 
… not everyone would have a standard like BevCo; that part of the company’s absolute DNA is 
fostering social responsibility. There are a lot of smaller players out there that would be more focused 
on the short-term commercial gain and something like ABAC means that those guys have to play at 
least to a minimum standard.  
The alcohol industry also faced the problem that new groups were undertaking alcohol 
advertising, namely large food and alcohol retailers.63 Although signatories to the ABAC 
demonstrated high levels of compliance with its terms, the fact that these new advertisers 
were not signatories to the scheme potentially undermined its coverage. The participant from 
Drink Inc discussed both these points: 
The other thing is that currently the major supermarket chains, they are increasingly producing their 
own alcohol brands… they’re not signatories to the ABAC Scheme… [the scheme] represents the 
larger part of all producers and brands, but as smaller players in beer and wine…[enter] into the 
market, and also the chains start to release their own [alcohol beverage] brands, that might start to be 
diluted.  
4. Corporate compliance practices in the food industry  
If companies are to institutionalise responsible business practices, self-regulation must be 
integrated into firms’ decision-making structures and systems, as well as their corporate 
culture and every-day practices.64 This entails creating internal codes of conduct and 
specialist business units to manage self-regulation, educating and training staff in code 
requirements, monitoring and enforcing compliance and permitting external reviews of the 
                                                 
62 See also Simone Pettigrew et al, 'The Extent and Nature of Alcohol Advertising on Australian Television' 
(2012) 31(6) Drug and Alcohol Review 797. 
63 See Evan Jones, 'Liquor Retailing and the Woolworths/Coles Juggernaut' (2005) 55 Journal of Australian 
Political Economy 1; Geoffrey Munro, 'Advertising Alcohol: When the Best Isn't Good Enough' (2006) 4(2) Of 
Substance 12. Although note that Woolworths has recently joined the ABAC Scheme, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
64 See, e.g., Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 1; Parker and Gilad, above n 1; Neil Gunningham and 
Darren Sinclair, Leaders and Laggards: Next-Generation Environmental Regulation (GreanLeaf Publishing, 
2002) ch 7; Patrick E Murphy et al, Ethical Marketing (Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005) ch 7; S Prakash Sethi and 
Olga Emelianova, 'A Failed Strategy of Using Voluntary Codes of Conduct by the Global Mining Industry' 
(2006) 6(3) Corporate Governance 226, 234; Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, 'Corporate 
Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?' (2009) 41(3) Administration and Society 3. 
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system.65 The RCMI and QSRI do not explicitly require that companies implement internal 
compliance systems,66 but all participants had created internal controls on their marketing 
practices as one component of their CSR strategies.67  Interviewees said that because food 
marketing is highly regulated,68 they had internal processes for regulating advertising prior to 
the adoption of the RCMI or QSRI. Consequently, joining the codes did not mean that 
companies had to create fundamentally new compliance policies or practices. Many 
participants said that they simply applied existing processes to a new set of regulatory 
considerations. For example, the Sustainability Manager at Convenience Foods said that: 
… because of the nature of the processes we already had built in the business, self-regulation…[has] 
just been another part of our already-built review process.  
An additional consideration is that many signatory companies do not advertise to children, as 
defined by the terms of the two initiatives. For example, nine RCMI signatories reported that 
they did not advertise to children during 2009.69 Thus, for many companies, adoption of the 
codes did not lead to significant changes in their marketing practices. However, some 
interviewees reported modifying or tightening internal systems to ensure on-going 
compliance with the initiatives. These measures included modifying internal advertising 
codes of conduct; training company employees and external marketing partners; changes to 
screening or review processes for marketing material; senior management involvement and/or 
oversight; and reporting on compliance. 
The RCMI and QSRI require companies to create a company action plan, which operates as a 
publicly available document describing how participants will meet the codes’ requirements.70 
                                                 
65 Ibid.  
66 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Guidelines for Developing Effective Voluntary 
Industry Codes of Conduct' (Commonwealth of Australia, July 2011) 10 
<http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/658186>. 
67 See also the measures described in companies’ annual reports to the AFGC. Australian Food and Grocery 
Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance Report (2011) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian Food 
and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report (2011) <http://www.afgc.org.au/component/content/article/15-
industry-codes/1218-qsr-initiative-reports.html>. 
68 See Chapter 2 for a description of the regulatory requirements that apply to food marketing and labelling. See, 
e.g., Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code (at 10 July 2013) std 
1.2.7. (which sets out requirements for health and nutrition claims on food labelling). 
69 As compiled from signatory companies’ 2009 company action plan reports, available from: Australian Food 
and Grocery Council, RCMI Reports (2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>.  
70 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food 
and Beverage Industry (March 2011) 2 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi.html>; Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
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Companies also undertook additional policy development processes upon joining the 
initiatives, including formalising pre-existing commitments on advertising to children and 
inserting self-regulatory requirements into internal codes of conduct. For Sugartec, the policy 
development process involved checking the alignment of the RCMI with the global parent 
company’s marketing principles and other self-regulatory commitments. The company’s 
representative described these steps as: 
… the international senior management, working with our area management and our local managing 
director and myself to understand the alignment, [that is] the first stage. [Is the RCMI] consistent with 
the Sugartec principles… our guiding framework being the [IFBA], and also our company values… our 
first step is to ensure that the local pledge matches that.  
All participants said that implementation of the initiatives involved training and educating 
internal business units, particularly marketing staff. For example, the lawyer from Fast-Food 
Global said that: 
…. the legal team… consistently educate [staff] about the marketing functions, so national marketing 
will have presentations done to them several times a year, when new people come on board they have 
to do online training modules…. we’re constantly updating [staff members], and when the [QSRI] 
came in we had a huge education program around that to… launch it….  
Interviewees had comprehensive processes for screening marketing material to ensure 
regulatory compliance. Participants incorporated the codes into their quality management 
systems or internal auditing processes, or into comprehensive plans under which new 
products were developed and marketed.71 These processes typically involved members of 
corporate communications and/or the legal team reviewing marketing material against 
internal policies, relevant industry codes and legislative requirements. The interviewee from 
Food Corp described its screening procedures in some depth:  
… any piece of communication… [has] to go through an approval process, so they have to be approved 
by brands governance… around food regulatory compliance, so we would be looking at how that 
complies with the Food Standards Code, but we would also be looking at how it complies with 
our…policies, so RCMI would be part of that… legal signs off… particularly in terms of trade 
practices, and any other legal issues… Marketing signs off on it… [and] the innovation person would 
have to sign off on it with new product development. If it was a sales piece, sales would have to sign 
                                                                                                                                                        
Marketing to Children (June 2009) para 5.1. Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. 
71 Tymms, above n 3, 35. 
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off on it, and so that then goes through a documented approval process and then all those comments get 
lodged and recorded for…corporate memory and due diligence. 
Companies extended or modified their internal compliance systems in response to the 
initiatives. After adopting the RCMI, Sugartec tightened its screening processes by including 
checks on the placement of television advertisements prior to screening, followed by a post-
analysis of the audience share of programs where its advertisements appeared. Similarly, 
Fast-Food Global created a new review process that involved analysis by the corporate 
communications team of all marketing directed to children, as well as screening by the legal 
team at a much earlier stage in the advertising development process. The lawyer I 
interviewed from the company said that:  
… absolutely everything goes through legal regardless… [joining the QSRI] just meant that in our 
review of advertising we’re… considering more factors than we would’ve had to consider and it’s 
meant that we’ve had to get involved with the kids’ advertising a lot earlier, so back in the day [the 
media agency] would just come with a finished commercial and go, can you just check that that’s ok. 
Nowadays we want to get involved in the script and storyboard stage… we’ve just had the agency 
come to us with a rough concept… 
Studies suggest that the success of compliance systems relies upon top management 
commitment and cultural supports for self-regulation.72 This could involve senior managers 
setting compliance goals and reviewing performance, as well as communicating the key 
message of industry codes to employees within the company.73 Participants in this study said 
that senior managers played a critical role in ensuring compliance with voluntary codes and 
demonstrating support for self-regulation in various ways. Senior staff members from a 
number of companies participated in the working groups that developed the codes’ terms and 
principles. Senior managers also oversaw implementation of the RCMI/QSRI at a company 
level; for example, by giving final approval on advertising material directed to children. 
Other interviewees mentioned that senior managers would approve the company’s annual 
compliance report prior to its submission to the AFGC. Several participants stressed the 
importance of companies’ commitment to the RCMI flowing from the top of the company 
down to the marketing and category teams and media partners.74 The Corporate Affairs 
Manager at NutriCorp described the role of senior management in developing a culture of 
compliance within the organisation:  
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 1; Parker and Gilad, above n 1; Parker and Nielsen, above n 
64. 
73 Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 1, 52, ch 3. 
74 See also Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 1, 203-205; Parker and Gilad, above n 1, 183-184. 
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 …if your senior leaders aren’t engaged behind these processes, or just see them as…tick boxes then 
that will filter down into your people, but if your company really does have at the core of it that it 
wants to do the right thing, has a culture that encourages that, then generally you’re going to have that 
filter down from your leaders as well.  
RCMI and QSRI companies report on compliance with their company action plan on a yearly 
basis, with the AFGC summarising these reports in its own annual compliance reports.75 
Accordingly, companies produce a public account of their advertising practices and the steps 
taken to comply with the code, which renders them accountable to outside assessment.76 
Several participants said that annual reporting to the AFGC comprised a key change under 
the self-regulatory system, particularly given that none of the advertising industry’s voluntary 
codes required company reporting. According to the representative from Snack Co, annual 
reporting also allowed the company to compare its performance from one year to the next:  
… [the annual compliance report] makes us reflect on what we did the year before and it’s that 
reminder to senior management that this is another piece of brands governance that we need to keep in 
mind in the year forward. So if someone in senior management had just seen the RCMI report and they 
saw a piece of kid’s advertising a week or a month later, they’re probably likely to connect the two… a 
bit of a reminder of ‘oh yeah, did we check this’. 
The interviewee from Sugartec said that the importance of the reporting process lay in the 
fact that it enabled external scrutiny of company activities:  
… we could rely on our internal processes and our corporate social responsibility manual, and say look 
how well we’ve been behaving, this is what we do. But being forced to go through that, not only 
internal checking, but then to report on that, to show that is certainly a step forward…  it opens us [up] 
for people to look at what we do. And that’s a check and we welcome that. 
For these companies, adoption of the initiatives served as a ‘reminder’ about the importance 
of responsible marketing to children, as well as providing an opportunity to revise 
components of their marketing strategies.77 However, while the initiatives require companies 
to report publicly on compliance, Chapter 7 described how the lack of a mandatory reporting 
framework makes it difficult to compare companies’ commitments. Also, while some 
                                                 
75 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance 
Report, above n 67; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry 
Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, above n 67; 
Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 Compliance Report 
(2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids.html>. 
76 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 43, 54.  
77 Gunningham and colleagues similarly found that regulations and inspection together reminded electroplaters 
and chemical companies of their regulatory obligations and prompted them to review their compliance activities. 
See Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan, above n 46, 312. 
282 
 
participants commissioned external audits of their corporate social responsibility strategies, 
none sought independent assessment of their reporting under the RCMI and QSRI 
specifically.78  Some CSR scholars criticise measures such as external assurance statements, 
but they are thought to be important in enhancing the transparency and credibility of 
companies’ commitments and in giving them ‘teeth’.79 
While some companies simply codified existing good practice, others made significant 
changes to their marketing strategies upon joining the codes. According to the independent 
review, 74 per cent of signatories applied restrictions to advertising that were technically 
outside the terms of the initiatives, but which gave effect to their spirit and intent.80 Table 21 
summarises the ‘beyond compliance’ measures that QSRI and RCMI participants reported in 
2011. These included eliminating marketing directed to children for all brands and across all 
media, restricting advertising in media with an audience share of 30 or 35 per cent children 
rather than 50 per cent (which is the audience share requirement set by the RCMI’s core 
document)81 and developing new products to meet the codes’ nutritional criteria.82 These 
findings suggest that in some cases the codes resulted in an actual shift in marketing 
practices, as well as modifications to systems for managing and reviewing marketing 
material. Give that these measures are not directly related to the terms of the initiatives, an 
alternative explanation is that companies’ responses to external pressures generated both 
changes in food marketing and self-regulatory commitments.83 In other words, the codes 
themselves did not prompt these marketing changes, or reductions in advertising directed to 
children. This conclusion is supported by research showing that reductions in unhealthy food 
advertising to children pre-dated the introduction of the RCMI (as discussed in Chapter 4).84 
                                                 
78  See also Simon, above n 7, 103, where the author critiques the lack of transparency in PepsiCo’s CSR 
initiatives, including the fact that they are not subject to external monitoring and evaluation. 
79 See Gunningham above n 54, 71-74; Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 64, 148; Matthew Potoski and Aseem 
Prakash, 'Green Clubs and Voluntary Compliance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance' (2005) 49(2) 
American Journal of Political Science 235; Carol A Adams and Ambika Zutshi, 'Corporate Disclosure and 
Auditing' in Rob Harrison, Terry Newholm and Deidre Shaw (eds), The Ethical Consumer (Sage, 2nd ed, 2006) 
207; Michael John Jones and Jill Frances Solomon, 'Social and Environmental Report Assurance: Some 
Interview Evidence' (2010) 34(1) Accounting Forum 20. 
80 Tymms, above n 3, 35-36. 
81 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative, above n 70, 1. 
82 Tymms, above n 3, 35. See also Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: 
Responsible or Responsive?' (2010) 6(2 Part 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity e390, e396 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>.  The authors concluded that RCMI 
participants’ reductions in unhealthy food marketing following the introduction of the initiative went beyond 
what was required by its terms. 
83 King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' above n 
82, e111. 
84 Ibid. 
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Table 21. RCMI and QSRI participants’ activities to encourage healthy eating85*  
* Note that not all participants reported on measures to improve the marketing environment in addition to those 
required by the RCMI and QSRI. 
 
 
                                                 
85 See Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2011 Compliance 
Report, above n 67. 
Company Reported changes  
RCMI participants 
Campbell Arnott’s Nutrition label warning that Tiny Teddy biscuits should only be eaten occasionally. 
Reformulation of the Tiny Teddy range with no artificial flavours, colours or 
preservatives. 
Coca-Cola Adopted an audience threshold of >35% children to determine whether media are 
directed to children.  
Fonterra A promotion encouraging parents’ awareness of the nutritional value of eating dairy 
products, which included television advertisements, a magazine advertorial, point-
of-sale material and a competition. 
Fonterra Free calendar promoting Calci-Yum yoghurt included in a national newspaper. 
Ferrero Adopted an audience threshold of >35% children to determine whether media are 
directed to children. 
Kellogg’s Adopted an audience threshold of >35% children to determine whether media are 
directed to children. 
Kraft Food Participates in the ‘Be Treatwise’ voluntary nutrition labelling scheme for 
confectionery products.  
Lion Directs all marketing activity to adults, despite developing products to be eaten by 
children. 
Mars Participates in the Daily Intake Guide labelling scheme. 
Reduced portion sizes of its chocolate bars to 1,050kj or 420kj and reduced the 
saturated fat content of Mars Bars (by 22%) and Milky War Bars (19%). 
Nestlé/Cereal Partners Adopted an audience threshold of >25% children to determine whether media are 
directed to children, and defined children as individuals under the age of 14. 
Patties Developed a range of products lower in saturated fat and sodium for sales in 
schools.  
QSRI participants 
Hungry Jack’s  Redesigned its website to provide complete menu information, ingredient and 
allergen information, as well as providing in store-nutrition information. 
Reformulated products to reduce saturated fat, sugar and sodium, including in frying 
oil, buns, chicken nuggets, chicken, cheese and bacon. 
McDonald’s  Reductions in sugar and sodium across the menu, including a 30% reduction in 
sodium in Chicken Crispy Strips. 
Oporto Updated all packaging to include nutrition information. 
Yum! Restaurants 
International (KFC 
and Pizza Hut) 
No longer provides toys with any KFC meal. 
Introduction of a salad into the KFC product range and plans for a children’s meal 
option.  
Reformulation of KFC and Pizza Hut products to reduce their sodium content. 
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Participants described some initial ‘teething problems’ in institutionalising code 
requirements.1 In the independent review, four RCMI signatories reported some tension 
between corporate affairs and the business’s marketing team in relation to code 
implementation.2 One interviewee said that there was an inherent conflict between regulatory 
compliance and marketers’ tendency to ‘push the envelope’ in an attempt to create new and 
innovative forms of promotion. This observation points to the fact that compliance can be 
undermined by the conflicting goals of different corporate units or by fragmented decision-
making within organisational bureaucracies, despite the existence of corporate compliance 
processes.3 
Another problem reported by the independent review and evident in my own research was the 
lack of clarity in relation to the meaning of key terms and definitions in the codes. 
Participants noted that the RCMI and QSRI were not prescriptive legislation, but a flexible, 
principles-based form of regulation with loosely defined terms. One of the benefits of the 
codes was that their meaning developed over time as the ASB changed its interpretation of 
particular terms, and as the AFGC amended the core code documents. However, this created 
difficulties for participants in determining whether advertising activity complied with the 
requirements of the initiatives. For example, two RCMI participants said that they had trouble 
deciding which nutrient criteria to use for identifying appropriate products that could be 
advertised to children. Other signatories had trouble determining whether a particular 
television program was ‘directed primarily to children’ for the purposes of the RCMI.4 Of 
particular concern were family movies that screened in the early evening and were watched 
by both parents and children. The participant from Sugartec described a complex procedure 
that the company used to determine whether it could advertise during these movies: 
… we’ll consider firstly the rating of the movie if we can get it, if it’s been screened before we’ll check 
audience share… we’ll look at the time slot to make sure that it’s not say an earlier movie like 5.30 or 
6.30... if it’s animated… 
                                                 
1 Tymms, above n 3, 36. 
2 Ibid 37. 
3 Parker, The Open Corporation, above n 1, 34. See also Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 31-33. 
4 Chapter 6 described how the RCMI determines the meaning of media ‘directed primarily to children’ 
according to different criteria (i.e. audience share, program classification and the creative content of the 
medium), so that the meaning of this term may not be immediately apparent. 
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The independent reviewer reported that signatories called for clearer definition of other code 
terms, for example ‘physical activity’, ‘healthy lifestyles’ and ‘good dietary habits’.5 Twelve 
signatories suggested that the AFGC or the Advertising Standards Bureau produce guidelines 
on the interpretation of the codes, similar to the practice note that the Australian Association 
of National Advertisers provides for the Food and Beverages Advertising and Marketing 
Communications Code.6 Signatories sought explanatory notes in order to refine their own 
marketing behaviour, but also to modify the behaviour of other companies in order to achieve 
a consistent industry-wide approach.7 
Participants also had to manage the actions of external partners in the marketing process. 
Television networks awarded companies ‘bonus’ advertising spots that were not accounted 
for in signatories’ advertising schedules. Accordingly, there were several examples of 
advertisements airing in time slots that breached the codes.8 For this reason, many 
participants stressed the importance of briefing marketing and media buying agencies in the 
initiatives’ requirements.9 Signatories also devoted significant effort towards explaining to 
television networks the problems associated with granting bonus airtime for advertisements.10 
Several signatories requested that the Free TV Commercial Advice Division classify their 
advertisements with a ‘W’ rating (G rated but place with care). This rating warns television 
stations to adhere to detailed information about placement restrictions when airing an 
advertisement in programs that are likely to attract a large child audience.11 Sugartec’s 
representative described how he had taken steps to prevent accidental non-compliance during 
bonus air time slots: 
… we… prepared a letter… which was sent to all of the traffic managers on all of the networks… 
outlining the importance of what we’re doing with the pledge, and highlighting the issues that we have 
with the bonus spots and asking for their assistance in not doing this, and to acknowledge our letter in 
                                                 
5 Tymms, above n 3, 41. 
6 Ibid. See Australian Association of National Advertisers, Food and Beverages Advertising and Marketing 
Communications Code Practice Note (2013) <http://www.aana.com.au/pages/codes.html>. 
7 Ibid 41-42. 
8 See also Tymms, above n 3, 37; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing 
Initiative 2011 Compliance Report, above n 67, 16-22; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick 
Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance 
Report, above n 67, 7; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 
Compliance Report (2010), above n 75, 15, 17-18. 
9 Tymms, above n 3, 37. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. See Free TV Commercials Advice, Classification Handbook: An Overview of Classification Procedures 
Incorporating the A-Z Television Production Checklist (January 2010) 67 Commercials Advice Division 
<http://www.freetv.com.au/content_common/pg-cad-procedures-guide.seo>. 
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writing… So we’ve exerted as much influence as we can. We’ve changed the rating of the television 
commercials, we’ve explained in writing to these organisations please do not do this. 
Other participants relinquished their rights to bonus airtime, one across all television stations 
at all times, another on digital stations only, and a third during Friday and Saturday night 
times slots (i.e. family movie times).12 This step had significant financial implications for 
these companies, given that it is expensive to produce television commercials and airing them 
in bonus airtime slots is valuable to food companies.13 
5. Alcohol companies’ implementation of the ABAC  
Participants from the alcohol industry took similar steps to ensure compliance with 
advertising self-regulation, namely drafting corporate policies in accordance with the codes’ 
principles; training and educating employees and media agency staff; screening advertising 
material for compliance; and engaging senior management in compliance processes.  All 
participants said that their company integrated the ABAC standards into their marketing 
policies. For example, the representative from Drink Inc said that:  
….we have… internal policies and processes that cover our marketing activity and the ABAC code 
wording is embedded into those policies… the spirit and intent of the ABAC is very much central to all 
of our marketing and communication work that we do. 
Alcohol companies described how they educated team members in compliance with the 
ABAC. For example, AlcoBrands included a ‘responsibility module’ as part of its internal 
marketing training course that all employees were required to take. A representative from 
Liquor International said that the company trained its external media agency in the ABAC in 
some detail. One interviewee discussed how her company used ABAC Adjudication Panel 
decisions to educate its internal marketing team: 
We… educate our marketers on an on-going basis when new adjudications come out, so there was a 
recent one against Diageo’s latest ad… that was upheld and… given that was such a high-profile 
advertisement we chose to send that to the marketers so they could understand… the Panel’s opinion 
and… the outcome… So that kind of continual education… is pretty important. 
Like the food industry, alcohol industry companies had internal review processes to ensure 
compliance with the ABAC Scheme, typically involving staff from corporate relations and/or 
                                                 
12 Tymms, above n 3, 37. 
13 Ibid. 
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the legal team. The Marketing Manager from AlcoBrands described a ‘multi-layered approval 
process’ that potentially involved sign-off from the global parent company in America:  
… an assistant brand manager might develop something with an agency which is then approved by a 
brand manager, which then might go to a marketing director… it’ll go to country managers, and 
someone like myself that looks across the region. If we’re talking about very significant campaigns 
they’ll go to legal approval in America as well.  
Alcohol industry participants described senior managers as being involved in compliance 
practices in various ways. For example, the Managing Director of one company was Chair of 
an alcohol industry body, meaning that he was a member of the ABAC Management 
Committee. A representative of this company said that: 
…. even our most senior members of the business are incredibly aware of our obligations…in our 
marketing team… building a positive drinking culture is… part of the marketing strategy which has 
sign-off from our executive team and so they’re all fundamentally engaged behind that… I certainly 
know from my experience that I’ll have sales director come up to me and say, ‘oh I saw this in market, 
I don’t think that’s compliant…’ 
Alcohol companies are not required to report on compliance with the ABAC in the same way 
as food companies are in relation to the RCMI and QSRI, but the ABAC Scheme requires 
participants to submit their advertising to the Alcohol Advertising Pre-Vetting Service.14 A 
pre-vetter determines whether advertising complies with the Australian Association of 
National Advertiser’s Code of Ethics and the ABAC prior to the advertisement’s publication 
or screening. As with the AFGC’s monitoring of the RCMI, the pre-vetting service forms an 
external check on companies’ compliance with advertising self-regulatory instruments. 
However, interviewees varied in their opinions of the usefulness of this service. One said that 
his company had been in business for a long time, and had well-developed internal 
compliance processes that made external screening redundant. However, he also thought that 
pre-vetting could be useful for smaller companies or new entrants to the market. In discussing 
problems with implementing the ABAC, some participants said that the pre-vetters often 
differed in their interpretation of the code, creating a degree of inconsistency in the screening 
process. The representative from AlcoBrands described his frustration when one of the pre-
vetters rejected a large advertising campaign: 
                                                 
14 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures (5 December 2012) cl 5.1 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/rules-procedures/>. See Chapter 2 for further description of the AAPS. 
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…[t]he ad was rejected because one of the actors… was wearing a pair of sneakers. And the sneakers 
apparently meant that he was too young and it was going to appeal to children. So a global ad that was 
produced got rejected on the basis of someone wearing sneakers… it can be very subjective… That 
created a huge problem for us because suddenly we had no advertising campaign to go into Christmas 
with and we thought we had a very well-followed process…. 
Not all participants found pre-vetting to be useful in ensuring compliance. However, most 
interviewees saw it as a fundamental component of the ABAC Scheme and one that 
contributed to the scheme’s success in promoting responsible alcohol advertising. However, 
alcohol companies are not obliged to report publicly on their compliance with the ABAC 
Scheme,15 and in this respect it is less transparent than food industry self-regulation, 
particularly as the results of pre-vetting are not made public. 
6. Is industry self-regulation successful in changing the marketing environment? 
To summarise so far, representatives of food and alcohol companies said that adherence to 
self-regulation formed an integral part of their business model, and described internal 
processes and policies that reflected their companies’ commitment to compliance. Some food 
companies made significant changes to their marketing practices upon joining the RCMI and 
QSRI, going ‘beyond compliance’ with the codes in several cases. Food companies’ 
descriptions of compliance are supported by monitoring and review of the RCMI and QSRI, 
which also show high levels of adherence to the codes.16 Audits of other national and 
international pledges produce similar findings, including both ‘in-house’ analyses performed 
by industry-based administrative bodies and external assessments by professional auditing 
firms.17 For example, the Council of Better Business Bureaus annually assesses participants’ 
                                                 
15 See also Jones, Hillier and Comfort, 'Exploring the Approach of the World's Leading Spirits' Producers to 
Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 7; Jones, Hiller and Comfort, 'The Leading Spirits and Beer 
Companies and Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 254-255. 
16 See Tymms, above n 3; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 
2011 Compliance Report, above n 67; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Australian Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 2011 Compliance Report, 
above n 67; Australian Food and Grocery Council, Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative 2010 
Compliance Report (2010), above n 75;  Healthy Kids Association, Final Report on the Compliance of 
Signatories to the Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising to 
Children (October 2011) Australian Food and Grocery Council <http://www.afgc.org.au/tools-guides-.html>; 
Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
17 See, e.g., Christina Vladu, Rene Christensen and Adrian Pana, Monitoring the European Platform for Action 
on Diet, Physical Activity and Health Activities: Annual Report 2012 (2012) IBF International Consulting 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/key_documents/index_en.htm#anchor1_more>; 
Accenture, 2012 Compliance Monitoring Report for the International Food and Beverage Alliance on Global 
Advertising on Television, Print and Internet (December 2012) International Food and Beverage Alliance 
<https://www.ifballiance.org/Resources/Resources-2-continued.html>. 
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compliance with the US CFBAI, by monitoring media, reviewing participants’ compliance 
reports and investigating reported breaches.18 The 2011 report found ‘substantial’ levels of 
compliance, with a small number of breaches due to technical problems or third-party 
errors.19 Taken together, these reports suggest that the food industry is routinely meeting the 
requirements of its voluntary programs in a number of jurisdictions. 
In light of such findings, this thesis must reconcile two contradictory facts. On the one hand, 
the food companies I interviewed seemed genuine in wanting to improve their marketing 
practices, and took steps to do so. On the other, public health research finds that self-
regulation has not significantly reduced children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.20 
If companies are ethically committed to responsible marketing – and are following this 
through in their regulatory compliance and marketing practices – then why are advertising 
codes having little such effect on the marketing environment?  
One possible answer is that interviewees’ compliance practices are not representative of the 
food industry as a whole. I interviewed only a small number of code participants, 
representing a fraction of the food and alcohol companies in Australia. Further, it is likely 
that interviewees were companies with better advertising practices, as participants who 
viewed their organisation as a good corporate citizen were probably more willing to 
participate in the study. Participants were also very large companies with sufficient resources 
to secure compliance.21 Although many interviewees represent ‘best practice’ in the 
                                                 
18 See Elaine D Kolish and Magdalena Hernandez, 'The Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative: A 
Report on Compliance and Progress During 2011' (Council of Better Business Bureaus, 2012) 13 
<http://www.bbb.org/us/childrens-food-and-beverage-advertising-initiative/>. 
19 Ibid 14.  
20 See, e.g., King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' 
above n 82; Lana Hebden A et al, 'Advertising of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of 
Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) Medical Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case 
for Independent Monitoring of Food Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public 
Health Nutrition <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. See 
also Monique Potvin Kent, Lise Dubois and Alissa Wanless, 'Self-Regulation by Industry of Food Marketing is 
Having Little Impact During Children's Preferred Television' (2011) 6(5-6) International Journal of Paediatric 
Obesity 401; Jennifer L Harris et al, 'Redefining "Child-Directed Advertising" to Reduce Unhealthy Television 
Food Advertising' (2013) 44(4) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 358. On young people’s exposure to 
alcohol advertising, see Matthew V Winter, Robert J Donovan and Lynda J Fielder, 'Exposure of Children and 
Adolescents to Alcohol Advertising on Television in Australia' (2008) 69(5) Journal of Studies on Alcohol and 
Drugs 676; Lynda Fielder, Robert J Donovan and Robyn Ouschan, 'Exposure of Children and Adolescents to 
Alcohol Advertising on Australian Metropolitan Free-to-Air Television' (2009) 104(7) Addiction 1157. 
21 See Parker and Gilad, above n 1, 188. 
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implementation of voluntary codes, my research does not demonstrate the extent to which 
other food and alcohol companies adhere to similar standards.22  
A second point is that independent research finds much higher levels of non-compliance with 
food industry advertising codes than studies conducted by industry bodies or external audits 
commissioned by the food industry.23 One study of the Spanish code on food advertising to 
children found that almost half (49.3 per cent) of television advertisements from participating 
companies did not comply with the code.24 These and other findings directly contradict the 
food industry’s claims that companies are adhering closely to voluntary advertising codes. 
Research on compliance with the ABAC produces similar findings.25 For example, one study 
analysed alcohol advertising in 93 magazines popular with young people.26 It identified 142 
unique advertisements, 52 per cent of which breached the ABAC, including one-fifth (22 per 
cent) that had strong appeal to children (as assessed by the researchers).27 
A more fundamental explanation is that voluntary advertising codes contain very weak 
standards that place few demands on participants and can be easily circumvented.28 While 
some companies reported taking specific measures to improve their marketing practices in 
response to the RCMI and QSRI, it appears that overall the codes set a relatively low bar for 
compliance and did not require members to alter their marketing practices significantly. The 
codes simply formalised advertising practices that already existed among the most prominent 
companies, rather than creating new, more demanding standards. This is likely due to 
extensive consultation with the large industry players during the development of the codes.  
Independent research on other food industry initiatives reaches much the same conclusion: 
companies have made some modest, incremental progress in reducing advertising unhealthy 
food to children, but are falling far short of standards that would significantly reduce 
                                                 
22 For a similar criticism, see Kathy Chapman, Penny Nicholas and Rajah Supramaniam, 'How Much Food 
Advertising is There on Australian Television?' (2006) 21(3) Health Promotion International 172, 176. 
23 See, e.g., Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising Regulations in 
Australia' (2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846. 
24 M Mar Romero-Fernández, Migeul Ángel Royo-Bordonada and Fernando Rodríguez-Aralejo, 'Compliance 
with Self-Regulation of Television Food and Beverage Advertising Aimed at Children in Spain' (2009) 13(7) 
Public Health Nutrition 1013. 
25 See Fielder, Donovan and Ouschan, above n 105; Kati Donovan et al, 'Magazine Alcohol Advertising 
Compliance with the Australian Alcoholic Beverages Advertising Code' (2007) 26(1) Drug and Alcohol Review 
73. See also Sandra Jones and Robert Donovan, 'Self-Regulation of Alcohol Advertising: Is it Working for 
Australia?' (2002) 2(3) Journal of Public Affairs 153; Simone Pettigrew, Rebecca Johnson and Mike Daube, 
'Introducing and Applying a New Australian Alcohol Advertising Code' (2012) 13(1) Journal of Public Affairs 
72. 
26 Kati Donovan et al, above n 110. 
27 Ibid 77. 
28 Chapter 6 describes the many ‘escape clauses’ contained in the RCMI and QSRI. 
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children’s exposure to this form of promotion.29 For example, one independent assessment of 
the US CFBAI found that food advertising during children’s programming had declined from 
10.9 advertisements per hour in 2005 to 7.6 in 2009.30 However, foods and beverages were 
still some of the products most heavily advertised on television, meaning that children 
continued to see thousands of these advertisements each year.31 Further, the nutritional 
quality of products advertised remained heavily skewed towards foods high in calories and 
low in nutrients that children should eat only very occasionally.32 
My research presents a picture of companies carefully implementing voluntary codes that in 
practice do very little to improve the food marketing environment. This illustrates one of the 
fundamental problems with CSR – that companies may implement internal controls without 
achieving significant changes in corporate conduct.33 This occurs where there is a lack of 
specificity in management systems, ‘symbolic compliance’ or poor implementation, but also 
where CSR measures are not aimed at meaningful objectives.34 In these circumstances, 
companies are being held accountable for regulatory processes that do not achieve any 
substantive outcome.35  
Where industries create weak voluntary schemes they leave themselves open to the criticism 
that CSR is largely self-serving, i.e. it neutralises human rights, public health and 
environmental issues through the application of market-based techniques, while also blocking 
more effective and democratic forms of (government) regulation.36 In these circumstances 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Consumers International, above n 6; Lang, Rayner and Kaelin, above n 6; Dale Kunkel, Christopher 
McKinley and Paul Wright, 'The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation on the Nutritional Quality of Foods 
Advertised on Television to Children' (Children Now, December 2009) 
<http://www.childrennow.org/index.php/learn/advertising_obesity>; Vivica I Kraak et al, 'Industry Progress to 
Market a Healthful Diet to American Children and Adolescents' (2011) 41(3) American Journal of Preventive 
Medicine 322.  
30 Kunkel, McKinley and  Wright, above n 114, 15. 
31 Ibid 21-22. 
32 Ibid 22.  
33 Parker and Gilad, above n 1, 185; Lawrence A Cunningham 'The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to 
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills' (2003-2004) Journal of Corporate Law 267, 270; Christine Parker, 'Meta-
Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility' in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu 
and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 207. 
34 Cunningham, above n 118; Parker, 'Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social 
Responsibility', above n 118, 244. 
35 Parker, 'Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 118, 229-230. 
36 See the discussion in Chapter 3 about how regulatory studies ‘depoliticises’ public health, environmental and 
labour concerns. See Stepan Wood, 'Green Revolution or Greenwash? Voluntary Environmental Standards, 
Public Law and Private Authority in Canada' in Law Commission of Australia (ed), New Perspectives on the 
Public-Private Divide (UBC Press, 2003) 123; Ronen Shamir, 'Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility' (2004) 38(4) Law and Society 
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CSR may be damaging to public health. This is the case with tobacco industry strategies that 
aimed to improve companies’ image by promoting their philanthropy and youth anti-smoking 
programs, while also maintaining the social acceptability of smoking, obscuring poor 
environmental and labour practices and undermining tobacco control efforts.37 Thus, we need 
to be cautious about food and alcohol industry self-regulation that may do little more than 
protect the industry’s reputation and enhance its credibility in the eyes of consumers, but may 
also deflect government interest in regulation.38  
Studies of other industries (including forestry, mining, apparel and nano-technology) find that 
it is not uncommon for voluntary codes to set weak standards.39 In fact, codes may be easier 
to implement when they are largely ‘aspirational’ or require companies to do little more than 
comply with existing legal requirements.40 This is because the costs of compliance will be 
relatively low, which makes it easier to attract participants to the scheme. However, codes 
can also be used to ‘ratchet up’ regulatory requirements once they are in place, for example 
by replacing broad principles with defined targets and enforceable standards.41 Food industry 
self-regulation could achieve public health benefits in the same manner, i.e. the AFGC could 
revise the terms of the initiatives to require companies to further improve their marketing 
practices, so that the codes would make a more significant contribution to obesity prevention. 
There is some evidence that the food industry is willing to strengthen its voluntary initiatives 
in this manner. Chapter 6 described how the AFGC has closed off some of the loopholes in 
the RCMI and QSRI. In the US, the Council of Better Business Bureaus recently made 
                                                                                                                                                        
Review 635; Ronen Shamir, 'Capitalism, Governance and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social 
Responsibility' (2010) 6 Annual Review of Law of Social Science 531.  
37 N Hirschhorn, 'Corporate Social Responsibility and the Tobacco Industry: Hope or Hype?' (2004) 13(4) 
Tobacco Control 447, 452. See also Dorfman et al, above n 4; Laura E Tesler and Ruth E Malone, 'Corporate 
Philanthropy, Lobbying and Public Health Policy' (2008) 98(12) American Journal of Public Health 2123; 
Sungkyu, Lee, Pamela M Ling and Stanton A Glantz, 'The Vector of the Tobacco Epidemic: Tobacco Industry 
Practices in Low and Middle-Income Countries' (2012) 23(1) Cancer Causes Control 117. 
38 See also Lisa L Sharma, Stephen P Teret and Kelly D Brownell, 'The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: 
Standards to Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures' (2010) 100(2) American Journal of Public 
Health 240, 242. 
39 See, e.g., Sethi and Emelianova, above n 64; Margaret A Emmelhainz and Ronald J Adams, 'The Apparel 
Industry Response to "Sweatshop" Concerns: A Review and Analysis of Codes of Conduct' (1999) 35(3) The 
Journal of Supply Chain Management 51; Benjamin Cashore et al, 'Can Non-State Government 'Ratchet Up' 
Global Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector' (2007) 16(2) RECIEL 158; Diana M Bowman 
and Graeme A Hodge, 'Counting on Codes: An Examination of Transnational Codes as a Regulatory 
Governance Mechanism for Nanotechnologies' (2009) 3(2) Regulation and Governance 145. 
40 Cashore et al, above n 124, 163. 
41 Ibid. See also Gunningham and Sinclair, above n 64, 145-146; Sharma, Teret, and Brownell, above n 123, 
243; Bowman and Hodge, above n 124, 159; John Moffet, Francois Bregha and Mary Jane Middelkoop, 
'Responsible Care: A Case Study of a Voluntary Environmental Initiative' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary 
Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science 
and Environment, Carleton University 2004) 177, 179-180. 
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similar improvements to the equivalent initiative, including a more inclusive definition of 
child-targeted media, extension of the initiative to alternative forms of promotion, and the 
adoption of uniform nutrition criteria.42  
However, several factors suggest that the food industry is unlikely to introduce a more 
demanding scheme that significantly reduces children’s exposure to food advertising. First is 
the lack of consensus on the idea of responsible marketing to children. The industry 
maintains that the codes should apply to advertising that directly targets children.43 Yet public 
health researchers argue that a more fundamental problem is children’s exposure to large 
volumes of food advertising and a marketing environment that normalises routine 
consumption of unhealthy food.44 Similarly, the alcohol industry conceptualises alcohol abuse 
as a minority problem associated mainly with underage drinking and drink-driving; hence 
restrictions on depicting children in alcohol advertising or associating alcohol consumption 
with the operation of motor vehicles.45 However, this is a very narrow conception of 
irresponsible drinking, given evidence that alcohol misuse is a widespread problem that 
causes significant social and health harms.46 Further, it will not lead to more comprehensive 
restrictions that substantially reduce the amount of alcohol advertising viewed by young 
people. Thus, a key challenge to producing credible standards on food and alcohol 
advertising lies in these industries’ willingness to broaden their conception of responsible 
advertising in accordance with public health concerns. 
                                                 
42 See Kolish and Hernandez, above n 103. 
43 Ibid 3. 
44 See, e.g., Juliet B Schor and Margaret Ford, 'From Tastes Great to Cool: Children's Food Marketing and the 
Rise of the Symbolic' (2007) 35(1)The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 10; Jennifer L Harris et al, 'A Crisis 
in the Marketplace: How Food Marketing Contributes to Childhood Obesity and What Can be Done' (2009) 30 
Annual Review of Public Health 211; Lana Hebden, Lesley King and Bridget Kelly, 'Art of Persuasion: An 
Analysis of Techniques Used to Market Foods to Children' (2011) 47(11) Journal of Paediatrics and Child 
Health 776, 780. 
45 See Jones, Hillier and Comfort, 'That's the Spirit: Exploring the Approach of the World's Leading Spirits' 
Producers to Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 8-9; The ABAC Scheme Limited, Alcohol Beverages 
Advertising (and Packaging) Code (March 2012) pt 1 s (a)(ii), (b), (d) 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/thecode/>. 
46 Jones, Hillier and Comfort, 'That's the Spirit: Exploring the Approach of the World's Leading Spirits' 
Producers to Corporate Social Responsibility', above n 19, 8-9. See, e.g., Ann M Roche and Kerrianne Watt, 
'Drinking and University Students: From Celebration to Inebriation' (1999) 18(4) Drug and Alcohol Review 389; 
Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy, 'Alcohol in Australia: Issues and Strategies' (Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Aged Care, 2001) ch 2 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/alc-
strategy/$FILE/alcohol_strategy_back.pdf>. 
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One possibility is that self-regulation will provide a channel through which the various actors 
can reach consensus on the goals of the RCMI and QSRI.47 However, a fundamental barrier 
to this occurring is the economic cost of meaningful advertising restrictions. While 
interviewees saw a ‘business case’ for self-regulation,48 the independent review reported that 
code implementation created significant costs for signatories.49 These stemmed from the 
creation of new marketing strategies; additional legal and corporate affairs resources for more 
elaborate advertising review and sign-off procedures; loss of revenue associated with 
withdrawal from advertising directed at children; additional staff training; and new product 
development and reformulation associated with meeting code requirements.50 These costs 
could not be passed onto the consumer because of the highly competitive Australian grocery 
environment. While they remained committed to compliance, signatories received little direct 
commercial benefit from implementing the codes.51 Accordingly, companies that developed 
more ethical marketing practices risked putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage to 
their less responsible competitors. Companies may find it difficult to reconcile responsible 
marketing to children with their obligation to make a profit, particularly in an intensively 
competitive market. 
A good example of the economic risks of CSR is PepsiCo, which has positioned itself as a 
leader of responsible conduct in the food industry. Its ‘Performance with Purpose’ program 
addresses health and nutrition issues, along with environmental sustainability, procurement 
practices, health and safety and human rights. The program includes setting and reporting on 
goals and standards; expansion of the company’s ‘Good-For-You’ portfolio; adopting internal 
codes on ethical marketing and advertising; supporting self-regulation and philanthropy; the 
creation of a ‘Global Nutrition Group’; and hiring public health experts to lead health and 
nutrition activities.52  
                                                 
47 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 43, 84. See also Kernaghan Webb, 
'Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary Codes: Private 
Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and 
Environment, Carleton University 2004) 2. 
48 See Vogel, The Market for Virtue, above n 41, ch 2. 
49 Tymms, above n 3, 38. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See Acharya, et al, above n 7; Simon above n 7; Pepsio, Purpose (2012) 
<http://www.Pepsico.com/Purpose.html>. 
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PepsiCo’s CEO Indra Nooyi was initially hailed as a ‘strategic visionary’ for her leadership 
of PepsiCo’s CSR strategy.53 However, investment critics now question the wisdom of the 
company’s focus on healthier products, and the shift away from its core business of selling 
soft drink.54 In 2011 PepsiCo lost ground to rival company Coca-Cola, with Pepsi slipping 
from number two in US soda sales to number three behind Coke and Diet Coke.55 The 
company reports shrinking profits, with a five per cent decline in net income at the end of 
2012.56 In response to concerns about its profitability, PepsiCo returned to its traditional 
business model of advertising ‘Fun-For-You’ products like Pespsi-Cola, Lay’s potato chips 
and Doritos corn chips (which make up 80 per cent of its sales),57 as well as celebrity 
endorsement and elaborate Super Bowl promotions.58 
As the PepsiCo ‘Good-for-You’ and ‘Fun-for-You’ ranges illustrate, food companies develop 
healthier products while also selling their traditional unhealthy produce range. They  continue 
to promote unhealthy foods and beverages to children, lobby against government 
intervention, and deny the connection between food advertising and dietary health. Further, 
there is evidence that Big Food acts responsibly in some markets but not others.59 One study 
examined the product portfolios and sales data from The Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo in 
the US, Brazil and China.60 From 2000 to 2010, both companies increased their net revenue 
and net profit on a global scale. In the US, they experienced declining per capita sales in 
carbonated soft drink, but large increases in the sales of bottled water and sports and energy 
drinks. Meanwhile in Brazil and China daily per capita volume sales of soft drinks increased 
269 and 147 per cent for Coca-Cola and PepsiCo respectively.61 In Brazil, soft drink sales 
more than doubled for Coca-Cola, reaching $5,686 million in 2010, while those of PepsiCo 
                                                 
53 Mike Esterl and Valerie Bauerlein, 'PepsiCo Wakes Up and Smells the Cola', Wall Street Journal (online) 28 
June 2011 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304447804576412043487648846.html>. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. See also Natalie Zmuda, 'How Pepsi Blinked, Fell Behind Diet Coke', AdvertisingAge (online) 21 March 
2011 <http://adage.com/article/news/pepsi-blinked-fell-diet-coke/149496/> 
56 The Associated Press, '5% Decline in Profit at PepsiCo', The New York Times (online) 17 October 2012 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/business/pepsicos-profit-declines-5.html?ref=pepsicoinc&_r=1&>. 
57 Esterl and Bauerlein, above n 138. 
58 See the debate concerning American singer Beyoncé’s marketing deal with PepsiCo, which conflicts with her 
endorsement of US First Lady Michelle Obama’s ‘Let’s Move’ anti-obesity campaign: Mark Bittman, 'Why Do 
Stars Think It's OK To Sell Soda?' The New York Times (online) January 5 2013 
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/why-do-stars-think-its-o-k-to-sell-soda/?ref=pepsicoinc>. 
59 See, e.g., Brownell and Warner, above n 34; David S Ludwig and Marion Nestle, 'Can the Food Industry Play 
a Constructive Role in the Obesity Epidemic?' (2008) 300(15) Journal of the American Medical Association 
1808. 
60 S Kleiman, SW Ng and B Popkin, 'Drinking to Our Health: Can Beverage Companies Cut Calories While 
Still Maintaining Profits?' (2012) 13(3) Obesity Reviews 258. 
61  Ibid 263. 
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grew from $293 million in 2000 to $675 million in 2010. The decline in sales of sweetened 
carbonated soft drink may have benefited the health of customers in the US. However, the 
authors raised the possibility that companies were offsetting declining growth in the US by 
turning to other markets, potentially with serious health impacts on these countries.62 
This is a reasonable hypothesis, given evidence that the alcohol and tobacco industries 
engaged in similar behaviour in response to declining sales, market saturation and increasing 
regulatory threats in developed countries.63 Alcohol manufacturers enter new markets in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia by buying shares in existing companies or building 
new plants.64 As a result, many of these countries have experienced a growth in alcohol-
related social and health problems.65 To create new markets in developing countries, tobacco 
manufacturers use aggressive marketing techniques that are heavily regulated elsewhere, 
block legislative restrictions on advertising, introduce weak voluntary codes and lobby 
countries to resist global tobacco control.66  
Like tobacco and alcohol, Big Food has rapidly penetrated low and middle income countries, 
accelerating the ‘nutrition transition’ and an associated growth in obesity and chronic 
diseases.67  These examples demonstrate that companies will pursue CSR strategies only to 
the extent that there are economic incentives do to so, or in response to scrutiny from civil 
society, peer pressure from other companies, consumer demands or fear of regulation. Where 
these incentives and pressures do not exist, companies will continue with practices that 
                                                 
62 Ibid 266. See also Jeffrey P Koplan and Kelly D Brownell, 'Response of the Food and Beverage Industry to 
the Obesity Threat' (2010) 304(13) Journal of the American Medical Association 1487, 1488. 
63 Rob Moodie et al, 'Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of Tobacco, Alcohol and Ultra-
Processed Food and Drink Industries' (2013) 381 The Lancet 670, 671. 
64 Barbor et al, above n 19, 78. 
65 Ibid; Robin Room and David Jernigan, 'The Ambiguous Role of Alcohol in Economic and Social 
Development' (2000) 95(12 s4) Addiction 523; Raekha Prasad, 'Alcohol Use on the Rise in India' (2009) 
373(9657) The Lancet 17. 
66 See, e.g., Lee, Ling and Glantz, above n 122; Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry 
Documents, Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health 
Organisation (July 2000) World Health Organisation <http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf>; 
Yussuf Saloojee and Elif Dagli, 'Tobacco Industry Tactics for Resisting Public Policy on Health' (2000) 78(7) 
Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 902; Ernesto Sebrié and Stanton Glantz, 'The Tobacco Industry In 
Developing Countries Has Forestalled Legislation on Tobacco Control' (2006) 332(7537) British Medical 
Journal 313; Richard D Hurt et al, 'Roadmap to a Tobacco Epidemic: Transnational Tobacco Companies Invade 
Indonesia' (2012) 21 Tobacco Control 306. 
67 Stuckler and Nestle, above n 34; Moodie et al, above n 148, 671. See also R Beaglehole and D Yach, 
'Globalisation and the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Disease: The Neglected Chronic Diseases 
of Adults' (2003) 362(9387) The Lancet 903; David Stuckler et al, 'Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of 
Global Producers in Increased Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol 
and Tobacco' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine e1001235 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001235>; Sanjay Basu et al, 
'Nutritional Determinants of Worldwide Diabetes: An Econometric Study of Food Markets and Diabetes 
Prevalence in 173 Countries' (2013) 16(1) Public Health Nutrition 179. 
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undermine public health, as illustrated by increasing soft drink sales in developing countries. 
Given that meaningful advertising restrictions pose significant economic costs for companies 
involved (and few tangible benefits), some form of external pressure is likely to be required 
to strengthen controls on advertising unhealthy food to Australian children. 
7. Conclusion 
Ethical and economic reasons prompted large food and alcohol companies to join advertising 
codes of conduct. Companies integrated the requirements of these codes into management 
controls, as well as making practical changes to their marketing campaigns. Complementing 
these findings are other studies that report high levels of compliance with voluntary industry 
initiatives. However, participants’ practices make a limited contribution to improvements in 
the food marketing environment, because firms are complying with very weak regulatory 
standards. It is theoretically possible to strengthen the RCMI and QSRI so that they place 
more demanding requirements on signatories, yet the food industry is unlikely to take this 
step unilaterally. Some food companies appear to be genuinely committed to ‘doing the right 
thing’, and changing their advertising practices in line with public health concerns, at least in 
developing countries. However in a highly competitive market, those who voluntarily restrict 
their marketing practices risk losing sales to their less ethical competitors. Thus, companies’ 
responsible practices are patchy at best, as it is not always in their economic interest to 
behave ethically. This suggests that the application of external pressure will be needed to 
produce uniform improvements in food companies’ behaviour in a manner that significantly 
reduces children’s exposure to unhealthy food marketing. Chapters 10 and 11 consider how 
public health and government intervention could be used to ‘ratchet up’ standards of food 
marketing to achieve this objective. 
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CHAPTER 10 
The business of public health? Health sector participation in food 
industry self-regulation 
In Chapters 6 to 9, I demonstrated how the self-regulatory scheme governing food advertising 
to children is failing. The next two chapters consider ways in which it could be improved. In 
Chapter 2, I drew on theories of regulation to describe how external stakeholder participation 
can improve the transparency and accountability of private regulation.1 Further, theories of 
deliberative democracy require that all affected parties have an opportunity to contribute to 
decision-making on the form and content of regulation.2 At the same time, the withdrawal of 
the state from regulatory space has created scope for new forms of private regulation, 
including those that adopt participatory governance procedures.3 Bearing these points in 
mind, this chapter explores the possibility of enhancing stakeholder participation in food 
industry self-regulation as a way of strengthening the public’s interest in the program. I use 
the ABAC Scheme as an example of what a more collaborative approach might look like in 
practice, as it includes both public health and government representation in its governance 
processes. The chapter draws upon data from interviews with representatives of nine public 
health advocacy organisations and research institutes and two interviews with academic 
researchers. I also present findings from interviews with two representatives of alcohol trade 
associations, one member of the ABAC Management Committee, two members of the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel and a representative of the Advertising Standards Bureau.  
The chapter begins by discussing the increasing use of collaborative initiatives in public 
health. Next I explore the extent to which public health advocates influence food and alcohol 
industry self-regulation, both indirectly and by participating in self-regulatory processes. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler and Peter Wiedemann (eds), Fairness and Competence in Citizen 
Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse (Kluwer Academic, 1995); Magnus Bostrom, 
'Regulatory Credibility and Authority Through Inclusiveness: Standardisation Organisations in Cases of Eco-
Labelling' (2006) 13(3) Organisation 345; Nick J Fox and Katie J Ward, 'What Governs Governance, and How 
Does It Evolve? The Sociology of Governance-In-Action' (2008) 59(3) The British Journal of Sociology 519, 
528. 
2 See, e.g., Julia Black, 'Proceduralising Regulation: Part 1' (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597; 
Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 37-43.  
3 See, e.g., David Vogel, 'Private Global Business Regulation' (2008) 11 Annual Review of Political Science 
261; Christine Overdevest, 'Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the 
Forest Sector' (2010) 8(1) Socio-Economic Review 47, 53. 
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Then I report on whether public health interviewees thought it would be appropriate for 
public health stakeholders to join non-statutory, quasi-regulatory processes governing food 
advertising, similar to the ABAC Scheme. I conclude by arguing against external stakeholder 
participation in industry-based schemes, at least in the absence of government intervention 
and oversight, because of the significant risk that public health interests will be subverted by 
those of industry.  
1. New forms of public health governance  
As in other fields (such as the apparel industry, forestry and fisheries),4 collaborative public 
health initiatives are becoming increasingly common. Traditional public health advocacy was 
based on an adversarial relationship between activists and the private sector, with health 
actors calling for government regulation of industry, researching corporate practices, 
conducting media campaigns and instigating litigation against high profile companies.5 
Tobacco control is held up as one of the great successes of this model of advocacy, both in 
Australia6 and internationally.7 Public health actors lobbied vigorously against the tobacco 
industry, drawing upon traditional methods of activism as well as more unconventional forms 
of social protest.8 Despite fierce industry resistance,9 public health advocacy cumulated in 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Deanna Newsom, Governing Through Markets: Forest 
Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority (Yale University Press, 2004); Tim Bartley, 'Certifying 
Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest 
Products Fields' (2003) 31(3) Politics and Society 433; Michael J Kaiser and Gareth Edwards-Jones, 'The Role 
of Ecolabelling in Fisheries Management and Conservation' (2006) 20(2) Conservation Biology 392. See also 
Chapter 3, which describes new forms of public health governance in more depth.   
5 Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, 'Public Health Advocacy: Process and Product' (2000) 90(5) American Journal 
of Public Health 722, 723; Nicholas Freudenberg, 'Public Health Advocacy to Change Corporate Practices: 
Implications for Health Education Practice and Research' (2005) 32(3) Health, Education and Behaviour 298; 
Nicholas Freudenberg, 'Campaigns to Change Health-Damaging Corporate Practices' in William H. Wiist (ed), 
The Bottom Line or Public Health: Tactics Corporations Use to Influence Health and Health Policy, and What 
We Can Do to Counter Them (Oxford University Press, 2010) 423. 
6 Constance A Nathanson, 'Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The Case of Smoking and Guns' 
(1999) 24(3) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 421. 
7 Simon Chapman and Deborah Lupton, The Fight For Public Health: Principles and Practice of Media 
Advocacy (BMJ Publishing Group, 1994) 4; Simon F Chapman and Melanie Wakefield, 'Tobacco Control 
Advocacy in Australia: Reflections on 30 Years of Progress' (2001) 28(3) Health Education & Behaviour 274.  
8 Ibid. See also Robin Walker, Under Fire: A History of Tobacco Smoking in Australia (Melbourne University 
Press, 1984) ch 8; Simon F Chapman, 'Civil Disobedience and Tobacco Control: The Case of BUGA UP' (1996) 
5(3) Tobacco Control 179; Ian Tyrrell, Deadly Enemies: Tobacco Control and Its Opponents in Australia 
(UNSW Press, 1999) ch 13. 
9 S M Carter and S Chapman, 'Smoking, Disease and Obdurate Denial: The Australian Tobacco Industry in the 
1980s' (2003) 12(Suppl III) Tobacco Control iii23; Claire Hooker and Simon F Chapman, 'Structural Elements 
in Achieving Legislative Tobacco Control in NSW 1955-1995: Political Reflections and Implications' (2005) 
30(1) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 10; Laura E Tesler and Ruth E Malone, 'Corporate 
Philanthropy, Lobbying and Public Health Policy' (2008) 98(12) American Journal of Public Health 2123, 
2128. 
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legislative bans on almost all forms of tobacco marketing in Australia.10 At an international 
level, it led to the creation of WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.11 This 
treaty requires that governments protect national tobacco control policies from the 
commercial and vested interests of the tobacco industry, blocking the industry from 
participating in public health decision-making.12  
While Big Tobacco remains a ‘pariah industry’ (though still very powerful and diversified)13 
international norms take a more favourable view of the food and alcohol industries. The 2011 
United Nations political declaration on non-communicable diseases acknowledged the 
fundamental conflict of interest between the tobacco industry and public health.14 However, it 
called for collaborative partnerships that engaged civil society and industry to reduce non-
communicable disease risk factors.15 WHO’s Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and 
Health and the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol also assume scope for 
partnership with the food and alcohol industries.16 For example, the former recommends that 
governments work with consumer groups and the private sector to develop ‘appropriate 
multisectoral approaches to deal with the marketing of food to children’.17 The latter calls for 
alcohol harm reduction policies that engage a range of government sectors, civil society and 
‘economic operators’.18 It also encourages alcohol manufacturers and retailers to introduce 
measures to prevent and reduce the harmful use of alcohol, including self-regulation and 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth); Public Health (Tobacco) Act 2008 (NSW). 
11 Hadii M Mamudu, Maria Elena Gonzalez and Stanton  Glantz, 'The Nature, Scope and Development of the 
Global Tobacco Control Epistemic Community' (2011) 101(11) American Journal of Public Health 2044; 
World Health Organisation, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted 21 May 2003 (entered into 
force 27 February 2005). 
12 World Health Organisation, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted 21 May 2003 (entered into 
force 27 February 2005) art 5(3). 
13 Mike Daube, 'Alcohol and Tobacco' (2012) 36(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 108. 
14 UN General Assembly, Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the 
Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases, 66th sess, Agenda Item 117, UN Doc A/66/L.1. (16 
September 2011) 5. 
15 Ibid 11. 
16 Anna B Gilmore, Emily Savell and Jeff Collin, 'Public Health, Corporations and the New Responsibility Deal: 
Promoting Partnerships with Vectors of Disease?' (2011) 33(1) Journal of Public Health 2; World Health 
Organisation, 'Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health' (World Health Organisation, 2004) 7  
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/eb11344/en/index.html>; World Health Organisation, 'Global 
Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol' 
 (World Health Organisation, 2010) 19 <http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/activities/gsrhua/en/index.html>. 
17 World Health Organisation, 'Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health', above n 16. See also 
World Health Organisation, '2008-2013 Action Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases' (World Health Organisation, 2009) 24  
<http://www.who.int/nmh/publications/9789241597418/en/>. 
18 World Health Organisation, 'Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol', above n 16, 6. 
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voluntary initiatives.19 Thus, both documents envisage a role for collaborative or co-
regulatory approaches to food and alcohol promotion. 
International norms on cooperation with the private sector translate into national contexts, 
with governments and health actors engaging with the alcohol and food industries in various 
ways. Some public health actors use adversarial forms of advocacy against these industries, 
but others accept employment in food companies, engage in marketing partnerships (as where 
NGOs allow a logo to appear on companies’ products for a fee) and participate in industry 
initiatives.20 Public-private partnerships represent an increasingly common form of industry 
engagement, with private, public and/or NGO actors collaborating in pursuit of a shared 
objective.21 Partnerships encompass a diverse array of initiatives, from equally shared 
decision-making among partners to private sector engagement within a framework of 
government-set targets and monitoring.22 The UK Responsibility Deal aims to promote 
healthy behaviour and make healthy choices easier using voluntary agreements with 
industry.23 Participating companies agree to abide by a set of core principles and collective 
‘pledges’ that set out the actions they will take in the areas of alcohol, food, health, the 
workplace and physical activity.24 Pledges are determined by ‘networks’ that include 
government, industry and civil society representatives. The food pledges include 
commitments on salt reduction, the provision of calorie information and the removal of 
artificial trans fats from food products.25 Pledges on alcohol relate to alcohol content and 
                                                 
19 Ibid 20. 
20 See, e.g., The Food Commission, Cause or Compromise? A Survey Into Marketing Partnerships Between 
Food Companies and Health Charities or Medical Associations (April 2002) 19 
<http://www.foodcomm.org.uk/campaigns/reports/>; Rogan Kersch and James Morone, 'The Politics of 
Obesity: Seven Steps to Government Action' (2002) 21(6) Health Affairs 142, 147-148; Michele Simon, 
'PepsiCo and Public Health: Is the Nation's Largest Food Company a Model of Corporate Responsibility or 
Master of Public Relations?' (2012) 15 CUNY Law Review 10.  
21 Michael R Reich, 'Introduction: Public-Private Partnerships for Public Health' in Michael R Reich (ed), 
Public-Private Partnerships for Public Health (Harvard University Press, 2002) 1, 3; World Health 
Organisation, Public Private Partnerships for Health (2012) <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story077/en/>.  
22 Corinna Hawkes and Kent Buse, 'Public Health Sector and Food Industry Interaction: It's Time to Clarify the 
Term "Partnership" and Be Honest About Underlying Interests' (2011) 21(4) European Journal of Public Health 
400. 
23 Department of Health, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Our Strategy for Public Health in England (HM 
Government, 30 November 2010) 30 
<http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_121941. 
24 Department of Health, Pledges (undated) < http://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/pledges/>. 
25 Public Health Responsibility Deal, Public Health Responsibility Deal: Food Pledges (20 December 2011) 
Department of Health <https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/food-pledges/>. 
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warning labels, promoting information about responsible drinking and preventing sales to 
underage drinkers.26 
There is on-going debate in the public health community regarding the value of collaboration 
with commercial entities.27 Many public health advocates take issue with WHO’s approach to 
the food and alcohol industries and argue forcefully against public-private partnerships.28 
They point to parallels between the health harms of alcohol, tobacco and highly processed 
foods, as well as a corporate ‘playbook’ of tactics common to Big Food, Big Tobacco and 
Big Alcohol.29 Further, there is evidence that voluntary or collaborative initiatives fail to 
achieve public health goals, generating only small and incremental improvements at best, and 
deflecting government attention from more effective interventions.30 Typically, partnerships 
set weak targets, inadequately manage conflicts of interest and lack transparency and 
accountability.31 For these reasons, public health actors say that the tobacco control model 
should be applied to food and alcohol.32 Governments must exclude industry actors from 
processes of policy development and consult with them only as necessary to design effective 
                                                 
26 Public Health Responsibility Deal, Public Health Responsibility Deal: Alcohol Pledges (20 December 2011) 
Department of Health <https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/alcohol-pledges/>. 
27 See, e.g., David S Ludwig and Marion Nestle, 'Can the Food Industry Play a Constructive Role in the Obesity 
Epidemic?' (2008) 300(15) Journal of the American Medical Association 1808; Kelly D Brownell, 'Thinking 
Forward: The Quicksand of Appeasing the Food Industry ' (2009) 9(7) PLoS Medicine 1 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001254>; Rob Moodie et al, 
'Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of Tobacco, Alcohol and Ultra-Processed Food and 
Drink Industries' (2013) 381 The Lancet 670. 
28 See, e.g., Gilmore, Savell and Collin, above n 16; Yoni Freedhoff and Paul C Hébert, 'Partnerships Between 
Health Organisations and the Food Industry Risk Derailing Public Health Nutrition' (2011) 183(3) Canadian 
Medical Association Journal  291; Kawther Hashem, Christine Haigh and Charlie Powell, The Irresponsibility 
Deal? Why the Government's Responsibility Deal is Better for the Food Industry Than Public Health 
(September 2011) 8 Children's Food Campaign 
<http://www.sustainweb.org/news/sep11_2011_responsibility_deal/>.  
29 Moodie et al, above n 27; Kelly D Brownell and Kenneth E Warner, 'The Perils of Ignoring History: Big 
Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food?' (2009) 87 The Milbank Quarterly 259; 
William H Wiist, 'The Corporate Playbook, Health and Democracy: The Snack Food and Beverage Industry's 
Tactics in Context' in David Stuckler and Karen Siegel (eds), Sick Societies: Responding to the Global 
Challenges of Chronic Disease (Oxford University Press, 2011) 204. 
30 Ludwig and Nestle, above n 27, 2-3; Moodie et al, above n 27, 670; Brownell, above n 27, 2. 
31 Ludwig and Nestle, above n 27; Freedhoff and Hérbert, above n 28; Kent Buse and Andrew M Harmer, 
'Seven Habits of Highly Effective Global Public-Private Health Partnerships: Practice and Potential' (2007) 
64(2) Social Science and Medicine 259, 262-263; Carlos Monteiro, Fabio S Gomes and Geoffrey Cannon, 'The 
Snack Attack' (2010) 100(6) American Journal of Public Health 975; Vivica I Kraak et al, 'Balancing the 
Benefits and Risks of Public-Private Partnerships to Address the Global Double Burden of Nutrition' (2012) 
15(3) Public Health Nutrition 503, 504. 
32 See Derek Yach et al, 'The World Health Organisation's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: 
Implications for Global Epidemics of Food-Related Deaths and Disease' (2003) 24(3/4) Journal of Public 
Health Policy 274; Editorial, 'Urgently Needed: A Framework Convention for Obesity Control' (2011) 
378(9793) The Lancet 741. 
303 
 
regulation.33 According to these critics, public health organisations should disengage from 
private-public partnerships and refuse funding and other support from the food and alcohol 
industries.34 Rather than aligning themselves with industry, public health groups must focus 
on supporting government action, primarily by advocating for prescriptive command-and-
control legislation.35  
Other public health actors take a more conciliatory approach to industry engagement, 
particularly towards Big Food.36 Their position is that the food industry cannot be 
‘denormalised’ to the same extent as tobacco, given that people need to eat.37 Partnerships 
also represent the best compromise solution in circumstances where the government is 
reluctant to regulate.38 Further, the enormous reach of the transnational food industry gives it 
significant capacity to influence dietary patterns.39 For example, the top ten multinational 
food companies collectively have revenues in excess of US$350 billion annually and a 
presence in over 200 countries.40 Through product reformulation these companies can remove 
vast quantities of salt, sugar and fat from the global food supply, to the benefit of population 
of health.41  
                                                 
33 World Health Organisation, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted 21 May 2003 (entered into 
force 27 February 2005) art 5(3); Daube, above n 13; Gilmore, Savell and Collin, above n 16; Hawkes and Buse, 
'Public Health Sector and Food Industry Interaction',  above n 22, 410; Brownell, above n 27; Moodie et al, 
above n 27, 676; Wiist, above n 29; David Stuckler and Marion Nestle, 'Big Food, Big Systems and Global 
Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine e1001242 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>. 
34 Moodie et al, above n 27, 676; Stuckler and Nestle, above n 33, 2.  
35 Monteiro, Gomes and Cannon, above n 31, 979; Stuckler and Nestle, above n 33, 3. 
36 See, e.g., Derek Yach, Antonio Lucio and Carlos Barroso, 'Can Food and Beverage Companies Help Improve 
Population Health? Some Insights From PepsiCo' (2007) 187(11-12) Medical Journal of Australia 656; Derek 
Yach et al, 'The Role and Challenges of the Food Industry in Addressing Chronic Disease' (2010) 6 
Globalisation and Health 10. 
37 Moodie et al, above n 27, 675-676; Corinna Hawkes and Kent Buse, 'Public-Private Engagement for Diet and 
Health: Addressing the Governance Gap' (2011) 39(December) SCN News 6; Lois Dorfman et al, 'Soda and 
Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility Campaigns: How Do They Compare?' (2012) 9(6) PLoS 
Medicine e1001241, 4 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001241>. 
38 Jonathan Gornall, 'Doctors and the Alcohol Industry: An Unhealthy Mix?' (2013) 346 British Medical Journal 
2 <http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1889?ijkey=XcDtz4WUWCWZoLp&keytype=ref>. 
39 Michelle M Mello, David M Studdert and Troyen A Brennan, 'Obesity - The New Frontier of Public Health 
Law' (2006) 354(24) New England Journal of Medicine 2601, 2607; Andrew Lansley, 'The Role of Business in 
Public Health' (2011) 377(9760) The Lancet 121. 
40 Tara Acharya et al, 'The Current and Future Role of the Food Industry in the Prevention and Control of 
Chronic Diseases: The Case of PepsiCo' in David Stuckler and Karen Siegel (eds), Sick Societies: Responding to 
the Global Challenges of Chronic Disease (Oxford University Press, 2011) 187, 191. 
41 See, e.g., Perviz Asaria et al, 'Chronic Disease Prevention: Health Effects and Financial Costs of Strategies to 
Reduce Salt Intake and Control Tobacco Use' (2007) 370(9604) The Lancet 2044; FJ He and GA MacGregor, 
'Salt Intake, Plasma Sodium and Worldwide Salt Reduction' (2012) 44(Suppl 1) Annals of Medicine S127. 
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Collaborative approaches also grant access to industry expertise, technology and financial 
resources.42 Thus, industry funding can ‘plug the gaps’ left by the state in health policy, 
particularly in light of rising healthcare costs.43 Recognising the ‘inconvenient truth’ of the 
need to collaborate with industry, researchers and health agencies have developed guidelines 
for effective private-public partnerships.44 Box 3 below outlines these recommendations, 
bearing in mind that governance structures necessarily differ depending on the issue at hand 
and the risks for each party in the partnership.45 Following the approach taken in Chapter 4, 
this model draws upon empirical and theoretical studies of regulation as well as public health 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Vivica I Kraak and Mary Story, 'A Public Health Perspective on Healthy Lifestyles and Public-Private 
Partnerships for Global Childhood Obesity Prevention' (2010) 110(2) Journal of the American Dietetic 
Association 192, 193; Leslie Pray and Laura Pillsbury, Building Public-Private Partnerships in Food and 
Nutrition: Workshop Summary (National Academies Press, 2012) 10. 
43 Elizabeth Majestic, 'Public Health's Inconvenient Truth: The Need to Create Partnerships with the Business 
Sector' (2009) 6(2) Preventing Chronic Disease 1, 3. 
44 Ibid; Buse and Harmer, above n 31; Pray and Pillsbury, above n 42, ch 3; World Health Organisation, 
Guidelines on Working with the Private Sector to Achieve Health Outcomes, Executive Board, 107th sess, 
Provision Agenda Item 8.3, WHO Doc EB107/20 (30 November 2002); United Nations System Standing 
Committee on Nutrition, A Draft Proposal for Initiating SCN Private Sector Engagement (12 February 2007) 
<http://www.unsystem.org/SCN/Publications/html/private_sector.htm>; Kent Buse and Sonja Tanaka, 'Global 
Public-Private Health Partnerships: Lessons Learned from Ten Years of Experience and Evaluation' (2011) 
61(Suppl 2) International Dental Journal 2. 
45 Hawkes and Buse, 'Public-Private Engagement for Diet and Health', above n 37, 7. 
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Box 3. Recommendations for effective collaborative initiatives 
• Allow a wide range of stakeholders to participate in regulatory processes, including industry, NGO and 
government representatives;46 
• Ensure that all participants are equally involved in standards implementation and development, with each party 
holding equal decision-making power; 47 
• Create guidelines that identify suitable partners for collaboration and manage conflicts of interest;48 
• Formalise the terms of engagement in written contracts that clearly describe the roles and responsibilities of each 
party;49 
• Commit the necessary resources for the scheme to carry out its planned activities;50 
• Set clear objectives and targets for participants to meet within a given timeframe;51 
• Make regulatory processes transparent by granting all parties full access to relevant information and documents;52 
• Maintain the independence of the scheme, for example by resourcing it through a government grant and using 
independent organisations in monitoring and audit activities;53 
• Make procedures available for dispute resolution;54 
• Monitor participants’ performance and provide for independent third-party evaluation of the scheme’s success;55 
and  
• Create credible sanctions for non-compliance and incentives for compliance.56 
                                                 
46 Lars H Gulbrandsen, 'Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in 
the Global Forest Regime?' (2004) 4(2) Global Environmental Politics 75, 83; Kernaghan Webb, 
'Understanding the Voluntary Codes Phenomenon' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), Voluntary Codes: Private 
Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for Innovation, Science and 
Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 2, 14. 
47 Bostrom, above n 1; Buse and Harmer, above n 31, 269; Benjamin Cashore et al, 'Can Non-State Governance 
''Ratchet Up'' Global Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector' (2007) 16(2) RECIEL 158, 161; 
Lisa L Sharma, Stephen P Teret and Kelly D Brownell, 'The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to 
Promote Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures' (2010) 100(2) American Journal of Public Health 240, 
241. 
48 Kraak et al above n 31, 510; Buse and Harmer, above n 31, 269.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Buse and Harmer, above n 31, 266-267. 
51 Anna Bryden et al, 'Voluntary Agreements Between Government and Business: A Scoping Review of the 
Literature with Specific Reference to the Public Health Responsibility Deal' (2013) 110(2) Health Policy 186, 
194. 
52 Buse and Harmer, above n 31, 265; David Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni and Tetty Havinga, 'Actors in Private 
Food Governance: The Legitimacy of Retail Standards and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society 
Participation ' (2011) 28(3) Agriculture and Human Values 353, 357-358. 
53 David Cohen, 'The Role of the State in a Privatised Regulatory Environment ' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), 
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 46, 29; S Prakash Sethi and Olga Emelianova, 
'A Failed Strategy of Using Voluntary Codes of Conduct by the Global Mining Industry' (2006) 6(3) Corporate 
Governance 226, 230. 
54 Bostrom, above n 1, 360; Bryne Purchase, 'The Political Economy of Voluntary Codes' in Kernaghan Webb 
(ed), Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 2004) 77, 89; Lars H Gulbrandsen, 'Accountability 
Arrangements in Non-State Standards Organisations: Instrumental Design and Imitation' (2008) 15(4) 
Organisation 563, 567. 
55  Buse and Harmer, above n 31, 269; Gulbrandsen, 'Overlapping Public and Private Governance,' above n 46, 
83; Kraak and Story, above n 42; 196-197; Neil Gunningham, 'Environment, Self-Regulation and the Chemical 
Industry: Assessing Responsible Care' (1995) 17(1) Law and Policy 57, 72-74. 
56 Bryden et al, above n 51, 193; Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 39; Andrew A King and Michael J Lenox, 'Industry Self-
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In light of the growth in collaborative public health initiatives, this chapter explores whether 
food industry self-regulation could be improved by enhancing external stakeholder 
participation in regulatory processes. Public health groups question the credibility of self-
regulation as an obesity prevention measure, given the numerous flaws in the RCMI and 
QSRI and the fact that the codes do little to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food 
advertising.57 At the same time, the independent review of the scheme found that code 
participants were frustrated at not receiving due recognition for attempting to change their 
marketing practices.58 Signatories felt that they experienced sustained, negative criticism 
from public health groups without any acknowledgement of their genuine efforts to behave 
responsibly in marketing to children.59 The independent reviewer recommended that the 
industry engage with external stakeholders and address their concerns if it wanted to improve 
the credibility of self-regulation and build trust with public health advocates and the wider 
community.60 For example, the Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) could consult 
with public health groups and other external stakeholders when revising the terms of the 
RCMI and QSRI or consider public health representation on an independent code 
management committee. The question, though, is whether this would strengthen the scheme 
in a manner that achieves public health outcomes, and also whether it would further the 
interests of participating public health organisations. To begin answering these questions, I 
examine how public health actors currently influence and interact with food and alcohol 
industry self-regulation in Australia.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program' (2000) 43(4) Academy of 
Management Journal 698, 714. 
57 See, e.g., Lana Hebden et al, 'Industry Self-regulation of Food Marketing to Children: Reading the Fine Print' 
(2010) 21(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 229; Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's 
Television Food Advertising Regulations in Australia ' (2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846; J Lumley, J 
Martin and N Antonopoulos, 'Exposing the Charade: The Failure to Protect Children from Unhealthy Food 
Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2012) <http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-
charade&Type=policydocuments>; L Wallard et al, 'The Takeaway on Fast-Food Meals: A Summary of Three 
Fast-Food Studies in Australia' (Cancer Council NSW, 2012) <http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/68145/news-
media/latest-news-news-media/cc-news/fast-food-exposing-the-truth/?pp=68145>. 
58 Susannah Tymms, 'Responsible Advertising to Children: An Independent Review of the Australian Food and 
Beverage Industry Self-Regulatory Codes' (AFGC, October 2012) 44 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-
codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html> 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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2. Public health advocacy and food industry self-regulation 
Influencing the RCMI and QSRI indirectly  
Australian public health organisations pursue stronger restrictions on unhealthy food 
advertising to children as part of their obesity prevention platforms.61 State and federal 
Cancer Councils that originally campaigned on tobacco control now target unhealthy eating 
and physical inactivity,62 following evidence of a link between obesity and cancer.63 Chronic 
disease prevention groups also take an interest in obesity policy (including the Public Health 
Association64 and the Heart Foundation65), as do research institutes, health professionals and 
academics. Many health organisations work across tobacco, alcohol and obesity, given that 
these are the three main preventable causes of non-communicable disease.66 Participants in 
my study advocated a wide range of actions to address the social, economic and cultural 
elements of the obesogenic environment.67 Interviewees said that although advertising 
restrictions could make a small (but significant) contribution to changing children’s 
consumption patterns, such measures were more effective as part of a multi-faceted approach 
to obesity prevention. For example, a senior executive from one health advocacy group 
described its policy approach in the following terms: 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Lumley,  Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 57; Wallard et al, above n 57; Boyd Swinburn et al, 
'The "Sydney Principles" for Reducing the Commercial Promotion of Foods and Beverages to Children' (2008) 
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62 Ibid. See also Cancer Council Victoria, Diet (2011) <http://www.cancervic.org.au/preventing-cancer/healthy-
diet>; Cancer Council NSW, Eating and Moving (2012) <http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/reduce-risks/eating-
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65 Heart Foundation, Championing Hearts (2008-2012) (July 2010) 9 
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66 See, e.g., R Beaglehole and D Yach, 'Globalisation and the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable 
Disease: The Neglected Chronic Diseases of Adults' (2003) 362(9387) The Lancet 903; Stephen J Begg et al, 
'Burden of Disease and Injury in Australia in the New Millennium: Measuring Health Loss from Diseases, 
Injuries and Risk Factors' (2008) 188(1) Medical Journal of Australia 36; National Preventative Health 
Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020. National Preventative Health Strategy - Overview' 
(Australian Government, 2009) 7 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
67 Boyd Swinburn, Garry Egger and Fezeela Raza, 'Dissecting Obesogenic Environments: The Development and 
Application of a Framework for Identifying and Prioritising Environmental Interventions for Obesity' (1999) 
29(6) Preventive Medicine 563; G Sacks, B Swinburn and M Lawrence, 'Obesity Policy Action Framework and 
Analysis Grids for a Comprehensive Policy Approach to Reducing Obesity' (2009) 10(1) Obesity Reviews 76. 
308 
 
… over the last few years… we’ve… convinced the Federal government to be more strongly focused 
on prevention, and… that encompasses… a spectrum of issues from physical inactivity, poor nutrition 
and obesity and overweight… they’re all interlinked, so we’ve got a fairly comprehensive approach 
that we take to those issues and… dealing with advertising of [unhealthy] foods and beverages to 
children is a critical part of our policy suite… 
Public health groups stressed that their policy approach to food advertising was underpinned 
by a large body of research demonstrating a causal connection between unhealthy food 
marketing and childhood obesity.68 In partnership with research organisations, health groups 
undertook their own studies on food advertising to children, which they used to extend the 
evidence base for their policy approach.69 Researchers also analysed food industry self-
regulation, including by measuring the nature and extent of food advertising on television 
before and after the introduction of the codes.70 Interviewees conveyed the sense that they 
were ‘filling in the gaps’ left by an inadequate formal monitoring and oversight system. 
Consequently, public health groups played a critical role in providing government with 
evidence on the scheme’s limited effectiveness in improving food marketing. However, 
interviewees said that they could perform this monitoring function only to a limited extent, 
given the time and resources required for this kind of research. Thus, they called for 
government to establish and fund an independent monitoring system to evaluate the 
initiatives’ effects. ANPHA’s work in this area will be discussed in the next chapter.71 
Public health advocates acted as community representatives in the debate on food advertising 
to children. They undertook community polling to gauge the extent of public concern about 
                                                 
68 As discussed in Chapter 1. See, e.g., Michael J McGinnis, Jennifer Gootman and Vivica I Kraak (eds), Food 
Marketing to Children and Youth: Threat or Opportunity? (National Academies Press, 2006) 183; Georgina 
Cairns, Kathryn Angus and Gerard Hastings, 'The Extent, Nature and Effects of Food Promotion to Children: A 
Review of the Evidence to December 2008' (World Health Organisation, 2009) 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/publications/marketing_evidence_2009/en/index.html>. 
69 See the discussion of these studies in Chapter 1. See, e.g., Bridget Kelly and Kathy Chapman, 'Food 
References and Marketing to Children in Australian Magazines: A Content Analysis' (2007) 22(4) Health 
Promotion International 284; Bridget Kelly et al, 'Internet Food Marketing on Popular Children's Websites and 
Food Product Websites in Australia' (2008) 11(11) Public Health Nutrition 1180; Bridget Kelly et al, 'Trends in 
Food Advertising to Children on Free-To-Air Television in Australia' (2010) 35(2) Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Public Health 131. 
70 Chapter 5 described this research in detail. See Lesley King et al, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Television 
Food Advertising: Responsible or Responsive?' (2011) 6(2 Part 2) International Journal of Paediatric Obesity 
e390 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3109/17477166.2010.517313/full>; Lana Hebden et al, 'Advertising 
of Fast-Food to Children on Australian Television: The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation' (2011) 195(1) 
Medical Journal of Australia 20; Lesley King et al, 'Building the Case for Independent Monitoring of Food 
Advertising on Australian Television' (2012) (FirstView Article) Public Health Nutrition 1 
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8706977>. 
71 See Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Draft Frameworks for Monitoring Television Marketing 
and Advertising to Children of Unhealthy Food and Drinks (13 May 2013) 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/draft-frameworks-tv-marketing-children>. 
309 
 
food advertising, and educated and informed community members on existing forms of 
regulation. The representative of one health organisation described how its advocacy efforts 
gave voice to public opinion on unhealthy food advertising to children:  
 
…. advocacy is a key role of what we do as an organisation, and because we have those strong reaches 
into the community… we have those ways that we can tap into the community and understand their 
needs, whether it’s through doing properly conducted research studies about what are parents’ views on 
these issues [or] getting them involved through our advocacy campaigns… 
 
Some public health groups formed organisations to foster community involvement in 
advocacy on restricting food advertising to children. For example, Cancer Council Australia, 
Diabetes Australia (Victoria), the Australian and New Zealand Obesity Society, VicHealth 
and YCMA Victoria funded the Parents Jury, an online forum of parents, grandparents and 
carers with an interest in improving the food and physical activity environment of Australian 
children.72 Public health organisations also formed the Coalition on Food Advertising to 
Children (CFAC) to advocate for improvements in regulation of food marketing to children.73 
In 2007, the CFAC ran the ‘Pull the Plug’ Campaign, where members of the public filled out 
postcards expressing their concern about televised food advertising to children and calling for 
extensions to the Children’s Television Standards 2005 (CTS 2005). During the review of the 
CTS 2005, CFAC presented the ACMA with 20,521 signed postcards, along with a 
submission proposing that food and beverage advertising be prohibited during programs 
where children made up a significant proportion of the viewing audience.74 However, public 
health advocates were unsuccessful in convincing the ACMA to strengthen restrictions on 
food advertising to children, underscoring the point that statutory restrictions in this area are 
unlikely, at least in the form proposed by public health advocates. 
Public health groups used these and similar campaigns to mobilise community concern 
around food advertising, to critique industry self-regulation and to challenge the food 
                                                 
72 The Parents’ Jury, About Us (2011) < http://www.parentsjury.org.au/about-us>. 
73 Cancer Council NSW, Coalition on Food Advertising to Children (2012) 
<http://www.cancercouncil.com.au/1929/reduce-risks/eating-moving/food-advertising/cfac/?pp=36572>. See 
also Coalition on Food Advertising to Children, Children's Health or Corporate Wealth? The Case for Banning 
Television Food Advertising to Children (January 2007) <http://www.cfac.net.au/food_marketing_child.htm>. 
74 Coalition on Food Advertising to Children, Submission to Australian Communications and Media Authority, 
Children’s Television Standards Review (August 2007) <http://www.cfac.net.au/readmore.html#submissions>; 
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industry’s claim that it has a legitimate right to advertise its products to children.75 Public 
health advocacy illustrates how activist pressure plays an on-going role in the regulatory 
system, as well as in the adoption of self-regulation in the first instance. NGO action ensures 
that voluntary schemes remain in the public eye and a topic of government attention, as well 
as placing pressure on industry to ‘ratchet up’ standards in existing voluntary programs.76 In 
some cases activist groups can function as de facto regulators and enforcers, shaming and 
pressuring companies into compliance.77 Health organisations also play an important 
monitoring and oversight role, particularly given the significant flaws in the AFGC’s 
reporting on compliance with the codes (discussed in Chapters 5 and 7),78 as well as limited 
government oversight of the scheme. 
Engaging directly with self-regulation 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the terms of the RCMI and QSRI create scope for direct public 
health engagement with food industry self-regulation. One of the main routes for advocates to 
participate in the scheme is via the advertising complaints hearing process.79 A number of 
health organisations investigated breaches of the initiatives and laid complaints with the 
Advertising Standards Board (ASB). This mirrors the actions of Australian tobacco control 
advocates in challenging the legitimacy of the Voluntary Code for Advertising Cigarettes in 
Australia, which operated in the 1970s prior to legislative bans on tobacco marketing.80 
Under the auspices of MOP UP (Movement Opposed to the Promotion of Unhealthy 
Products), health activists complained to the Advertising Standards Council (the complaints 
hearing body under Australia’s previous advertising self-regulatory system) that a Winfield 
                                                 
75 ICC Commission on Marketing and Advertising, Framework for Responsible Food and Beverage Marketing 
Communications 2012 (2012) 3 International Chamber of Commerce <http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-
Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2012/Framework-for-Responsible-Food-and-Beverage-Marketing-
Communications-2012/>. 
76 Bartley, above n 4, Cashore et al, 'Can Non-State Governance ''Ratchet Up'' Global Environmental Standards? 
Lessons from the Forest Sector,' above n 47. 
77 Neil Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton and Robert A Kagan, 'Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance 
in Environmental Protection ' (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 289, 337. 
78 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report 
(December 2010) <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-kids/rcmi-reports-2009.html>; Australian 
Food and Grocery Council, Food and Beverage Advertising to Children: Activity Report (May 2012) 
<http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi/rcmi-reports-2009.html>. 
79 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food 
and Beverage Industry (March 2011) 3 <http://www.afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-
children/rcmi.html>; Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
Marketing to Children (June 2009) cl 6.3. Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. 
80 Simon Chapman, 'A David and Goliath Story: Tobacco Advertising and Self-Regulation in Australia' (1980) 
281(6249) British Medical Journal 1187. 
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campaign featuring Australian actor Paul Hogan had major appeal to children, in breach of 
the tobacco industry’s code.81 In a significant coup for public health activists, the Council 
upheld the complaint 18 months after it was first laid (in November 1978), leading to the 
withdrawal of the campaign and positive media coverage of the activist group.82 
Public health groups similarly used complaints to expose non-compliance with food 
advertising initiatives, and also as ‘test cases’ to demonstrate loopholes in the codes and in 
the complaints hearing mechanism itself. For example, the Obesity Policy Coalition has made 
complaints about food marketing to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
the ACMA and the ASB.83 It reports the determinations on its website and uses them in 
policy briefs on food advertising regulation.84 However, the ASB views these complaints as 
troublesome, and an illegitimate use of the complaints hearing mechanism.85 In the 
independent review of food industry self-regulation, the ASB said that public health 
organisations deliberately made complaints that they knew it would dismiss.86 Although these 
complaints demonstrated the limitations of the RCMI and QSRI, the ASB felt that they were 
a waste of its resources.87 I interviewed a representative of the Advertising Standards Bureau 
who also felt that public health complaints were not representative of wider public concern 
about food advertising to children:  
… there’s a lot of concern in the media [about childhood obesity and food advertising]… and by 
particular lobby groups…[but] no one knows how much that actually is represented in the community 
…with [the] new codes... I’d say at least 90% of the complaints come from organised consumer lobby 
groups… which isn’t to say lobby groups…don’t have…a role, but…people off the street aren’t… 
writing in to complain to us…  [about breaches of the RCMI and QSRI]. 
However, in common with other researchers, I argue that it is virtually impossible for 
members of the public to make complaints about food advertising under the RCMI and 
QSRI.88 The codes are extremely complex and technical, making it difficult to identify 
advertisements that breach their terms. Further, most people probably do not even know the 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid 1189-1190. 
83 Obesity Policy Coalition, Complaints (undated) <http://www.opc.org.au/whatwedo/complaints.aspx>. 
84 Obesity Policy Coalition, Policy Brief: Food Advertising Voluntary Codes (June 2012) 2-3 
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85 Tymms, above n 58, 46. 
86 Ibid  
87 Ibid. 
88 Lumley, Martin and Antonopoulos, above n 57, 15. 
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initiatives exist, particularly considering that the AFGC gives them little publicity.89 The 
advertising industry argues that the small number of complaints received by the ASB shows 
that self-regulation prevents the majority of irresponsible advertising.90 What is more likely is 
that individuals face significant barriers when attempting to make complaints under 
advertising codes of conduct, which deter them from doing so.91 This makes it all the more 
important that public health advocates lay complaints about food advertising, in order to 
challenge the argument that low numbers of complaints demonstrate the success of 
advertising self-regulation. 
The RCMI provides for another form of public health participation in the complaints hearing 
mechanism. When the ASB makes a determination under the RCMI it must decide whether 
the advertised product meets signatory companies’ criteria for ‘healthy dietary choice’ 
products.92 The AFGC contracts an independent arbiter to compare the advertised product to 
the nutritional criteria chosen by participants to identify healthier products.93 The AFGC 
originally contracted Professor Bruce Neal (of the George Institute for Global Health) as the 
independent arbiter. Professor Neal resigned from this position, stating that the RCMI was 
too complex for the public to understand and that the program was unworkable and 
ineffective.94 The independent arbiter performs a restricted role in the complaints hearing 
process and Professor Neal’s experience suggests that the role does not allow for feedback on 
the scheme’s operation. Accordingly, this position does not represent meaningful public 
health involvement in food industry self-regulation. Rather, the arbiter is engaged solely on 
the industry’s own terms. 
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Chapter 7 described how the RCMI and QSRI provide for independent third-party monitoring 
and evaluation. The Healthy Kids Association (HKA) reviewed QSRI signatories’ advertising 
against the terms of the code during two separate audit periods, one in 2010 and one in 
2011.95 In 2012 the AFGC contracted a consultant to assess the management, implementation 
and monitoring of the two codes.96 External monitoring and review is one of the strengths of 
food industry self-regulation, but there are significant limitations in the review framework. 
For example, the 2012 evaluation focused on the regulatory processes established by the 
codes rather than their substantive outcomes, such as whether they led to a reduction in 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. As a result, the review did not comment on 
the real-world impact of the codes on the food marketing environment.97  
Further, by engaging a consultant to perform the review, the AFGC missed an opportunity to 
involve external stakeholders in the codes’ governance processes.98 A more credible form of 
review would involve an independent body comprised of representatives from public health 
organisations and other interested parties, and would measure the codes’ success against 
well-defined, quantifiable and outcome-based performance indicators.99 In summary, public 
health organisations have had little discernible impact on food industry self-regulation as 
participants in regulatory processes; although this chapter and Chapter 8 suggest that their 
advocacy was a source of pressure on the industry to adopt advertising self-regulation, and to 
comply with voluntary standards once they were in place. 
3. Public health advocacy and alcohol industry self-regulation 
Indirectly influencing the ABAC Scheme  
Many public health organisations are involved in alcohol policy advocacy alongside their 
work in obesity prevention,100 while other groups deal solely with alcohol harm prevention.101 
Alcohol policy advocates seek to address all aspects of alcohol sales and promotion in order 
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to modify the demand for, and reduce the harms associated with, excessive alcohol 
consumption.102 This includes measures such as pricing and taxation, restricting the 
availability of alcohol, education and persuasion strategies, as well as the regulation of 
alcohol marketing.103 Alcohol policy groups also discussed the importance of ensuring that 
their policy platform reflected community views on alcohol advertising and promotion. One 
interviewee described how her organisation wanted to ensure that its policy positions were:  
… not only informed by a range of experts, but also informed by what different community 
representatives feel about different topics… so we do a lot of community polling… talking to all 
stakeholders, so not just our public health friends, but also the alcohol industry…so that we get an 
understanding of whether the things we’re suggesting are actually realistic or idealistic… 
Another interviewee said that there was little public awareness of the ABAC Scheme, 
meaning that one of public health organisations’ key functions was publicising the ABAC’s 
existence, as well as its flaws.  
The same interviewee discussed the National Preventative Health Taskforce’s 
recommendations on regulation of alcohol marketing and sponsorship.104 The Taskforce 
recommended phasing out alcohol promotions from television broadcasts that have high 
exposure to young people, including advertising during live sports broadcasts, during time 
periods with large youth audiences and sponsorship of sports and cultural events.105 The 
Federal government responded by saying that it would not regulate at present, but tasked 
ANPHA with monitoring alcohol advertising to young people.106  
ANPHA recently released an issues paper on the ABAC, following the Taskforce’s 
recommendation that it monitor and evaluate voluntary approaches to alcohol promotion.107 
This paper described research on alcohol marketing and its impact upon young people’s 
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alcohol consumption, and the current system for regulating alcohol advertising in Australia. It 
also called for public submissions on the effectiveness of the ABAC in addressing 
community concerns about young people’s exposure to alcohol advertising. The interviewee 
said that her organisation would watch the government’s response to the Taskforce and 
demand action on alcohol advertising regulation if the government did not act. Other 
interviewees felt that the government had failed to take a leadership role regulation of alcohol 
advertising and in alcohol policy more broadly. Accordingly, it was important for public 
health groups to devise policy approaches to propose to government, and to hold government 
accountable for its commitments. However, in advocating for effective policy options they 
faced strong resistance from powerful industry lobbyists.108 
Participating in regulatory processes 
Public health organisations participated in the ABAC Scheme by making complaints to the 
ABAC Adjudication Panel about alcohol advertising.109 The majority of complaints to the 
Panel are made on a confidential basis.110 Those that identify the complainant(s) include 
submissions from the Alcohol Policy Coalition, the WA Community Alcohol Network, 
Cancer Council WA and the McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth,111 as well as 
from individual alcohol policy researchers.112 A representative from the ABAC Management 
Committee referred to what he called ‘professional complainants’, i.e. anti-alcohol advocates 
who monitored alcohol advertising to identify advertisements that they could lay complaints 
about. An interviewee from one of the alcohol trade associations took issue with public health 
complaints to the Panel, arguing that they did not reflect wider community concern about 
alcohol advertising:113 
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… it’s very easy to be misled by complaints… there is a profession out there who makes their life point 
to complain about…alcohol ads… they’re very professional about how they go about it and you can be 
a bit misled as to what the community’s expectations are if you’re only looking at [those complaints]. 
In contrast to this interviewee, a representative from the ABAC Adjudication Panel said that 
it was perfectly legitimate for public health advocates to use complaints as a way of exposing 
the ABAC’s limitations:  
… I have seen a range of complaints from advocates… effectively testing the application of the 
code…I don’t find that offensive in any way… while alcohol is a legal drug, it is to be used against a 
backdrop of responsible, moderate use… this scheme as imperfect as it is, is about ensuring that those 
public health goals are not undermined through inappropriate advertising… I have no difficulty with 
those…who live with, and treat the causes of alcohol [harms] complaining about individual ads and 
seeking to expand the interpretation or the reach or to knock out ads.  
The ABAC Scheme enables greater external stakeholder participation in governance 
processes than food industry self-regulation, as I describe below. The alcohol industry created 
the contemporary version of the scheme in 1998, at which point it was almost entirely 
industry-based. The ABAC Management Committee (which administers the code) consisted 
of the Executive Directors of the three main alcohol industry bodies, as well as a 
representative of the Advertising Federation of Australia.114 The ABAC Adjudication Panel 
comprised five members, including a Chief Adjudicator and four other members with 
expertise in marketing and/or a background in the media industry.115  
In 2003, the Ministerial Council for Drug Strategy led a review of the scheme, conducted by 
the National Committee for the Review of Alcohol Advertising (NCRAA).116  The NCRAA 
reported that the ABAC Scheme did not address public health concerns about alcohol 
advertising, partly because of a number of weaknesses in the complaints hearing mechanism. 
For example, the majority of complaints were dealt with under the ASB’s complaint 
resolution system rather than the ABAC, the general public was largely unaware of the 
scheme and how to make complaints, and there was insufficient reporting of how complaints 
were adjudicated and the outcomes of those complaints.117 The NCRAA concluded that 
                                                                                                                                                        
promoted irresponsible drinking patterns. See also The ABAC Scheme Limited, Summary and ABAC Response 
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although the ABAC Scheme was a ‘reasonable and viable system’, it had ‘considerable 
shortcomings that required redress’.118  
Following negotiations with government, the alcohol industry rolled out changes to the 
ABAC between 2004 and 2005, as recommended by the NCRAA.119 The industry revised the 
terms of the code so that it contained a new preamble, specific provisions on internet 
advertising and a protocol for event-based promotion of alcohol beverages. It restructured the 
Management Committee to include a representative of the federal Department of Health and 
Ageing, with the goal of enhancing the Committee’s independence from industry and 
ensuring that it was ‘cognisant of public health issues’.120 The alcohol industry also 
incorporated a public health expert in the ABAC Adjudication Panel.121 In 2007 the 
Management Committee appointed an additional public health representative to improve 
complaint response times.122 
The alcohol industry takes enormous pride in the ABAC Scheme, viewing it as an example of 
best practice in alcohol advertising regulation.123 Alcohol industry participants discussed a 
number of government reviews that had reported favourably on the ABAC, for example the 
recent review of outdoor advertising regulation.124 According to interviewees, the scheme’s 
strengths included the detailed decisions produced by the Adjudication Panel and the Panel’s 
independence from industry. Further, interviewees said although some companies were 
reluctant to withdraw or modify non-compliant advertisements, that there had never been a 
case where an ABAC participant had refused to abide by the Panel’s decision. The ABAC 
Management Committee representative also described the benefits of government 
involvement in the administration of the ABAC: 
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…we get a direct input as to the how the Ministry might be feeling about issues….also we get a 
different view, it’s a more balanced view…we’re dealing with alcohol all the time, so it is valuable to 
have some other views at the table… 
However, researchers question whether health and government representation in the ABAC 
Scheme furthers public health objectives.125 For example, a number of studies criticise the 
ABAC Adjudication Panel’s decision making processes.126 One study compared 
determinations on 14 alcohol advertisements made by the Panel, with the judgments of a six 
person panel of marketing, communications and public health experts.127 The ABAC 
Adjudication Panel dismissed all but one of the advertisements, yet a majority of the 
independent panel thought that eight of the advertisements breached the ABAC and two did 
not (the panel was evenly split on the remaining four advertisements). The researchers 
concluded that the Adjudication Panel’s views did not adequately reflect community 
standards on alcohol advertising, and that the scheme did not protect the community from 
inappropriate forms of alcohol advertising.128 Researchers also question the ability of the 
Panel to be fully impartial in their determinations, given that members are paid a retainer plus 
an amount per complaint heard from funds provided by industry.129 However, the panel 
members that I interviewed defended the complaints determination process, saying that 
complaints were determined in a genuine and robust fashion.130 
 Public health interviewees thought that public health representation on the ABAC 
Adjudication Panel was relatively meaningless. Panel members typically reached consensus 
on the majority of decisions, but where there was dissent it tended to come from the public 
health representatives. However, because the majority of the panel were likely to back 
alcohol industry interests, the health representatives were always outvoted when they 
disagreed with other panel members. One of the health sector representatives on the Panel 
said that other panellists took a different approach to interpreting the ABAC than the health 
members and that arguing the public health case was ‘not the most comfortable position’ to 
                                                 
125 See also Chapter 6, which describes limitations in the scope and coverage of the ABAC, as it applies to 
alcohol advertising that appeals to children and young people. 
126 Sandra C Jones and Robert J Donovan, 'Self-Regulation of Alcohol Advertising: Is It Working for Australia?' 
(2002) 2(3) Journal of Public Affairs 153; Sandra C Jones, Danika Hall and Geoffrey Munro, 'How Effective is 
the Revised Regulatory Code for Alcohol Advertising in Australia?' (2008) 27(1) Drug and Alcohol Review 29; 
Robert J Donovan, Lynda Fielder and Geoffrey Jalleh, 'Alcohol Advertising Advocacy Research No Match for 
Corporate Dollars: The Case of Bundy R Bear' (2011) 20 Journal of Research for Consumers 1. 
127 Jones, Hall and Munro, above n 126. 
128 Ibid 37. 
129 Donovan, Fielder and Jalleh, above n 126, 3. 
130 See also Colmar Brunton, above n 113; The ABAC Scheme Limited, Summary and ABAC Response to the 
Review of the ABAC Decision Report, above n 113. 
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be in. The inclusion of health representation on the Panel allows for public health opinions to 
be heard in the determination process, but the design of the scheme means that they cannot 
trump industry perspectives. Arguably, this imbalance of power is a more critical concern 
than the potential for bias in panel members’ decision-making. A better approach would be 
for the Adjudication Panel to comprise a diverse range of representatives, with no one interest 
dominating its membership. More ideally, an entirely independent body would hear 
complaints about alcohol advertising under the ABAC.131 
Alcohol policy researchers argue that the Federal government’s oversight of the scheme is 
compromised by its financial ties with the alcohol industry, including income generated by 
taxes on alcohol beverages and donations to political parties.132 In essence, a situation of 
‘regulatory capture’ exists, where there is cooperation between government and industry, 
rather than genuine co-regulation.133  Public health interviewees suggested that there was 
limited evidence that the government representative had any ability to influence the scheme, 
particularly given that the majority of committee members were from the alcohol industry. 
One alcohol policy researcher expressed the view that: 
… the government representative appears to play no role at all except turn up to Management 
Committee meetings… it seems that they are silent on those… meetings and tend to just stay out of it 
… there’s no evidence that they intervene on anything to do with alcohol policy…. 
The alcohol industry characterises the ABAC Scheme as quasi-regulatory because of 
government involvement in setting and revising the codes’ standards, as well as public health 
representation in the complaints hearing mechanism.134 However, public health interviewees 
challenged this characterisation of the ABAC, given that there was little evidence that the 
government had any meaningful influence over the scheme’s operation and because it was 
largely ineffective. For example, one public health advocate said that:  
… [the government representatives are] just members like everybody else. So I can’t see that’s co-
regulation, because co-regulation would suggest that government has some sort of power to do 
something… [the] system… is entirely industry driven and industry governed and industry paid for, in 
which people sign up if they want to… and… if their ad is found to be in breach… they are not obliged 
to remove it, and there is no penalty… there’s nothing quasi-regulatory about that at all… it’s a self-
regulation system… It has no teeth and it’s not designed to have any teeth.  
                                                 
131 Jones, Hall and Munro, above n 126, 29. 
132 Donovan, Fielder and Jalleh, above n 126, 10. 
133 Ibid. 
134 See The ABAC Scheme Limited, About the ABAC Scheme (undated) <http://www.abac.org.au/about/>. 
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Further, there is a lack of transparency in relation to the role played by the government 
representative on the ABAC Management Committee. While the ABAC’s Rules and 
Procedures specify the inclusion of the representative on the Committee, they do not describe 
the role that this individual plays, or his or her influence in committee decision-making 
processes.135 Literature on effective public-private partnerships suggests that collaborative 
arrangements should be clearly structured, formal and transparent, with all parties having real 
influence over the partnerships’ outcomes.136 Government participation in the ABAC Scheme 
represents none of these things, suggesting that it is unlikely to further public health 
objectives. 
The creation of the Alcohol Advertising Review Board 
In response to concerns about the ABAC Scheme, public health organisations recently 
established an alternative system for public complaints about alcohol advertising. The 
McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth and the Cancer Council WA created the 
Alcohol Advertising Review Board (AARB) in March 2012, with the support of a wide range 
of other health organisations.137 The AARB mimics the operation of the ABAC: it accepts 
complaints from members of the public about alcohol advertisements and invites advertisers 
to respond (within seven days) to the issues raised in the complaint. The AARB recruited 
nearly 70 individuals to be panellists on an independent Review Board that determines 
complaints, including professionals in the fields of law, public health, marketing and 
education.138 Three members consider each complaint against two advertising codes; if the 
Panel upholds the complaint, the AARB will contact the advertiser and ask that they 
withdraw or modify the advertisement.139 The AARB publishes the Board’s determinations 
on its website140 and prepares reports on the scheme’s operation.141 
                                                 
135 The ABAC Scheme Limited, The ABAC Scheme: Rules and Procedures (5 December 2012) cl 1. 
<http://www.abac.org.au/publications/rules-procedures/>. 
136 See Box 3 above. See also Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, 'Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice' 
(2008) 18(4) Journal of Public Administration Research 543, 546. 
137 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, About Us (2012) <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/about/>. 
138 Melissa Sweet and Rebecca Johnson, 'Naming and Shaming Irresponsible Alcohol Advertisers' on Croaky: 
The Crikey Health Blog (9 August 2012) <http://blogs.crikey.com.au/croakey/2012/08/09/naming-and-shaming-
irresponsible-alcohol-advertisers/>. 
139 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Procedures (2012) 
<http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/about/procedures/>. 
140 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Determination Reports (2012) 
<http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/articles/determination-reports/>. 
141 See Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Alcohol Advertising Review Board First Report March-June 2012 (2 
August 2012) McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth, Cancer Council Western Australia 
<http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/news/reports/>; Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Quarterly Report 
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The AARB wrote its own Alcohol Advertising Review Board Code, consisting of separate 
content and placement codes. The Content Code is constructed from ‘best practice’ 
provisions contained in alcohol advertising codes in jurisdictions with self- or quasi-
regulatory systems that are similar to the ABAC.142  It covers a broader range of advertising 
content than the ABAC, particularly in relation to advertising that appeals to young people.143 
These provisions are outlined in Box 4 below. The Placement Code, by contrast, ‘is a set of 
ideal provisions about where alcohol advertising should appear in the physical and online 
environments, so as to protect young people from excessive exposure’.144 It prohibits the 
placement of alcohol advertisements in places or at broadcast times when young people are 
exposed or likely to be exposed, and in connection with content that appeals to young people 
(see also Box 4 below).145 The Placement Code covers a significant loophole in the ABAC 
Scheme, i.e. its failure to regulate the placement of alcohol advertisements.146  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
June-August 2012 (6 December 2012) McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and Youth, Cancer Council 
Western Australia <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/news/reports/>; Alcohol Advertising Review Board, 
Quarterly Report September-November 2012 (12 February 2013) McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and 
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Advertising Review Board, Annual Report 2012-13(11 June 2013) McCusker Centre for Action on Alcohol and 
Youth, Cancer Council Western Australia <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/news/annual-reports/>. 
142 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, The Code (2012) <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/about/the-
code/>; Melissa Sweet and Rebecca Johnson, 'Introducing a New Watchdog for Alcohol Marketing' on 
Croakey: The Crikey Health Blog (19 March 2012) 
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143 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Alcohol Advertising Review Board Content and Placement Code (2012) 
s 4(a) <http://www.alcoholadreview.com.au/resources/Alcohol-Advertising-Review-Board-Content-and-
Placement-Code-July-2012.pdf>. 
144 Sweet and Johnson, 'Introducing a New Watchdog for Alcohol Marketing,' above n 142. 
145 See Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Alcohol Advertising Review Board Content and Placement Code, 
above n 143. 
146 See Chapter 6; Simone Pettigrew, Rebecca Johnson and Mike Daube, 'Introducing and Applying a New 
Australian Alcohol Advertising Code' (2012) 13(1) Journal of Public Affairs 72, 73. 
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Box 4. Provisions of the Alcohol Advertising Review Board Code that apply to advertising’s 
appeal to young people 147 
 
ALCOHOL ADVERTISING REVIEW BOARD CONTENT CODE  
 
ALCOHOL-SPECIFIC PROVISIONS  
a. Young people 
i. Alcohol advertisements shall not: 
1. be directed at, or have a strong or evident appeal to, Young People 
2. associate any Product with youth or youth symbols, 
3. portray Product in the context of, or in relation to, an activity attractive primarily to Young 
People; or  
4. Include a person or character whose example is likely to be followed by Young People or who 
has strong appeal to Young People 
ii. Adults appearing in Alcohol Advertisements must be over 25 years of age and be clearly depicted 
as adults of this age. 
…… 
 
ALCOHOL ADVERTISING REVIEW BOARD PLACEMENT CODE 
 
1. Placement: General 
 
Alcohol advertisements should not be placed: 
ii. In places or at broadcast times when Young People are exposed or likely to be exposed; or 
iii. In connection with content that appeals to Young People. 
 
2. Television (free-to-air and pay TV) 
Alcohol Advertisements shall not be broadcast between 5am and 9pm. 
 
3. Radio 
Alcohol Advertisements shall not be broadcast between 5am and 9pm.  
4.  Cinema 
Alcohol Advertisements may only be shown during R18+ films. 
5.  Publications 
Alcohol Advertisements are not permitted in publications that appeal or are likely to appeal to Young People. This provision 
does not apply to alcohol industry publications. 
6. Outdoor 
Alcohol Advertisements are not permitted within 500m of schools. 
7.  Transport advertising 
No Alcohol Advertisements shall be placed on any means of public transport. No Alcohol Advertisements shall be placed at 
any train, tram, bus or ferry stops. 
8.  Internet 
Alcohol Advertisements shall not appear online in connection with content that appeals or is likely to appeal to Young 
People. 
9.  Sponsorship 
Alcohol Advertisements shall not appear at cultural or sporting events that appeal or are likely to appeal to Young People. 
 
                                                 
147 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Alcohol Advertising Review Board Content and Placement Code, above 
n 143. 
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In the AARB’s first year of operation it received 200 complaints and made 145 
determinations.148 The AARB Review Board upheld 104 complaints in full, 32 in part and 
dismissed nine.149 Nineteen companies refused to participate in the AARB process, but 13 
provided the AARB with a written response to complaints about their products.150 A handful 
of companies also took action to remedy non-compliant advertising. For example, Bacardi 
Lion removed a billboard from a bus shelter adjacent to a children’s playground.151 Yet 
overall, the alcohol and advertising industries are extremely hostile to the AARB. The 
Australian Association of National Advertisers (AANA) called it ‘a farce’, and demanded 
that it be disbanded.152 According to the AANA, the existing advertising self-regulatory 
system adequately protected consumers.153 Further, the AARB did not meet standards for 
good self-regulation, as the AARB had ‘set themselves up as judge, jury and executioner’: 
health organisations had established the scheme without community consultation, submitted 
anonymous complaints themselves and adjudicated on complaints using their own set of 
standards and members of their own networks.154 The three main alcohol industry bodies 
referred to the AARB as a ‘stunt’.155 They said that in contrast to the ABAC (which had the 
support of government), the AARB lacked authority and would only serve to confuse the 
community.156 
The AARB can be viewed as a form of civil regulation, i.e. an attempt by public health 
organisations to impose their own standards of advertising on the alcohol industry.157 It 
represents the reverse of the situation found in other areas of regulation, where industry 
organisations create self-regulation to challenge the operation of NGO-run schemes, or those 
proposed by governments and other organisations.158 For example, as part of its corporate 
                                                 
148 Alcohol Advertising Review Board, Annual Report 2012-13, above n 141, 1. 
149 Ibid. 
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responsibility strategy the tobacco industry attempted to develop a global voluntary 
regulatory regime as an alternative to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.159  
In the case of the AARB, public health advocates sought to reclaim the regulatory space that 
is currently occupied by the ABAC. The AARB uses complaint determinations to highlight 
the limitations of industry self-regulation, particularly the fact that the ABAC does not apply 
to a wide range of techniques that advertisers use to target young people, including placing 
advertisements on university campuses,160 and associating alcohol products with youth 
culture through sponsorship arrangements.161 The AARB ‘names and shames’ companies that 
undertake irresponsible alcohol advertising, by discussing companies’ response to the Review 
Board’s determinations in its reports,162 describing advertisements that target young people 
on its website, and reporting in the media on companies that refuse to engage with AARB 
processes.163 It challenges the credibility and legitimacy of the ABAC Scheme, building a 
stronger case for government regulation of alcohol advertising.164 
4. Collaborating with the food industry to strengthen self-regulation 
In this chapter, and in Chapter 7, I have demonstrated that there is little formal engagement 
between the food industry and public health groups in food advertising regulation. The 
question then is whether the self-regulatory system should provide for greater participation by 
external stakeholders as a means of improving the transparency and accountability of 
regulatory processes and strengthening substantive controls on food advertising to children.  
To answer this question, I asked interview participants whether they thought some form of 
co-regulatory or collaborative approach to advertising was possible with either the food or 
alcohol industries. 
In relation to food marketing, interviewees’ first choice was statutory restrictions on 
unhealthy food advertising during children’s peak television viewing times and on the use of 
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advertising techniques that appealed to children. However, some participants felt that co-
regulation was feasible as an interim measure, or as part of a step-wise approach to 
regulation. Unlike tobacco, food is not a restricted product, nor is it chemically addictive.165 
While the tobacco industry denied the addictiveness and harmful nature of its products,166 
parts of the food industry shows some responsiveness to concerns about the nutritional 
quality of its products and the legitimacy of its marketing practices.167 For these reasons, 
participants thought that there was some scope for working with the food industry. For 
example, the representative from one health organisation said that: 
[t]here are some organisations… that say… you cannot work with [the food] industry under any 
circumstances, and we actually don’t accept that view… because unlike tobacco…there is a safe level 
of consumption [of food products], and… the food industry itself is not universally evil, unlike the 
tobacco industry… there is a very solid case for engaging industry to do the right thing, because… 
some companies are doing some very good things in relation to a whole range of issues in the food 
space… 
Interviewees discussed successful public-private partnerships in other areas of food policy, 
most importantly the UK’s salt reduction initiative (which now forms part of the 
Responsibility Deal).168 In 2003, the Food Standards Authority (FSA) and the Department of 
Health committed to reduce salt intake in the British population from an average of 9.5g to 6g 
per person per day.169 To achieve this target, the FSA led work on voluntary product 
reformulation, undertook consumer awareness campaigns and encouraged the food industry 
to use interpretive nutrition labelling on its products.170 Following consultation with NGOs 
and the food industry, the FSA developed a Food Salt Model that mapped out salt reductions 
in 80 categories of food products.171 Participating companies then voluntarily reformulated 
products in order to meet the targets contained in the model. FSA monitoring shows that the 
salt reduction initiative had a positive effect: by 2008, the intervention had achieved an 
average of 0.9g per person reduction in daily salt intake, as well as reduced salt levels in key 
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food products, including breakfast cereals (a 43 per cent reduction in salt levels), branded, 
packaged pre-sliced bread (over 30 per cent) and ready to use pasta sauces (over 30 per 
cent).172 The interviewee from another public health organisation discussed the possibility of 
collaboration with the food industry in light of the success of the UK’s salt reduction program 
and the creation of the Responsibility Deal:  
Ideally you’d have government-legislated targets… But in the absence of a government willing to do 
that, we look to the UK model where they have engaged the industry … to reduce the quantities of 
[saturated fat, sugar and salt] in the food supply… voluntary agreements in the UK [have]… achieved a 
tangible reduction in population salt consumption in the space of about three or four years, and the 
importance of that move is enormous… 
Many participants saw product reformulation as a viable area for voluntary or co-regulatory 
approaches. However, they were more sceptical about the idea of working with the food 
industry on reducing advertising to children. The strength of the UK salt reduction program 
was that it involved voluntary action within a framework of government policy and 
leadership, rather than leaving the industry to set its own agenda – as remains the case with 
the RCMI and QSRI. Further, interviewees said that there was simply no economic reason for 
the industry to accept meaningful, voluntary constraints on advertising. Without government 
involvement in food advertising regulation, or a credible threat of statutory regulation, 
voluntary schemes were unlikely to be effective in reducing unhealthy food advertising to 
children. Interviewees also argued that food industry self-regulation forestalled more 
effective statutory regulation of food marketing. For example, one interviewee said that:  
…we are up against a very powerful industry that has put up these voluntary agreements… which 
have… bought them either time or breathing space or complete government inaction… 
Public health interviewees were united behind the idea that there should be strong 
government leadership in policy on food marketing to children, even if the regulatory scheme 
incorporated some element of voluntary action. They called for the Federal government to set 
targets for industry to achieve in reducing marketing to children, create economic incentives 
for industry to join the scheme, sanction non-compliant companies and threaten the industry 
with regulation. Participants said that there was enough evidence that the voluntary scheme 
was not working to justify government action on food advertising to children. Further, the 
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report of the National Preventive Health Taskforce created a mandate for government action 
in this area.173 The representative from one health advocacy organisation put this argument in 
the following terms:  
[The Federal government has said] said that [it will] monitor the situation and see how it goes, but… 
the evidence is fairly clear that… there’s been significant breaches and lack of action to enforce these 
voluntary agreements, so… it’s time to take legislative action to…put an end to…marketing to 
children. 
5. Collaboration with the alcohol industry  
Public health interviewees were sceptical about the idea of cooperation with the alcohol 
industry, perhaps more so than with the food industry. Similarly to Big Food, participants 
said that Big Alcohol had a strong economic incentive to advertise in a way that reached 
young people and recruited new drinkers. This reflected a broader conflict of interest between 
the industry’s objective of encouraging consumption of its products and the public health 
goal of minimising harmful alcohol use.174 Because of this conflict of interest, voluntary 
approaches were unlikely to reduce young people’s exposure to alcohol advertising. For 
example, one public health representative said that:  
The track record suggests that if you do leave it to the industry they won’t impose meaningful 
restrictions… because that would actually harm their bottom line… if you’re trusting [the industry] to 
self-regulate, knowing full well that they have to target this new market, the chances are that that’s not 
going to happen to the extent that it would give any public health gains. 
Participants drew comparisons between Big Food, Big Alcohol and Big Tobacco, arguing 
that all three were ‘adopting the same tried and tested methods, which are working for them 
every single time’.175 One interviewee argued that like the tobacco industry, the alcohol 
industry was aware that its advertising appealed to young people and that it deliberately 
marketed its products to attract young drinkers.176 In such circumstances, the industry should 
not be trusted to self-regulate: 
… I believe industry does understand what it’s doing… it’s really clear that [the tobacco industry 
needs] young people to become brand-conscious as early as possible… is the alcohol industry likely to 
                                                 
173 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health Strategy – Overview', above n 66, 14-
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174 See also the discussion in Chapter 8. 
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know the same thing? I think that’s… not an unfair extrapolation, that getting young people drinking 
early does actually suit them. 
As with food industry self-regulation, participants argued that the alcohol industry used its 
voluntary initiatives to forestall government regulation. Several interviewees discussed the 
industry’s response to criticism of the ABAC Scheme and how it prevented a meaningful 
government approach to alcohol advertising. A range of state and federal government bodies 
have scrutinised the ABAC’s operation, in addition to the influential review led by the 
Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy.177 Most recently, the report of the National Preventive 
Health Taskforce noted areas of concern in the scheme, including the continued exposure of 
young people to alcohol advertising on free-to-air television and low levels of public 
awareness of the ABAC.178 The alcohol industry presents itself as highly responsive to 
government criticism and willing to improve self-regulation. However, public health 
interviewees said that the industry did just enough to avoid further regulation without making 
significant changes to the scheme. Further, the industry’s flexibility made it a ‘moving target’ 
that was much harder to regulate. The interviewee from one public health organisation said 
that: 
 …the government keeps coming back, finding that [the ABAC has] been ineffective… making some 
recommendations… some of them get picked up in a really half-hearted way and then they move on to 
the next review two years later where it says the exact same thing… so you keep getting patchwork 
[revisions] done on the code, but that patchwork… never really addressed the fact that the code 
remains… essentially as it was when it was developed 13 years ago. 
One public health researcher said that the industry’s lack of responsiveness to community and 
government concerns meant that it should be excluded from regulatory efforts:  
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… if you think back to the Senate Committee hearing on the Alcohol Toll Reduction Bill…the NSW 
Alcohol Summit…  all the papers that have been published about this, there have been numerous points 
at which we have said this is not working. The government has given industry another go to improve 
and it has not improved. So no, I don’t have any faith that we could work with the industry to make 
[the ABAC Scheme] work. 
As in obesity prevention, contemporary approaches to alcohol policy often involve 
participation by the alcohol industry. Interviewees discussed DrinkWise as an Australian 
example of a collaborative initiative with the alcohol industry. Although it was created by the 
alcohol industry, DrinkWise has received federal government funding179 and its board 
includes seven community representatives as well as six industry members.180 However, 
researchers question its independence from industry and whether its education programs are 
likely to reduce alcohol-related harm.181 One interviewee said that the creation of DrinkWise 
hampered genuine alcohol harm reduction efforts. Another argued that the alcohol industry 
used DrinkWise to influence government’s alcohol policy efforts:  
… both [political] parties get massive donations from the hospitality and liquor industries, so it’s no 
surprise that the Chair of DrinkWise is on the Australian Preventive Health Agency Advisory Council 
and the Chair of the Brewer’s Association is on that organisation’s Expert Committee on Alcohol… the 
alcohol industry…  has insinuated themselves into government health advisory groups, or set up 
organisations like DrinkWise that purport to put on a responsible face.  
The tone of the interview data suggested a more adversarial relationship between public 
health advocates and the alcohol industry than the food industry. This is illustrated by the 
creation of the AARB, which directly challenges the ABAC Scheme. Interviewees saw less 
scope for collaboration and called for strong government leadership in alcohol policy and the 
exclusion of industry actors from processes of policy development. Interviewees wanted to 
see the ABAC expanded to cover excluded forms of marketing such as sports sponsorship, as 
well as administration of the scheme by an independent organisation or a government agency.  
6. Is collaboration an effective approach to food advertising regulation?  
Evidence of successful public-private partnerships suggests that there is some scope for 
collaboration between public health and industry actors. However, engagement with industry 
                                                 
179 DrinkWise Australia, About (2012) <http://www.drinkwise.org.au/about/>. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Wayne D Hall and Robin Room, 'Assessing the Wisdom of Funding DrinkWise' (2006) 185(11/12) Medical 
Journal of Australia 635; Peter Miller and Kypros Kypri, 'Why We Will Not Accept Funding From Drinkwise' 
(2009) 28(3) Drug and Alcohol Review 324. 
 
330 
 
comes with considerable risks.182 For example, the tobacco industry used philanthropy to 
convert NGOs and other organisations into stakeholders that would support companies’ 
policies and practices.183 Michele Simon writes that Pepsico’s employment of health experts 
is one example of the company ‘co-opting the scientific conversation around public health 
and diet’, and disguises its underlying agenda of ‘marketing and selling highly processed 
food and beverage products to the world’.184  
The ABAC Scheme also illustrates the pitfalls of public health participation in industry 
initiatives. Because governance processes are predominantly industry based, public health 
and government representation seems mostly ‘symbolic’ or tokenistic, and has no real 
influence over the operation of the scheme or the content of the code.185 Where industry 
retains control of governance processes, public health participation is unlikely to result in 
stronger regulatory standards, improved transparency and accountability or more effective 
enforcement processes. External participation may benefit the industry, but it can come at 
considerable expense to the health actors involved, including a loss of independence, public 
trust and credibility in the eyes of the wider public health community.186  
Another problem with collaborative approaches is that the industry tends to dominate 
partnership arrangements to the detriment of public health interests. A report on the 
Responsibility Deal described how NGOs working on the salt reduction pledge experienced 
considerable pressure from food industry participants to water down the commitments.187 
Consequently, the final pledge simply reiterated the salt reduction targets set by the FSA in 
2012. The food industry had already agreed to those targets in 2008, so the Deal effectively 
made no progress in this area.188 This supports the public health argument that collaborative 
approaches are unlikely to lead to effective, evidence-based policy, because of the conflict of 
interest between public health and the food industry’s profit.189  
                                                 
182 See Hawkes and Buse, 'Public Health Sector and Food Industry Interaction', above n 22. 
183 Tesler and Malone, above n 9. 
184 Simon, above n 20, 111. 
185 See also Pettigrew, Johnson and Daube, above n 146, 73. 
186 Kraak et al, above n 31, 504; Jeffrey P Koplan and Kelly D Brownell, 'Response of the Food and Beverage 
Industry to the Obesity Threat' (2010) 304(13) Journal of the American Medical Association 1487. 
187 Hashem, Haigh and Powell, above n 28, 8. 
188 Ibid. 
189 See Gilmore, Savell and Collin, above n 16; Nigel Hawkes, 'BMA Meeting: BMA Condemns Government's 
"Responsibility Deals" with Food and Drinks Industries' (2011) 342 British Medical Journal d4166 
<http://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d4166?rss=1>. 
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Public health organisations are uneasy about partnership arrangements with the alcohol 
industry for similar reasons.190 Six leading UK health organisations walked out of the Deal’s 
Alcohol Network, which includes representatives from alcohol industry trade associations 
and companies including Diageo, Heineken and Bacardi Brown-Forman.191 Health sector 
participants were concerned that the Deal promoted ineffective interventions while ignoring 
substantive issues like the availability and promotion of alcohol.192 Their actions prompted 
two other health organisations participating in the Food Network not to sign up to the Deal.193 
The Responsibility Deal illustrates how industry can take charge of collaborative 
arrangements and use them to further its own interests, even in the context of a relatively 
strong government presence. For these reasons, public health organisations should carefully 
weigh up the costs and benefits of participating in industry initiatives or endorsing voluntary 
approaches.  
Effective forms of partnership are designed to prevent any one interest from dominating the 
scheme, and to give all parties a genuine opportunity to participate in collaborative 
processes.194 Arguably, public health initiatives should also involve government leadership, 
monitoring and oversight. For example, government agencies hosted the UK salt reduction 
initiative, set the objectives to be achieved, designed salt reduction targets and ran a 
comprehensive monitoring system to track participants’ progress in meeting these targets.195 
However, as with the ABAC Scheme, the food industry maintains close control over the 
regulatory processes attached to the RCMI and QSRI. In these circumstances there is 
significant capacity for the industry to use public health participants in a way that suits the 
industry’s agenda rather than as a means to strengthen the public’s interest in self-
regulation.196 This is particularly the case given that there is a significant imbalance of power 
                                                 
190 See Daube, above n 13; Hashem, Haigh and Powell, above n 28, 4; Anna B Gilmore and Gary Fooks, 'Global 
Fund Needs to Address Conflict of Interest' (2012) 90(1) Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 71. 
191 Hashem, Haigh and Powell, above n 28, 4; Department of Health, Alcohol Network’s Core Group (undated) 
<http://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/alcohol-networks-core-group/>. 
192 Gornall, above n 38, 1-2. 
193 Hashem, Haigh and Powell, above n 28, 4; Sarah Boseley, 'Lansley's Health Strategy Flounders as More 
Organisations Refuse to Join', The Guardian (online) 15 March 2011 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/mar/15/lansley-health-strategy-flounders-refuse>. 
194 Bostrom, above n 1, 355; Ansell and Gash, above n 126, 546. 
195 See Webster et al, above n 172, 1046-1047. 
196 Wiist, above n 29. 
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between the food industry and public health actors, considering the industry’s economic and 
political power.197  
Self-regulation could be re-designed to overcome some of these problems, for example by 
equally distributing decision-making power between industry and external stakeholders.198 
However, the food industry is unlikely to voluntarily endorse a truly collaborative approach, 
as it would mean relinquishing control over its self-regulatory system. As with many other 
voluntary programs, meaningful engagement between industry and public health actors is 
unlikely to occur spontaneously.199 Rather, government action will be required to provide 
impartial leadership, empower external participants and create the institutional supports for 
effective quasi- or co-regulatory approaches to food advertising regulation.200 
7. Conclusion  
A collaborative approach is not viable in relation to food advertising regulation. Interviewees 
said that the alcohol and food industries had not attempted genuine self-regulation, but did 
only what was necessary to stave off public health criticism and prevent government 
regulation. Consequently, they were not appropriate partners for collaboration. The ABAC 
Scheme also points to the risk that external engagement in industry initiatives lends 
credibility to private regulation without creating more demanding regulatory standards or 
more transparent and accountable governance processes. It may also dilute the government’s 
policy response and undermine public health advocacy efforts. Public health organisations 
should be wary of participating in food industry initiatives, including the RCMI and QSRI, as 
the conditions are not present for the scheme to operate as a successful voluntary or quasi-
regulatory program (as demonstrated in Chapters 6 to 9). It may be appropriate for public 
health stakeholders to collaborate with the alcohol and food industries, but only within a 
framework of government support and oversight that protects public health interests. 
Accordingly, the next chapter explores the ways in which food industry self-regulation could 
be transformed into a co-regulatory system with a more significant role for the state.
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CHAPTER 11 
‘Scaffolding’ self-regulation: government intervention in food 
industry initiatives 
This chapter explores how food industry self-regulation might be improved through 
government intervention. It draws upon arguments and analysis from previous chapters, as 
well as data from my interviews with public health representatives, the UK Advertising 
Standards Authority (ASA) and from document analysis. The chapter begins by describing 
the challenges governments face when directly regulating public health, using the US 
Interagency Working Group on Food Marketing to Children as a case study. This sets the 
scene for considering new forms of public health governance in relation to food marketing. 
First I explore how the Australian Federal government currently influences food industry 
self-regulation. I argue that the Federal government should strengthen its involvement in the 
scheme, while acknowledging that there are significant barriers to the introduction of 
statutory regulation. The next section of the chapter then considers how food industry self-
regulation can be incrementally strengthened through the use of ‘regulatory scaffolds’ that 
improve the terms and conditions of the RCMI and QSRI and enhance their regulatory 
processes.1 Taking a responsive regulatory approach, I argue that government must threaten 
the food industry with escalating levels of intervention should an expanded scheme fail to 
reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.2  
1. Public health regulation in an era of big business and small government  
Public health advocates prefer a model of public health law based on ‘command-and-control’ 
regulation, i.e. prescriptive rules developed, administered and enforced by state bodies.3 As 
described in Chapter 10, many public health advocates support this approach to regulating 
food advertising, arguing that governments should introduce legislative measures that 
                                                 
1 See Roger S Magnusson and Belinda H Reeve, 'Regulation and the Prevention Agenda' (2013) 199(2) Medical 
Journal of Australia 89. 
2 See Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, 1992), and the other references in Chapter 2 above. 
3 Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood, 'Introduction' in Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and 
Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998) 1, 14. See, e.g., Robert 
Beaglehole et al, 'Public Health in the New Era: Improving Health through Collective Action' (2004) 363(9426) 
The Lancet 2084; Tim Lang, 'Food, the Law and Public Health: Three Models of the Relationship' (2006) 120 
Public Health 30; Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint Lawrence Gostin, Public 
Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint (University of California Press, 3rd ed, 2012). 
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eliminate scope for industry manipulation and mandate compliance.4 They claim that 
legislative bans are more effective than voluntary schemes, have wide community support 
and respect children’s right to health.5 Government leadership is also appropriate given the 
state’s duty to protect the welfare of its population and its necessary role in addressing the 
social determinants of health.6 Further, there is little reason to allow the food industry to self-
regulate, given evidence that voluntary initiatives contain lenient standards, establish 
inadequate administrative and enforcement arrangements and make few improvements to the 
food marketing environment in practice.7 
However, there are significant political constraints on the capacity of government to impose 
direct statutory controls for food advertising.  First, industry has already claimed the 
regulatory space by creating, administering and enforcing systems of governance.8 Second, 
government action is constrained by growing demands for interventions to be evidence-
based.9 Arguments for restrictions on food advertising derive from studies suggesting a 
causal link between exposure to unhealthy food advertising and diet-related health, implying 
that advertising regulation would be an effective obesity prevention measure.10 However, 
industry (and some government) actors question whether the evidence base is sufficient to 
warrant statutory forms of action.11 Like Big Tobacco, the food industry denies that 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., J Lumley, J Martin and N Antonopoulos, 'Exposing the Charade - The Failure to Protect Children 
from Unhealthy Food Advertising' (Obesity Policy Coalition, 2012) 
<http://www.opc.org.au/paper.aspx?ID=exposing-the-charade&Type=policydocuments>; David Stuckler and 
Marion Nestle, 'Big Food, Big Systems and Global Health' (2012) 9(6) PLoS Medicine e1001242 
<http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001242>. 
5 See Chapter 1 for a fuller version of these arguments. 
6 Chapter 3 sets out justifications for government intervention in public health. 
7 These points are comprehensively discussed in Chapters 6 to 9. 
8 See, e.g., Julia Black, 'Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
''Post-Regulatory'' World' (2001) 54(1) Current Legal Problems 103, 128; Tim Bartley, 'Institutional Emergence 
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9 Don Nutbeam, 'How Does Evidence Influence Public Health Policy? Tackling Health Inequalities in England' 
(2003) 14(3) Health Promotion Journal of Australia 154; Ross C Brownson, Jonathan E Fielding and 
Christopher M Maylahn, 'Evidence-Based Public Health: A Fundamental Concept for Public Health Practice' 
(2009) 30 Annual Review of Public Health 175. See also Gostin, above n 3, 63 (and Chapter 3 above). 
10 See Rogan Kersch and James Morone, 'The Politics of Obesity: Seven Steps to Government Action' (2002) 
21(6) Health Affairs 142, 14; Corinna Hawkes, 'Regulating Food Marketing to Young People Worldwide: 
Trends and Policy Drivers' (2007) 97(11) American Journal of Public Health 1962. See also the discussion in 
Chapter 4 about how different actors in food advertising regulation use evidence on the effects of self-regulation 
to support or challenge government intervention in this area. 
11 See, e.g., Martin Caraher, Jane Landon and Kath Dalmey, 'Television Advertising and Children: Lessons 
From Policy Development' (2006) 9(5) Public Health Nutrition 596, 602; Alexandra Chung et al, 'An Analysis 
of Potential Barriers and Enablers to Regulating the Television Marketing of Unhealthy Foods to Children at the 
State Government Level in Australia' (2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 1123, 1126. 
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advertising influences product choice, meaning that legislation would constitute an over-
reaction to the health risks posed by food marketing.12 This is despite an increasingly large 
body of research that suggests a plausible connection between unhealthy food advertising and 
obesity, independent of other contributing factors.13 
 In the United States, Constitutional protection of commercial free speech imposes additional 
obstacles to government regulation of food advertising.14 Legal systems permit limitations on 
commercial speech in order to prevent threats to public health and to protect children from 
harm.15 However, First Amendment jurisprudence requires regulation to be designed to 
restrict child-targeted advertising while not unduly restricting promotions to adults.16 For 
example, the US Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts regulation that banned tobacco 
advertising within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds,17 on the basis that ‘the governmental 
interest in protecting children from harmful materials… does not justify an unnecessarily 
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults’.18 Thus, restrictions on advertisements that 
are seen by both children and adults may be vulnerable to legal challenge where they 
significantly limit the ability of advertisers to communicate with adult audiences.19 Although 
the Australian constitution does not explicitly protect commercial free speech, below I 
discuss how neo-liberal policy approaches effectively prevent the Federal government from 
taking decisive action to reduce children’s exposure to food marketing.  
The food industry will attack any attempt by government to influence its marketing, either by 
legislation or by less intrusive measures.20  For example, in 2009 the US Congress directed 
the Federal government to convene an Interagency Working Group on Marketing to Children, 
with representatives from the US Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Agriculture, 
                                                 
12 Australian Food and Grocery Council, Marketing to Children - Need to Restate the Facts (12 November 
2012) <http://www.afgc.org.au/media-releases/1311-marketing-to-children-need-to-restate-the-facts.html>. 
13 See Chapter 1 for a description of this evidence. 
14 See Michelle M Mello, 'Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Food Advertising to Children: Possibilities 
for a Reinvigorated Role' (2010) 35(2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 227, 264; Jennifer Pomeranz, 
'Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited: The Federal Trade Commission Has the Constitutional and 
Statutory Authority to Regulate' (2010) 38(1) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 98. 
15 Ronald Bayer and Amy L Fairchild, 'The Genesis of Public Health Ethics' (2004) 18(6) Bioethics 473, 486, 
489. 
16 Mello, above n 14, 256. 
17 Lorillard v Reilly 533 US 525 (2001).  
18 Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 521 US 844 (1997) 875 cited in Lorillard v Reilly 533 US 525 (2001) 
564. 
19 Mello, above n 14, 256-257. 
20 Ibid. See also Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health 
(University of California Press, 2002); Michele Simon, 'Can Food Companies Be Trusted to Self-Regulate? An 
Analysis of Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine Children’s Health' (2006) 39 Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review 169. 
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the Centres for Disease Control and the Food and Drug Administration.21 This group sought 
to develop uniform standards for the nutritional quality of foods promoted to children, 
following concerns that the US Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative 
(CFBAI) allowed participants to use their own complex and weak criteria.22 In 2011 the 
Working Group released draft principles that limited the amount of sodium, sugar and fat in 
foods advertised to children, as well as setting a minimum content for healthier food groups 
such as fruits, vegetables and low-fat milk products.23  The Working Group stressed the non-
legislative nature of the standards, which the industry would apply in existing self-regulatory 
initiatives.24 It called on the industry to adopt the standards voluntarily by 2016.25  
In October 2011, following public consultation, two House of Congress Energy and 
Commerce subcommittees jointly convened a hearing to consider submissions on the 
proposal.26 Members of the food industry and the Republican Party argued that the standards 
were overly broad, ineffective, ‘quasi-regulatory’ and encroached on First Amendment 
rights.27 Major food companies also banded together under the ‘Sensible Food Policy 
Coalition’ to lobby against the nutritional standards – to the value of US$6.6 million in the 
                                                 
21 Vivica I Kraak et al, 'Industry Progress to Market a Healthful Diet to American Children and Adolescents' 
(2011) 41(3) American Journal of Preventive Medicine 322, 328. 
22 Dale Kunkel, Christopher McKinley and Paul Wright, 'The Impact of Industry Self-Regulation on the 
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Guide Industry Self-Regulatory Efforts' (Federal Trade Commission, 28 April 2011) 
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24 Ibid. See also David Vladeck, 'What's on the Table' on Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
Commission, Business Centre Blog (1 July 2011) <http://business.ftc.gov/blog/2011/07/whats-table>. 
25 Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to Children, 'Preliminary Proposed Nutrition Principles', 
above n 23, 30. 
26 Doug Trapp, 'Proposed Standards Scaled Back for Food Marketing Aimed at Children', American Medical 
News (online) 24 October 2011 
<http://www.amednews.com/article/20111024/government/310249952/7/#relatedcontenthed>. 
27 See Marion Nestle, 'The Food Industry vs. Nutrition Standards: A First Amendment Issue?' on Marion Nestle, 
Food Politics (6 September 2011) <http://www.foodpolitics.com/2011/09/the-food-industry-vs-nutrition-
standards-a-first-amendment-issue/> Food Marketing: Can ‘Voluntary’ Government Restrictions Improve 
Children’s Health? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce Manufacturing and Trade and 
Subcommittee on Health of the House Energy and Commerce Committee (12 October 2011) (opening statement 
of Fred Upton, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman) 
<http://archives.republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/hearingdetail.aspx?NewsID=8973>; Food 
Marketing: Can ‘Voluntary’ Government Restrictions Improve Children’s Health? Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Commerce Manufacturing and Trade and Subcommittee on Health of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee (12 October 2011) (statement of Jim Baughman, Senior Marketing Counsel, Campbell 
Soup Company) 
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first quarter of 2011.28 Consequently, the Working Group significantly weakened its original 
proposal, revising the coverage of its advertising standards from children 16 years of age and 
under, to those aged less than 12 years. It also excluded marketing through philanthropy, 
sponsorship, entertainment and sports events, brand equity characters and product packaging, 
all of which were included in the standard’s original definition of marketing.29  
Congress further delayed the guidelines by inserting a clause into the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 2012 that required the Working Group to perform a cost/benefit analysis 
of its final recommendations,30 a measure typically applied only to mandatory regulations.31 
In response to the Working Group’s activities, the CFBAI introduced a uniform nutrient 
profiling scheme that takes effect in December 2013.32 Although more demanding than 
existing company-specific schemes, these standards restrict fewer products in advertising to 
children than those of the Working Group.33 
The failure of the Interagency Working Group demonstrates the power of food industry 
lobbying and its influence over the US Federal Government.34 It also illustrates the complex 
relationships between public and private actors in food governance, where governments are 
                                                 
28 Lyndsey Layton and Dan Eggen, 'Industries Lobby Against Voluntary Nutrition Guidelines for Food 
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House Energy and Commerce Committee (12 October 2011) (statement of David C Vladeck, Director of the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) 
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attempting to regulate a powerful global industry that increasingly creates its own de facto 
regulatory standards rather than simply complying with those that have been promulgated by 
the state.35 At the same time, governments often invite the industry to be an active participant 
in obesity prevention initiatives, by contributing to the formulation of national nutrition 
policy, affiliating with government initiatives and participating in private-public 
partnerships.36 As a result, many countries have found it difficult to directly regulate food 
advertising to children, defaulting to industry self-regulation.37 However, governments and 
health agencies continue to show interest in new ways of shaping, steering or influencing 
food industry action, as an intermediate measure between legislation and ‘pure’ self-
regulation.38 Key to many proposals is step-wise or incremental action, incorporating 
transition periods, phased restrictions and the threat of more coercive regulatory measures, all 
of which bears a close resemblance to responsive regulation.39 This chapter explores the 
potential for a similar incremental strengthening of the RCMI and QSRI by first examining 
existing government influence over the scheme. 
2. Australian Federal government influence in food industry self-regulation  
Chapter 2 outlined the broader regulatory framework that the RCMI and QSRI operate in, 
including co-regulatory arrangements under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) and 
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the self-regulatory system created by the advertising industry. It also discussed how the terms 
of the two codes explicitly link them to the broader advertising regulatory system. For 
example, the RCMI and QSRI require that companies comply with the Children’s Television 
Standards (CTS) 2009 that relate to the use of popular personalities and characters, and 
premium offers in advertising to children.40 The codes also specify that companies must 
abide by the advertising industry’s codes of conduct, namely the Code of Ethics, the Food 
and Beverages Advertising and Marketing Communications Code, and the Code for 
Advertising and Marketing Communications to Children.41   
 
Chapter 2 described inadequate monitoring and enforcement of the CTS 2009 (and other 
advertising regulatory instruments), permitting advertisers to breach the standards with little 
fear of being sanctioned.42 Combined with the limited scope of the CTS 2009, this lack of 
enforcement means that the legislative underpinning to the RCMI and QSRI do not support 
the objective of reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. Thus, a critical 
first step to improving the self-regulatory scheme is strengthening existing statutory controls 
on advertising to children by providing for more effective enforcement of the CTS 2009. 
 
As well as providing the regulatory framework for the codes’ operation, a series of 
government reviews encouraged the food industry to self-regulate.  Chapter 1 described the 
main impetus for the RCMI, namely the review of the CTS 2005 by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA),43 as well as the 2009 report on obesity 
prevention by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Aging.44 In 
the same year, the National Preventive Health Taskforce released its strategy for chronic 
                                                 
40 Australian Food and Grocery Council, The Responsible Children's Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food 
and Beverage Industry (March 2011) 1  <http://afgc.org.au/industry-codes/advertising-to-children/rcmi.html>; 
Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry, Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children 
(June 2009) 1 Australian Association of National Advertisers 
<http://www.aana.com.au/QuickServiceRestaurantInitative.htm>. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Michele Roberts et al, 'Compliance with Children's Television Food Advertising Regulations in Australia' 
(2012) 12(1) BMC Public Health 846. 
43 See Chapters 1 and 7 for further description of how the RCMI and QSRI were developed. The QSRI followed 
from the creation of the RCMI and is not explicitly linked to the ACMA’s review in the same way as the RCMI. 
See also Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Review of the Children's Television Standards 
2005: Final Report of the Review' (Australian Government, August 2009) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/Childrens-TV/childrens-television-standards-review>. 
44 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Parliament of Australia Weighing It 
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disease prevention, which critiqued the operation of the RCMI. The Taskforce recommended 
that the Federal government monitor the code, and incrementally strengthen the regulatory 
scheme if it failed to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising.45 However, 
the response from government provided tacit support for food industry self-regulation, and 
little suggestion that it would restrict unhealthy food advertising through legislative 
measures.46 Rather, the government agreed to monitor the effectiveness of self-regulation in 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, via the Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) (described in Chapter 4).47  
Prior to ANPHA’s establishment, the ACMA evaluated the RCMI and QSRI and released a 
report on their operation, which I described in Chapter 4.48 To summarise, the report 
highlighted significant limitations in the self-regulatory regime, including the narrow terms of 
the two codes and a lack of publicly available information on their operation.49 The ACMA 
concluded that self-regulation had not fully addressed community concerns about food 
advertising and that it was unclear whether it had reduced children’s exposure to unhealthy 
food advertising on free-to-air television.50 However, it decided not to conduct further 
monitoring of the initiatives. As a broadcasting regulator, the ACMA said it was ‘neither 
equipped nor resourced to make independent judgments on issues of public and preventive 
health’.51 It acknowledged the creation of ANPHA which, as a public health agency, was 
better placed to promote a whole-of-government response to obesity prevention and to take 
the lead in monitoring and evaluating the initiatives.52 
At an August 2011 Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, the South Australian Minister 
for Health raised evidence that the RCMI and QSRI were unsuccessful in reducing children’s 
                                                 
45  National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'National Preventative Health Strategy - The Roadmap for Action' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 125 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
46 Australian Government, 'Taking Preventative Action: A Response to Australia: The Healthiest Country by 
2020, The Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) 46 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/>. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See Australian Communications and Media Authority, 'Industry Self-Regulation of Food and Beverage 
Advertising to Children. ACMA Monitoring Report' (Australian Government, December 2011) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310132/industry_self-regulation-
advertising_to_children_monitoring_report-dec2011.pdf>. 
49 Ibid15-21, 28-32. 
50 Ibid 6. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid 37. 
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exposure to unhealthy food advertising.53 Following a discussion of this evidence, Australian 
Health Ministers agreed on the following actions:54 
• The Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council would work with ANPHA and the 
South Australian Government to organise a national seminar on food marketing to 
children; 
• ANPHA would review recent monitoring of food advertising, related evidence and 
relevant reports, and report back in 2012; and  
• The Food Regulation Standing Committee would provide advice by early 2012 on 
developing suitable criteria for determining unhealthy foods that are not appropriate 
for advertising to children. 
In May 2012, South Australia Health, ANPHA and the Australian Health Ministers Advisory 
Council held a seminar to discuss action on food advertising to children.55 Attended by 
government, industry and public health representatives, the seminar identified reducing 
children’s exposure to food marketing as a key policy goal, along with creating a clear 
mechanism for evaluating whether this objective has been achieved.56 Despite industry claims 
that self-regulation was reducing food advertising to children, governments and public health 
participants remained concerned about children’s exposure to advertising during key 
television viewing periods, as well as in other media falling outside the codes.57 However, the 
seminar focused on ‘strengthening current industry initiatives in the short to medium term 
through further discussion and engagement’.58 This was to be facilitated by the establishment 
of a government-industry working group, the National Working Group on Food Marketing to 
Children, which included representatives of the AFGC, ANPHA and South Australia Health. 
The Working Group’s key activities would be to: 59 
•  Measure and reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food marketing; 
                                                 
53 Department of Health and Ageing, Weighing It Up: Obesity in Australia (5 May 2013) Australian 
Government <http://health.gov.au/internet/publications/publishing.nsf/Content/weighing-it-up~recommend11>. 
54 Ibid; Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Draft Frameworks for Monitoring Television Marketing 
and Advertising to Children for Unhealthy Food and Drinks – Issues Paper (April 2013) 4-5 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/frameworks-monitoring-unhealthy-food-drafts>. 
55 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Communiqué, National Seminar on Food Advertising and 
Marketing to Children (24 May 2012) ANPHA, SA Health 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/news-20120524>. 
56 Ibid 2. 
57 Ibid 3. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 4. 
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• Develop a framework to facilitate regular, independent monitoring of unhealthy food 
marketing directed to children in a standardised format, including agreed mechanisms 
and metrics for analysing and reporting on advertising data;  
• Provide input and advice to reviews of the food and advertising industry codes 
undertaken by relevant industry bodies; 
• Consider the development of standardised nutritional criteria for identifying products 
that are appropriate for advertising to children; and  
• Consider whether marketing activities in children’s sport are consistent with the intent 
of the RCMI and QSRI. 
Despite the concerns raised at the seminar, the food industry did not indicate that it would 
strengthen its voluntary codes.60 However, ANPHA commissioned the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to review recent research on 
children’s exposure to food and beverage marketing on television.61 In October 2012, 
ANPHA released a report evaluating children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising since 
the introduction of the RCMI and QSRI.62 Chapter 4 described the findings of this report, 
which found that there was little food advertised during C and P classified programs, but that 
the amount of unhealthy food advertising was high during G rated programs with large child 
audiences.63 Further, changes in patterns of food advertising could not be attributed to the 
creation of the initiatives because a consistent method had not been applied across the 
studies.64  
In April 2013 ANPHA released two draft frameworks to facilitate independent monitoring of 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food marketing.65 The frameworks set out criteria for 
sampling periods; the definition of children; data sources; television programs to be 
examined; classification of unhealthy products; and indicators for analysis.66 One framework 
concerns children’s exposure to television advertising of unhealthy food during C, P and G-
                                                 
60 Department of Health and Ageing, Weighing It Up: Obesity in Australia, above n 53. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Lisa G Smithers, John W Lynch and Tracy Merlin, 'Television Marketing of Unhealthy Food and Beverages 
to Children in Australia: A Review of Published Evidence from 2009' (Australian National Preventive Health 
Agency, 2012) <http://www.anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/publications>.  
63 Ibid 156. 
64 Ibid 37. See also Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Overweight and Obesity Prevention (2 May 
2013) <http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/obesity-home>. 
65 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Draft Frameworks for Monitoring Television Marketing and 
Advertising to Children of Unhealthy Food and Drinks (13 May 2013) 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/draft-frameworks-tv-marketing-children>. 
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rated programs and during programs with a significant child viewing audience.67 The second 
monitors compliance with the initiatives by measuring the number and frequency of 
unhealthy food advertisements in media directed primarily to children (according to the terms 
of the codes) and the proportion of this advertising by signatory companies.68 ANPHA 
intends to review the frameworks after two years in operation.69 At the time of writing, 
ANPHA had released an issues paper and was seeking public comment on the frameworks’ 
operation.70 ANPHA expects to release the two frameworks as a voluntary guideline for 
parties interested in researching and monitoring the amount of, and children’s exposure to, 
television advertising for unhealthy food, as well as food industry compliance with self-
regulation.71 This is in accordance with ANPHA’s powers to ‘develop national standards and 
codes of practice relating to preventive health matters’ under the Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 (Cth).72   
ANPHA had also requested advice from the Food Regulatory Standing Committee on 
developing nutrition criteria to support self-regulation of food advertising. However, the 
Standing Committee’s advice was delayed by its work on a front-of-pack labelling scheme 
and the standard for nutrition and health claims.73 The Committee was to provide advice to 
ANPHA at a June 2013 meeting of the Legislative and Government Forum on Food 
Regulation.74 However, it appears that the Forum did not consider the criteria at the meeting, 
although it may recommend the use of the Nutrient Profiling Scoring Criterion recently 
developed for the health and nutrition claims standard.75 
It is too early to say whether ANPHA’s monitoring frameworks will significantly strengthen 
food industry self-regulation. However, the frameworks contain significant limitations that 
                                                 
67 Defined as time periods where the number of children watching television across all time periods is greater 
than 35 per cent of the maximum child audience for the day. See Australian National Preventive Health Agency, 
Framework 1 (10 May 2013) <http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/framework-1>. 
68 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Framework 2 (10 May 2013) 
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could undermine their usefulness. For example, they define children narrowly as under age 
12 or 14 (depending on whether the RCMI or QSRI is being evaluated) and apply only to 
television advertising.76 One of proposed indicators in Framework 1 is the proportion of total 
food advertisements that are for unhealthy products in programs with large child audiences.77 
This is not a meaningful indicator for describing children’s exposure to advertising and may 
be misleading where programs contain only a few advertisements for food products.78  
The two frameworks have different objectives, data and definitions, with one monitoring 
children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising and the other monitoring companies’ 
compliance with their own commitments under the codes. Accordingly, the results from 
studies using one framework cannot be compared to results from the other.79 Studies using 
Framework 2 might conclude that the industry is complying with the codes, but this does not 
necessarily mean that children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising has diminished.80 
While it is important to evaluate industry compliance with voluntary codes, it must be kept in 
mind that a high level of compliance with weak self-regulation will not produce significant 
changes in the marketing environment. Thus, any results of studies using Framework 2 would 
need to be considered in light of those from studies using Framework 1. 
3. Strengthening government intervention in the RCMI and QSRI  
Despite these concerns, the ANPHA frameworks represent growing government interest in 
food industry self-regulation and in incrementally strengthening state oversight of the 
scheme. The question is whether there is now sufficient government involvement in self-
regulation to ensure that it reduces children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. As they 
stand, the codes cannot reasonably achieve this goal. This thesis has described numerous 
weaknesses and loopholes in their terms and conditions, combined with administration and 
enforcement that is ineffective and lacks transparency and accountability. There are also few 
economic or other incentives for the industry to adopt more demanding standards. Further, 
evidence indicates that the codes have not significantly reduced children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising and they have failed to address community concerns about 
advertising and childhood obesity.  
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At present, Federal government intervention consists of developing standards for monitoring 
of food advertising by other parties. It does not appear that ANPHA will monitor the RCMI 
and QSRI directly, nor has the government sought to improve the terms and conditions of 
self-regulation. Government bodies encouraged the creation of the codes and used them as a 
justification for not directly regulating food advertising. However, the food industry did not 
consult with government in developing the code nor does it involve public actors in self-
regulatory processes.81 Although independent monitoring is a step in the right direction, the 
many failures of self-regulation mean that further government intervention is likely to be 
necessary if these initiatives are to contribute to obesity prevention. The ABAC Scheme also 
illustrates the need for a comprehensive system of government monitoring, intervention and 
oversight, as limited government engagement risks industry co-option of the public interest in 
voluntary codes. 
Barriers to legislative restrictions on food advertising to children  
This argument does not imply that statutory regulation is the solution to reducing children’s 
exposure to food advertising. There are a number of barriers to government regulation, 
meaning that command-and-control options may not be practical or politically feasible, at 
least not immediately. Chapter 8 described how the food industry is Australia’s largest 
manufacturing sector and a significant employer in rural and regional areas of Australia.82 
The government relies upon industry income to support its activities and to increase 
productivity and employment, thus enhancing its popularity with the voting public.83 The 
industry’s economic strength makes it a powerful lobby group with considerable influence 
over policy development processes.84 One public health interviewee said that food industry 
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representatives were skilled at drawing upon economic arguments to protect the industry’s 
position, pointing out the impact of legislation on industry employment.85  
The industry has taken a proactive stance to criticisms of its role in the obesity epidemic, 
populating the regulatory space with a range of voluntary initiatives.86 These include the 
Code of Practice for Food Labelling and Promotion, the Daily Intake Guide Labelling 
scheme and the ‘Healthier Australia Commitment’.87 One of the AFGC’s roles is to point to 
the success of such voluntary programs and to vigorously resist any (government-led) 
alternatives. For example, Australian Health Ministers recently announced the introduction of 
a voluntary front-of-pack labelling system that gives processed foods a star rating based on 
their fat, sugar and saturated fat content.88 The star system challenges the industry’s own 
Daily Intake Guide labelling scheme, particularly as the Federal government will consider a 
mandatory program if star labelling is not widely adopted within two years.89 Despite 
industry representation on the committee and working groups designing the scheme,90 the 
AFGC immediately criticised star labelling, citing the high cost of implementation to the 
industry and the fact that it had not been subjected to a cost-benefit analysis.91 The AFGC 
argued that its own labelling scheme ‘should remain as a foundation informative element on 
labels’.92 The industry’s voluntary initiatives create de facto regulatory standards in labelling, 
marketing and product reformulation, which make it more difficult for the government to take 
control of the food regulatory space in circumstances when it is willing to regulate. 
The government engages the food industry in the creation and delivery of a range of food 
policy initiatives. Food industry representation is included in the Food and Health Dialogue, 
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along with government and public health members.93 A representative of the food industry is 
also included on an expert committee that advises ANPHA on obesity prevention policy.94  
In May 2013, the Federal government announced Australia’s first National Food Plan, which 
provides a policy framework for ensuring that Australia has a ‘sustainable, globally 
competitive and resilient food supply that supports access to nutritious and affordable food’.95 
The government has recently established the Australian Council on Food to advise on food 
system issues and monitor the implementation of the Plan.96 This Council will be chaired by 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and includes ministers with an interest 
in food and nutrition policy, as well as members of the manufacturing, retailing and transport 
sectors of the food industry and representatives from public health and consumer groups 
(among others).97 The government is unlikely to introduce legislative measures that would 
risk jeopardising its collaborative relationship with the food industry, as well as the industry’s 
engagement in voluntary programs. Indeed, the green paper for the National Food Plan 
restates the government’s support for self-regulation of food advertising, saying that it:98 
… believes the best approach to reducing exposure of children and others to the marketing of unhealthy 
food is to work with industry under the existing combination of industry self-regulation and broader 
government regulation that governs food advertising to children. 
Furthermore, there are strong political ideologies that would circumscribe the use of statutory 
regulation. The Australian government’s regulatory policy favours reducing the regulatory 
burden and increasing economic productivity and efficiency.99 It presumes that the least 
intrusive form of regulation should be used to address a problem, with legislation only 
justified where there is a strong public interest or public health concern; a high level of risk; 
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some form of market failure; or non-legislative options are unsuccessful.100 Proposed 
regulation must also meet demanding cost-benefit and regulatory impact analyses,101 as with 
the ACMA’s economic modelling of the economic costs and benefits of food advertising 
restrictions, which it undertook for the CTS review.102 Chapter 1 described how the ACMA 
declined to further restrict food advertising to children because of the impact on broadcaster 
revenue and profitability and the uncertain benefits to obesity prevention.103  
The government’s neo-liberal agenda also influences food and nutrition policy, which has 
undergone reforms aimed at deregulating the food industry and maximising its profit and 
productivity.104 Yet neo-liberal policy making often comes at the expense of the public health 
agenda (as illustrated by the US Interagency Working Group), which must compete with the 
goals of promoting economic growth and reducing regulatory burdens. These are typically 
the government’s primary concerns rather than public health.105  
Although public health advocates argue for the application of the tobacco control model to 
food and alcohol, there are significant differences between the three products that make this 
unlikely. Table 22 below summarises the similarities and differences between food, tobacco 
and alcohol across a number of dimensions, some of which were discussed in previous 
chapters. Cigarette smoking is toxic, highly addictive and ultimately lethal.106 Through 
second-hand smoke, tobacco users harm the health of non-smokers, including by causing 
respiratory illnesses in children and chronic diseases such as lung cancer.107 Studies that 
linked smoking to disease set off a major shift in the cultural meaning of smoking and its 
social acceptability, as did declines in middle class smoking.108 Cigarette smoking slowly 
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moved from being an every-day part of life to being heavily stigmatised in many social 
circles and viewed almost as a moral failing.109 Internal documents revealed the industry’s 
deceptive and underhand practices, which along with its declining political and economic 
power, contributed to the ‘denormalisation’ of Big Tobacco.110 Successful litigation against 
the industry helped reframe cigarette smoking as an issue of corporate rather than personal 
responsibility, particularly as evidence of nicotine’s addictiveness demonstrated that smoking 
was not simply a matter of individual choice.111 Together these factors contributed to political 
and popular support for wide-ranging tobacco control measures, including statutory controls 
on its sale and distribution, bans on advertising and marketing, and pricing and taxation 
measures.112 Increasing evidence of a causal relationship between children’s exposure to 
cigarette advertising and smoking initiation provided further support for legislative 
restrictions on tobacco promotion.113 
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Table 22. Similarities and differences between tobacco, alcohol and food 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of 
product 
Advertising 
restrictions 
Policy and 
Regulatory 
environment 
Nature and 
health harms  
Evidence 
linking 
advertising 
and 
consumption 
Social role  Industry 
activities 
Government 
approach to 
industry  
Public health 
position on 
the industry 
Tobacco Legislative 
bans on almost 
all forms of 
marketing and 
promotion. 
Heavily 
regulated, with 
the goal of 
discouraging 
all forms of 
tobacco use. 
 
An addictive 
and toxic drug, 
with no safe 
level of use. 
Causes 
significant 
morbidity and 
mortality 
globally. 
Strong 
evidence of a 
causal link 
between 
advertising 
and the uptake 
of smoking 
among 
children and 
adolescents. 
Smoking now 
‘denormalised’ 
in Australian 
society and 
smokers are 
becoming a 
stigmatised 
social group. 
Engaged in 
unscrupulous 
practices, 
including 
targeting 
young people 
for product 
development 
and 
promotion, 
denying health 
harms and 
addictiveness 
of tobacco 
use, lobbying 
against 
tobacco 
control. 
Excludes the 
industry from 
processes of 
policy 
development 
and from 
participation 
in public 
health 
initiatives. 
Hostile 
relationship 
between the 
Australian 
industry and 
government. 
Views tobacco 
companies as 
‘the enemy’ 
and campaigns 
vigorously 
against 
industry 
activities. 
Alcohol  Largely 
industry self-
regulation but 
with some 
statutory 
restrictions on 
broadcast 
advertising. 
Heavily 
regulated, but 
with few 
advertising 
restrictions. 
Policy aims to 
prevent 
underage 
drinking, 
reduce 
excessive or 
harmful 
consumption, 
but tolerates 
moderate 
consumption.  
A potentially 
toxic drug. 
Low levels of 
consumption 
have pleasant 
effects and 
possibly some 
health 
benefits. 
Higher levels 
of 
consumption 
cause acute 
and chronic 
health harms. 
A significant 
body of 
evidence 
shows that 
advertising 
influences 
children’s 
preferences, 
beliefs and 
drinking 
behaviours. 
Alcohol use is 
‘normalised’ 
in Australian 
culture. 
However there 
is growing 
concern about 
‘binge 
drinking’ 
among young 
Australians. 
Undertakes 
similar 
activities to 
Big Tobacco, 
including 
denying health 
harms of 
product, 
developing 
own education 
programs and 
targeting the 
youth market. 
Invites the 
industry to 
participate in 
public health 
policy, 
provides 
support for 
industry-based 
initiatives and 
works with the 
industry on 
alcohol harm 
prevention. 
Some 
engagement 
with the 
alcohol 
industry, 
although there 
is concern 
about its level 
of 
involvement 
in public 
health policy. 
Food Almost 
entirely 
industry self-
regulation 
with few 
statutory 
controls on 
marketing to 
children. 
Comprehensive 
regulation of 
food safety; 
little 
preventive 
health 
regulation. 
Policy aims to 
decrease 
consumption of 
unhealthy 
foods. 
Nutritionally 
complex, 
legally sold to 
children and is 
a necessity for 
life. Highly 
processed 
products are 
particularly 
implicated in 
obesity. 
Some 
evidence 
exists, but 
more is 
needed on the 
causal 
pathways 
between 
advertising 
exposure and 
children’s 
eating habits. 
Consumption 
of unhealthy 
food forms 
part of 
children’s 
social and 
family lives. 
Growing 
concern about 
products 
created for and 
marketed to 
children. 
Uses the same 
tactics as other 
industries 
including 
distorting 
science, 
creating front 
groups, 
marketing to 
children, 
lobbying 
against 
legislation. 
Invites 
industry to 
participate in 
public health 
initiatives, 
forms 
collaborative 
arrangements 
and 
encourages 
self-
regulation. 
Some scope 
for 
collaboration, 
but 
considerable 
debate over 
what form this 
should take 
and whether 
industry can 
be ‘part of the 
solution’ to 
obesity. 
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Food is a necessity of life and good nutrition contributes to growth and development during 
childhood and adolescence.114 Consumption can be either beneficial or detrimental to health, 
depending upon the types of foods people eat and in what quantity.115 Thus, it is more 
difficult for governments to regulate food compared to tobacco because of its nutritional 
complexity. Statutory regulation also faces the challenge that ‘junk’ food is a familiar part of 
children’s social and family lives.116 Compared to alcohol and tobacco, parents are slower to 
see confectionery, savoury snacks and sugary drinks as a threat to children’s health and ‘the 
public has not yet mobilised broadly around strategies to improve nutrition and physical 
activity for children and youth’.117 This may relate to the fact that popular and media 
discourses conceptualise childhood obesity as resulting primarily from parents’ failure to 
control children’s eating patterns and television viewing habits, rather than as a broader social 
problem.118 Thus, government intervention is often viewed as paternalistic, particularly as Big 
Food has not been held responsible for obesity in the same way as Big Tobacco has for the 
diseases caused by smoking.119 Further, while there is growing evidence linking obesity and 
children’s exposure to food marketing, compared to tobacco advertising ‘there have been far 
fewer studies that spell out the actual mechanisms of impact, and the literature has not 
coalesced around one causal model’.120 This allows the food industry to dispute the 
connection between advertising and obesity and to argue that government regulation would 
be expensive, intrusive and unjustified.121 
Similar factors underpin the government’s reluctance to restrict alcohol advertising. Like 
tobacco, alcohol is treated as a ‘special commodity’ because of its addictive and toxic 
                                                 
114 Jeffrey P Koplan, Catharyn T Liverman and Vivica I Kraak, Preventing Childhood Obesity: Health in the 
Balance (The National Academies Press, 2005) 33. 
115 Derek Yach et al, 'The World Health Organisation's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: 
Implications for Global Epidemics of Food-Related Deaths and Disease' (2003) 24(3-4) Journal of Public 
Health Policy 274, 275-276. 
116 See, e.g., Juliet B Schor and Margaret Ford, 'From Tastes Great to Cool: Children's Food Marketing and the 
Rise of the Symbolic' (2007) 35(1) The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 10, 16. 
117 Jonathan D Klein and William Dietz, 'Childhood Obesity: The New Tobacco' (2010) 29(3) Health Affairs 
388, 381. See also Kersch and Morone, above n 10, 147. 
118 Deborah Lupton, '"A Grim Health Future": Food Risks in the Sydney Press' 6(2) Health, Risk and Society 
187; Catriona M F Bonfiglioli et al, 'Choice and Voice: Obesity Debates in Television News' (2007) 187(8) 
Medical Journal of Australia 442; Amber Bastian, 'Representations of Childhood Obesity in Australia 
Newsprint Media and Academic Literature' (2011) 35(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 
135. 
119 See, e.g., Dorfman et al, above n 86; Mello, Rimm and Studdert, above n 111; LO Gostin and KG Gostin, 'A 
Broader Liberty: J S Mill, Paternalism and the Public's Health' (2009) 123(3) Public Health 214. 
120 Schor and Ford, above n 116, 14. See also Kathy Chapman, Bridget P Kelley and Lesley A King, 'Using a 
Research Framework to Identify Knowledge Gaps in Research on Food Marketing to Children in Australia' 
(2009) 33(3) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 253. 
121 See e.g., the discussion on the Interagency Working Group on Food Marketing to Children above, as well 
Chapter 4. 
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properties.122 Although moderate alcohol use has few risks (and may be beneficial to the 
cardiovascular health of middle-aged drinkers),123 excessive consumption causes acute and 
long-term health problems, resulting in significant morbidity and mortality.124 It also causes 
harm to others, for example through interpersonal violence, adverse pregnancy outcomes and 
road crashes.125 Accordingly, regulation restricts the availability of alcohol, prohibits sales to 
children and adolescents, and seeks to control its affordability through pricing and taxation.126  
While there is evidence that alcohol promotion influences young people’s drinking 
behaviours,127 regulatory reform is complicated by the fact that alcohol consumption is an 
everyday part of social life for many Australians (including young people).128 This contributes 
to community acceptance of the alcohol industry and the perception that it has a legitimate 
right to advertise its products to adults.129 According to the manager of one health advocacy 
organisation, public perceptions of the industry and its products undermined effective alcohol 
policy (including restrictions on alcohol advertising): 
                                                 
122 See Thomas Barbor et al, Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2010). 
123 See, e.g., Susan E Brien et al, 'Effect of Alcohol Consumption on Biological Markers Associated with Risk 
of Coronary Heart Disease: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Interventional Studies' (2011) 342 British 
Medical Journal d363 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3043110/>. 
124 See, e.g., Yvonne Bonomo et al, 'Adverse Outcomes of Alcohol Use in Adolescents' (2001) 96(10) Addiction 
1845; Jürgen Rehm et al, 'Global Burden of Disease and Economic Cost Attributable to Alcohol Use and 
Alcohol-Use Disorders' (2009) 373(9682) The Lancet 2223, 2228; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
'Australia's Health 2012'. Australia's Health Series No 13. Cat No AUS 156 (AIHW, 2012) 228-234 
<http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=10737422172>. 
125 See, e.g., Yen F Tai, John B Saunders and David S Celermajer, 'Collateral Damage from Alcohol Abuse: The 
Enormous Costs to Australia' (1998) 168(1) Medical Journal of Australia  6; Anne-Marie Laslett et al, 
'Surveying the Range and Magnitude of Alcohol's Harm to Others in Australia' (2011) 106(9) Addiction 1603. 
126 Barbor et al, above n 122; Wendy Loxley et al, 'Alcohol Policy and Harm Reduction in Australia' (2005) 
24(6) Drug and Alcohol Review 559; Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy, 'National Drug Strategy 2010-2015' 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) 
<http://www.nationaldrugstrategy.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/nds2015>. 
127 See, e.g, Gerard Hastings et al, 'Alcohol Marketing and Young People's Drinking: A Review of the Research' 
(2005) 26(3) Journal of Public Health Policy 296; Petra Meier et al, 'Independent Review of the Effects of 
Alcohol Pricing and Promotion' (School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield, 2008) 
91<http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.95617!/file/PartA.pdf>; P Andersen et al, 'Impact of Alcohol 
Advertising and Media Exposure to Adolescent Alcohol Use: A Systematic Review of Longitudinal Studies' 
(2009) 44(3) Alcohol and Alcoholism 229. 
128 See, e.g., Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, above n 124, 228; National Expert Advisory Committee 
on Alcohol, 'Alcohol in Australia: Issues and Strategies. A Background Paper to the National Alcohol Policy 
Strategy: A Plan for Action 2001 to 2003/04' (Department of Health and Ageing, 2001) 1-3 
<http://www.health.gov.au/internet/drugstrategy/publishing.nsf/Content/alc-
strategy/$FILE/alcohol_strategy_back.pdf>; Richard Midford, 'Australia and Alcohol: Living Down the Legend' 
(2005) 100 Addiction 891, 892; Joseph Borlagdan et al, 'From Ideal to Reality: Cultural Contradictions and 
Young People's Drinking' (National Centre for Education and Training on Addiction, 2010) 
<http://www.decd.sa.gov.au/drugstrategy/files/links/From_Ideal_to_Reality_NCET.pdf>. 
129 Chapter 8 discussed how the normalisation of alcohol use impacts upon attempts to protect young people 
from alcohol advertising. 
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… it’s really clear how the general public feels about tobacco companies now, and their take on Big 
Tobacco is a battle that the government wants to be seen to be taking, whereas… the alcohol industry’s 
done really well to make sure that the general public feels robbed whenever the government tries to do 
anything in [alcohol policy], [which] has meant that the government doesn’t want to take this on. 
The fact that the government has not strengthened restrictions on alcohol promotion could 
suggest that it is unlikely to do so in relation to food advertising to children. This is especially 
the case given that the alcohol industry requires a more explicit social licence to operate than 
Big Food, and perceives itself to be subject to a higher level of government scrutiny (as 
described in Chapter 9). 
An incremental approach to regulation of food advertising to children  
Public health actors argue that the similarities between food, tobacco and alcohol are greater 
than they might appear at first glance, as are the activities of the three industries concerned.130 
Accordingly, they advocate for comprehensive statutory controls on food and alcohol 
advertising similar to those that now apply to tobacco. Yet the history of tobacco and alcohol 
advertising regulation indicates that food advertising regulation is more likely to develop in 
stages. Chapter 10 described how numerous government reviews have recommended that the 
ABAC Scheme be improved, yet the basic model of the ABAC has remained the same 
despite persistent concerns about the scheme’s operation.131 The Federal government was 
hesitant to restrict tobacco advertising, despite mounting evidence of tobacco’ harmful 
effects, and only did so in response to mounting pressure from state governments, successive 
federal health ministers and anti-tobacco advocates.132 Comprehensive measures like the 
Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992 (Cth) followed only after the gradual 
implementation of legislative restrictions on different forms of tobacco marketing, beginning 
with broadcast advertising in the 1970s.133 This suggests that statutory restrictions on food 
                                                 
130 See Chapter 10 for further discussion of this point. See, e.g., Kersch and Morone, above n 10; Kelly D 
Brownell and Kenneth E Warner, 'The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. 
How Similar Is Big Food?' (2009) 87 The Milbank Quarterly 259; Laura Bond, Mike Daube and Tanya 
Chikritzhs, 'Selling Addictions: Similarities in Approaches Between Big Tobacco and Big Booze' (2010) 3(6) 
Australasian Medical Journal 326; Mike Daube, 'Alcohol and Tobacco' (2012) 36(2) Australia and New 
Zealand Journal of Public Health 108; Rob Moodie et al, 'Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects 
of Tobacco, Alcohol and Ultra-Processed Food and Drink Industries' (2013) 381 The Lancet 670. 
131 See, e.g., Sandra C Jones, Danika Hall and Geoffrey Munro, 'How Effective is the Revised Regulatory Code 
for Alcohol Advertising in Australia?' (2008) 27(1) Drug and Alcohol Review 29; Simone Pettigrew, Rebecca 
Johnson and Mike Daube, 'Introducing and Applying a New Australian Alcohol Advertising Code' (2012) 13(1) 
Journal of Public Affairs 72. 
132  See, e.g. Tyrrell, above n 108, 164; Robin Walker, Under Fire: A History of Tobacco Smoking in Australia 
(Melbourne University Press, 1984) 105-111. 
133 Ibid. 
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advertising in Australia are likely to develop incrementally – if they occur at all. The ABAC 
illustrates the very real possibility that the Federal government will leave food advertising 
regulation in the hands of the industry, although accompanied by some degree of public 
monitoring and oversight. 
Co-regulation of food advertising to children in the UK  
Food advertising restrictions in the United Kingdom suggest that governments are more 
likely to build upon existing industry-based schemes than move directly from self-regulation 
to legislation. Advertising in the UK is governed by industry self-regulation operating within 
a co-regulatory framework. This arrangement stems from the government’s communications 
regulator (OfCom) contracting out some of functions to the Advertising Standards Authority 
(ASA) and the Committee of Advertising Practice.134 These bodies administer the UK 
advertising industry’s self-regulatory system for non-broadcast advertising, with CAP writing 
and maintaining the UK Code for Non-Broadcast Advertising, Sales Promotion and Direct 
Marketing,135 and ASA managing and enforcing the code. Following the arrangement with 
OfCom, a new Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP) took responsibility for 
setting the UK Code of Broadcast Advertising136 and monitoring broadcast advertising. A 
separate division of ASA (ASA(B)) adjudicates on complaints about broadcast advertising, 
but can refer complaints to OfCom where an advertiser does not comply with its decision.137 
OfCom retains backstop regulatory powers, for example it approves any changes to the Code 
of Broadcast Advertising proposed by BCAP.138 OfCOm may also insist that broadcast 
                                                 
134 See The Contracting Out (Functions relating to Broadcast Advertising) and Specification of Relevant 
Functions Order 2004 (UK) SI 2004/1975, s 3; OfCom, Memorandum of Understanding Between Office of 
Communications (OfCom) and the Advertising Standards Authority (Broadcast) Limited ('ASA(B)') and the 
Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice Limited ('BCAP') and The Broadcast Advertising Standards 
Board of Finance Limited ('BASBOF') (May 2004)  
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/reg_broad_ad/statement/mou.pdf>. 
 OfCom, Television Food and Drink Advertising to Children: Final Statement (OfCom, 22 February 2007) 1 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/foodads_new/statement/statement.pdf>. 
135 Committee of Advertising Practice, The CAP Code: The UK Code of Non-Broadcast Advertising, Sales 
Promotion and Direct Marketing (2010) <http://www.cap.org.uk/Advertising-Codes/Non-broadcast-
HTML/Section-15-Food,-food-supplements-and-associated-health-or-nutritional-claims.aspx>. Chapter 5 
described how CAP (and BCAP) are two industry committees comprising representatives from advertisers 
media, agencies and other industry sectors. ASA is an independent organisation that acts as a regulator across all 
media. See Committee of Advertising Practice, Our Committees (2013) <http://www.cap.org.uk/About-
CAP/Who-we-are/Our-committees.aspx>; Advertising Standards Authority, About ASA (2013) 
<http://www.asa.org.uk/About-ASA.aspx>. 
136 Committee of Advertising Practice, The BCAP Code: The UK Code of Broadcast Advertising (2010) 
<http://www.cap.org.uk/Advertising-Codes/Broadcast/BCAP-Code.aspx >. 
137 OfCom, Memorandum of Understanding, above n 134, 14. 
138 Ibid 15.  
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advertising rules be amended or introduced, and if BCAP refuses to do so, introduce a rule 
change or amendment itself.139 
Chapter 1 described how in 2003, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport asked 
OfCom to revise the Code of Broadcast Advertising in order to strenghten restrictions on food 
advertising to children.140 Accordingly, OfCom commissioned a literature review of research 
on the effects of television advertising on children’s food preferences.141 This 2004 study 
found evidence that advertising had a modest effect on children’s food choices, which 
combined with community concerns about food advertising to children, led OfCom to 
conclude that it should devise new rules on unhealthy food advertising to children.142  Also in 
2004, the Department of Health produced a White Paper on obesity, which reiterated the 
Government’s view that there was a strong case for restrictions on television food advertising 
to children.143 At the same time, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) published a consultation 
on a nutrient profiling scheme to identify unhealthy food products for the purposes of 
restrictions on television food advertising to children.144  
In March 2006, OfCom publicly consulted on a range of regulatory options, including a pre-
9pm watershed ban on food advertising.145 Following a further round of consultation,146 
OfCom decided to restrict unhealthy food advertising in and around children’s programs and 
on dedicated children’s channels.147 These restrictions were based on the nutrient profiling 
                                                 
139 Ibid 6.  
140 See OfCom, Television Advertising of Food and Drink Products to Children: Final Statement (22 February 
2007) 1 <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/foodads_new/statement/>. 
141 This research was described in Chapter 1. See Sonia Livingstone and Ellen Helsper, 'Advertising Foods to 
Children: Understanding Promotion in the Context of Children's Daily Lives' (Department of Media and 
Communications, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, May 2004) 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/tv-research/food_ads/>. 
142 See OfCom, Television Food and Drink Advertising to Children: Final Statement, above n 140, 2. See also 
OfCom, Childhood Obesity – Food Advertising in Context (July 2004) 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/tv-research/food_ads/>. Ofcom updated this 
research in 2005 by commissioning a literature review from Sonia Livingstone, a contributor to the original 
review (also discussed in Chapter 1). See Sonia Livingstone, 'New Research on Advertising Foods to Children' 
(Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science, 22 January 
2006) <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/tv-research/food_ads/>. 
143 Department of Health, Choosing Health: Making Healthier Choices Easier (HM Government, 2004) 34-37 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/d
h_digitalassets/@dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalasset/dh_133489.pdf>. 
144 OfCom, Television Food and Drink Advertising to Children: Final Statement, above n 140, 2. 
145 OfCom, Television Advertising of Food and Drink Products to Children (28 March 2006) 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/foodads/foodadsprint>. 
146 OfCom, Television Advertising of Food and Drink to Children: Options for New Restrictions (8 June 2006) 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/foodads/update/>; OfCom, Television Advertising of Food and 
Drink Products to Children: Statement and Further Consultation (17 November 2006) 
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147 OfCom, Television Food and Drink Advertising to Children: Final Statement, above n 140, 2. 
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model finalised by the FSA in 2005, which companies used to identify products high in fat, 
salt and sugar that could not be advertised to children.148 OfCom incorporated the new 
restrictions on food advertising in the existing UK Code of Broadcast Advertising.149 In 
parallel, CAP modified rules on advertising techniques used to promote food and drink 
products to children (in all forms of advertising), contained in the Code of Non-Broadcast 
Advertising.150  These rules restrict advertisements encouraging excessive consumption or 
suggesting a sedentary lifestyle, ‘pressure to purchase’ advertising, promotional offers and 
the use of celebrities and characters in promotions to children, among other things.151   
I interviewed a representative of the ASA, who described both broadcast and non-broadcast 
advertising restrictions as evolving over time in response to public concerns and a changing 
evidence base. He stressed that the new restrictions on unhealthy food advertising built upon 
pre-existing rules for advertising to children, rather than constituting an entirely new form of 
regulation. He also said that: 
[ASA]… chose… to advance the [non-broadcast advertising] restrictions, it’s not as if we’ve just 
introduced these rules… if you look at previous versions of the code we have several restrictions in 
there, we just… jumped them up… a little bit to bring them into a position which they consider to be 
akin to that in broadcast [advertising]… 
The UK restrictions are some of the strongest controls on food advertising to children 
internationally.152 They have a number of benefits compared to the Australian self-regulatory 
system, including mandatory compliance by all advertisers (rather than only those that have 
joined the scheme). Nevertheless, they only affect ‘targeted’ children’s broadcasting rather 
than viewing periods where children comprise a substantial number of a mixed audience, 
                                                 
148 Ibid 3. 
149 See Committee of Advertising Practice, The BCAP Code: The UK Code of Broadcast Advertising, above n 
136,  cl 32.5.1. According to the Code, companies must not advertise unhealthy products in or adjacent to 
programs commissioned for, principally directed at or likely to appeal particularly to audiences below the age of 
16. The code relies upon audience indexing to determine whether programs are likely to appeal to children. See 
Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice, Audience Indexing: Identification of Television Programs Likely 
to Appeal to Children and Young People (June 2010) Committee of Advertising Practice 
<http://www.cap.org.uk/Advertising-Codes/Broadcast-HTML/Section-32-Scheduling-rules.aspx>. 
150 See Committee of Advertising Practice, The CAP Code: The UK Code of Non-Broadcast Advertising, Sales 
Promotion and Direct Marketing, above n 135, cl 5. Note that these restrictions apply to all food and beverage 
products (with the exception of fresh fruit and vegetables) as this code does not use the FSA’s nutrient profiling 
model. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 37, 89; Jean Adams et al, 'Effect of Restrictions on Television Food 
Advertising to Children on Exposure to Advertisements for ''Less Healthy'' Foods: Repeat Cross-Sectional 
Study' (2012) 7(2) PLoS One e31578 
<http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0031578>. 
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meaning that their effect on children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising is debated.153 
Also, the UK restrictions do not take the form of a legislative ban on food advertising, but 
operate through a co-regulatory system with advertising industry involvement. They are 
similar to the Protecting Children from Junk Food Advertising (Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Amendment) Bill introduced by the Australian Greens Party in 2011 
(which had not passed at the time of writing).154 Through amendments to the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth) the Bill would restrict unhealthy food advertising during children’s 
peak television viewing periods, on subscription broadcast services intended for or primarily 
watched by children, on the internet and by ‘commercial electronic message’. However, it 
seems clear that this Bill is unlikely to be passed, given the government’s support for industry 
self-regulation and its commitment to monitor the RCMI and QSRI before taking any further 
action. 
Strengthening controls on advertising of unhealthy food to Australian children 
Although direct statutory regulation of food advertising is unlikely, this does not mean that 
the government is without options for improving the food marketing environment. Chapter 3 
described how governments and other actors are searching for new ways to shape healthier 
choices that respect individual liberties and circumvent industry opposition.155 Health 
organisations, public bodies and academics have proposed an incremental approach to 
strengthening existing initiatives as one way of navigating the barriers to government 
action.156 For example, WHO suggests that governments identify priorities for regulating food 
                                                 
153 Monitoring by OfCom suggests that the restrictions have substantially reduced children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising, with children seeing 34 per cent less of this advertising in 2007/08 compared to 
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Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale University Press, 
2008). 
156 See, e.g., Hawkes and Lobstein, above n 37; McGinnis, Gootman and Kraak, above n 39; National 
Preventative Health Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020. National Preventative Health 
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advertising to children (such as controls on promoting specific products or in settings where 
children gather), which they gradually expand into comprehensive controls on all unhealthy 
food marketing.157   
While governments may be constrained in directly regulating business, Chapter 3 argued that 
the state retains a special role in public health law and regulation.158 Where it relies upon 
private regulation to further public policy objectives, the government has a responsibility to 
act as guardian of the public’s interest, i.e. to ensure that regulatory processes do not further 
private interests at the expense of public health goals.159 ‘Regulatory capitalism’ creates 
scope for enhanced participation by public health and civil society actors in creating and 
implementing public health governance, as well as the food and alcohol industries.160 Thus, 
government’s role may be to structure the relationships between the different actors involved 
in regulation, to ensure that regulatory processes are transparent and accountable and reflect a 
balance of interests, as well as achieving their desired outcomes. 
Government leadership in health can take a range of forms, from observation, monitoring and 
other forms of meta-regulation, to more directly restricting corporate practices.161 As 
suggested by responsive regulation, governments should move between these roles depending 
upon the health risks concerned, the efficacy of existing voluntary programs and the evidence 
base for action.162 Drawing upon literature from regulatory studies and public health law, I 
now propose ways in which the government could incrementally strengthen food industry 
self-regulation and, in doing so, fulfill its obligation to ensure that food advertising regulation 
achieves public health goals. Table 23 outlines a range of strategies for the Federal 
                                                                                                                                                        
Strategy – Overview', above n 39; Henney, Taylor and Boon,, above n 39; World Health Organisation, 'Set of 
Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children', above n 39; Blewett  
et al, above n 39. 
157 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children' (World Health Organisation, 2012) 16 
<http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/framework_marketing_food_to_children/en/>. 
158 See, e.g., Gostin, above n 3; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above n 153. 
159 David Cohen, 'The Role of the State in a Privatised Regulatory Environment ' in Kernaghan Webb (ed), 
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Carleton Research Unit for 
Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University 2004) 25; Peter Vincent-Jones, 'Values and Purpose 
in Government: Central-Local Relations in Regulatory Perspective' (2002) 29(1) Journal of Law and Society 27; 
Ian Bartle and Peter Vass, 'Self-Regulation within the Regulatory State: Towards a New Regulatory Paradigm?' 
(2007) 84(5) Public Administration 885. 
160 Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, above n 8. See also Lang, 'Food, the Law and Public Health', above n 3; 
Havinga, above n 35; Lang, Barling and Caraher, above n 35. 
161 Peter Crampton, Janet Hoek and Robert Beaglehole, 'Leadership for Health: Developing a Canny Nanny 
State' (2011) 124(1329) New Zealand Medical Journal 66, 69. See also Gostin, above n 3; Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, above n 153. 
162 Ayres and  Braithwaite, above n 2. 
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government to extend its influence over the RCMI and QSRI in the form of a more quasi- or 
co-regulatory scheme. These measures could be implemented through ‘legislative scaffolds’ 
that allow industry to continue with voluntary action but within a more extensive architecture 
of government intervention and oversight.163 The following discussion describes selected 
measures in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
163 Magnusson and Reeve, above n 1. 
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Table 23. Ways for government to strengthen voluntary restrictions on food advertising 
to children164 
Component of regulation Form of government intervention Examples  
Regulatory/policy framework Determine overarching policy 
frameworks and objectives.  
Preventing childhood obesity. 
The content of regulation    
The goals of voluntary initiatives 
 
Clearly identify the goals of self-
regulation, and set objectively 
verifiable targets and performance 
indicators. 
 
 
Reduce children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising and the 
use of persuasive techniques in 
marketing to children.  
The terms of voluntary initiatives Define key terms and definitions 
underpinning voluntary schemes. 
Broaden the definition of 
advertising/media ‘directed 
primarily to children’, and expand 
the communication channels, 
promotion techniques and age 
range of children covered by the 
initiatives. Create a nutrient 
profiling model that provides the 
basis for identifying unhealthy 
products and that applies to all 
code signatories. 
Regulatory processes    
Administration  
 
 
Provide for administration of the 
scheme by an independent body 
representing a wide range of 
interests.  
Establish an administrative 
committee that includes equal 
representation from government, 
industry and public health sectors.  
Monitoring Ensure that the scheme includes 
systematic and independent 
monitoring. 
Monitor the amount of unhealthy 
food advertising in children’s peak 
television viewing times and in 
other media. Monitor companies’ 
compliance with the initiatives, as 
well as the percentage of the food 
industry that has failed to join the 
scheme.   
Review  Ensure that there is regular, 
independent and structured review 
of the scheme’s overall operation. 
Commission an independent third-
party review of the scheme. 
Enforcement    
Incentives for compliance 
 
 
Provide incentives that give 
participants an economic incentive 
to comply. 
Publicise the RCMI and QSRI on 
government department websites, 
publicly release the results of 
monitoring activities. 
Deterring non-compliance  Take steps to deter non-compliance 
at both company and industry 
levels. 
 
Establish an independent body to 
hear complaints and sanction non-
compliance through negative 
publicity and fines. 
Threaten escalation to co-
regulation and legislation.  
 
                                                 
164 This table builds upon one designed for research on voluntary salt reduction programs in Australia, jointly 
undertaken with Roger Magnusson. 
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Goals, targets and indicators 
Addressing the risk factors for chronic disease requires a comprehensive, multi-sectoral 
approach, implying a basket of legal and policy interventions.165 It demands collaboration 
between different government departments and levels of government, as well as various 
private actors. Accordingly, governments need to take leadership of health initiatives by 
setting clear objectives, and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different parties in 
achieving these goals.166 WHO recommends that the Ministry of Health establish a 
government-led working group on food marketing to children, with representation from 
multiple departments, agencies and bodies, to ensure government-wide consensus and 
cooperation on policies concerning food marketing on children.167 This group could dialogue 
with a broader stakeholder committee that includes representatives of civil society, academia 
and the food, advertising and media industries.168  
The National Working Group on Food Marketing to Children (described above) represents 
the kind of multi-stakeholder group proposed by WHO, but its remit could be broadened to 
include the creation of key definitions and standards for the codes, as well other measures to 
strengthen the scheme’s operation.169 Strong government leadership of the scheme would 
ensure that the objectives of self-regulation are aligned with public health goals, as well as 
the food and nutrition policy framework more broadly. It also diminishes the risk that private 
sector actors will step into the ‘regulatory space’ created by government inaction.170 It is 
crucial that the government set clear goals and targets for the RCMI and QSRI, given that the 
codes are premised on different objectives to those advocated by public health groups, and 
there is significant debate on what they should aim to achieve. 
                                                 
165 Roger Magnusson, 'What's Law Got To Do With It? Part 1: A Framework for Obesity Prevention' (2008) 
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166 World Health Organisation, 'Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic 
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167 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children', above n 157, 13.  
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Coverage of the scheme: terms and definitions 
 Governments should specify the key terms, standards and definitions that underpin voluntary 
initiatives.171 For instance, governments should require that restrictions on food advertising 
apply to marketing defined very broadly, including product placement, direct marketing, 
packaging and labelling, sponsorship, brand promotions and advertising using digital 
media.172 Other key definitions include the age of children, media directed to children, 
persuasive techniques that particularly appeal to children and the types of unhealthy foods 
and beverages covered by self-regulation.173 The RCMI and QSRI would be significantly 
improved if they used standard nutrition criteria developed by a government agency to 
identify products that are appropriate to market to children.174 The nutrient profiling tool 
created by the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Authority for nutrition and health 
claims on food labels could be used for this function, as it is adapted from the nutrient 
profiling scheme that underpins UK restrictions on unhealthy food advertising to children.175 
As discussed above, the Food Regulatory Standing Committee is considering this issue, but at 
the time of writing had not yet provided its advice on an appropriate nutrient profiling 
scheme to be used in restricting food advertising to children. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
Governments should provide for independent monitoring and oversight of voluntary schemes. 
This may involve establishing or appointing an institution or agency to monitor and oversee 
self-regulation.176 Chapter 7 argued for a new management structure for the RCMI and QSRI, 
using an independent body that comprises representatives from a wide range of interested 
parties, including consumer organisations, government and NGOs, industry actors and 
                                                 
171 SA Health, above n 81, 17; World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of 
Recommendations on the Marketing of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children', above n 157, 21. 
172 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
of Foods and Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children', above n 157, 9-10. 
173 Ibid 21. See also Chapter 6, which provides a comprehensive set of recommendations for improving the 
terms and conditions of the RCMI and QSRI. 
174 Ibid 26. See also National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020. 
National Preventative Health Strategy – Overview', above n 39, 14; Lana Hebden et al, 'Regulating the Types of 
Foods and Beverages Marketed to Australian Children: How Useful are Food Industry Commitments?' (2010) 
67(4) Nutrition and Dietetics 258, 265. 
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<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2047-6310.2013.00167.x/full> 
176 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
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participants to the initiative.177 An alternative may be to grant administration of the scheme to 
a government body, with the potential for regulatory tasks to be delegated to private actors. 
Chapter 7 also described how voluntary programs should provide for systematic and 
independent monitoring, including collection and analysis of information on compliance, 
participants’ progress towards the scheme’s targets, and its success in meeting public 
objectives.178 To support monitoring activities, governments should also ensure that there is a 
framework for independent, regular review of the scheme.179 Although ANPHA is in the 
process of developing a monitoring framework for food industry self-regulation, this could be 
strengthened by committing the government (or an independent third-party) to periodic 
review of the scheme after the first round of monitoring is complete. 
Incentives for compliance 
A key role for governments is to provide incentives for companies to join voluntary schemes 
and then to change their products and practices in line with their commitment. Governments 
can take a number of steps to encourage compliance, for example publicity campaigns that 
enhance consumer understanding of the scheme and how it works.180  Public education about 
the codes should be within the context of the explicit goals that government has adopted and 
which industry codes are expected to contribute towards, i.e. reducing children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising. The government could also provide information about the RCMI 
and QSRI on relevant department websites, which would assist consumers in laying 
complaints about food advertising with the ASB.  
Publicising the RCMI and QSRI could draw public attention to companies’ advertising 
practices and challenge parents to think about purchasing products from companies with 
more constructive marketing strategies. However, Chapter 8 questioned whether consumers 
                                                 
177 See SA Health, above n 81, 17; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Guidelines for 
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are capable, in a practical sense, of purchasing products only from companies that comply 
with the initiatives.181 The fact that consumers do not make purchasing choices based on 
compliance with self-regulation closes off one avenue for code participants to benefit 
commercially from the scheme. However, disclosing information about companies’ 
performance (and that of self-regulation overall) can still enhance NGOs’ watchdog role and 
place pressure on industry actors to deliver on their voluntary commitments, due to its effects 
on corporate reputations.182 
Enforcing compliance and deterring ‘free-riders’ 
Governments should consider ways to deter non-compliance and prevent companies ‘free-
riding’ on voluntary schemes.183 Chapter 7 described how self-regulation should provide for 
both informal sanctions and more punitive options for on-going or serious non-compliance.184 
As the food industry’s scheme is voluntary there is little chance of direct government 
enforcement, unless breaches of the initiatives also represent non-compliance with public 
regulation such as the CTS 2009.185 However, there are a number of routes by which the 
government could strengthen existing enforcement arrangements. For example, it could 
‘shame’ the industry into compliance by publicising negative results from any monitoring and 
review activities. Given the difficulties that the public has in identifying advertisements that 
breach the codes, ANPHA’s monitoring frameworks could strengthen enforcement by 
systematically identifying instances of non-compliance. This would also assist public health 
groups in laying tactical complaints with the ASB that are intended to test the scheme’s 
operation and expose its loopholes. An alternative option is that the government could require 
an independent administrative body (described above) to hear complaints and sanction non-
compliance through fines or negative publicity.186 The government could also mandate or 
                                                 
181 See, e.g., Sarah MacKay, 'Food Advertising and Obesity in Australia: To What Extent Can Self-Regulation 
Protect the Interests of Children?' (2009) 35 Monash University Law Review 118, 127. 
182 World Health Organisation, 'A Framework for Implementing the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing 
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Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998) 150. 
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185 As discussed in Chapter 2, the ACMA can directly enforce breaches of the CTS 2009 as broadcast licensees 
must comply with the Standards as a licensing condition (see Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) sch 2, cl 
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encourage the industry to pre-vet food marketing, particularly advertisements broadcast on 
television.  
Perhaps the most significant deterrent to non-compliance is for the government to indicate its 
willingness to escalate to more intrusive options if self-regulation fails to achieve public 
objectives.187 Responsive regulation argues that effective voluntary measures rely upon the 
threat of statutory regulation, which gives the pyramid of regulation its pointy tip.188 
According to public health interviewees, one critical flaw in the current regime was that the 
self-regulatory regimes were weak and ineffective, and that there were no real incentives for 
industry to improve the performance or management of these schemes, including little 
credible threat of government regulation.189 Indeed, the government did not explicitly commit 
to the possibility of intervention in its response to the National Preventative Health Taskforce 
(which recommended that it do so), and has remained silent on this issue since.190  
ANPHA’s monitoring activity could be construed as a tacit threat that the government will 
directly regulate food advertising to children, if monitoring shows that the voluntary scheme 
is ineffective. However, by communicating this threat explicitly, the government gives the 
food industry an incentive to comply with self-regulation and even to improve its voluntary 
standards. This appears to be one of the few benefits of the US Interagency Working Group’s 
proposal for uniform nutrition criteria – that it placed pressure on the food industry to create 
more demanding uniform standards (rather than permitting self-regulation participants to 
choose their own).191 Further, by taking a phased approach to intervention, the government 
gives itself a stronger justification for introducing coercive measures once self- or co-
regulation has failed, helping it to negotiate the significant political barriers to statutory 
regulation. 
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Escalating controls 
There are a variety of ways in which the government could take an escalating approach to 
controls on food advertising to children; however I propose that it develop the scheme into a 
form of co-regulation. By creating legislative infrastructure the government could require 
registration or approval of industry codes, and could identify the particular objectives and 
issues that the codes must cover. This scheme can be contrasted to the current self-regulatory 
arrangements, which are still industry developed and controlled, with the government relying 
upon political pressure to persuade the food industry to strengthen the terms and conditions of 
the initiatives. Adding ‘legislative scaffolds’ to self-regulation would not necessarily preclude 
industry from participating in processes of code development, administration and 
enforcement. However, it would impose real pressure on industry to take regulation seriously, 
as it becomes easier for governments to prescribe a code, or part of the content of a code, as 
well as to build in new regulatory requirements if an improved co-regulatory regime proves 
ineffective. The government could put these measures into effect by creating new legislation 
or by making amendments to the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). The Act requires 
registration of the broadcast industry’s codes of conduct (described in Chapter 2), setting a 
precedent for this form of co-regulation for broadcast advertising.192  
Incremental improvement of advertising content standards 
 Once the basic regulatory arrangements for the codes are in place, government should 
progressively build upon co-regulation to ‘ratchet up’ the standards governing food 
marketing to children, if monitoring shows that improved regulatory arrangements do not 
reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. Box 5 below outlines a staged, co-
regulatory approach to restricting food advertising to children. It takes into account the fact 
that the government is unlikely to introduce additional restrictions on food advertising before 
ANPHA finalises the new monitoring arrangements for the RCMI and QSRI. As Stage three 
illustrates, the government should consider legislative bans on unhealthy food advertising, if 
a voluntary scheme with stronger government intervention fails to meet targets and goals for 
reducing children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. 
  
                                                 
192 Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) pt 9. 
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Box 5. A responsive approach to strengthening food industry self-regulation 
Stage one • The Food Regulatory Standing Committee creates a nutrient profiling scheme to be 
used in identifying products that are appropriate for advertising to children. 
• In collaboration with the food industry and public health organisations, the government 
sets the goals, targets and indicators to be achieved by the RCMI and QSRI. 
• The food industry revises the RCMI and QSRI in accordance with the targets and 
objectives proposed by government. 
• ANPHA finalises the monitoring framework for the codes and commits to periodic 
review of restrictions on food advertising to children. 
• The government communicates to the food industry that more intrusive co-regulation 
will follow if a stronger voluntary scheme fails to reduce children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising. 
Stage two • ANPHA reports on the results of monitoring and undertakes an independent review of 
the scheme.  
• If evaluation shows that self-regulation is failing, the government introduces co-
regulation that requires government approval/registration of food advertising codes. 
• The government uses co-regulation to specify key objectives, terms and definitions for 
regulation of food advertising to children, including ‘media directed to children’, 
‘advertising directed to children’, the age range covered by the codes and the media 
channels and marketing techniques that restrictions apply to.  
• Legislative scaffodling also establishes an independent committee to administer and 
enforce the RCMI and QSRI, and an independent panel to hear consumer complaints 
about unhealthy food advertising to children.  
Stage two • The government introduces mandatory pre-vetting for food advertising to children (for 
companies with a defined advertising spend) if monitoring shows that the improved 
scheme has not reduced children’s exposure to food advertising. 
• The government provides for more punitive enforcement measures, e.g., fines and 
targeted adverse publicity. 
• It also communicates to the food industry that legislation will be introduced if co-
regulation proves unsuccessful in moderating children’s exposure to food advertising. 
Stage three • The government introduces legislative restrictions on unhealthy food advertising during 
children’s peak television viewing periods and in other media, as well as on commonly 
used persuasive techniques, if co-regulation fails to reduce children’s exposure to 
unhealthy food advertising. 
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4. Conclusion  
Despite increasing government oversight of food industry self-regulation, I argue that there is 
further scope for government intervention in the operation of the RCMI and QSRI. However, 
I outlined a series of barriers to prescriptive command-and-control regulation in this area, not 
the least of which is the significant power of the food industry. In this context I proposed that 
the Federal government draw upon novel forms of intervention to incrementally strengthen 
these initiatives and provide for further government oversight. Through co-regulation the 
Federal government could set the objectives, definitions and institutional arrangements for 
the codes, while allowing industry to implement restrictions on food marketing to children 
voluntarily. I also proposed that the government take a dynamic approach to food marketing 
regulation. This could have two components: progressively ‘ratcheting up’ the substantive 
conditions of the codes, as well as introducing increasingly more intrusive regulation to give 
effect to the initiatives’ requirements. In line with responsive regulation, one of the most 
critical components of this strategy is that the government explicitly communicates to 
industry that it will introduce statutory regulation if voluntary or co-regulatory programs fail 
to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. 
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CONCLUSION 
The dramatic increase in childhood obesity poses an immediate threat to children’s health, as 
well as to the health of future generations of adults. If continuing unchecked, it could place a 
significant economic strain on Australia’s healthcare system through its contribution to the 
burden of chronic disease. The food industry makes a significant contribution to weight by 
developing and marketing unhealthy food to children. Big Food spends considerable sums of 
money on sophisticated marketing strategies that target young people, using a wide range of 
communication channels and promotional techniques. Evidence shows that this advertising 
affects children’s food preferences and choices, their actual consumption patterns and their 
diet-related health, independent of other factors. Accordingly, governments, consumers, 
parents and public health organisations have become increasingly concerned about the 
marketing practices of the food industry. 
The food industry has responded to the risks posed by childhood obesity by developing 
voluntary advertising codes that have filled the food regulatory space and operate as de facto 
regulatory standards. In Australia, the industry created two such codes, The Responsible 
Children’s Marketing Initiative of the Australian Food and Beverage Industry and the 
Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry’s Initiative for Responsible Advertising and 
Marketing to Children. As with self-regulatory ‘pledges’ in other jurisdictions, these controls 
are weak and the industry has been resistant to strengthening them in a manner that would 
significantly reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. However, the 
Australian Federal government has been politically unable or unwilling to impose more direct 
statutory controls. The regulatory dilemma posed by this situation is the key challenge that 
this thesis addresses. 
In 2009 the National Preventive Health Taskforce released its report on reducing the burden 
of disease caused by tobacco use, excessive alcohol consumption and obesity.1 The Taskforce 
noted critical flaws in food industry self-regulation and proposed responsive regulation as a 
means of strengthening controls on unhealthy food advertising to children. Its strategy began 
                                                 
1 National Preventative Health Taskforce, 'Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020 - National Preventative 
Health Strategy - Overview' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 
<http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/national-preventative-
health-strategy-1lp>. 
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with government monitoring of the voluntary codes followed by the introduction of co-
regulation to address any limitations in the scheme. This would ultimately lead to legislation 
that banned unhealthy food advertising before 9pm if co-regulation was ineffective in 
reducing children’s exposure to such advertising.  
Consistent with the recommendations of the Taskforce, this thesis applied a responsive 
regulatory approach to self-regulation of food advertising to children in Australia. It assessed 
the content of, and regulatory processes established by, the RCMI and QSRI in order to 
understand why these codes do not reduce the amount of unhealthy food advertising children 
see. The overall goal of the thesis was to determine whether escalation to more intrusive 
forms of regulation was justified, and what form of government intervention might be 
appropriate. My research found that food industry self-regulation is failing Australian 
children. There are critical loopholes in the substantive conditions contained in the initiatives 
and significant flaws in the design and implementation of the scheme. The institutional 
arrangements for self-regulation lack transparency and accountability, particularly because of 
their narrow scope for external stakeholder participation. Public health organisations place 
pressure on the food industry to comply with the codes and improve advertising practices, but 
government intervention in food industry self-regulation is insufficient to produce an 
industry-based scheme that truly furthers public health objectives. 
1. The content of the RCMI and QSRI  
The RCMI and QSRI contain numerous escape clauses in their substantive terms and 
coverage. The codes only apply to ‘media directed primarily to children’, rather than media 
with substantial adult and child audiences.  This allows participants to market their products 
during television programs with large child audiences. The definition of ‘advertising directed 
primarily to children’ still permits food advertisers to use a range of creative techniques that 
young people find appealing, including toys, animated characters and scenes of children 
playing. The codes exclude a number of key communication channels and marketing 
techniques, particularly digital media, product packaging and labelling, brand promotion and 
many forms of industry sponsorship. Further, the Advertising Standards Board (ASB) 
interprets the codes’ provision on ‘premium offers’ as permitting food companies to market 
non-food items as part of children’s meals or food products, rendering this provision virtually 
meaningless. Under the RCMI, signatory companies use their own nutrient profile models to 
determine which of their products may be marketed to children. This renders the scheme 
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complex, confusing and weak, and enables participants to market most of their (unhealthy) 
products to children. The nutrient profile model attached to the QSRI sets high thresholds for 
undesirable nutrients and energy content. Further, it only covers children’s meals, which 
represent a fraction of the products promoted by fast-food restaurants. 
The cumulative effect of these escape clauses is that the initiatives contain weak standards 
that apply to only very little food advertising viewed by children, even if they reduce food 
advertising during designated chidren’s programs. These loopholes in the terms and 
conditions of the codes must be closed off if self-regulation is to moderate the volume, and 
persuasive power of food advertising that children see.  As Handsley argues,2 this means 
revising the regulatory axes along which these schemes are designed, including the concepts 
of ‘media directed primarily to children’, ‘advertising directed primarily to children’, the 
definition of children, the communication channels and marketing techniques covered by the 
codes, and the nutrition criteria used to identify ‘healthier choice’ products. 
2. The design of regulatory processes 
Furthermore, the governance processes established by the RCMI and QSRI are critically 
flawed. The codes’ vague objectives leave them open to debate about what they aim to 
achieve (and what they should aim to achieve), and undermines independent evaluation of the 
scheme. The food industry argues that the codes seek to reduce unhealthy food advertising 
that targets children specifically, whereas the goal for public health advocates is to 
substantially reduce children’s total exposure to unhealthy food advertising and promotions.  
The main monitoring mechanism draws upon participant self-reporting, which is highly 
variable and relies upon companies’ willingness to disclose serious breaches. The AFGC 
monitors the scheme independently of participants, but its reports only consider advertising 
for unhealthy food that is ‘directed primarily to children’ (rather than the amount of this 
advertising viewed by children), and they do not fully record all instances of non-compliance. 
Accordingly, the performance of the RCMI and QSRI is not subject to systematic and 
independent monitoring. Additionally, it is difficult for members of the public to use the 
complaint hearing mechanism via the ASB, given the complex nature of the scheme. Yet 
there are few other options for enforcing self-regulation given that the AFGC is a food 
industry representative body and does not engage in ‘naming and shaming’ code signatories, 
                                                 
2 Elizabeth Handsley et al, 'Regulatory Axes on Food Advertising to Children on Television' (2009) 6(1) 
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 1. 
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nor is it willing to consider more punitive options. Although the scheme has benefited from 
independent external review, the AFGC has not committed to on-going external evaluation of 
the scheme’s success against objective performance criteria.  
Most important, the industry developed the scheme with little participation from external 
stakeholders, and largely excludes them from routine administrative and enforcement 
processes, meaning that the codes’ governance processes are almost entirely industry based. 
Together with the other limitations in self-regulatory processes, lack of external stakeholder 
participation significantly undermines the transparency and accountability of self-regulation. 
It also suggests that industry adopted the initiatives to give the appearance of regulation 
rather than to address the actual concerns of parents, governments, public health advocates 
and other NGOs. Thus, it is unsurprising that the schemes lack credibility with public health 
researchers, and have failed to address community concerns about food advertising and 
childhood obesity. A more effective and democratic system would require external 
stakeholders to be more fully incorporated into administration, monitoring and enforcement 
activities. This is particularly the case considering that self-regulation is presented as an 
alternative to a more publicly accountable system based on statutory regulation. 
3. Institutional influences on food industry self-regulation 
I have documented several institutional constraints on the industry’s ability to adopt a more 
effective voluntary program. The food industry is dominated by large, multinational 
companies, enabling wide code coverage even with a handful of participants. However, key 
industry players have not joined the codes, including supermarket giants Coles and 
Woolworths, which play an increasingly important role in food retail and promotion. The 
diverse and complex nature of food products also makes self-regulation more prone to failure, 
as consumers cannot tell which products belong to code signatories, even if they were aware 
of the codes. Also, consumers are unlikely to purchase products based on a company’s 
responsible marketing practices, which means that market pressure cannot be harnessed as an 
economic incentive for companies to join and comply with the scheme. Further, there is 
ongoing debate about how to use nutrient profile models to classify food products for the 
purposes of marketing to children, which potentially impacts upon the efficacy of self-
regulation. This is particularly the case when companies are permitted to devise their own 
weak standards for identifying products appropriate for marketing to children. 
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The food industry possesses the institutional structures for effective self-regulation, namely 
an active trade association that can unite companies behind voluntary programs. The AFGC 
proactively administers the RCMI and QSRI and assists participants with compliance. By 
using the ASB to hear complaints about food advertising, the scheme also benefits from 
connections to the broader advertising self-regulatory framework. However, the 
administration of the codes by a trade industry association undermines the real and perceived 
impartiality and effectiveness of governance processes. The scheme is also vulnerable to free-
riding, given the AFGC’s failure to enforce the initiatives and the lack of economic 
incentives for companies to join the scheme. Industry developed the codes under pressure 
from government, consumer groups and health advocates, and as a means to improve its 
collective reputation. Apart from managing political pressures, there is little evidence that the 
food industry has a genuine, widespread commitment to obesity prevention, especially given 
the fundamental conflict of interest between the industry’s profit and reducing unhealthy food 
advertising to children. In these circumstances, self-regulation does not represent a ‘win-win’ 
situation for industry and the public. This leads to the conclusion that government 
intervention will be needed to produce a scheme that significantly reduces children’s 
exposure to unhealthy food advertising. 
4. Corporate practices and the implementation of the codes 
Voluntary advertising codes are one example of Big Food’s adoption of complex corporate 
social responsibility strategies regarding the nutritional quality and marketing of companies’ 
products. Within this context, I considered the reasons why multinational food and alcohol 
companies join industry codes of conduct and the steps they take to implement self-
regulation. Respondents I interviewed reported a genuine desire to ‘do the right thing’ and to 
market their products to children responsibly. Compliance with self-regulation also supported 
their core business model and other social responsibility projects, including at the global 
level. Thus, spokespeople from companies reported inter-twined economic and ethical 
reasons for joining voluntary codes, reinforced by implicit pressure from pledges and 
guidelines being introduced in other countries, as well scrutiny from governments, advocacy 
groups and consumers. Interviewees also discussed the importance of protecting the 
industry’s reputation and expressed concern that their commitments were being undermined 
by other signatories engaging in ‘creative compliance’, or by companies that failed to join the 
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scheme. A community of ‘shared fate’ does appear to exist in the food industry where poor 
practices by one firm may jeopardise the reputation of the industry as a whole. 
Interviewees described compliance practices that aligned with their commitment to 
responsible marketing, including modifying policy documents; training employees and 
external partners; re-structuring internal compliance systems; senior management 
engagement; and reporting on compliance. The interviews suggested that companies put 
significant time and effort into complying with the RCMI and QSRI, a perspective that is also 
reflected in the AFGC’s monitoring reports. Yet independent research shows that these and 
other voluntary initiatives have had little ‘real-world’ impact on the food marketing 
environment. A key explanation for this contradiction is that code participants (at least some 
of them) are implementing voluntary standards that do not require them to significantly alter 
their marketing practices. Rather, self-regulation simply rolled out existing best practice 
standards across the industry, with the goals of allowing companies to police each other’s 
behaviour, improving the industry’s reputation and deflecting government interest in 
regulating food advertising. The RCMI and QSRI could be used to ratchet up marketing 
standards by tightening the substantive controls on participants’ conduct, but this is unlikely 
to happen, given that responsible marketing comes at a significant cost to individual 
companies. This points to the need for some form of external pressure if the industry is to 
adopt a voluntary scheme that serves public rather than private interests. 
5. Public health participation in industry based initiatives  
Given the many failures of self-regulation, I went on to consider ways in which the RCMI 
and QSRI schemes might be strengthened (drawing upon the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 3). Chapter 10 explored the scope for enhancing external stakeholder 
participation in self-regulatory processes. Public health groups are highly active in the food 
regulatory space and in obesity prevention more broadly. They advocate for government 
regulation on advertising unhealthy food to children, develop policy proposals, research the 
extent and nature of food marketing, evaluate self-regulation and lay complaints about 
advertisements that breach the RCMI and QSRI. As such, they constitute a significant source 
of pressure on the industry to adopt self-regulation and to comply with voluntary standards. 
In addition, the RCMI and QSRI allow for direct stakeholder engagement in the scheme, via 
the nutrition arbiter that participates in food advertising complaints determinations and also 
through processes of independent review. However, I argue that these are relatively weak 
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forms of external influence, meaning that in practice non-industry stakeholders have had little 
direct influence over the operation of self-regulation. 
The public health stakeholders that I interviewed acknowledged that there was potential for 
collaborating with the food industry in policy initiatives. Further, they saw co-regulation as a 
viable option for controls on food marketing, at least as an interim measure. This suggests 
that there is some scope for developing the RCMI and QSRI into more participatory 
programs. However, the ABAC illustrates the dangers of public health participation in 
industry-based schemes, both for the health actors involved and for the credibility of the 
scheme itself. Because of the significant risk of industry ‘capture’, external stakeholder 
engagement in private regulation offers little benefit to public health, unless it occurs within a 
framework of government support and oversight.  
6. Government influence over industry self-regulation 
The overall conclusion is that state intervention is required if the RCMI and QSRI are to 
operate as an effective voluntary scheme. Government and the food industry are devoting 
significant attention to the development of new food and nutrition policies and regulatory 
standards. During my period of PhD candidature, the Federal government has introduced the 
voluntary star scheme for front-of-pack nutrition labelling, finalised Standard 1.2.7 of the 
Food Standards Code on health and nutrition claims, together with a nutrient profiling model, 
and initiated development of the National Food Plan and National Nutrition Policy. It 
remains to be seen whether these developments in food governance also encourage greater 
government interest in food advertising to children, particularly given ANPHA’s proposed 
frameworks for monitoring the RCMI and QSRI.3 However, even without the results of 
further monitoring, this thesis provides sufficient evidence that self-regulation is ineffective 
and unlikely to further reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising. For these 
reasons, it is time for the government to step up on the regulation of advertising unhealthy 
food to children. 
Government action need not imply statutory regulation, despite this being the preferred 
option of public health groups. A number of government initiatives, including the Food and 
Health Dialogue, rely upon collaboration with the food industry, discouraging the 
                                                 
3 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, Draft Frameworks for Monitoring Television Marketing and 
Advertising to Children for Unhealthy Food and Drinks – Issues Paper (April 2013) 
<http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf/Content/frameworks-monitoring-unhealthy-food-drafts>. 
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introduction of legislation that is unpopular with Big Food, and puts co-operative approaches 
at risk. Other impediments to state action include the ‘normalisation’ of the food industry and 
junk food consumption, combined with entrenched neo-liberal ideologies about individual 
choice and the desirability of streamlining regulation. Even when the government is willing 
to confront industry directly (as with Big Tobacco), it is likely that regulation will develop 
incrementally over a number of years. The UK restrictions on advertising unhealthy food 
illustrate how governments are more likely to build upon existing regulatory models than 
they are to introduce entirely new legislative measures. 
7. An incremental approach to strengthening the food industry’s scheme 
Given these impediments to immediate statutory regulation of food advertising, the Federal 
government may need to take action through novel forms of regulation that do not involve 
prescriptive legislation, but which still recognise the state’s leadership role in public health. 
The RCMI and QSRI could be strengthened by the use of regulatory ‘scaffolds’,4 where the 
government determines key substantive elements of voluntary codes, and structures the 
involvement of different stakeholders in regulatory processes, while still allowing significant 
industry governance of code content and the standards that apply to code signatories. 
Through co-regulation the government would set the objectives for the RCMI and QSRI, 
define their key terms and create uniform nutrition standards for the scheme. It would also 
provide for independent administration, monitoring, enforcement and review of self-
regulation, through processes that facilitate participation by a wide range of stakeholders.  
In accordance with responsive regulation, and as recommended by the National Preventive 
Health Taskforce, I argue that the government should take further steps to restrict food 
advertising to children. This could involve progressively strengthening the scheme’s 
requirements, as well as escalation up a pyramid of increasing severe regulatory options. 
Specifically, in Chapter 11 I proposed that the government finalise the monitoring 
frameworks for the codes and the nutrient profiling model to be used in determining which 
foods and beverages are appropriate for advertising to children. The government should also 
consider a co-regulatory scheme, using legislation to require registration of the codes, as well 
as to specify the objectives to be addressed in food industry self-regulation, define terms in 
the initiatives, and establish independent governance processes for the schemes. Co-
                                                 
4 Roger S Magnusson and Belinda H Reeve, 'Regulation and the Prevention Agenda' (2013) 199(2) Medical 
Journal of Australia 89. 
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regulation, including registration of industry codes, occurs in other sectors, including 
broadcast advertising regulation, setting a precedent for this kind of regulatory arrangement. 
A final step is that government must clearly communicate to industry that if an improved 
voluntary scheme fails to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food advertising, it is 
willing to introduce more coercive forms of regulation such as statutory bans on advertising 
unhealthy food during children’s peak viewing times or in media with large child audiences. 
 In making this argument, I endorse the use of regulation that involves some degree of 
collaboration with the food industry or voluntary action on its part. Yet there are strong 
arguments that Big Food and Big Alcohol should not play any role in public health initiatives 
and that statutory regulation should be the main (or only) approach. A responsive, staged or 
incremental approach may not be as effective as statutory bans on advertising in the short 
term, but it is more politically feasible in conditions of regulatory capitalism. It adds value to 
public health by proposing new ways of regulating the powerful, multinational industries that 
exert a substantial influence on consumer choice, and ultimately on public health. It 
recognises the constraints on state action, but also the potential for other actors (such as 
public health organisations) to play a larger part in public health governance, without leaving 
public health initiatives in the hands of industry. Rather, voluntary action must take place in 
the context of government monitoring and oversight, combined with the potential for 
regulatory escalation. This includes the possibility of co-regulation when the industry does 
not voluntarily ‘get its house in order’, followed by the introduction of more coercive 
regulatory options. Public health needs strong government leadership, particularly when 
faced with challenges that require new forms of law, regulation and governance.  
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The Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative of the 
Australian Food and Beverage Industry 
 
Introduction 
The Australian Food and Beverage Industry has developed this initiative to 
demonstrate its commitment to responsible marketing of foods and beverages to 
children. 
The goal is to ensure that a high level of social responsibility in marketing 
communication and marketing food and beverage products in Australia is 
maintained. 
This initiative will provide confidence in the responsible marketing practices via clear 
expectations of the form, spirit and context, and a transparent process for monitoring 
and review of practices. The aim is to provide a framework for food and beverage 
companies to help promote healthy dietary choices and lifestyles to Australian 
children. 
This Initiative has been developed in collaboration with the AANA as part of the 
system of advertising and marketing self-regulation in Australia. Signatories to this 
initiative must also abide by: 
 The AANA Code for Advertising & Marketing Communications to Children 
 The AANA Food & Beverages Advertising & Marketing Communications Code 
 The AANA Code of Ethics 
This document outlines the minimum commitments required by signatories. 
Companies may choose to adopt additional commitments. 
Scope 
The scope of this initiative is based on the definitions of Advertising or Marketing 
Communications to Children and Media. 
Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children is defined by the ANNA Code 
for Advertising and Marketing Communications to Children and means advertising or 
marketing communications which, having regard to the theme, visuals and language 
used, are directed primarily to Children and are for Product. 
Media means television, radio, print, cinema and third-party internet sites where the 
audience is predominantly children and/or having regard to the theme, visuals, and 
language used are directed primarily to children. In regards to television, this 
includes all P and C programs; all programs where more than 50% of the audience is 
children under 12 years; plus those G rated programs that meet the criteria above as 
being designed for children. 
Further definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
An indicative television program list is provided in Appendix II. 
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Core Principles 
Companies participating in this initiative will publicly commit to marketing 
communications to children under 12, only when it will further the goal of promoting 
healthy dietary choices and healthy lifestyles. 
Each participant will develop an individual company action plan that outlines how 
they will meet the following core principles: 
Advertising Messaging 
Participants will not advertise food and beverage products to children under 12 in 
media unless: 
1. those products represent healthy dietary choices, consistent with established 
scientific or Australian government standards 
And 
2. the advertising and/or marketing communication activities reference, or are in 
the context of, a healthy lifestyle, designed to appeal to the intended audience 
through messaging that encourages: 
 good dietary habits, consistent with established scientific or government criteria 
 physical activity. 
Use of Popular Personalities and Characters 
Participants will not use popular personalities, program characters or licensed 
characters in advertising primarily directed to children under 12 unless such 
advertising complies with the messaging options set out above. This is in addition to 
requirements under the Children’s Television Standards 2009 covering C and P 
periods (CTS section 35). 
Product Placement 
Participants will commit to not paying for or actively seeking to place their food or 
beverage products in the program/editorial content of any medium primarily directed 
to children under 12 for the purpose of promoting the sale of those products unless 
those products are consistent with healthy dietary choices under #1 above. 
Use of Products in Interactive Games 
Participants will commit that, in any interactive game primarily directed to children 
under 12 where the company’s food or beverage products are incorporated into the 
game, the interactive game must incorporate or be consistent with healthy dietary 
choices under #1 above and healthy lifestyle messaging under #2 above. 
Advertising in Schools 
Participants will refrain from product-related communications in primary schools, 
except where specifically requested by, or agreed with, the school administration for 
educational or informational purposes, or related to healthy lifestyle activities under 
the supervision of the school administration or appropriate adults. 
Use of Premium Offers 
Participants will commit to not advertising premium offers unless the reference to the 
premium is merely incidental to the product being advertised in accordance with the 
AANA codes and the Children’s Television Standards 2009 (CTS Section 33). 
3  March 2011 
 
Individual Company Action Plans 
Companies will sign up to this initiative as a minimum commitment and will develop 
and publish individual Company Action Plans that outline their specific commitments 
including individual nutritional standards if applicable in order to meet the core 
principles of this initiative. 
Because companies and their product lines vary, the way companies comply with 
this framework will differ. However, all commitments will be consistent with the core 
principles outlined in this initiative. 
This initiative outlines the minimum commitments required by signatories. 
Companies may choose to go further if they wish. 
Complaints 
AFGC and AANA have formulated a transparent public complaints system, managed 
by the Advertising Standards Bureau. 
Sanctions may be imposed on participants who fail to meet their obligations under 
the terms of this initiative. 
Compliance monitoring 
Companies are required to report on their marketing communication activities to 
children on an annual basis. Key criteria have been established to assess how 
companies’ activities meet the core principles outlined in this initiative. 
AFGC will be responsible for coordinating the monitoring of company activities on an 
annual basis to confirm compliance, with resultant reports being made publically 
available. 
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Appendix I - Definitions 
In this Initiative: 
Marketing Communications means 
a. matter which is published or broadcast using any medium in all of Australia or 
in a substantial section of Australia for payment or other valuable consideration 
and which draws the attention of the public or a segment of it, to a product, 
service, person, organisation, or line of conduct in a manner calculated to 
promote or oppose directly or indirectly that product, service, person, 
organisation or line of conduct; 
b. any activity which is undertaken by or on behalf of an advertiser or marketer for 
payment or other valuable consideration and which draws the attention of the 
public or a segment of it to a product, service, person, organisation or line of 
conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose directly or indirectly the 
product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct, but does not include 
Excluded Advertising or Marketing Communications. 
Excluded Marketing Communications means labels or packaging for products. 
Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children is defined by the AANA 
Code for Advertising and Marketing Communications to Children and means 
advertising or marketing communications which, having regard to the theme, visuals, 
and language used, are directed primarily to children and are for product. 
Media means television, radio, print, cinema and third-party internet sites where the 
audience is predominantly children and/or having regard to the theme, visuals, and 
language used are directed primarily to children. 
Children means persons under 12 years of age. 
Popular Personalities and Characters means: 
 a personality or character from a C program or P program 
 a popular program or movie character 
 a non-proprietary cartoon, animated or computer generated character 
 a popular personality. 
Premium means anything offered free or at a reduced price and which is conditional 
upon the purchase of a children’s food or beverage product. 
Product is defined by the AANA Code for Advertising and Marketing 
Communications to Children and means goods, services and/or facilities which are 
targeted toward and have principal appeal to Children. In the case of the 
Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, the Product is contained to food and 
beverages. 
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Appendix II - Indicative Television Program List 
Under the Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative, participants will not advertise 
food and beverage products to children under 12 in media unless it meets the core 
principles in relation to advertising messaging.  
The list in Table 1 has been provided to illustrate the types of television programs 
covered by the initiative. This list includes all P and C programs; all programs where 
more than 50% of the audience is children under 12 years; plus those G rated 
programs that meet the criteria as being designed for children (through the themes, 
visuals and language used). The list in Table 2 outlines programs that are not 
covered by the initiative. 
Note: these are indicative lists and will be updated from time to time to reflect current 
programming. The Advertising Standards Board makes the final determination of 
programs covered by the Responsible Children’s Marketing Initiative. 
Table 1: Programs covered by the RCMI 
Action Man A.T.O.M. 
Alvin and the Chipmunks 
Animalia 
Bakugan 
Ben 10: Alien Force 
Blinky Bill 
Bubble Town Club 
Camp Lazlo 
Cats & Dogs 
Chaotic 
Chowder 
Class of 3000 
Codename: Kids Next Door 
Count Duckula 
Dangermouse 
Dennis & Gnasher 
Dex Hamilton 
Digimon Data Squad 
Dive Olly Dive 
Dora The Explorer  
Erky Perky 
Foster’s Home for Imaginary 
Friends 
Flipper 
Go, Diego Go  
Go Go Stop 
G2G: Got  to Go 
Handy Manny 
Hannah Montana 
Hi-5 
H2O - Just Add Water 
It’s Academic 
Kamen Rider Dragon Knight 
Kid's WB on Nine 
Kidspeak 
Kim Possible 
K9 
Lab Rats Challenge 
Legend of Enyo 
Legion of Superheroes 
Life and Times of Juniper Lee 
Looney Tunes 
Maddigan’s Quest 
Magical Tales 
Marine Boy 
Mickey Mouse Clubhouse 
Mortified 
My Friends Tigger and Pooh 
My Gym Partner is a Monkey 
Oggy and the Cockroaches 
Out of Jimmy’s Head 
Phineas and Ferb 
Power Rangers 
Puzzle Play 
Ruby Gloom 
Rugrats Go Wild! 
Saturday Disney  
Scooby-Doo (and Shaggy) 
Scope 
Sea Princesses 
Spectacular Spiderman 
Spit it Out 
SpongeBob SquarePants 
Spy Kids   
Sumo Mouse 
Tamagotchi! 
The Ant Bully 
The Batman 
The Book Place 
The Fairies 
The Flintstones 
The Jetsons 
The Marvellous Misadventures 
    of Flapjack 
The Perils of Penelope Pitstop 
The Replacements 
The Saddle Club 
The Shak 
The Sleepover Club 
The Wind in the Willows 
Thunderbirds 
Toasted TV 
Tom & Jerry 
Top Cat 
Totally Wild 
Toybox 
Trapped 
Treasure Island 
Wacky Races 
Wipeout 
Wormwood 
Yin Yang Yo! 
Yu Gi Oh! 5 Dragons 
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Table 2: Programs not covered by the RCMI 
The Simpsons 
Wipeout 
The X Factor 
Malcolm in the Middle 
Sunrise 
Today 
Knight Rider 
Wagon Train 
The Virginian 
Home and Away 
Neighbours 
The Zoo 
The Nanny 
Friends 
I Dream of Jeannie 
Bewitched 
The Morning Show 
Get Smart 
Ready Steady Cook 
Masterchef 
Here’s Lucy 
Deal or No Deal 
The A-Team 
Monster Garage 
Minute to Win It 
That ‘70s Show 
How I Met Your Mother 
Two and a Half Men 
The Big Bang Theory 
Top Gear 
Seinfeld 
 
AUSTRALIAN QUICK SERVICE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY INITIATIVE FOR RESPONSIBLE 
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING TO CHILDREN 
 
 
1. STATEMENT OF INTENT 
 
The Australian Quick Service Restaurant Industry has developed this initiative to demonstrate its 
commitment to responsible advertising and marketing of food and/or beverages to children.  
 
The Initiative provides a common framework for quick service restaurant companies to ensure 
that only food and beverages that represent healthier choices are promoted directly to children 
and to ensure parents or guardians can make informed product choices for their children. 
 
This Initiative has been developed in collaboration with the AANA as part of the system of 
advertising and marketing self-regulation in Australia. 
   
Participants must also abide by: 
o The AANA Code for Advertising & Marketing Communications to Children 
o The AANA Food & Beverages Advertising & Marketing Communications Code 
o The AANA Code of Ethics 
 
This initiative will provide confidence in the responsible marketing practices via clear expectations 
of the form, spirit and context, and a transparent process for monitoring and review of practices.   
 
Definitions are set out in Clause 7 and Appendix 1 
 
2. PARTICIPANTS  
 
Participants to this Initiative include: 
 
McDonald’s 
KFC 
Pizza Hut 
Hungry Jack’s 
Oporto 
Red Rooster 
Chicken Treat 
 
3. COMMENCEMENT 
 
This Initiative commences on 1 August 2009. 
 
4. CORE PRINCIPLES 
 
4.1 Advertising and Marketing Messaging  
 
Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children for food and/or beverages must: 
 
(a) Represent healthier choices, as determined by a defined set of Nutrition Criteria for assessing 
children’s meals (see Appendix 1); and/or 
 
(b) Represent a healthy lifestyle, designed to appeal to the intended audience through messaging 
that encourages: 
(i)  healthier choices, as determined by a defined set of Nutrition Criteria for 
assessing children’s meals (see Appendix 1); and 
 (ii)  physical activity. 
 
4.2 Popular Personalities and Licensed Characters 
 
Popular Personalities or Licensed Characters must not be used in Advertising or Marketing 
Communications to Children for food and/or beverage products, unless such Advertising or 
Marketing Communications complies with the messaging options set out in Article 4.1 and the 
specific requirements of Section 22 (Promotions and Endorsements by Program Characters) of 
the Children’s Television Standards 2005. 
 
4.3 Product Placement 
 
Participants must not pay for the placement of, or actively seek to place, food and/or beverage 
products in the program or editorial content of any Medium directed primarily to Children unless 
such food and/or beverage products are consistent with Article 4.1(a). 
 
4.4 Use of Products in Interactive Games 
 
Each Participant must ensure, as far as possible, that any interactive game which incorporates 
food and/or beverage products sold at that Participant’s store or outlet and is primarily directed to 
Children, is consistent with Article 4.1(b).  
 
4.5 Advertising in Schools 
 
Participants must not engage in any product-related communications in Australian schools, 
except where specifically requested by, or agreed with, the school administration, or related to 
healthy lifestyle activities under the supervision of the school administration or appropriate adults. 
 
4.6 Use of Premium Offers  
 
Participants must not advertise Premium offers in any Medium directed primarily to Children 
unless the reference to the Premium is merely incidental to the food and/or beverage product 
being advertised in accordance with the AANA Codes and Section 20 (Disclaimers and Premium 
Offers) of the Childrens Television Standards 2005. 
 
4.7 On-Pack Nutrition Labelling 
 
Nutritional profile information must be provided on packaging wherever possible, in respect of 
those food products usually contained in such packaging to assist parents and guardians to make 
informed food choices for their children.  
 
4.8 Availability of Nutrition Information 
 
Nutritional profile information must also be available on company websites or upon request, in 
respect of all food and beverage products to assist parents and guardians to make informed food 
choices for their children. 
 
5. INDIVIDUAL COMPANY ACTION PLANS  
 
5.1 Participants must develop and publish individual ‘Company Action Plans’ for the purposes of 
communicating how they will each meet the requirements of this Initiative and the anticipated 
timeframe for these required actions. 
 
5.2 All commitments must be consistent with the core principles outlined in this Initiative. 
 
6. COMPLIANCE, COMPLAINTS, AND MONITORING 
 
6.1 Key Criteria for Meeting Core Principles 
 
Participants acknowledge that key criteria will be established in consultation with nutritional 
experts and the AANA to assess whether Signatories’ Advertising or Marketing Communications 
to Children for food and/or beverage products meet the core principles outlined in this document. 
 
6.2 Compliance and Complaints 
 
Participants acknowledge that:  
 
(a)  they will work with the AANA to formulate a public compliance program, including the 
administration of a public complaints system in relation to this Initiative via the 
Advertising Standards Bureau which will be determined by the Advertising Standards 
Board, and each Participant will be subject to such compliance and public complaints 
process; 
 
(b)  any compliance program developed will be made publicly available; 
 
(c)  the compliance program developed will periodically be reviewed, in consultation with  
the participants, in respect of procedures and the overall impact of this Initiative.  The 
first such review will be started on or around the first anniversary from the 
implementation of this compliance program.  
 
6.3 Monitoring Implementation of Initiative 
 
On and from the commencement of this Initiative, the Participants will appoint an independent 
individual or organisation to monitor Participants’ Advertising or Marketing Communications to 
Children for food and/or beverage products for a period of 12 months and will publish a publicly 
available report of its findings. Such monitoring and reporting will be repeated periodically. The 
final report will focus on industry response and determine the nature of improvements in 
performance and will report generally on the findings. 
 
7. DEFINITIONS  
 
In this Initiative, unless the context otherwise requires: 
 
Advertising or Marketing Communications means any matter generated by a  
Participant which is published or broadcast using any Medium for payment or other valuable 
consideration and which draws the attention of the public or a segment to it, to a product, service, 
person, organisation, or line of conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose directly or 
indirectly that product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct but does not include in-
store point of sale material, labels, or packaging of products.  
 
Advertising or Marketing Communications to Children means Advertising or Marketing 
Communications which, having regard to the theme, visuals and language used, are directed 
primarily to Children and are for food and/or beverage products. 
 
Child means a person under 14 years of age. 
 
Children means persons under 14 years of age.  
 
Children’s Television Standards 2005 means the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority Children’s Television Standards 2005.  
 
Participants means: 
 
(a) McDonald’s Australia,  
 
(b) Yum Brands Australia, 
 
(c) Hungry Jack’s Australia; 
 
(d) Quick Service Restaurant Holdings Pty Ltd; and 
 
(e) any other Quick Service Restaurant who agrees to be bound by the terms of the 
Initiative after its Commencement.  
 
Medium means television, radio, newspapers, magazines, outdoor billboards and posters, 
emails, interactive games, cinema and internet sites. 
 
Popular Personalities and Licensed Characters means a personality or character from a C 
program or P program, a popular program or movie character, a non-proprietary cartoon, 
animated or computer generated character 
 
Premium means anything offered free or at a reduced price and which is conditional upon the 
purchase of regular Children’s Food or Beverage Product. 
 
 
8. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
(a) Agreement to this initiative to be finalised by 25 June 2009.  
(b) Company Action Plans will be required to be submitted on company website by 1 August 
2009.  
(c) The Participants and the AANA undertake to review this initiative in 2010. 
 
APPENDIX 1 –NUTRITION CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING CHILDREN’S MEALS 
 
The nutrition criteria for assessing children’s meals, according to the Australian Quick Service 
Restaurant Industry Initiative for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children, are as 
follows: 
 
1. Meal composition 
a. The meal must be comprised of at least a main and a beverage. 
b. The meal should reflect general principles of healthy eating as defined by credible 
nutrition authorities. 
 
2. Energy 
a. The meal must satisfy an energy criteria based on the Nutrient Reference Values1 for 
children of different age groups.  The maximum energy limits for each target age group 
are as follows: 
i. 4-8 years - 2080 kJ per meal 
ii. 9-13 years - 2770 kJ per meal 
 
3. Nutrients of public health concern 
a. The meal must not exceed maximum limits as follows: 
i. Saturated fat - 0.4g per 100kJ; 
ii. Sugar - 1.8g per 100kJ; and 
iii. Sodium - 650mg per serve. 
 
b. Overall, the average level of saturated fat, sugar and sodium in the meal will be less 
than what children are currently eating (based on the Children’s Survey2). 
 
The nutrition criteria for assessing children’s meals have been developed by a team of 
Accredited Practicing Dietitians in consultation with national guidelines and authorities on 
children’s nutrition.  These criteria will be piloted over the next 12 months and updated as 
required to reflect changes in nutrition science and NHMRC recommendations. Specific details 
on the nutrition criteria are outlined in a compliance tool provided to signatories of this 
Initiative. 
 
References 
1. National Health and Medical Research Council. Nutrient Reference Values for Australia and New Zealand. Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia; 2006. 
2. Australian Government: Department of Health and Ageing. 2007 Australian National Children’s Nutrition and Physical Activity 
Survey. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia; 2008. 
  
The ABAC Scheme:  
ALCOHOL BEVERAGES ADVERTISING (AND PACKAGING) CODE 
 
 
Preamble 
 
Brewers Association of Australia and New Zealand Inc, the Distilled Spirits Industry 
Council of Australia Inc and the Winemakers Federation of Australia are committed to 
the goal that all advertisements for alcohol beverages produced for publication or 
broadcast in Australia other than point of sale material produced by alcohol beverage 
retailers, comply with the spirit and intent of this Code. 
 
The Code is designed to ensure that alcohol advertising will be conducted in a 
manner which neither conflicts with nor detracts from the need for responsibility and 
moderation in liquor merchandising and consumption, and which does not encourage 
consumption by underage persons. 
 
The conformity of an advertisement with this Code is to be assessed in terms of its 
probable impact upon a reasonable person within the class of persons to whom the 
advertisement is directed and other persons to whom the advertisement may be 
communicated, and taking its content as a whole. 
 
 
Definitions 
 
For the purpose of this Code – 
 
adult means a person who is at least 18 years of age; 
 
alcohol beverage includes any particular brand of alcohol beverage; 
 
adolescent means a person aged 14-17 years inclusive; 
 
Australian Alcohol Guidelines means the electronic document ‘Australian 
Guidelines to Reduce Health Risks from Drinking Alcohol (1-2)’ published by the 
National Health & Medical Research Council (“NHMRC”) as at 1st January 2010. 
 
child means a person under 14 years of age; and 
 
low alcohol beverage means an alcohol beverage which contains less than 3.8% 
alcohol/volume. 
 
 
Standards to be applied 
 
Part 1 – Standards to be applied to advertisements for alcohol beverages 
 
Advertisements for alcohol beverages must – 
 
a) present a mature, balanced and responsible approach to the consumption 
of alcohol beverages and, accordingly – 
i) must not encourage excessive consumption or abuse of alcohol; 
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ii) must not encourage under-age drinking; 
iii) must not promote offensive behaviour, or the excessive 
consumption, misuse or abuse of alcohol beverages; 
iv) must only depict the responsible and moderate consumption of 
alcohol beverages; 
 
b) not have a strong or evident appeal to children or adolescents and, 
accordingly – 
i) adults appearing in advertisements must be over 25 years of age 
and be clearly depicted as adults; 
ii) children and adolescents may only appear in advertisements in 
natural situations (eg family barbecue, licensed family restaurant) 
and where there is no implication that the depicted children and 
adolescents will consume or serve alcohol beverages; and 
iii) adults under the age of 25 years may only appear as part of a 
natural crowd or background scene; 
 
c) not suggest that the consumption or presence of alcohol beverages may 
create or contribute to a significant change in mood or environment and, 
accordingly –  
i) must not depict the consumption or presence of alcohol beverages 
as a cause of or contributing to the achievement of personal, 
business, social, sporting, sexual or other success; 
ii) if alcohol beverages are depicted as part of a celebration, must not 
imply or suggest that the beverage was a cause of or contributed 
to success or achievement; and 
iii) must not suggest that the consumption of alcohol beverages offers 
any therapeutic benefit or is a necessary aid to relaxation; 
 
d) not depict any direct association between the consumption of alcohol 
beverages, other than low alcohol beverages, and the operation of a 
motor vehicle, boat or aircraft or the engagement in any sport (including 
swimming and water sports) or potentially hazardous activity and, 
accordingly –  
i) any depiction of the consumption of alcohol beverages in 
connection with the above activities must not be represented as 
having taken place before or during engagement of the activity in 
question and must in all cases portray safe practices; and 
ii) any claim concerning safe consumption of low alcohol beverages 
must be demonstrably accurate; 
 
e) not challenge or dare people to drink or sample a particular alcohol 
beverage, other than low alcohol beverages, and must not contain any 
inducement to prefer an alcohol beverage because of its higher alcohol 
content; and 
 
f) comply with the Advertiser Code of Ethics adopted by the Australian 
Association of National Advertisers. 
 
g) not encourage consumption that is in excess of, or inconsistent with the 
Australian Alcohol Guidelines issued by the NHMRC. 
 
h) not refer to The ABAC Scheme, in whole or in part, in a manner which 
may bring the scheme into disrepute. 
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Internet Advertisements 
 
The required standard for advertisements outlined in (1)(a) to (h) above applies to 
internet sites primarily intended for advertising developed by or for producers or 
importers of alcohol products available in Australia or that are reasonably expected to 
be made available in Australia, and to banner advertising of such products on third 
party sites. 
 
 
Retail Advertisements 
 
Advertisements which contain the name of a retailer or retailers offering alcohol 
beverages for sale, contain information about the price or prices at which those 
beverages are offered for sale, and which contain no other material relating to or 
concerning the attributes or virtues of alcohol beverages except – 
 
i) the brand name or names of alcohol beverages offered for sale; 
ii) the type and/or style of the alcohol beverages offered for sale; 
iii) a photographic or other reproduction of any container or containers (or 
part thereof, including any label) in which the alcohol beverages offered 
for sale are packaged; 
iv) the location and/or times at which the alcohol beverages are offered for 
sale; and 
v) such other matter as is reasonably necessary to enable potential 
purchasers to identify the retailer or retailers on whose behalf the 
advertisement is published, 
 
must comply with the spirit and intent of the Code but are not subject to any process 
of prior clearance. 
 
 
Promotion of alcohol at events 
 
Alcohol beverage companies play a valuable role in supporting many community 
events and activities.  It is acknowledged that they have the right to promote their 
products at events together with the right to promote their association with events 
and event participation.  However, combined with these rights comes a range of 
responsibilities.  Alcohol beverage companies do not seek to promote their products 
at events which are designed to clearly target people under the legal drinking age. 
 
This protocol commits participating alcohol beverage companies to endeavour to 
ensure that: 
 
• All promotional advertising in support of events does not clearly target 
underage persons and as such is consistent with the ABAC standard; and 
• Alcohol beverages served at such events are served in keeping with 
guidelines, and where applicable legal requirements, for responsible serving 
of alcohol (which preclude the serving of alcohol to underage persons); and 
• Promotional staff at events do not promote consumption patterns that are 
inconsistent with responsible consumption, as defined in the NHMRC 
Guidelines; and 
• Promotional staff do not misstate the nature or alcohol content of a product; 
and 
• Promotional staff at events are of legal drinking age; and 
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• Promotional materials distributed at events do not clearly target underage 
persons; and  
• Promotional materials given away at or in association with events do not 
connect the consumption of alcohol with the achievement of sexual success; 
and 
• Promotional materials given away at or in association with events do not link 
the consumption of alcohol with sporting, financial, professional or personal 
success; and 
• Promotional materials given away at events do not encourage consumption 
patterns that are inconsistent with responsible consumption, as defined in the 
NHMRC Guidelines; and 
• A condition of entry into giveaways promoted by alcohol companies at or in 
association with events is that participants must be over the legal drinking 
age; and Prizes given away in promotions associated with alcohol beverage 
companies will only be awarded to winners who are over the legal drinking 
age. 
 
Third Parties 
 
At many events alcohol companies limit their promotional commitments to specified 
activities.  This protocol only applies to such conduct, activities or materials 
associated with events that are also associated with alcohol beverage companies. 
 
Alcohol beverage companies will use every reasonable endeavour to ensure that 
where other parties control and/or undertake events, including activities surrounding 
those events, they comply with this protocol.  However non-compliance by third 
parties will not place alcohol beverage companies in breach of this protocol.  
 
Public Education 
 
This protocol does not apply to or seek to restrict alcohol beverage companies from 
being associated with conduct, activity or materials that educate the public, including 
underage persons, about the consequences of alcohol consumption and the possible 
consequences of excessive or underage consumption.   
 
 
Part 2 – Standards to be applied to the naming and packaging of alcohol beverages 
 
1.  The naming or packaging of alcohol beverages (which is also referred to within 
these standards as “product material”) must: 
 
a) present a mature, balanced and responsible approach to the consumption of 
alcohol beverages and, accordingly – 
i) must not encourage excessive consumption or abuse of alcohol; 
ii) must not encourage under-age drinking; 
iii) must not promote offensive behaviour, or the excessive 
consumption, misuse or abuse of alcohol beverages; 
iv) must only depict the responsible and moderate consumption of 
alcohol beverages; 
 
b) not have a strong or evident appeal to children or adolescents and, 
accordingly – 
i) adults appearing in product material must be over 25 years of age and 
be clearly depicted as adults; 
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ii) children and adolescents may only appear in product material in 
natural situations (e.g. family barbecue, licensed family restaurant) 
and where there is no implication that the depicted children and 
adolescents will consume or serve alcohol beverages; and 
iii) adults under the age of 25 years may only appear as part of a natural 
crowd or background scene; 
 
c) not suggest that the consumption or presence of alcohol beverages may 
create or contribute to a significant change in mood or environment and, 
accordingly –  
i) must not depict the consumption or presence of alcohol beverages 
as a cause of or contributing to the achievement of personal, 
business, social, sporting, sexual or other success; 
ii) if alcohol beverages are depicted as part of a celebration, must not 
imply or suggest that the beverage was a cause of or contributed 
to success or achievement; and 
iii) must not suggest that the consumption of alcohol beverages offers 
any therapeutic benefit or is a necessary aid to relaxation; 
 
d) not depict any direct association between the consumption of alcohol 
beverages, other than low alcohol beverages, and the operation of a motor 
vehicle, boat or aircraft or the engagement in any sport (including swimming 
and water sports) or potentially hazardous activity and, accordingly –  
i) any depiction of the consumption of alcohol beverages in 
connection with the above activities must not be represented as 
having taken place before or during engagement of the activity in 
question and must in all cases portray safe practices; and 
ii) any claim concerning safe consumption of low alcohol beverages 
must be demonstrably accurate; 
 
e) not challenge or dare people to drink or sample a particular alcohol beverage, 
other than low alcohol beverages, and must not contain any inducement to 
prefer an alcohol beverage because of its higher alcohol content; and 
 
f) not encourage consumption that is in excess of, or inconsistent with the 
Australian Alcohol Guidelines issued by the NHMRC. 
 
g)   not refer to The ABAC Scheme, in whole or in part, in a manner which may 
      bring the scheme into disrepute. 
 
2.  These standards, (Part 2 (1) (a)-(g)), apply to the naming and packaging of all 
alcohol beverages supplied in Australia, with the exception of the name of any 
product or a trademark which the supplier can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the 
Adjudication Panel, had been supplied for bona fide retail sale in the ordinary course 
of business in a State or Territory of Australia prior to 31 October 2009. 
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17 June 2011 
 
Professor Roger Magnusson 
Sydney Law School – F10 
The University of Sydney 
Email: roger.magnusson@sydney.edu.au 
 
 
Dear Professor Magnusson 
 
Thank you for your correspondence dated 15 June 2011 addressing comments made to you by the 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).  The Executive of the HREC, on 17 June 2011, 
considered this information and approved the protocol entitled “Investigating self-regulation of 
food and beverage advertising to children”. 
 
Details of the approval are as follows: 
 
Protocol No.:  13870 
 
Approval Period:  June 2011 to June 2012 
 
Authorised Personnel: Professor Roger Magnusson 
   Ms Belinda Reeve 
    
    
Documents Approved:  
Participant Information Statement Version 1 19 May 2011 
Participant Consent Form Version 2 15 June 2011 
Letter of Invitation Version 1 
Interview Schedule – Industry Body Version 1 19 May 2011 
Interview Schedule – Company Version 1 19 May 2011 
 
The HREC is a fully constituted Ethics Committee in accordance with the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans-March 2007 under Section 5.1.29. 
 
The approval of this project is conditional upon your continuing compliance with the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans. A report on this research must be 
submitted every 12 months from the date of the approval or on completion of the project, 
whichever occurs first. Failure to submit reports will result in withdrawal of consent for the project to 
proceed. Your report is due by 30 June 2012. 
 
 
Chief Investigator / Supervisor’s responsibilities to ensure that: 
 
1. All serious and unexpected adverse events should be reported to the HREC within 72 
hours for clinical trials/interventional research. 
 
2. All unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should 
be reported to the HREC as soon as possible. 
 
3. Any changes to the protocol must be approved by the HREC before the research project 
can proceed. 
  
4. All research participants are to be provided with a Participant Information Statement and 
Consent Form, unless otherwise agreed by the Committee. The following statement must 
appear on the bottom of the Participant Information Statement: Any person with concerns 
or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact the Manager, Human 
Ethics, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); + 61 2 8627 8177 
(Facsimile) or ro.humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email). 
 
5. You must retain copies of all signed Consent Forms and provide these to the HREC on 
request. 
 
6. It is your responsibility to provide a copy of this letter to any internal/external granting 
agencies if requested. 
 
7. The HREC approval is valid for four (4) years from the Approval Period stated in this letter. 
Investigators are requested to submit a progress report annually.  
 
8. A report and a copy of any published material should be provided at the completion of the 
Project. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact Research Integrity (Human Ethics) should you require further 
information or clarification. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Associate Professor Ian Maxwell 
Chair 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
Copy:  Belinda Reeve belinda.reeve@sydney.edu.au 
